

Black Sea History Working Papers, vol. 7

Maria Christina Chatziioannou and Apostolos Delis (eds)

LINKAGES OF THE BLACK SEA WITH THE WEST. NAVIGATION, TRADE AND IMMIGRATION



Research project within the THALIS Programme. A collaboration of the Ionian University with the Institute for Mediterranean Studies-FORTH, University of Crete, University of Thessaly, Hellenic Research Foundation and University of the Aegean: “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774-1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”



Rethymnon, Crete 2020

PUBLISHED BY THE CENTRE OF MARITIME HISTORY,
INSTITUTE FOR MEDITERRANEAN STUDIES – FOUNDATION OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY



ISBN: 978-618-81780-8-3

Black Sea History Working Papers Series

1. Constantin Ardeleanu and Andreas Lyberatos (eds), *Port-Cities of the western shore of the Black Sea: Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th centuries*, Black Sea History Working Papers, volume 1, Corfu 2016, published in www.blacksea.gr.
2. Evrydiki Sifneos, Oksana Iurkova and Valentina Shandra (eds), *Port-Cities of the northern shore of the Black Sea: Institutional, Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th Centuries*, Black Sea History Working Papers, volume 2, forthcoming.
3. Gelina Harlaftis, Victoria Konstantinova, Igor Lyman, Anna Sydorenko and Eka Tchkoidze (eds), *Between Grain and Oil from the Azov to Caucasus: The Port-Cities of the Eastern Coast of the Black Sea, late 18th – early 20th century*, Black Sea History Working Papers, volume 3, Rethymnon 2020, published in www.blacksea.gr.
4. Mikhail Davidov, Gelina Harlaftis and Vladimir Kulikov, *The Economic Development of the Port-Cities of the Northern and Southern Black Sea Coast, 19th – Beginning of the 20th century. Transport, Industry and Finance*, Black Sea History Working Papers, volume 4, forthcoming.
5. Edhem Eldem, Vangelis Kechriotis, Sophia Laiou (eds), *The Economic and Social Development of the Port-Cities of the Southern Black Sea Coast, Late 18th – Beginning of the 20th century*, Black Sea History Working Papers, volume 5, Corfu, 2017, published in www.blacksea.gr.
- 5a. Edhem Eldem and Sophia Laiou (eds), *Istanbul and the Black Sea Coast: Shipping and Trade, 1770-1920*, Istanbul, The ISIS Press, 2018.
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1.

Introduction: The Linkages of the Black Sea

Maria Christina Chatziioannou

Apostolos Delis

This seventh volume of the series of the Black Sea project is a very different one. It is not about the history of a particular region and its ports of the Black Sea on specific topics (economy, society, urban planning). Instead, it treats the linkages of the Black Sea area and ports with the western world. It could also be described as the reverse view of this relation between the Black Sea ports with western ports, markets and societies. Inner Black Sea navigation and connections and maritime linkages to the West of cargoes and people are the subjects of this volume of linkages with the Black Sea. All diverse subjects, that connect in many ways the economic activities of the Black Sea port cities (commerce, shipping, manufacturing), to the rest of the world and help to explain their development and their integration to the world economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The integration of the Black Sea port cities in the Mediterranean and global economic circuit becomes more and more evident during the long nineteenth century. The eminence of Odessa, facing little competition by other ports, in the commercial transactions with the major Mediterranean ports, like Marseille or Trieste, is the main characteristic of the first half of the century. However, the rapid technological, institutional, economic and political evolution during the second half of the century brings new structural changes in the pattern of economic development of the Black Sea port cities. More ports of the eastern-Russian shore (Novorossiysk, Batum), of the southern-Ottoman shore (Trabzon) as well as from the Sea of Azov (Berdyansk, Mariupol) and the Danube (Braila, Galatz) emerge and manage to get an important share of the commercial relations with Mediterranean and beyond. Odessa no longer monopolizes the traf-

fic of vessels and commodities, but maintained its importance, in stiff competition with other Black Sea ports of increasingly greater economic importance (e.g. Batum and Constanța for oil).¹ The means of this gradual but steady integration of the emerging Black Sea ports in the international economy were multiple: steam navigation, railways and telegraph. In steam navigation, the competing companies, Austrian, French, Ottoman, Russian, Greek and even Danish, by introducing passenger lines, connected on a regular basis the Black Sea ports between them as well as with Mediterranean and up to Northern Europe. Thus, a twofold integration attained; an internal one among the Black Sea ports, which increased the volume of transactions within the Black Sea areas and a further one that integrated ports like Samsun, Trabzon or Batum in the international markets.² Parallel to steam navigation, was the development of railways, which integrated a huge part of the interior of the Black Sea ports to the economy, previously out of the orbit of international trade and communications. From the 1860's, when the first railway lines inaugurated, Odessa-Balta (1865), Cernavoda-Constanța (1860), Varna-Ruse (1866), up to 1914, the expansion of railroads was continuous.³ In southern Russia the expansion of

1. See Socratis Petmezas, George Kostelenos and Alexandra Papadopoulou (eds), with the collaboration of Marios Emmanouil, *The development of 24 Black Sea port-cities. A statistical approach*, (Black Sea History Project Working Papers, vol. 8, forthcoming); also data from the paper presented by Apostolos Delis "Marseille and the Black Sea trade in the 19th century. A neglected subject in the historiography", in the Seventh International Congress of Maritime History International Maritime Economic History Association (IMEHA) (Perth, Australia, 27 June-1 July 2016).

2. Ekin Mahmuzlu, "The Transformation of the Mercantile Shipping in Eastern Anatolian Black Sea Ports between 1834 and 1914", in Edhem Eldem, Sophia Laiou, †Vangelis Kechriotis (eds), *The Economic and Social Development of the Port-Cities of the Southern Black Sea Coast and Hinterland, Late 18th – Beginning of the 20th Century*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers vol. V, 2015), pp. 139-147.

3. Jacob Metzer, "Railroad Development and Market Integration: The Case of Tsarist Russia", *The Journal of Economic History*, 34:3 (Sep., 1974), pp. 529-550; Gelina Harlaftis and Anna Sydorenko, "The ports between the hinterland and foreland: the transport system of the maritime region of the eastern coast of the Black Sea" draft paper; Alexandra Yerolympos – Athina Vitopoulou, "The making of a new town. Rise and decline of Odessa, 1794-1917", in Vassilis Colonas, Athina Vitopoulou, Alexandra Yerolympos (eds), *Architecture and City planning in the Black Sea port-cit-*

railway network from 1856 to 1914 managed to increase the export trade zone by approximately 65%, embracing an area from Samara in the northeast to Baku in the Caspian Sea and Batum in the eastern Black Sea shore. Railways not only connected the vast interior of the Black Sea coasts but also transformed previously unimportant ports, like Rostov on Don, Sevastopol, Batum, Novorossiysk, Trabzon and Samsun, to major partners in the international trade of the area.⁴ Finally, they also linked Black Sea ports to distant markets and areas like Central Europe, Persia and up to Indian Ocean.⁵ This greater integration of the interior of the Black Sea also brought manifold structural changes in the economic and social landscape. It increased dramatically the population of its port cities and beyond. In southern Russia the overall population was increased between 1856 and 1914 by approximately 380%.⁶ Not only the quantities

ies, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. VI, forthcoming), p. 122; Ivan Roussev, "The Black Sea port-city in the road of modernization. The first modern attempts in Varna during the 1840s – 1870s" in Constantin Ardeleanu and Andreas Lyberatos (eds), *Port-Cities of the western shore of the Black Sea: Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th centuries*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. I, 2016), p. 219.

4. Anna Sydorenko, "The Crimean ports and their Linkages as Grain Export Gateways with the Mediterranean and West European Markets (end of 19th-beginning of the 20th Centuries)", in Evrydiki Sifneos, Oksana Iurkova and Valentina Shandra (eds), *Port-Cities of the northern shore of the Black Sea: Institutional, Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th Centuries*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. II, forthcoming), p. 210; Alexandra Yerolympos – Athina Vitopoulou, "Trabzon and Samsun: Ottoman port cities of the Black Sea at the threshold of modernity", in Vassilis Colonas, Athina Vitopoulou, Alexandra Yerolympos (eds), *Architecture and City planning in the Black Sea port-cities*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. VI, forth coming), p. 224.

5. Moses Lofley Harvey, "The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance", unpublished PhD, University of California, 1938, pp. 138-139; Dimitar Christov, "The Rise of a Port: Socio-economic Development of Burgas in the 19thc.", in Constantin Ardeleanu and Andreas Lyberatos (eds), *Port-Cities of the western shore of the Black Sea: Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th centuries*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers vol. I, 2016), p. 207; Alexandra Yerolympos – Athina Vitopoulou, "Dynamics of change and spatial development of the Black Sea port cities: a comparative framework.", in Vassilis Colonas, Athina Vitopoulou, Alexandra Yerolympos (eds), *Architecture and City planning in the Black Sea port-cities*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. VI, forthcoming), p. 72.

6. Harvey, "The Development of Russian Commerce", pp. 142-144.

of the exported staples (cereals) were enormously grown, but also new types of activities and commodities were made exploitable and profitable. The oil of Caucasus and the iron and mining industries in the Donetsk are among those, who not only gave a new economic impetus, but also introduced heavy industrialization and along with it new forms and patterns of employment and everyday life.⁷ One could say that this integration and development of the Black Sea port cities is an integral part of the process of globalization that is on the move and characterizes the long nineteenth century.⁸ The effects of this integration and globalization are visible in the Black Sea port cities also in many aspects of material and cultural life. The modernization of their urban space not only reveals common patterns, types of buildings and architectural style. It also reflects common trends in the organization and use of space for economic, administrative, social and political needs (town halls, railway stations, gentlemen's clubs, theaters etc), which not much differ from the rest of European cities in the same period.⁹

It is in this context that the stories of the five chapters of this book unfold and contribute as 'Linkages of the Black Sea'. The three main subjects of this volume, navigation, linkages to western ports and immigration were instrumental to the development and integration of the Black Sea ports to the world economy. The book begins with the obvious, but neglected subject of navigation, or how technically ships connected Black Sea with the rest of the world. There, **Apostolos Delis**, in the first chapter, faces a challenge, as very few, if any, secondary works generally on navigation exist, let

7. Eka Tchikoidze, "Oil and Soil: the role of Batoum's economic development in shaping of geopolitical significance of the Caucasus" in Gelina Harlaftis, Victoria Konstantinova and Igor Lyman (eds), *Between grain and oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: the port-cities of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, late 18th – early 20th century*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. III, 2020), pp. 430-461.

8. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "When did globalisation begin?", *European Review of Economic History*, 6:1, (2002), pp. 23-50; Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 103, 106.

9. Alexandra Yerolympos – Athina Vitopoulou, "Shared models and practices in the transformation of Black Sea port cities", in Vassilis Colonas, Athina Vitopoulou, Alexandra Yerolympos, *Architecture and City planning in the Black Sea port-cities*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, volume VI, forthcoming), p. 296.

alone specifically for the Black Sea. This deficit is counterbalanced by the rich and detailed information provided by the books regarding the sailing directions for the Black Sea published repeatedly throughout the nineteenth century by the Hydrographic Office of the British Admiralty. Based on this invaluable source the author also collaborated with the experienced cartographer and historian Mitia Frumin who provided very instructive maps of the routes and conditions of the ships to the Black Sea. The chapter, additionally documented by British consular reports and newspaper commercial information, addresses mainly three issues: the sea routes along with the special conditions (ice, swallow waters, malpractices of port professionals) of navigation to and especially within the Black Sea, the duration of the voyage from the various Black Sea ports to Marseille and Trieste and a comparative assessment of the risk to navigate the Black Sea based on evidence from the marine insurance market.

The western ports connection is treated by the following chapter of **Maria Christina Chatziioannou**. The chapter is dealing with the port of Trieste, one of the most important linkages of the Black Sea trade in the Mediterranean and gateway of the Hapsburg Monarchy and of central Europe. Both offer detailed quantitative evidence based on primary sources that focus primarily in the ‘Age of Empires’, namely 1875-1914. Chatziioannou’s chapter is based on U.S. consular reports and especially on data regarding the external trade of Russia during the period 1873-1885 and on Trieste’s maritime traffic of the years 1882-85. Her work give prominence to sources hitherto quite unexplored for the study of the port of Trieste in relation to the Black Sea trade. It also assess the position of Trieste in a wider comparative context giving the real dimension and contribution of this linkage to the development of the Black Sea ports during the second industrial revolution. The chapter is based on a very thorough research carried by herself on the newspaper *L’Osservatore Triestino* and to a lesser degree *Il Piccolo*. Through these sources she managed to build a data base and provide a thorough quantitative analysis. Port traffic, flags of the carriers, commodities and share of each Black Sea port to Trieste’s commerce are presented in detail offering an in depth picture of the importance of the trade relations between Trieste and Black Sea. The paper also offers the necessary processed material for any future analysis on the economy of Trieste and Black Sea ports.

Panayotis Kapetanaki's chapter presents the business group from the Ionian Islands, in their great majority from the isles of Cephalonia and Ithaca and their importance in the Black Sea trade, especially in the ports of Danube. Shipowners, merchants but also seamen, craftsmen and port workers from these islands based their fortunes on the riches of the Black Sea and more specifically on the growth of the Danube ports, to which they very much contributed. To this end they not only carried extensive trade and navigated regularly the Black Sea waters, but also settled in large numbers on the three main ports of Danube, Galatz, Braila and Sulina. They managed to take advantage of their hybrid political status in the period 1815-1864, namely under the protection of British Empire and not only seized a considerable share in the transport of cereals from the Black Sea ports, but also largely controlled the rest of the port activities in the Danube river. They also managed to transform their initial settlement to thriving and powerful communities within these ports.¹⁰ The example of Ionians in Danube, as one can see in Kapetanaki's chapter, is illustrative of a multiple relation to the Black Sea port activity and growth, including immigration and settlement, maritime transport as well as trade networks expanded to Mediterranean and western European ports.¹¹

The last two chapters treat one of the most dramatic phenomena of the turn to twentieth century, which showed the limits of evolution in the Black Sea port-cities and the radical changes occurring in the Southern Russian area: emigration to the Americas. It is interesting that those (Jews, Germans), who were welcomed about a century ago to inhabit and develop a sparsely populated country, (Southern Russia) and who thanks to their know-how made the northern Black Sea shore the granary of Europe and one of the most economically competitive regions, a century later, became un-

10. Dimitrios Kontogeorgis, *Η ελληνική διασπορά στη Ρουμανία. Η περίπτωση της ελληνικής παροικίας της Βραϊλάς (1820-1914)*, [The Greek diaspora in Rumania. The case of the Greek community of Braila, 1820-1914], (PhD thesis, University of Athens, 2012).

11. Gelina Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day*, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 70-103 and 'From diaspora traders to shipping tycoons: the Vagliano Bros', *Business History Review*, 81 (2007), pp. 237-268.

desirable and subject of a hostile policy who promoted their exodus from the Russian Empire to the other side of the Atlantic. Emigration to the Americas was of course not only a consequence of hostile policies, like those towards Jews or German Mennonites in Russian Empire.¹² It was also due to the shift of economic importance of the American continent, primarily United States and Argentina, as competitive exporters of foodstuffs, which from the second half of the nineteenth century needed to populate and develop the vast inhabited areas beyond their coasts as well as their fast growing industrialized port cities (New York, Buenos Aires).

In this context, migration from Southern Russia to the Americas was a very interesting episode from an once *Promised Land* to another, in certain cases within less than a century. In fact, the Jewish example, so wonderfully presented and analyzed by **Maria Damilakou** for the emigration of Southern Russian Jews to South America, reveals among other economic, social and political issues, the contrasting feelings of the immigrant Jews in Argentina and how they compared their new life with the previous lifestyle in what during their lifetime knew as homeland, and where they came from: Southern Russia. Maria Damilakou's chapter illuminates the macro historical aspects of this migratory movement such as the Russian policy towards the minorities within the empire, the policies of Argentina and Brazil towards immigration and the international economic conjuncture of the period 1870-1914. At the same time, she focuses on the mechanisms and the organization of the factors (Jewish Colonization Association, Baron Hirsch) that promoted and organized the transfer of Southern Russian Jews to South America. And finally, she also tries to see the micro historical reality and the difficulties of these people settled in a totally new environment. This way she manages to offer contemporarily an important contribution to many study areas such as Diaspora, Jewish, Black Sea and Russian History.

Per Christian Sebak treats the emigration from Odessa to the United States in the period 1892-1924. This is part of the second

12. Maria Damilakou in the present volume, 133-34; James Ciment, John Radzinski, *American Immigration: An Encyclopedia of Political, Social, and Cultural Change*, (London Na New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 162.

great migratory movement to the United States started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, mainly composed of emigrants from Eastern Europe as well as from the Southern Europe and the Black Sea. These are the emigrants who had to face among other difficulties, the enmity, antagonisms and the racial prejudice not only of the Anglo-Saxon element of the old colonists, but also of the immigrants of the previous generations, who came mainly from Western and Northern Europe (Irish, Scandinavians etc).¹³ Sebak offers an exhaustive account of the organization, mechanisms and strategies of the liner shipping companies of Northern Europe, British, German, Danish, in order to secure and control the flow of these emigrants coming from far more remote areas compared with the previous wave of twenty or thirty years ago. He also describes in detail the inland routes and the controls that the emigrants had to overcome in order to reach the embarkation ports of Baltic and North Sea (Libau, Bremen, Hamburg) and how and why these embarkation ports managed to keep their position against Odessa, which never managed to become a serious competitor. And what makes this case even more interesting is that despite the eagerness of the Russian governments to force its minorities to emigrate, its steam navigation companies were unable to compete with the North European ones and take an important share in the migratory passenger traffic from Russia.

The content and the approaches of this volume of linkages of the Black Sea are far from exhaustive and leave room for many other aspects so far unexplored. However, what is offered is a wide picture of diverse subjects, who connect the development of the Black Sea ports with parallel and interlinked realities, developments and processes in other parts of the globe, such as the Mediterranean, Baltic, North Sea as well as the Americas. The destiny of the Black Sea port cities, yet fully integrated in the world economy is subject to socio-economic and political developments, that occurred during the long nineteenth century and shaped the fate of the entire sea

13. Ciment-Radzilowski, *American Immigration*, p. 167; June Granatir Alexander, *Daily Life in Immigrant America, 1870-1920. How the Second Great Wave of Immigrants Made Their Way in America*, (Ivan R. Dee, 2009); Alan M. Kraut, *The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921* (American History Series, Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).

region. The political and economic antagonisms of the great European powers, and their economic agents, such as the big shipping liner companies, the growing importance and competition of the US economy and its immigration policy and perhaps, most important of all, the slow demise of the old empires (Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman), determined the choices and the fates of individuals and masses living in the Black Sea region or others who made a living thanks to their linkages with the Black Sea ports (shipping, commerce, shipbuilding). What Damilakou successfully describes for Russia in the end of the nineteenth century as “moving from cosmopolitanism to nationalism and experiencing the impact of social conflict and radicalization of ideas” may well apply also for other parts of the Black Sea like the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ The cosmopolitan societies that emerged and developed throughout the nineteenth century in many Black Sea ports and the ways they were connected to the Mediterranean and European ports and economies, were severely tested and disintegrated after 1914.

14. Maria Damilakou in the present volume, 117.

2.

Navigating perilous waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the nineteenth century

Apostolos Delis

Crossing the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara and Bosphorus and navigating the waters of the Black Sea in the nineteenth century presented many difficulties and dangers. The particularities of this enclosed sea were of diverse nature: the shallowness of the waters in the Sea of Azov, the inhospitable coasts of Crimea, the rough and stormy prevailed north winds and the frozen ports of the northern shores during the winter were among the main factors that dictated the rhythms and the practices of maritime trade in the region. They also caused numerous nautical disasters, ruinous commercial ventures and innumerable practical difficulties for the ships, the seamen and those commercially engaged who depended from the efficiency of the maritime transport. Based mainly on primary sources the paper will analyze a) the sea routes ships followed along with the special characteristics and the factors that affected navigation in the Black Sea, b) the duration of the voyage from the ports of Black Sea and c) the rate of danger to navigate Black Sea was based on evidence from marine insurance market.

The sea routes

The adventure already started before entering the Black Sea. Ships had already to sail through three difficult passages to reach the entrance of the Black Sea, from Dardanelles, through Sea of Marmara and Bosphorus. Dardanelles is a channel of 33 miles long with average breadth of 2 miles and with depth in mid-channel from 46 to 100 meters. Its European side is steep, high, cliffy, yellow and with arid aspect. The Asiatic instead has flat coast, bays and roadsteads with good and easy

access, but less populated than the European one. In Dardanelles in winter time N.E. winds were often blowing hard and were also accompanied by fog and snow rendering navigation for a sailing vessel impracticable.¹ From March to September, when also North and N.E. winds were constantly blowing, it was impossible to go up the strait and ships had to attend for a favorable breeze, which would enable them to shift from one anchorage to another up to the Sea of Marmara²:

The regular and but gentle sea and land wind, is called the Imbat, and prevails all through the Archipelago for a considerable time. It lasts sometimes so long that it is not a rare occurrence to see 200 or 300 vessels in Tenedos channel or in other anchorages, waiting a favourable and enduring breeze. With every slight southerly air they get underway, but only to shift from one anchorage to another, and they reach the sea of Marmara after having accomplished the distance by short stages.

Ships sailing with strong fair wind up to the Narrows of Chana kale had to steer on the European side and if they sailed with light fair wind they followed the Asiatic shore up to Kephez point, when they steered to the European shore. But in the Narrows, in both cases, ships had to stay in the centre, as the current was weaker there than at the sides and its speed, which could attain even 4 knots, rendered it the most difficult part of the navigation in the Dardanelles. In Chana kale was the central health office, but ships could also obtain pratique at Seddul Bahr, the northern entrance of Dardanelles from the Aegean Sea, at White Cliffs on the Asiatic shore before Chana kale and at Gallipoli or Lampsakos on the north entrance of the channel. Ships with foul bill had to perform quarantine at Niagara, two miles north of Chanak and in case of epidemics had necessarily to touch at Chanak for being submitted to special measures. The ship had to show the bill of health to Constantinople and obtain two *firmans*: one to pass on to the Black Sea and one for the return trip. Before entering the Black Sea vessels had to stop at Anatoli Kavak on the Asiatic side of the entrance to Bosphorus to deliver one of the *firmans* to an officer approaching with a boat carrying a red flag and

1. *Sailing Directions for the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara, Bosphorus, and Black Sea*, Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, (London, fourth edition, 1893), p. 10.

2. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 10-11, 39, 43.

who customarily demanded a gift of approximately five piasters or one shilling. In their return, vessels that intended to stop at Constantinople, they had to take again pratique at Anatoli Kavak, but if not, they could pass straight through to Bosphorus.³

In Chana kale already in 1882 telegraphic services were provided as well as divers for temporary repairs on the bottom of the ships. Steamers could get coal supplies of 30 to 40 tons, which in 1893 increased to 100 tons per day and general supplies were provided for ships in small quantities but in high prices. Similarly tugs for towing the vessels up to Ak Bashi Bay demanded high prices and pilots for Constantinople, Sea of Marmara, Black Sea or even Danube had no fixed prices but could be hired for 16 to 20 pounds.⁴ Pilots for Black Sea could also be hired at Constantinople, which often were not ex captains or seamen, but boatmen, or even stevedores and interpreters, who had a scarce knowledge of the coasts and ports of Black Sea, and sometimes were proved a disastrous choice for the ships.⁵

After the Narrows ships under strong fair wind had to keep on the Asiatic side to avoid the current up to Nagara point, when again had to steer for Sestos point and all along the European side to the Galata point and Gallipoli. Sailing under a light fair wind from the Narrows they also had to keep on the Asiatic shore, but after passing Nagara should continue from Abydos on the southern shore up to Lampsakos and Chardak point. If they sailed with a foul wind, instead, especially with strong N or NE winds, it was impossible to advance, and in the best of cases with some favourable breezes could reach Kephez point, where they had either to pay a tug or wait for a fair wind which would take days. If they choose to sail with a foul wind, they had also to take the Asiatic side up to Nagara point, which lasted up to 5 hours and then continuing to the same side up to Gallipoli, which was a good 18 to 20 hours.⁶

3. *Sailing Directions for the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara, Bosphorus, and Black Sea*, Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, (London, third edition, 1882), pp. 37, 126.

4. *Sailing Directions*, 1882, p. 7; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 72.


5. Jean Louis Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale, La Mer Noire et Le commerce International de 1774 à 1861», (PhD thesis, Université de Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, 1983), p. 364, note 10; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 28.

6. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 44-45.

7. *ibid*, p. 46.

ing ships in winter, but avoided when S.W. gales blew.⁸ But if they had advanced further the Hora point, they could anchor on the northern (European) coast. Marmara Island separates the western part of that sea in the northern channel between the island and the European coast and the southern channel between Marmara Island and the Pasha Liman groups of isles. In winter, ships working the Black Sea, especially in the eastward voyage, preferred the southward channel of Marmara Island due to the more frequent South and S.E. winds and in case of bad weather there were close to good anchorages, but in the summer the northern part of the channel considered to be the best, especially for larger vessels.⁹

Map 2: Navigating the Sea of Marmara



After Stefano point, sailing ships with a fair wind was suggested to keep the shore of Europe in order to avoid the current and anchor under the Constantinople walls if the wind falls. Then, after rounding the Seraglio point, should keep in mid channel until the port of Constantinople opens, avoiding the main strength of the current, which if were kept close to Seraglio point would have

8. *Sailing Directions*, 1882, p. 54.

9. *Sailing Directions*, 1882, p. 55; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 46-47.

risked to be thrown to the adjacent quays by the wind. Steamers and sailing ships with light fair or a foul wind, in order to avoid the strong current at mid-channel as well as the traffic at the height of the Seraglio point, it was better to take the Asiatic shore up to the Leander Tower, favored also by a counter current in northward direction. Generally it was advisable for ships bound to Bosphorus to keep in the Asiatic shore and anchor from Fener Bay up to Leander Tower, or once being in the Asiatic shore, to cross to the current and anchor between Topkhane and Ortakioi, considered more prudent choices than the opposing shore under the city walls subjected to strong S or S.E winds.¹⁰

Then ships bound to Black Sea had to pass through the channel of Bosphorus ranging 17 miles long and from 0.4 to 1.5 miles wide.¹¹ Anchorages from Galata up to Kiobashi were all on the European side, while from there up to entrance of the Black Sea both sides offered good anchorages.¹² N.E. winds are the most frequent and from early May to midst September *Meltem* or solar winds blow steadily from N or NE and bring fine weather. During the rest of the year S.W. winds blow strong with rain but when they are light bring fine weather, whereas in winter bring fogs. Furthermore, the prevalent N.E. winds were blowing along with the current which invariably was running from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.¹³ Currents in Bosphorus were subjected to the directions and strength of the winds. Between June and August when the snow thaws and N or N.E. winds prevail, the current may reach even 5 or 6 knots in certain parts of the channel and make impossible for a vessel to stem and advance, unless S or S.W. winds blow.¹⁴ When northern winds prevail a current goes downwards in the European shore, and a counter current in the Asiatic shore; the opposite happens when southern winds blow.¹⁵ Generally, ships going northward did not follow the Asiatic shore from Leander Tower to Kandili, due to the lack

10. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 49-51, 54, 57.

11. *ibid*, p. 3.


12. Chevalier Taitbout de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer Noire de la Mer d'Azov*, (Constantinople, 1850), p. 171; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 52.

13. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 13.

14. *ibid* 1893, p. 23.

15. de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, p. 170.

Map 3: Constantinople and Bosphorus crossing



of eddies and anchorages.¹⁶ Therefore sailing or steam ships with strong fair (southern) wind advised to keep the European shore up to Arnaut point, then to cross to the Kandili and continue on this side up to Khanlijeh, then cross again to the European shore up to the Kiobashi point. From there they cross again to Beikos Bay and after passing Umur Banks, should take the European coast at Mezar point and keep on that side up to the Black Sea.¹⁷ Sailing ships with foul wind required great knowledge, skill and perseverance to advance step by step and take advantage of the counter currents and the slightest favorable breeze instead of waiting for southerly winds. Very often ships had to be towed by their own crew from the coast or hired men on purpose or by a steam tug hired in Istanbul which became a standard mean of advancing the channel over time.¹⁸

In Black Sea the largest extent from Burghaz on the west to the St. Nikolai to the east is 600 miles and its greatest breadth from Melen Su (modern Turkey) to Odessa is 330 miles. Its coasts vary in aspect; from Cape Rumili to Cape Kaliakra in the western side are backed by mountains and heights as well as in southern Crimea, in Circassia in the eastern side and in Armenia and Anatolia on the southern shores. In the mouth of Danube and northern Crimea instead the shores are low and visible only at close distance.¹⁹ According to experienced contemporary navigators the weather changes abruptly when passing the line between cape Aia in Crimea and cape Kerempeh in Anatolia, thus dividing the sea in western and eastern areas. In the western coast northerly winds prevailed in the summer, but when south and S.E. winds were blowing, were extremely dangerous, especially when met with the strong current coming from the north due to the flow of enormous masses of water from Bug, Dniester and Danube, thus producing hacking waves. In the western part of the Black Sea N.E. winds in the winter bring clear weather and cold. N. W. or western winds instead bring fog and moisture. S.W. winds are strong in spring and autumn and were dangerous for ships on the Caucasian coast. On eastern part,

16. *Sailing Directions*, 1882, p. 97.

17. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 52-54.

18. de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, pp. 170-71; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 56-57.

19. *The Black Sea Pilot*, Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, (London, third edition, 1884), p. 2; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 4-5.

at Novorossisk, N.E. winds prevail from September to April and are tempestuous and violent. Asia Minor coasts however are better protected by northern winds and enjoy a milder climate in the eastern part (Pontus area) rather than the western one up to Bosphorus, which is colder and more exposed to storms.²⁰ The strong current coming from the Don and other rivers in the Sea of Azov, travels from Kerch straits south-west around Crimea and meets the waters flowing from Dnieper, Bug and Dniester to the Black Sea, forming a powerful current that sets southward to Bosphorus. A part of this water that not enters the channel, especially when pushed by northern winds, continues eastwards along the Anatolian coast and then north to Caucasian coast up to Kuban coast and the strait of Kerch, making an almost circular movement.²¹

As early as in 1830s sailing ships bound to Odessa, after passing Bosphorus, frequently followed the northwestern direction to Cape Kaliakra, then N.E. to Serpent Island off the mouth of Danube and then to Cape Fontana, aided in case of adverse weather from shelters in Cape Iniada and the Gulfs of Bourgas or Varna.²² In the latter part of the century is mentioned that sailing vessels bound to Odessa once in the entrance of Bosphorus had to avoid the northerly winds in the open sea, which blow often during the year, and was considered safer, not to beat along the western coast of Bulgaria, but head for Crimean shore taking advantage of the N.E and E.N.E. prevailing winds.²³ Vessels bound to Theodosia or Kerch meeting easterly winds and in order to avoid the adverse current coming from the southern shores of Crimea followed the course along the Anatolian coast up to Sinope before turning up to their destination. Steam vessels instead could follow more straight courses to their destination.²⁴

20. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 17-19.


21. de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, pp. 12-13; *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 24-25.

22. J.W. Norie, *New piloting directions for the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic or Gulf of Venice, the Black Sea, Grecian Archipelago, and the Seas of Marmara and Azof*, (London, 1831), p. 285.

23. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 59.

24. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 58-59; de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, pp. 13-14;

Map 4: Navigating the Black Sea



However, once in their destination, ships had to face the lack of port facilities which seriously affected the time of loading and unloading, raised the costs and exposed ships to dangers from natural elements. Even in Odessa, the easiest destination to reach and the most developed of the Black Sea ports, one of the two artificial harbours was too small for large ships, which had to anchor in the port of quarantine, even after they had completed it. Despite the enormous surface in the port of Odessa, (240.000 m²) only 600 meters of mole were really useful to ships, which jammed arranged in different lines and loading and unloading was effectuated with lighters due to the narrowness and the bad state of the mole. Also the violent easterly and N.E. winds were dangerous for the vessels, which eventually were drawn by their anchors on the coast or were breaking in the moles.²⁵ Furthermore ships had to perform a quarantine of 14 days, which often was reduced to only 4 days, where the fumigation of the cargo was performed by soldiers without much care damaging commodities like fabrics and goods like coffee, tobacco or tea, during the unpacking of imported commodities, were stolen. Finally the quarantine in Odessa ceased its function in 1857

25. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», pp. 355-356.

and since then the ships with clear sanitary bill were admitted in the port after interrogation of the captain and inspection of the vessel.²⁶

Return voyage

In the return from a Black Sea port, the most difficult task was to approach safely the entrance of Bosphorus. Sailing ships up to the middle of the nineteenth century departing from Odessa, but also from Crimea or the Sea of Azov took the coast of Rumelia or else the western coast using as landmarks the Cape Kaliakra, Cape Emona and Cape Kouri or Iniada before reaching the entrance of Bosphorus.²⁷ With clear weather landmarks such as cliffs, beaches and towers on both the Anatolian and Rumelian coasts made the approach easy. In foggy weather however, when guns could not be heard or the light vessel to be seen, sounding was the most effective way to check the vessel's position. A cast of 50 (91.44 m) to 55 fathoms (100.58 m) of mud and shell meant that the vessel was off the Anatolian coast, and it should steer southwards and if the water changes rapidly to 45 fathoms with the same bottom, then the vessel had to steer westward up until casting from the bottom sand and shell and could enter safely the channel. If on the other hand the sounding found only mud at 50 to 55 fathoms meant that the ships was off the Rumelian coast and had to keep southeast direction up until the water shoaled to 45 fathoms mud and shell, which means that the vessel passed the eastward entrance of the channel. If a cast of 37 to 40 fathoms got sand and shell the vessels should steer directly southwards to Bosphorus entrance.²⁸ Another great difficulty was the false entrances. Shilli or Kilios Bay and the Lake Derkos near Karaburnu on the Rumelian coast were often exchanged for the entrances for Bosphorus, in some cases with disastrous results.²⁹ Beacons could help to verify position, but again sounding was proved the more effective, especially in foggy weather. Off Shilli or Kilios shells would be obtained and from there up to the

26. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», pp. 365-367.

27. de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, p. 18.

28. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 60-62.

29. de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, p. 20.

true entrance sand and shell and a greater depth of water would be expected; and off Lake Derkos, mud and shell or only shell would be obtained and not sand and shell which was to be expected.³⁰ Once in the channel, the prevailing northern winds and current, especially in summer, makes the navigation an easier task. Vessels usually keeping on the western side of the channel with fair wind were advised to pass eastwards the Umur or Englishman banks and anchor if necessary at Umur Bay rather than Therapia or Buyukdere, which was difficult to set sail in light winds. From Constantinople to Gallipoli a mid-channel course between the coast of Europe and the Island of Marmara was advisable and in clear weather, the southward channel was a good option, by avoiding the steamers coming in the opposite direction in the northern channel. Once in Dardanelles, a vessel was advisable to navigate in the mid channel and if S.W. winds blow hard to anchor on the Asiatic shores up to the entrance in the Aegean Sea.³¹

Danube and Sea of Azov

Navigation in Danube and the Sea of Azov presented further difficulties and dangers. Commercial navigation in Danube from the Black Sea meant from the entrance of the mouth of Sulina up to the port of Braila, a distance of 102 miles.³² The mouth of Sulina was the middle entrance to the river and the only one accessible to ships, thanks to its depth. Its breadth varied from 278 to 556 meters, its depth in certain parts at the banks was between 1.2 to 2.1 meters and generally between 4 to 15 meters and at the mouth of Sulina in average around 6 meters, its lowest depth at the piers reached in June, July and August.³³ Generally the water depth in the river reached its lower levels from September to December and its higher levels between February and July, when the river floods begun. The current of the river set downwards and traveled with a speed of 1 to 3 knots per hour and in abnormal cases of heavy floods could reach even 5 knots.³⁴ Dock

30. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 63.

31. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 64-66; *Sailing Directions*, 1882, pp. 55-56.

32. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 198.

33. *The Black Sea Pilot*, 1884, p. 28.

34. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 199; *The Black Sea Pilot*, 1884, p. 28.

accommodation was inexistent and anchoring and mooring facilities were poor even as late as the two last decades of the nineteenth century. Pilotage was compulsory in Danube for vessels larger than 60 tons in 1884 and to more than 100 tons if loaded and more than 150 tons if in ballast in 1893.³⁵ Navigation up to late 1850s, namely before the improvements in the Sulina mouth and in the river carried out by the European Commission, which assumed the jurisdiction of the commerce in Danube after the treaty of Paris in 1856, was confided mainly to medium class of sailing ships. Ships with draught of more than 12 feet (3.65 m) could not enter the river unless in ballast, but the worse was in return, when loaded had to cross the Sulina bar and enter the Black Sea.³⁶ Ships had to unload the cargo to lighters, and then cross the bar lightened of their cargo. Next, the lighters had to load again the ship of her cargo. During this operation of unloading and loading, ships as well as the lighters were exposed, especially in spring and autumn, to the risks of being wrecked or driven way by violent N. or N.E. winds, such as those of the storm of 6 November 1855 which destroyed 30 ships, 60 lighters and make perish about 300 men.³⁷ The lower depth of the water and in consequence the necessity of using lighters for the unloading and loading of cargo, not only caused serious delays in the voyage, but also a burdensome additional cost not easily always calculated beforehand. Lighterage was the most expensive part of the voyage cost and British sources calculated it in average at 12 shillings per ton. The European Commission calculated this expense to 45 pounds for a vessel between 90 to 140 tons, 90 pounds for a vessel from 140 to 200 tons and 150 pounds for vessels from 200 to 400 tons. Furthermore, cargo was often damaged during the transshipment and frequently part of it was also stolen by the masters of the lighters in an organized manner, bringing a loss of cargo that was calculated by the European Commission in average at 7 to 8% per ship.³⁸

The improvement works of the European Commission facilitated

35. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 203-204; *The Black Sea Pilot*, 1884, p. 29.

36. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Lower Danube*, Report by Consul Ward, 1872, p. 693.

37. *Des effets produits par l'amélioration de l'embouchure de Soulina sur le commerce d'exportation maritime*, Galatz, 1869, pp. 8-9 ; Foreign Office, *Lower Danube*, 1872, p. 690.

38. *Des effets produits par l'amélioration*, pp. 11, 18-19 ; Foreign Office, *Lower Danube*, 1872, p. 690.

commerce and navigation in Danube and lowered shipping costs. At first increased the size of vessels entering the river, which augmented from 141 ton in average in 1861 to 245 tons in 1871, thanks to the deepening of the waters at minimum level from 11 feet (3.35 m) in 1868 to 13 feet (3.96 m) in 1871. Then it also increased the commercial traffic in terms of number of vessels and tonnage, including many steamers.³⁹ According the claims of the European Commission the improvement works also reduced the rate of accidents and shipwrecks in the Sulina roadstead between 1855 and 1868.⁴⁰ Furthermore, regulated and reduced the lightering and towing costs, decreased the duration of the voyage, and helped shipowners to calculate with precision the voyage costs in Danube, as well as stabilized in lower prices freight rates from 1850 to 1868 thus reducing shipping costs for shippers.⁴¹ However, the desired aim to attain the minimum depth of 15 feet (4.57 m) of water was not attained as late as 1872, which meant that sailing ships of more than 500 tons and steamers had still to make use of lighters which cost between 100 to 300 pounds per streamer and a loss of time. Furthermore, the necessity of using lighters continued the frauds of cargo by their masters even as late as 1884.⁴² Also between 1862 and 1871, despite the improvement works of the European Commission were registered 213 collisions, 525 strandings and 12 wrecks in the mouth of Sulina wrecks due to the narrowness of the stream.⁴³

Navigation in the Sea of Azov presented even greater difficulties. First was the shallowness of the water. Already the entrance of the sea in the strait of Kerch was dangerous to pass and had a depth of only 13 feet of water.⁴⁴ The greatest depth was from 40 (12.19m) to 44 feet (13.4 m) between Kerch and the spit of Bielo Sarai (White House). However, in the entrance of the Gulf of Azov the depth was diminished to 30 feet (9.1 m) and in the roadstead of Taganrog was between 8 (2.4 m) to 11 feet (3.35 m), which according another source

39. *Des effets produits par l'amélioration*, pp. 13, 19; Foreign Office, *Lower Danube*, 1872, pp. 693-694.

40. *ibid*, p. 9.

41. *ibid*, pp. 13-15, 18.

42. Foreign Office, *Lower Danube*, 1872, pp. 693, 695; *The Black Sea Pilot*, 1884, p. 28.

43. Foreign Office, *Lower Danube*, 1872, p. 695

44. Moses Lofley Harvey, "The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance", (PhD, University of California, 1938), p. 166.

reached even to 16 feet (4.87).⁴⁵ When S. or S.W. winds blew the water level was raised by 10 to 12 feet (3.65 m) and the swell of the water rushing back not only interrupted the loading of the ships, but also could cause damages to the ships in anchor. When N.E. winds blew the water level fall by 2 to 3 feet (0.9 m) and in sometimes even by 9 feet (2.74 m) and in that case wagons were approaching to load the cargo from the ships grounded on the sand and people could walk across (see Picture 1). In fact ships with draught more than 18 feet (5.48 m) had to anchor 50 km from the port of Taganrog.⁴⁶

Picture 1: Loading at Taganrog in 1841



Source: Joseph Meyer, Friedrich Hofmann, Hermann Julius Meyer, *Meyer's Universum, oder, Abbildung und Beschreibung des sehenswerthesten und merkwürdigsten der Natur und Kunst auf der ganzen Erde*, Volume 8, (Druck und Verlag vom Bibliographischen Institut, 1841, CCCLXIV), pp.102-104.

The shallowness of the water and the lack of adequate port facilities made indispensable the use of lighters. As late as 1893 in Taganrog dredging operation did not had finished, a mole built in

45. *The Black Sea Pilot*, 1884, p. 79; de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, pp. 107, 117.

46. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 361; Norie, *New piloting directions*, p. 290; de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, p. 108.

1872 was falling to pieces and larger vessels still anchored at 25 miles (46.3 km) from the town.⁴⁷ In 1858 at Mariupol it was necessary to load the cargo on two types of barges, the smaller ones able to cross the bar of the river Kalmius to reach the port, and the bigger ones who brought it to the ships, which had to anchor three miles (5.5 km) from the shore.⁴⁸ Forty years later, despite the increase of trade in the port still the harbor depth was at 14 feet (4.26) and the mouth of the river Kalmius, where the shipment of grain took place, was silted up. Finally in 1901 the port infrastructure and the mouth of the river greatly improved after dredging operations, enabling passenger steamers and lighters to reach the quay, but cargo steamers still had to load grain in roadstead as previously.⁴⁹ In Berdiansk the lack of an adequate jetty and the strong southern wind which was dangerous for barges largely delayed the loading of ships. The problem found remedy after the completion of a break-water in October 1868, which protected the loading operations.⁵⁰

Generally the use of lighters and barges not only caused delays and raised transport costs, but also led to a frequent loss of cargo stolen from the lighters in the Yenikale brought first to Taman and from there carried to Kerch to be sold as a Kuban area commodity.⁵¹ The problem begun to find some remedy when a French company was hired for the deepening of Yenikale Straits to 18 feet (5.48m) which according to British Consul at Kerch: *"It is impossible to overrate the advantage which will result to shipping from this intended improvement. The system of plunder is iniquitous; few vessels that are forced to lighten ever leave Kertch with the same quantity of grain they took in up the Azof, while a long row of windmills along the coast, and beaten foot-tracks from the several little creeks, show plainly what becomes of the grain thus lost. In fact, the*

47. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 279-281.

48. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», pp. 360-361; Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Mariupol, Report by Mr. Cumberbatch, British Consul at Berdiansk*, 1858, p. 43.

49. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Mariupol, Report by Vice-Consul Walton*, 1898, pp. 20-22; *ibid*, 1901, p. 19-20.

50. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», pp. 360-361, notes 104-106; Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Berdiansk and Mariopol, Report by Mr. Consul Zohrab*, 1869, p. 502.

51. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 360, note 99.

ships are so effectually lightened that disputes are frequent on their arrival at their destination owing to their putting out necessarily a less quantity than is specified in the bills of lading".⁵² Not only that, but also lighter masters, after having agreed with ship masters to lighten their cargo on a certain price, demanded higher prices, in an extortionate way, knowing that the ship master was anxious to proceed to his destination.⁵³ The problem of the lightermen was also strictly connected with that of pilotage. Ships entering the straits to the Sea of Azov had to perform quarantine in Kerch, which up to the middle of the nineteenth century varied between 14 to 28 days.⁵⁴ Furthermore, in 1867 the British Consul reported that he and the Governor General managed to put an end to the extortions and abuses ship captains received at Quarantine and Custom house at Kerch as well as the bribes and illegal fees paid to the port master kept on a separate 'secret' book and shared with the rest of the employees.⁵⁵ The ship captains had to pay a certain amount at the quarantine, which during the 1860s was 8 rubles, and included the right to have a pilot for safe crossing of the straits. The pilots settled in the village of Yenikale, mostly Greeks according to the British Consul in 1862, were paid from the state to provide such service on the arrival of every ship at Kerch.⁵⁶ However, in practice was happening what the British Consul eloquently describes in 1866: "*When a ship arrives, she hoists her pilot flag, and waits for more than twenty four hours the arrival of a pilot; at length weary of delay, the master takes a boat and proceeds to Janikali, where the pilots are waiting for him; and as soon as he lands, they exact from him a present of 10 roubles in addition to their legal charge previous to going on board.*" To ship masters who reacted to this 'custom' and who claimed their rightfully paid service, were 'punished' by the pilots who ran the ship aground.⁵⁷ Even worse, stranding a ship was

52. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Kertch, Report by Consul Barrow*, 1873, p. 1434.

53. Ibid, 1866, p. 73.

54. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 358; Harvey, "The Development of Russian", p. 116.

55. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Kertch, Report by Consul Barrow*, 1867, p. 131.

56. Ibid, 1867, 132; Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 364, note 11.

57. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Kertch, Report by Consul Barrow*, 1866, p. 72.

a frequent willing act and practice by the Yenikale pilots who by this sought to gain more by the salvage and repair fees on the damaged ships.⁵⁸ In fact the Yenikale pilots seemed that were orchestrated even also with Constantinople pilots to damage ships crossing the straits bar. In fact Yenikale lightermen who must have been quite the same people performing pilotage service, complained in 1876 to the British Consul at Kerch for buoy improvements which procured less ships accidents and thus damaged their business stating that “*the lightering alone would not pay if they had not occasionally “ships in distress”*.”⁵⁹

However, despite the dredging works for the deepening of the waters, the widening of the channel, the improvements in the light-house system and the reorganization of pilotage service up to the first years of the 20th century navigation in the Yenikale Straits and in Azov remained a difficult and treacherous task. In 1882 the British Consul reported that depth of the channel was still not satisfactory for large vessels and steamers and no further progress in the pilotage system was made, whereas the following year after investigation for the stranding of several steamers many pilots were fired.⁶⁰ As late as 1900 still improvements were in progress either in the deepening of the water for diminishing the delays and attract larger ships and the pilotage system hoping to stop the evil practices of local pilots.⁶¹

Ice

Despite all the above rendering navigation difficult and to a certain degree dangerous, nothing really affected the rhythms of sea transport and trade as much as the ice. During winter time, navigation in the ports of northern shores, in the Sea of Azov and in Danube was almost impossible due to the frost. And despite the fact that the period of the closure varied from year to year, it is possible to trace some general character-

58. Harvey, “The Development of Russian”, p. 167.

59. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Kertch*, Report by Consul Barrow, 1874, 1296 and *ibid*, 1875, p. 1564.

60. Foreign Office, Annual Series, *Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Kertch*, Report by Vice-Consul Colledge, 1881, pp. 1107-1109; *ibid*, Report by Acting Vice-Consul Stevens, 1883, p. 976.

61. *Ibid*, Report by Vice-Consul Wardrop, 1900, p. 10 and 1901, p. 10.

istics and differences from area to area. Thus, in Danube from 1837 to 1887 the river was closed 14 times in December, 19 in January and 8 times in February and normally closing occurred in early January (see Table 1). The breaking of the ice occurred in January only 3 times, but in February and March 19 times each. The average closing period was 37 days, but in 1879-80, it remained closed for 96 days and only twice in 1871 and 1881 lasted just 13 days. In Odessa, things were somewhat better, as the port was frozen for shorter periods of time during December, January or February, but not that continuously as in Danube. The worst of all was in the Sea of Azov. Navigation was impracticable from the end of November up to the beginning of April, or as in 1871 in the middle of April, and only in 1882 the ice was broken as early as the 16th of March. In November, in various dates ranging from as early as the 4th in 1885 up to 21st the latest barges were removed to winter quarters.⁶² (1893, p. 28-31). Therefore ships had to finish the loading of cereals by November at latest and set sail for the return voyage. Otherwise, and this is what frequently happened, captains preferred to winter in the ports up to the breaking of the ice and the opening of the navigation, instead of risking being caught by the frost during the voyage.⁶³

Table 1: Closing and opening of ports in winter

Danube, 1837-87	Closing	Opening	Average closure period
	December 14 times	January 3 times	37 days
	January 19 times	February 19 times	
	February 8 times	March 19 times	
Odessa	Closing	Opening	
	Shorter periods in December January and February		
Azov	Closing	Opening	
	End November	End March-beginning April	

Source: processed data from *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 28-31.

62. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, pp. 28-31.

63. Norie, *New piloting directions*, p. 285.

Duration of the Voyage

Table 2: Homeward voyage duration in days, 1845.

	Summer			Winter		
	MARSEILLE	TRIESTE	difference	MARSEILLE	TRIESTE	difference
Danube						
Galatz	54.8	44.59	10.21	118	105.75	12.25
Braila	56.08	44.74	11.34	114.23	91.5	22.73
Azov						
Berdyansk	51.40	47.6	3.8	68		
Mariupol	51.9	41.6	10.3			
Taganrog	60.53	39.8	20.73	85.4		
Southern Russia						
Odessa	42.64	32.08	10.56	67.41	40	27.41

Source: Processed data from *Semaphore de Marseille* and the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco*.

The duration of the voyage was varied between the seasons. In Table 2 under the heading summer is indicated the period from April to October and as winter from November to March and shows the voyage effectuated from Black Sea to two major Mediterranean destinations in 1845, Marseille and Trieste. The focus is made mainly on the busiest ports of the three most commercial hubs of the Black Sea, Danube, Azov and Southern Russia coast, mainly Odessa. Sailing ships from Odessa spent approximately 11 days more to reach Marseille in the summer period and 27 days more in the winter. Interestingly enough in 1817 sailing ships from Odessa to Marseille required approximately 43 days in summer and 47 days in spring, but 64 in autumn, including the ports of call, indicating the lack of improved performance of sailing ships.⁶⁴ It is also noteworthy the absence of ships departing from Sea of Azov to Trieste in winter and only 5 ships from Berdiansk and 5 from Taganrog for Marseille, all departed in November of 1845 due to

64. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 368, note 33.

the frost. The quickest route in average was from Odessa in both seasons, and in the good season the longest was from Taganrog, due to the difficulties related to this port whereas in the winter the longest was from the Danube ports also due to navigation problems in the river already described.

Table 3: Distribution of time employed on each leg in the route Black Sea – Marseille, 1845.

1845	Average total in days	Up to Constantinople	% of the total voyage	Stay in Constantinople	% of the total voyage	Constantinople – Marseille	% of the total voyage
Taganrog-Marseille	68.37	23.74	30.01	7.56	12.16	37.05	57.83
Odessa-Marseille	43.92	6.20	13.99	3.85	8.62	33.86	77.39
Braila-Marseille	69.40	27.00	34.60	6.33	8.69	36.07	56.71
Galatz-Marseille	63.08	19.19	28.45	4.60	7.07	39.29	64.48

Source: Processed data from *Semaphore de Marseille*.

Generally ships crossed the Black Sea without making any intermediary stop up to their port of destination in the outward voyage or up to Bosphorus in the return voyage, especially when bound or departed from Odessa.⁶⁵ According to table 3 the leg of voyage from Taganrog and Danube to Constantinople represented almost from one third to one fourth of the total time employed, ranging in average from 19 to 27 days from Danube and 24 days from Taganrog. From Odessa instead, it employed only 6 days in average and 14% of the total time of the voyage. Ships from Odessa bound to Marseille in 1817 required 4 to 7 days in average to reach Constantinople in the good season, indicating again no improvements in the performance of sailing vessels in these trade routes.⁶⁶ Ships

65. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 369.

66. Ibid, p. 69, note 35.

stayed in Constantinople slightly more than 5 days in average from whatever port they had departed, the shortest stay being 4 days for those coming from Odessa and the longest was 8 days for those coming from Taganrog. Finally, in the calculation of the leg from Constantinople to Marseille are also included the days the ships spent in other Mediterranean ports of call, like Malta, Toulon or as very often occurred in the Isle of Hyeres near Toulon. The number of ports of call in the Mediterranean varied, but usually when captains carried the cargo on their own touched in more ports of call than when freighted by others.⁶⁷

Given the difficulties of navigation in Danube and in the Sea of Azov and then in the Black Sea, the most important part of the voyage was the first leg up to Constantinople. According to certain contemporaries was considered that the ship arrived in Constantinople from a Black Sea port had already effectuated half of the voyage, despite that the distance to cover afterwards to Mediterranean ports or beyond was much greater.⁶⁸ These difficulties were also expressed in terms of freight rates, which were 10 to 15% higher for Danube than Odessa and in late 1820s 20-25% for Azov, only to be reduced later to 15%. Even within the Sea of Azov captains demanded higher prices for Taganrog than to Berdiansk and Mariupol, due to painful conditions of loading in that port.⁶⁹

Table 4: Voyage duration per type of vessel.

PORTS	brig-1845	brig-1875	ship-1845	ship-1875	steamer-1875	steamer-1895
Berdiansk	55.17	61.78	44	58.44	15.5	13.29
Burgas	46.5	58.58		47	21	16
Galatz	62.67	63		102.75		
Braila	71.04	68.34		64.44	20.36	14.74

67. Ibid, p. 370.

68. Ibid, p. 384.

69. Ibid, p. 387.

PORTS	brig-1845	brig-1875	ship-1845	ship-1875	steamer-1875	steamer-1895
Mariupol	52.86	52.52	49.67	59.86	14.88	12.10
Odessa	43.89	56.75	45.21	52.12	15.84	13.11
Taganrog	68.25	60.07	70	65.53	16.76	13.11
Varna	47.06	63.86		55.25		

Source: Processed data from *Semaphore de Marseille*.

Table 4 compares voyage duration on different dates per type of vessel. It is astonishing to see that sailing vessels, brigs and full rigged ships, employed more time in 1875 than in 1845 and only steamers effectively reduced their voyage time in the twenty years, between 1875 and 1895. The most plausible explanation for this seems to be the very much increased traffic in the examined ports during the elapsed thirty years, which in parallel with the slow progress of port infrastructure, caused delays and perhaps created traffic jammed situations like those depicted in early photographs from the Vieux Port of Marseille in the 1860s as the one below.

Picture 2: *The Vieux Port at Marseille around 1860.*

A view taken from Tour Saint Jean



Source: Paul Masson, *Les Bouches du Rhône. Encyclopédie départementale*, t. IX, «Le Commerce», (Paris, 1922), plate III.

The assessment of the risk

The Black Sea was notorious for its violent as well as uncertain winds and storms.⁷⁰ Winters were particularly severe and northern cold winds often accompanied with rain, hail and snow, made the rigging and sails frozen and stiff and thus very hard to maneuver as well as covered the deck with snow and ice making the work on board very dangerous for the crew.⁷¹ However, English and French pilot books of the nineteenth century, despite describing the difficulties this sea often concluded that the Black Sea “free from islands and rocks, its navigation is neither difficult not dangerous” and that prudence, skill and a good vessel were enough to ensure a safe trip.⁷² On the other hand newspapers from Marseille, Trieste, Constantinople, Syros and so on, reported at ordinary basis tens of shipwrecks occurred in Black Sea during the entire year, but especially in winter and more often near the entrance of Bosphorus and the western and southwestern coast with very few good anchorages.⁷³ One way to assess the rate of danger would be therefore to register or even estimate the shipwrecks occurred in Black Sea in certain years in relation to other sea routes. But this is not very practical and also doubtful method to assess how danger for ships Black Sea was in relation to other areas. A safer way is to follow the response of the marine insurance market. In Table 5 the information comes from the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco* concerning the insurance premiums on merchandises in the port of Trieste at 1845. The selected dates represent the moment of changes occurred on insurance premiums during the year. In the newspaper are included the commercial routes of the port of Trieste, namely Baltic and North Seas, Northern and Southern Atlantic, Mediterranean and Black Sea, but not the Indian and Pacific oceans, and thus Indian, Indonesian, Chinese and Japanese ports, yet not opened to its commercial horizons. It can be noticed that by the end of March to the end of September (which is the good season), Black Sea areas were among

70. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 58.

71. Henry A.S. Deaborn, *Memoir on the commerce and navigation of the Black Sea and the trade and maritime geography of Turkey and Egypt*, (Boston, 1819), p. 22; de Marigny, *Pilote de la Mer*, p. 16.

72. *Sailing Directions*, 1893, p. 58.

73. Van Regemorter, «La Russie Meridionale», p. 369.

the most risky to sail after Central and North America, Baltic Sea and Scandinavia. Also for much more distant routes like Brazil, UK and French Atlantic, Cape Verde, the Canaries, Madeira as well as for the entire Mediterranean, ships were insured at much lower rates in all seasons and this is why are not included in the comparison in Table 5 (except of Brazil). In October premiums were raised by 78% in Danube and the Azov and by 33% in Odessa and the Crimean coast as well as in Mingrelia and the Asian coast of the Black Sea. However, if these prices were already high, in winter months insurance primes were almost prohibitive for the Sea of Azov, which results as the most unnavigable sea of the word due to the frost. In similar fashion follow the extremely high rates for Danube, close to the Baltic ports as well as the very high for the rest of the Black Sea.

Table 5: Insurance premiums (%) on cargo from the port of Trieste, 1845

JANUARY 7th	Outward	Homeward
Taganrock and Sea of Azov	8	8
St. Petersburg and Baltic ports	5.75	5
Danube	5.5	5.5
Berghen and the coast up to Sund	5.25	4.5
Stettin and Copenhagen	4.75	4.5
Mingrelia, Redoutkale and Asian coast of Black sea	4.5	4.5
Bremen and Hamburg	4.25	4
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	3.5	4
North America	3.5	3.5
Odessa and coast of Crimea including Kerch	3.25	3.25
Brazil	2	2
MARCH 29th	Outward	Homeward
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	3.5	3
St. Petersburg and Baltic ports	3.5	3
North America	3	2.5
Berghen and the coast up to Sund	2.75	2.5
Stettin and Copenhagen	2.75	2.5
Danube	2.25	2.25
Mingrelia, Redoutkale and Asian coast of Black sea	2.25	2.25

MARCH 29th	Outward	Homeward
Taganrock and Sea of Azov	2.25	2.25
Bremen and Hamburg	2.25	2
Brasil	2	2
Odessa and coast of Crimea including Kertch	1.875	1.875
AUGUST 26th	Outward	Homeward
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	4	4
St. Petersburg and Baltic ports	4	3.75
North America	4	3.5
Berghen and the coast up to Sund	2.75	2.5
Stettin and Copenhagen	2.75	2.5
Danube	2.25	2.25
Mingrelia, Redoutkale and Asian coast of Black sea	2.25	2.25
Taganrock and Sea of Azov	2.25	2.25
Bremen and Hamburg	2.25	2
Brazil	2	2
Odessa and coast of Crimea including Kertch	1.875	1.875
SEPTEMBER 30th	Outward	Homeward
St. Petersburg and Baltic ports	5.75	5
Berghen and the coast up to Sund	5.5	4.5
Stettin and Copenhagen	5.25	4.5
Bremen and Hamburg	4.75	4
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	4	4
Danube	4	4
Taganrock and Sea of Azov	4	4
North America	3.5	3.5
Mingrelia, Redoutkale and Asian coast of Black sea	3	3
Odessa and coast of Crimea including Kertch	2.5	2.5
Brazil	2	2
DECEMBER 2nd	Outward	Homeward
Taganrock and Sea of Azov	8	8
St. Petersburg and Baltic ports	5.75	5
Berghen and the coast up to Sund	5.5	4.5

DECEMBER 2nd	Outward	Homeward
Stettin and Copenhagen	5.5	5
Danube	5.5	5.5
Bremen and Hamburg	4.75	4
Mingrelia, Redoutkale and Asian coast of Black sea	4.5	4.5
Odessa and coast of Crimea including Kertch	3.5	3.5
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	3	3.5
North America	2.5	3
Brazil	2	2

Source: Processed data from the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco*.

Furthermore, ships navigating in more difficult seas in determined periods had to pay an additional premium. This overcharge for Atlantic ports, including West African coasts, US ports, Antilles and Mexico was of 1% (see Table 6). However, even in this case, navigation in Black Sea represented a more complex and peculiar task reflected in the fixing of these supplementary premiums. For Black Sea intending outside Danube and Azov the highest additional rate was 1.25% from November to the end of February. In Danube things were worse, charging a supplement of 3% from November to the end of March. But the very bad was in the Sea of Azov, where navigation already from October up to the middle of November was considered dangerous enough by doubling the quote from 1.5 to 3%, up to become prohibitive from mid-November to the end of March with a supplement reaching to 5.5%.

**Table 6: Supplementary insurance premiums (%)
from the port of Trieste, 1845.**

Black Sea	September and October	November to the end of February	March	
	0.5	1.25	0.5	
Danube	September	October	November to the end of march	
	0.75	1.5	3	

Sea of Azov	September	October	1 to 15 November	16 November to the end of March
	0.75	1.5	3	5.5
	October to March			
Beyond Cape Finisterre	1			
(West) African Coasts	1			
Atlantic US ports	1			
	July to the end of January			
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	1			

Source: Processed data from the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco*.

The fact that the price of sailing in Black Sea was not calculated on the basis of distance but of the dangers and difficulties it represented is further confirmed by the rates of intermediary insurance premiums.⁷⁴ In Table 7 premiums from Constantinople to Mediterranean ports were quite low and unchanged during the whole year. On the other hand the premiums to Black Sea ports, despite being much closer to Constantinople, were high in winter time for Odessa, Trebizond and Kerch and almost prohibitive for Danube and especially the Sea of Azov. Moreover, even within Black Sea ports as from Odessa to Danube and to Sea of Azov the premiums were very high as those from Constantinople and even from the ports of the Sea of Azov up to Kerch, its exit to Black Sea, insurance premiums were as high as 5.5%.

74. Ibid, p. 384.

Table 7: Intermediate insurance premiums (%)

INTERMEDIATE PREMIUMS	7 th January 1845	26 th August 1845
From Constantinople to:	Outward and homeward voyages	
Greece, Smyrna, Turkish Islands	1	1
Alexandria, Ionian Islands, Malta and Messina	1.25	1.25
Genoa, Livorno, Marseilles	1.5	1.5
Syria	1.75	1.75
Spanish coast up to Gibraltar	1.875	1.875
Tunis, Algiers and the African Coast including Ceuta	2.25	2.25
From Constantinople departing from the port of loading to:	Outward and homeward voyages	
Odessa, Trebizond and Kerch	2	0.75
Redoutkale and Mingelia	3.25	1.25
Danube	4.25	1.25
Ports in the Sea of Azov	6.75	1.25
From Odessa:	Outward and homeward voyages	
Danube	4.25	1.25
Ports in the Sea of Azov	6.75	1.5
From Sea of Azov:	Outward and homeward voyages	
Kerch	5.5	1.25

Source: Processed data from the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco*.

Similar view we get also from the insurance primes above the hull in Table 8. Ships in the Black Sea and Danube from 1st of October up to the end of March had to pay the same additional premium of 1% as those vessels sailing beyond Cape Finisterre. In winter time Azov is the only sea area that ships had to pay an addition of 2%. Even in August and September, still in the good season, ships in Azov had to pay the additional premium of 1%, same with what demanded for ships sailing in very distant seas like the Atlantic Ocean and beyond Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope.

Table 8: Insurance premiums (in %) above the hull from Trieste in 1845.

Entire year		5
For 6 months		5.5
Under 6 months		6
Additional rates if the ship sails in:		
Azov	From 1 st October up the end of March	2
Azov	August and September	1
Black Sea, Danube, beyond Cape Finisterre	From 1 st October up the end of March	1
African coast from Cape Bon including Ceuta	From 1 st October up the end of March	1
United States and Atlantic	From 1 st October up the end of March	1
Antilles and Gulf of Mexico	From 1 st July up the end of January	1
Beyond Cape of Good Hope	Every season	1
Beyond Cape Horn	Every season	1

Source: Processed data from the *Giornale del Lloyd Austriaco*.

Twenty five years later the situation seems almost unchanged. In Table 9 are compared the insurance premiums of sailing ships from the ports of Genoa, Livorno, Venice and Marseille. The commercial routes now encompass almost the entire globe including China, India, Japan and North and South American pacific ports. The premiums indicated concern only the summer season and therefore escape to us the most difficult period of navigation especially in Black Sea. Even like this, Black Sea resulted among the most difficult areas to sail after Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Ocean destinations in the good season and Azov and Danube have the same premiums in Venice as Brazil, Mexico, Rio de la Plata, India and China. Moreover, in the sources of Table 9 is indicated that only ships navigating in Black Sea, had to pay a supplement on the ordinary one and this supplement was also increased by 0.5% every 10 or 15 days between September and December up to the departure of the vessel from the loading port.

Table 9: Insurance premiums on full risks (*a tutto rischio*) of sailing ships from selected Mediterranean ports, 1870.

	Genoa	Livorno	Venice (used those of Lloyd Austriaco)	Marseille	
	Outward	Homeward	Outward	Outward	Homeward
Japan	3.33			3.5	4
India and China	3	3	3	2	2.5
California	3.25		3.5	2.5	3
Chile, Lima etc	2.5	3	3.5	2	2.5
Plata	1.375	1.375	3	1.5	2
Brasil	1.125	1.375	2.5	1.25	1.75
Mexico	2.25	2.5	2.75	2.5	3
Antilles	1.25	1.75	2.25	1.25	1.5
North America, United States on Atlantic etc	1.5	1.625	1.6	1	1.5
England and Ireland	1.375	1.5	1.6	1.125	1.25
Danube	1.125		2.25	1.25	
Azov	1.125	1.25	2	1.5	

	Genoa		Livorno		Venice (used those of Lloyd Austriaco)		Marseille	
	Outward	Homeward	Outward	Homeward	Outward	Homeward	Outward	Homeward
Black Sea	1		1		1.6	2.5	1.25	
Greece and Turkey	0.875	1	1	1.5	0.875	2.5	0.75	1.25
North Africa	0.875	1.5	1.125	1.375	1.5	1.75	0.625	1.25
Spanish Atlantic and Portugal	0.875	1	1.25		1.6	2	0.75	1.25
Spanish Mediterranean	0.625	0.75	0.875	1	1.5	1.625	0.5	0.625
Oceanic France and Belgium	1.25	1.5	1.5	1.75	2	3	1	1.33
Southern France	0.5	0.75	0.625	0.75	1.25	1.375	0.375	0.5
Adriatic Italy and Dalmatia	0.875	0.75	1.25	1.375	0.75	1	1.25	
Sicily	0.625	0.75	1	1.25	1	1.75	1	
Sardegna	0.5	0.75	1	1.5	1.25	1.375	0.75	
Corsica	0.5	0.75	0.75		1.25	1.375	0.75	
Mediterranean Italy	0.5	0.625	0.5	0.75	1.25	1.375	0.5	1

Source: Sebastiano Vallebona, *Manuale pratico-legale delle assicurazioni e dei sinistri ed avarie di mare*, (Genova, 1870), p. 64.

To conclude, navigation in the Black Sea was a demanding task for ships due to the peculiarities of weather conditions, geographical particularities and of poor port infrastructure. The dangers were not uniform in every part of the sea, Azov and the Danube representing the most difficult ones to navigate and load the cargo. Despite the improving knowledge through charts and pilots in the navigation and the amelioration of port facilities in certain ports, Black Sea remained an unpredictable and dangerous sea even as late as the beginning of the twentieth century, when even iron hulled steamships faced nautical disasters. The observation of insurance premiums proved a quite safe instrument to verify and assess the level of danger of navigation in different sea regions and routes in relation to the Black Sea.

3.

The port of Trieste and its Black Sea economic relations: A first assessment

Maria Christina Chatziioannou

Trieste belongs to the typology of world cities described by Friedmann as the type of cities that relied on world city networks rather than state relations, and, more specifically, the port cities with diasporic merchant communities defined by ties of kinship and ethnicity. In these port cities, maritime connections were important, since in history they have often remained free of control by state regulations¹. Trieste offers a case study of a rather independent port city development based on the world city's networks. The Black Sea maritime connections and commercial exchanges offer us the necessary evidence.

This sub-project of the Thales program (<http://blacksea.gr/>) is about Trieste's trade connections with the Black Sea ports from the last quarter of the nineteenth century up until World War I. A database based on the sources of the Austrian newspaper *L' Osservatore Triestino* covers arrival and/or departure dates, ports of arrival or departure, ship names, types of ships, flags, captains' names, passengers, variety of goods, days of operation and receivers of traded goods.² A very interesting flow of cargoes comes out from that, focusing on all Black Sea ports and their maritime connections with Trieste in the period covering the years from 1875 until 1914. From 1900 to 1904 a real explosion in Trieste's trade with the Black Sea is noticed in the Belle Époque period. What is important to stress

1. John Friedmann, "The World City Hypothesis", *Development and Change*, 17:1 (1986), pp. 69-83; P. J. Taylor, *World City Network: a Global Urban Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2004).

2. Dr Erica Mezzoli prepared the database comprising the arrivals and departures of cargoes – and in some occasions passengers as well – from Trieste to the Black Sea ports and backwards.

here in a preliminary way is that the trade ports in the Black Sea region corresponding to Trieste vary in the period under examination from Nikolayev (grains) to Batumi (petrol), Trebizond (various goods) and Zounguldak (coke).

This article aims at rendering an outline of Trieste's port economy from the last quarter of the nineteenth century the evolution of an early free port to a modern port with global connections. My first goal was to draft a rough picture of Trieste's external trade in order to understand its longstanding and asymmetrical orientation towards the Black Sea. It must be noted that commercial relations between Trieste and the Black Sea ports are an unexplored topic in the 'Age of Empires', and the history of Austro-Hungarian and Russian economic relations is difficult to reconstruct, given the lack of relevant studies. D. Lieven has noted that the Austrian and the Russian empires had many similarities as multiethnic vast land territories, with distinct elites who were benefiting from hereditary privileges. Since 18th c. both land based elites were French oriented as regarded culture and style.³ Roughly speaking this French influence was not in accordance with economic relations as is shown in the Table 1 (1878-1885) showing Russia's trade was highly depended on Germany and Britain.

So, a starting point could be Russia's comparative commercial relations with her trade partners. Trieste's external trade formed part of the Austrian-Hungarian economy, but was also quite independent. In the last quarter of the 19th c. trade with the Levant (Smyrna) was more or less over. This is a transition period for the port's economy following the economic stagnation of 1873, after Vienna's stock market crash that had severe consequences for mercantile Trieste. In the 1880's, apart from the well-known trade of grains from Nikolayev, Taganrog, and Odessa, we notice the emergence of a new import trade to Trieste deriving from the Black Sea, which is oil from Batumi.⁴ In the 1900's, and before World War I, data for the port of Trieste reveals an intense commercial traffic flow.

3. D. Lieven, *Empire. The Russian empire and its rivals*, (Yale University Press: New Haven & London 2001), pp. 158-163

4. On Imperial Russia's agricultural case, see, for example, Elise Kinerling Wirtschafter, *Social Identity in Imperial Russia*, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), pp.101-130.

Trieste was a cosmopolitan port city that served the consuming demands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1919, when it became part of the Italian state. Many research questions, however, are still open; for example, was Trieste the most important port of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for the entire Austrian era that lasted for two centuries? The other Austrian ports in the Adriatic were Fiume (Rijeka), Zara (Zadar), Spalato (Split) and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) all of which formed part of a regional trade network with unidentified economic participation. The second question regards the nature of Trieste's economic relations with Russia and the world economy in the 'Age of Empires'; how was Trieste transformed from a Mediterranean port to a world distribution trade centre?

A large free port since 1719, Trieste served the transit trade that flourished already from that time, and the port's infrastructures were improved by public investments since the nineteenth century. Trieste's connections with the Black sea passed through Constantinople. Milo mentions that the early connections of Trieste to the Black Sea might be attributed to the Greek merchants' networks. This is not exactly the case since the study of the chiot businessman Ambrosio Stefano Ralli (1798-1886) shows that he did not primarily work with the Black Sea, since the international wheat trade of the Black Sea followed predominantly the route to Livorno, Marseille and London. The financial affairs that he was following mainly through insurance companies had to do with Vienna, St. Petersburg and London. And when another chiot Peter Scaramanga established himself from Rostov to Trieste, he worked with the *Banca Commerciale Triestina* and the insurance company *Generali*, but his "Russian expertise" enabled him to undertake the Russian consulate in Trieste. The small Greek orthodox community there was thriving in mercantile activities mainly with the Levant, in the first half of 19th c., was slowly turning to financial activities (banks, insurance companies) in the following years.⁵ There were other early cases too like the Serbian merchant Jovan (Jovo) Kurtović who traded with the Levant, mainly Smyrna, but this commercial trend did not exclude entrepreneurial expeditions to south Russia for the

5. Anna Milo, *L'élite del potere a Trieste. Una biografia collettiva 1891-1938*, (Franco Angeli: Milan 1989), pp. 44-47, 50.

wheat trade, like that of Nikolaos Plastaras of Trieste to Kherson.⁶

So the city's economic identity before its unification to Italy can be summarized in the following characteristics: transit trade, which constructed an economy of intermediation, and the attraction of foreign merchants, such as the nearby Slavs, Greek merchants from the Ottoman Empire, Jewish and Italian merchants from other parts of Italy, all of who established themselves there, and were deeply integrated into the local Italian culture and population.⁷

After the 1873 crisis, Trieste faced a decline in value and products of her international trade in Austria. Metternich's project to unite the economy of Bevier and Württemberg through railway connections with the Adriatic was realized later with the Tauri railway (Tauernbahn). Thus, the economy of Trieste was connected as far as south Germany, and the port's economy recovered fast. Especially after 1900, and up to World War I, Trieste's economy flourished,⁸ a fact verified by the indexed data from *L'Osservatore Triestino*. It seems, however, that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not the major beneficiary for that maritime traffic.

6. Cristian Luca, "The Venetian Consul at Kherson Pietro Maria Locatelli and his Reports on International Trade in the North-Western Black Sea Ports (1793-1797), in Constantin Ardeleanu and Andreas Lyberatos (eds), *Port-Cities of the western shore of the Black Sea: Economic and Social Development, 18th – early 20th centuries*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers, vol. I, 2016), pp. 2-3.

7. L. Fabbrini, "Trieste e i Suoi Problemi Economici" (Trieste and its economic problems), *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*, Serie III, Vol. 25 (Anno 62), No. 3 (1954), pp. 235-254.

8. Werner Drobesh, "Il ruolo di Trieste tra I porti marittimi e fluviali austriaci" (The role of Trieste among the Austrian maritime and river ports), in R. Finzi, Loredana Panariti, G. Panjek, *Storia Economica e Sociale di Trieste*, v. II, (LINT: Trieste, 2003), pp. 364-365. Railway transportation from Trieste was costly because of the mountainous nature of its hinterland, and it was compensated with differential duties on coffee and other staples. Railway distances in Km from Trieste to Vienna were 578, to Linz 520, to Graz 473, to Salzburg 394, to Klagenfurt 244. The railway from Vienna had reached Trieste in 1857, and at the same time an artificial harbor was constructed. The traffic tonnage through the city port was augmented rapidly from 88,176 in 1810, 206,597 in 1820, 321,049 in 1830, 717,293 in 1860, 960,103 in 1870 after the opening of the Suez canal, 1,471,464 in 1890, 2,158,624 in 1900 and 5,480,074 in 1913. See Leonard Unger, "The Economy of the Free Territory of Trieste", *Geographical Review*, 37:4 (1947), pp. 591-592.

Trieste was a major transit port redistributing goods from the Mediterranean, and after the opening of Suez in 1869, from the Far East too. It is reported that maritime trade in Trieste increased 16% during the years 1877-1881.⁹ Austrian Lloyd, the big Austrian shipping company, had its headquarters in Trieste, and big insurance companies like the *Assicurazioni Generali* (1831) and the *Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà* (1838) had their headquarters there as well.¹⁰ The Austrian Lloyd became powerful controlling maritime routes, so it impeded the Adriatic expansion of the Greek steamship company Courdgis' Trieste line in 1902.¹¹

Trieste's original function as free port was transformed after its unification with Italy in 1919. The Italian government offered Austria a free zone in the port, which was not effective, because ships arrived with goods for different countries and the goods consigned to Austria were only a part of the cargo. Thus the ships had to first dock at the general zone, and only after unloading there they would be directed to the Austrian free zone. Such a procedure was bound to cause delay and added expenses. It is clear that a free port worked profitably only when it was free to all as previously. It is well known from earlier studies, and particularly on the thriving small Greek community, that the port of Trieste had traditionally close relations with the Eastern Mediterranean,¹² although the Italian government did not leave the old Mediterranean lines in the port of Trieste.¹³

The lines of Lloyd Austriaco from Trieste in the late nineteenth

9. N. Kent, *Trieste. Adriatic Emporium and Gateway to the Heart of Europe* (London: Hurst & Co, 2011), p.144.

10. Several studies from social scientists were published after WWII referring to the future of the port of Trieste; Richard Schüller, "Trieste", *Social Research*, 13:4 (1946), pp. 399-409.

11. Evrydiki Sifneos, "Was the Extraction of Coal at Kozlu and Zonguldak Mines Profitable?" An Attempt at an Answer from the Courdgi Papers", in Edhem Eldem, Sophia Laiou, †Vangelis Kechriotis (eds), *The Economic and Social Development of the Port-Cities of the Southern Black Sea Coast and Hinterland, Late 18th – Beginning of the 20th Century*, (Black Sea Project Working Papers vol. V, 2015), p. 117.

12. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *Η ελληνική παροικία της Τεργέστης, 1751-1830* (The Greek Community of Trieste, 1751-1830), 2 vols., (Athens: University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986).

13. K. A. Sinnhuber, "Austria and Trieste", *Geography*, 39: 3 (1954), pp. 202-204.

century did not offer direct lines to the Black Sea, but cargoes could be transferred there via Constantinople, a standard destination of Lloyd Austriaco, as there was a Constantinople-Varna line.¹⁴ A wide range of destinations extending from the eastern Mediterranean to India reveal a privileged dense network of regular maritime routes:

Lloyd Austriaco had regular maritime connections in the 1880's in the Mediterranean:

9-knot speed itineraries:

- Trieste (Fiume), Corfu, Alexandria and back, 52 voyages/year, 2.402 maritime leagues for each round course.
- Trieste, Corfu, Syria, Constantinople and back, 52 voyages/year, 2.356 maritime leagues for each round course

8-knot speed itineraries:

- Trieste, Pola, Dalmatia, Durazzo and back, 52 voyages/year, 1.037 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Pola (Pula, Croatia), Dalmatia, Albania, Prevera (Preveza); and back, 52 voyages/year, 1.482 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Pola, Cattaro (Montenegro) and back, 52 voyages/year, 825 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Fiume and back, 52 voyages/year, 272 maritime leagues for each round course
- Fiume, Trieste and back, 52 voyages/year, 272 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Fiume, Corfu, Syria, Smyrna and back, 52 voyages/year, 2.280 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Patras, Piraeus, Volo, Salonica, Constantinople and return, 26 voyages/year, 3.306 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Ceylon, Calcutta and back, 6 voyages/year, 12.260 maritime leagues for each round course

14. *Index to the Miscellaneous Documents of the Representatives for the 1 session of the 48 congress, 1883-84* in 40 volumes, (Washington: 1884).

- Trieste, Aden, Bombay, Ceylon, Singapore and return, 6 voyages/year, 13.750 maritime leagues for each round course
- Trieste, Bombay and return 3 voyages/year, 8.680 maritime leagues for each round course

The indemnity is fixed by article 2 of the convention in the following proportions:

- Constantinople-Varna line: 4 florins
- Trieste-Alexandria, Trieste-Constantinople, Trieste-Bombay, Fiume-Liverpool, Trieste-Calcutta: 1.80 florins
- Singapore line: 2.50 florins
- Other courses: 1.50 florins

The Lloyd steamers had these privileges. They were exempt from paying tonnage duties, were allowed to take cargoes at night, could embark health officers to abbreviate quarantine, had the right in national ports of most commodious places to load and unload, and every three months they were reimbursed the taxes paid in making the passage of the Suez Canal.

Picture 1: Ships in the Port of Trieste, beginning of the 18th c.



Picture 2: Trieste and its port, beginning of the 18th c.



The Russian economic perspective

There is strong evidence that the U.S. State Department was very much interested to enter into the Russian market in the last quarter of the 19th c, and American consuls became quite competent to give detailed reports about Russian trade and about their foreign competitors in Russian markets, their consular reports refer to the potential advantages of the port of Trieste.¹⁵ Furthermore, it would

15. British Library, *United States. Department of State. Consular Service Commercial Relations of the United States. Reports... from the Consuls of the United States on the commerce, manufactures, etc., of their Consular Districts. no. 1-31. Washington, 1881....* For example: (1883-1884, vos 1-6). Every volume contains several reports from the U.S. Consuls on the commerce, manufactures etc of their consular districts, published by the Department of State, in Washington by the government printing office and indexed by geographic and thematic unit, or by export goods from various countries.

be interesting to compare *L'Osservatore Triestino*'s data with another non-European source. The american consular reports give us tables of Russia's external trade for the period from 1873 to 1885 indicating values of exports and imports in US dollars. The countries mentioned are Germany, United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Turkey, Italy, U.S.A., Holland, Belgium, Norway and Sweden, Romania, Greece, South America, and several other countries. Russia's export-import balance appears balanced, rather slightly positive. The Value of exports in the series of 13 years is 4,485 million US Dollars, a yearly average of 345 million dollars.

Table 1: Russia's external trade. Value of imports/exports and balance (1000Xdollars) 1873-1885

Countries	Imports		Exports		Balance
		%		%	
Germany	1.853.628	43%	1.411.170	31%	- 442.458
United Kingdom	1.144.767	26%	1.458.753	33%	313.986
Austria-Hungary	210.193	5%	283.799	6%	73.606
France	184.844	4%	412.901	9%	228.057
Turkey	134.058	3%	91.755	2%	- 42.303
Italy	87.377	2%	88.600	2%	1.223
United States	94.634	2%		0%	- 94.634
Holland	69.043	2%	280.132	6%	211.089
Belgium	78.233	2%	172.723	4%	94.490
Norway and Sweden	37.044	1%	122.477	3%	85.433
Romania	19.037	0%	45.337	1%	26.300
Greece	18.702	0%	25.564	1%	6.862
South America	106.611	2%		0%	- 106.611
All other countries	282.466	7%	55.818	1%	- 226.648
Total imports / Exports / Balance	4.320.637	100%	4.485.425	100%	164.788

Analysing the value of imports to Russia within these 13 years, we notice that Germany keeps the highest percentage of the total value of imports, holding 43% of the total value of imports for the period. British imports to Russia hold 26% of the total values. All other countries hold an average of under 5% of the total import values

to Russia, during the same period. For example, imports to Russia from Austria Hungary for the period 1873-1885 hold 5% of the total values of the period. The exports of Austria (mentioned without Hungary) from Russia hold 6% of the total values for the period.

All in all examining the value of exports from Russia to the same countries and the same period, we notice that Russian exports to the United Kingdom maintain the 33% of the total Russian exports in the period. Germany holds the 31% of the total exports of the period to Russia. All other exports from Russia to other countries range under 9% for the same period. So there is no doubt that Russia had two main trade partners in the 1870's and 1880's, Germany and United Kingdom, as these two countries covered 69% of imports and 64% of exports during the period examined. All other countries were competing for a small share in Russian markets. On top of that the external trade between Russia and Austria Hungary appears quite limited.¹⁶

Trieste's economic perspective

Following this point, we shall examine the case of Trieste closer, using also evidence deriving from the U.S. consular reports. A closer look at Trieste's imports and exports for the years 1882, 1883 give us some preliminary results to combine with the rest of our data.

Table 2: Imports/Exports to/from the port of Trieste

	Imports to Trieste (value in dollars \$)				Exports from Trieste (value in dollars \$)			
	1882		1883		1882		1883	
		%		%		%		%
Austria Hungary	4.046.864	7	3.879.110	6	10.544.133	19	10.710.598	20
Brazil	2.573.418	4	6.504.643	10	340.702	1	436.831	1
Egypt	4.042.314	7	4.568.655	7	4.500.904	8	3.776.605	7
Great Britain	7.179.674	12	10.091.749	15	3.959.542	7	3.629.952	7


16. *Index to the Miscellaneous Documents of the Representatives for the 1 session of the 48 congress, 1884-85* in 17 volumes, (Washington: 1885), p. 460.

	Imports to Trieste (value in dollars \$)				Exports from Trieste (value in dollars \$)			
	1882		1883		1882		1883	
		%		%		%		%
Greece	2.043.880	3	3.292.441	5	4.856.011	9	5.107.018	10
India Oriental	18.388.300	31	18.525.259	28	3.683.178	7	2.340.912	4
Italy	9.423.322	16	10.255.539	15	11.008.452	20	10.972.882	21
Rumania	514.196	1	670.905	1	496.175	1	568.535	1
Russia	2.902.516	5	2.221.225	3	658.280	1	79.836	0
Turkey	7.822.676	13	7.114.786	11	14.134.938	26	14.926.124	28
Total	58.937.160	100	67.124.312	100	54.182.315	100	52.549.293	100

Source: Index to the Miscellaneous Documents of the Representatives for the 1 session of the 48th congress, 1883-84 in 40 volumes, Washington 1884¹⁷ p. 663 Imports and exports of Trieste for 1882-1883


Figures 1, 2: Maritime Imports/Exports

Figure 1: Imports to Trieste 1882, 1883 (value in dollars \$)



17. In 1856, a law required the State Department to annually transmit all commercial information sent to the Department by consuls. The result was *Commercial Relations of the*

Figure 2: Exports from Trieste 1882, 1883 (value in dollars \$)



Comments on Maritime Imports/Exports (Figures 1 and 2)

There are 10 countries for evaluation from all over the world, obviously the main trade partners of Trieste indicating the global perspectives of this Austrian Hungarian port. Numbers indicate value in US dollars and percentages of the total value of imports or exports but having in mind the lack of accurate numbers the U.S. consular reports give us a good picture of Trieste's trade potentialities.

Imports are 10% to 20% higher than exports.

Imports in 1883 are 18% higher than the imports in 1882 and exports 5% lower.

United States, published annually from 1856 until ended in 1914. These annual reports, of varying quality, described economic and social conditions in the consuls' host countries; during the 1890s and early 1900s they filled two hefty volumes. According to one authority, "The general ground covered may be summarized as a description of existing conditions in business, exports and imports, and improvement in transportation facilities".

A high percentage of 30% of imports (average figure for the two years) is coming from India Oriental, while the exports to India accounted for only 5.5% of the total goods exported to the 10 countries under evaluation.

A percentage of 26% of exports is transported to Turkey, while only 13% of the total imports are coming from Turkey.

The size of transit trade in the port of Trieste is considerable if we observe the percentage of import/ export values to Austria-Hungary: imports to the port of Trieste are only 6.5% of total value in these 2 years, and exports to the Empire covers 19.5%.

Table 3: Departures of Vessels from Trieste 1884-1885

Countries	1885	1885	1884	1884
	Vessels	Tonnage	Vessels	Tonnage
Austria-Hungary	3.956	229.262	4.274	215.242
America	61	72.270	60	64.288
Africa	106	91.593	98	80.275
Asia	34	59.941	35	59.097
Australia				
Hamburg	18	12.760	8	5.714
Belgium	1	1.263	1	885
Bulgaria	2	1.944		
France	116	76.017	143	94.756
Great Britain and Ireland	132	149.578	139	156.452
Greece	189	39.867	214	46.230
Italy	1.739	224.634	1.569	174.826
Montenegro	2	28	3	162
Netherlands			2	1.524
Portugal	1	549		
Roumania	2	1.640	1	1.280
Russia	19	17.078	25	17.132
Spain	10	7.647	6	4.690
Sweden and Norway				
Turkey	484	275.980	482	252.326
Total	9.632	1.264.051	7.060	1.175.529

Comments on departures of vessels from Trieste 1884, 1885 (Table 3)

The analysis of the number of vessels shows that the 83% in both years are going to Austria-Hungary (61-57 percent) and to Italy (22-26 percent), however it is meaningless to compare with other countries, because the tonnage of the vessels varies largely. Vessels sailing from Trieste to the other ports of Austria-Hungary (e.g. Fiume, Zara, Spalato and Ragusa) are likely to be coasting vessels.

The analysis of the average size of the vessels going to each country (total tonnage by number of vessels) gives the following results:

Smaller vessels travel to Montenegro (34) Austria-Hungary (54), Italy (118).

Larger vessels head to Asia (1,726), America (1,128) and Great Britain and Ireland (1,129).

Analyzing the tonnage of the vessels that sail from the port of Trieste to the ports of Austria-Hungary we observe that it represents a share of 18% of the total tonnage for the years 1884 and 1885.

Similar figures appear for Turkey; departures/exports are respectively 22% and 21%.

The third major maritime destination from Trieste is Italy, and for 1885 it amounts to 18% (tonnage), while for 1884, 15%. Russia, and the Black Sea ports in general, such as of Romania and Bulgaria, represent a very small share of maritime traffic from Trieste, which rises to less than 2% (tonnage) of the total exports from Trieste. Great Britain is the fourth export destination, representing a share of 12% (tonnage) in 1885 and 13% in 1884. The outgoing vessels from Trieste to Asia (India) correspond to 5% (tonnage). While the outgoing vessels from Trieste to Greece amount to only 4% (tonnage) of the total exports.

Table 4: Arrivals of vessels to Trieste (1884-1885). FLAGS

	1885		1884	
	Tonnage	Number of ships	Tonnage	Number of ships
Austro-Hungarian	698,635	4,666	643,728	4,156

	1885		1884	
	Tonnage	Number of ships	Tonnage	Number of ships
North American			1,978	2
Argentine Republic	65	1		
Belgian			1,223	1
Danish	313	2	896	2
French	9,152	10	1,298	4
German	40,052	48	31,076	40
Greek	15,810	146	21,983	171
English	266,971	236	251,083	214
Italian	214,636	1,731	185,043	1,554
Montenegrin	1,453	45	1,750	55
Netherlands			631	1
Turkish	3,063	34	3,492	42
Asian	1,837	4	266	2
Swedish and Norwegian	17,863	46	13,135	30
Total	1,269,850	6,969	1,157,582	

Comments on Arrivals to Trieste (1884-1885) (Table 4)

The vessels with Austro-Hungarian and Italian flags cover 92% in number of vessels and 71% in tonnage. The next major flag is the English one, which despite the fact that in number of vessels is only 3%, in tonnage it corresponds to 21%, thus we presume that the English vessels are the largest vessels entering the port of Trieste carrying goods not only from England but from India also. A small number of vessels raised the Greek flag. There is no trade with Norway-Sweden and Germany (in accordance with table 2); however, 46 vessels in 1885 and 30 in 1884 arrived at Trieste under the Swedish or Norwegian flags, and 48 and 40 with German flags.

In accordance with table 2, imports to Trieste from Turkey represent a share of 12% of the total number of goods imported in the years (1882-1883), but the Turkish flag is almost nonexistent as far as the arriving vessels at Trieste is concerned.

Trieste and the Black sea oil

The new and innovative product of oil in 1885 was coming to Trieste from Baku, via the Black sea port of Batumi, and exported from there to Turkey and Europe. The oil exploit in Azerbaijan was exported to Bagdad, Teheran and Russia as well, via different routes. Already, the first refineries of Nobel and Rothschild were working in Batumi producing three fractions, the illumination oil (the light fractions called kerosene), the medium fractions-lubricant oil, and the heavy fractions – residuum oil in small quantities. In Baku foreign capital had enabled this Caspian port become the major world oil-producing centre. Nobel brothers, founded an oil company in Baku in 1879 which was soon to become the world's largest, while soon the Rothschild brothers established the Caspian-Black Sea Society for Commerce and Industry; by the 1890s six British-owned companies, in addition to three French, two German, two Belgian, and one Greek, were in operation. The high degree of concentration accounted for the unparalleled advances in volume of oil output, which in 1898 surpassed that of the United States. By the turn of the century it seemed that the Baku oil boom reached its limits and in 1898 a prolonged economic depression set in.¹⁸

Table 5: Exports of petroleum products from Batumi 1885

Oil exports from Batumi 1885	Illuminating Oil		Lubrication Oil		Residuum Oil		Total	
	gallons	%	gallons	%	gallons	%	gallons	%
Austria-Hungary	3.281.570	12	613.115	15	0	0	4.100.080	13
Turkey	11.843.950	44	13.100	0	205.400	31	12.062.450	38
England	1.748.800	7	1.239.525	30	187.550	28	3.175.875	10
France	1.056.125	4	1.211.570	29	198.500	30	2.466.195	8
Italy	3.239.470	12	980.740	24	75.000	11	4.295.210	14

18. Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920. The shaping of national identity in a muslim community*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 20-23.

Oil exports from Batumi 1885	Illuminating Oil		Lubrication Oil		Residuum Oil		Total	
	gallons	%	gallons	%	gallons	%	gallons	%
Romania and Serbia	5.197.060	19	0	0	0	0	5.197.060	16
Germany	250.000	1	40.100	1	0	0	290.100	1
Other Countries	498.350	2	50.100	1	0	0	548.450	2
Total	27.115.325		4.148.250		666.450		32.135.420	

Source: Index to the Miscellaneous Documents of the Representatives for the 1 session of the 49th congress, 1885-86 in 26 volumes, Washington 1886, p. 643

The 85% (in gallons) of the total oil coming from Batumi is exported as illumination oil, the whole of which amounts to 27 million gallons. The nineteenth century is considered to be the “Age of Illumination Oil”, with the light fractions substituting for all other materials used for illumination; 44% of the production is exported to Turkey, 19% to Romania-Serbia, whereas a 12% is exported to Austria-Hungary and Italy separately. The medium fractions were used for lubrication of manufacturing equipment taking over the oil of animal and vegetable origin and all the products were exported to industrialized countries: 30% to England, 29% to France, 24% to Italy, 15% to Austria-Hungary. The residuum oil produced in a very small quantity (only 2%) was exported mainly to Turkey, England, France and Italy. The main importer of the Baku/Batumi oil was Turkey. Trieste, the main port of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was a significant destination of Batumi oil (13%) and this is confirmed from the *The Osservatore Triestino* database, as well.

Examining the arrivals and departures to/from Trieste to various Black Sea ports in the last two decades of the 19th c. through the *Osservatore Triestino* database we can observe that from 1880 to 1883 most cargo arrivals to Trieste concern cereals. But from 1884 a new trade partner, Batumi, appears from the Black Sea, so Baku oil from the Caspian Sea enters the port of Trieste. The next years, oil from Batumi enters the port and in correspondence to that Trieste sends lumber, empty barrels, various goods and vacant steamships to the Black sea ports, while parallel to that route cereals from the

known ports of the Black Sea continue to be exported to Trieste. In 1894 except oil, fuel oil and mineral oil are exported from Batumi to Trieste. These maritime cargo through various steamships continue to cover the last years of the 19th c.

In fin dei conti

It seems that maritime routes from Trieste to various Mediterranean and Black Sea ports were active throughout the long nineteenth century. Although Russia and the Austro-Hungarian state were not major trade partners, it seems that Trieste kept its commercial ties with the Black Sea region, from Taganrog, Odessa, Nikolayev, Marianopoli, Galatz, Braila, Sebastopol, Sulinà, Batumi, Trebizond, and Zoungouldak, but the innovative trade came definitely from Batumi and its oil exports.

Trieste proved as a world port city, which set its modern social characteristics and competent economic capabilities from the beginning of the eighteenth century, when it became a free port. It was the maritime gate of the eastern Mediterranean for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but also an important transit port, redistributing agricultural goods from multi ethnic ports shifting from the Black Sea via Constantinople, to Smyrna and the Levant, to Alexandria, and further away. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Trieste's maritime routes extended to India. The city's status as an Austro-Hungarian port until 1919, and then as an Italian port, did alter its economic capabilities to a certain extent, since the port and its entrepreneurial elites had achieved long-standing comparative advantages, and established international trade networks.

The ports of Trieste, Venice and Fiume represent different types of coastal environment and adaptation in the Adriatic. However Trieste offered the easiest route from the Mediterranean to the Danubian cities (Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Belgrade). Historically Trieste was in a contact zone. This Hapsburg free port offered opportunities to Greeks, Slavs, Armenians, Jews and other minorities, especially by facilitating trade exchanges with the markets in the Ottoman eastern Mediterranean. Smyrna was the outlet for agricultural products which Trieste distributed to other European cen-

ters. The railroad connections of this port to Vienna in 1857 and the opening of the Suez Canal increased the tonnage of the ships from 717.293 in 1860 to 1,471,464 in 1890. Mediterranean products competed with colonial goods and central European products were exported to all local and international destinations from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean, to Near and Far East and to South America. But despite its railway connection, maritime transportation predominated in Trieste's bulk commodities. Ship industry grew concomitantly together with maritime services. The port grew into two distinct areas for general cargo, storage, passenger traffic and ship yards, petroleum, iron and steel manufacturing. San Saba developed into a petroleum harbor with storage facilities and refinery. Before WWII Trieste's principal commodity was petroleum (crude and refined) displacing other import products. Petroleum was coming from North and South America the Southeast Asia and the Black Sea. The petroleum and its products was redistributed primary to Austria, Italy and Switzerland. When in 1880's petroleum entered Trieste its potential importance was immediately evaluated and expanded to a new business policy.¹⁹ Not to forget that the growing world demand for oil, the product which turned upside down business industry and technology, as well as everyday life, was introduced to Trieste from Baku via Batumi in the 1880's and from there distributed all over the known world.

19. Leonard Unger, "The Economy of the Free Territory of Trieste", *Geographical Review*, 37:4 (Oct., 1947), pp. 583-608. On Trieste's global perspectives, see G. Melinato, *L'Adriatico conteso. Commerci, politica e affari tra Italia e Austria-Ungheria (1882-1914)*, Milan, Franco Angeli 2018, p. 28 sg.

4.

Ionian trade in the Russian Black Sea and settlement in the Danube (1815-1864)

Panayiotis Kapetanakis

Introduction

The Ionian Sea and its seven main islands, namely Corfu, Paxos, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Cephalonia, Zante and Cerigo, had played a vital role in linking the Mediterranean Sea with the western and central part of the European continent. As a result, the Ionian State and its ports, which since 1809 were part of the global British Empire, became an integral part of the new era of early economic globalization and the international trade system of the nineteenth century. Within this trade system, and taking advantage of the political and economic developments in Europe, the British subjects of the Ionian Islands managed to participate actively in the new, international distribution of commercial and maritime activity of the nineteenth century in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and to shape up the terms of their noteworthy maritime and commercial presence in the Russian Black Sea. However, the Ionian presence was not limited only to the ports of New Russia, but was expanded in the ports of the Lower Danube, primarily in the ports of Braila and Galatz, with the Danube becoming a key area of their maritime and trade specialization during the mid-nineteenth century.

The present chapter aims to present the main factors that led to the aforementioned commercial and maritime orientation and presence of the Ionians in the Black Sea and mainly in the Danube River, during the period when the Ionian Islands were under British colonial rule (1809-1864). The main topics to be studied are: a) the political and economic developments taking place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean world and especially in the Ionian Islands and the Black Sea during the period covering the years from 1809 (starting

year of the British rule over the Ionian Islands) up to 1864 (last year of British protection, the Ionian Islands were ceded to Greek Kingdom); b) the growth and geography of the Ionian maritime trade and shipping, and the specific role the Black Sea and, mainly, the Danube River played in the development of Ionian maritime trade; and last but not least, c) the terms and conditions of the establishment and settlement of the Ionian subjects in the Danubian ports of Braila, Galatz and Sulina. Finally, there is one more issue we shall deal with in this chapter, and concerns the role that Britain as the protecting power of the Ionians has played in the development of their shipping.

The present chapter uses the archival information provided by the *Odysseus – Ionian Maritime History Database*.¹ The latter includes an amount of 21,000 departures/arrivals of vessels under various flags from/to the Ionian Islands during the years 1809-1864.²

The Ionian Sea and the Mediterranean world (1815-1864)

During the nineteenth century the Mediterranean came back to the west European and British foreground and was connected to the Atlantic economy.³ This is a new reality in which the Ionian Sea and the

1. To access the online database *Odysseus*, go to: <http://odysseus.britonian.eu/> (date of access: 28 October 2015)

2. For the nationality of the vessels sailing to and from the Ionian Islands' ports, apart from the "Odysseus, Ionian Maritime History Database", see United States, House of Representatives, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Ex. Doc. No. 63, *Letter of the Secretary of State, Department of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1862* (Washington-DC 1863).

3. L. R. Fisher and H. W. Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850-1914", in R. Wolfram Fisher, Marvin McNinis and Jurgen Schneider (eds), *The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500-1914*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986), pp. 519-544. See also Vassilis N. Metaxas, *Αρχές Ναυτιλιακής Οικονομικής* [Principles of Maritime Economics] (Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1998), pp. 276-277; Alan Cafruny, *Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987); Gelina Harlaftis, and Vassilis Kardasis, 'International shipping in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea: Istanbul as a maritime centre, 1870-1910,' in Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds), *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization before 1950* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 233-265.

Ionian Islands' State, as part of the Mediterranean economic world, had to function.⁴ The signal for that change was, of course, the industrial revolution taking place in Western Europe. The need for cereals, due to the urban population explosion Western Europe was experiencing, led to the search for new wheat-producing regions.⁵ The regions that emerged were the Russian Black Sea⁶ and, after the fourth decade of nineteenth century, the Danube River.⁷ Both regions managed to leave behind their so-called "Ottoman isolation" and enter into the new era of the globalizing European economy. This development was due not only to the industrial revolution taking place in Europe, but also due to the continuous wars fought between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires; wars launched by the desire of Russia to dominate, in political and economic terms, in the Balkans and the eastern part of the Mediterranean, at the expense not only of the Ottoman Empire, but also of its European allies, like Great Britain.⁸

The most essential of those wars was the Russo-Turkish War of

4. Fernand Braudel, *La Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen a l' époque de Philippe II*, Vol. I, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), pp. 149-165. See also, Gelina Harlaftis, 'Στην Θάλασσα' [At Sea], in Spyros Asdrahas, Anastasios Tzamtzis and Gelina Harlaftis (eds), *Η Ελλάδα της Θάλασσας* [Greece of the Sea] (Athens: Melissa Publications, 2004), pp. 15-32.

5. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Chris Wrigley, *Industry and Empire* (London: The New Press, 1999), Ch.7; R. Woods, 'Population Growth and Economic Change in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,' in Mathias, P. and Davis, J. A. (eds), *The Nature of Industrialization: The First Industrial Revolutions* (London: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 127-153; B. R. Tomlinson, 'Economics and Empire: The Periphery and the Imperial Economy,' in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch.3.

6. On the Russian Black Sea and the transport of cereals, see Adam Kirkaldy, *British Shipping. Its History, Organization, and Importance* (London: Elibron Classics, 2004), pp. 337-347. See also, Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794-1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Athanassios John Mazis, *The Greeks of Odessa. Diaspora Leadership in Late Imperial Russia* (New York: East European Monographs, 2004).

7. On the Danube River, see Constantin Ardeleanu, *Evoluția Intereselor Economice și Politice Britanice la Gurile Dunării (1829-1914)* (Brăila: Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei, 2008), Ch. 1, 2.

8. Andrew Porter, "Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century", in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 10-15.

1828-1829, which ended with the *Treaty of Adrianople*, giving to the victorious Russian Empire most of the eastern shore of the Black Sea, the mouth of the Danube, as well as the occupation of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. This is the period when the true internationalization of the Black Sea and the Bosphorus Strait took place, by giving the right for free navigation not only to the Russian flag but to any flag being at peace with the Sublime Port, such as the British flag or the flag of the British-protected Ionian State. The aftermath of the Crimean War (1854-1856),⁹ a war that Great Britain had hankered for,¹⁰ was the Treaty of Paris that led to the formation of the autonomous United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (1859), and some years later of Romania (1861). But the most significant result was the establishment of the *European Commission of the Danube* for the improvement of free navigation on the river.¹¹

The country most interested in free and unrestricted navigation in the Black Sea, and particularly the Danube, was, of course, Great Britain;¹² her rising need for cereals and the need for disengagement from the wheat of her – since autumn 1853 and the outbreak of the Crimean War – main rival and enemy, Russia, led Britain to guide her interest towards the Danubian breadbasket region.¹³ Actually, the key to understanding the commercial reality in the Black Sea, and mostly in the Danube, is Great Britain and its decision to support production and trade of the Danubian cereals in every way

9. On the Crimean War, see A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 62-82.

10. Op.Cit., pp. 111-112.

11. On the historical background of the Danube River, see Virginia Paskaleva, "Shipping and Trade on the Lower Danube in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", in Vacalopoulos, Svolopoulos and Király (eds), *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies; From the mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914* (New Jersey: 1988), pp. 131-151; see also Richard Charles Frucht, "War, Peace, and Internationality: The Danube, 1789-1916", in Vacalopoulos, Svolopoulos and Király (eds), *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies; From the mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914* (New Jersey: 1988), pp. 79-98.

12. Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, *A Concise Economic History of the World. From Palaeolithic Times to the Present*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 220-224.

13. Jeremy Black and Donald M. Macrailld, *Nineteenth-century Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 226-227.

in her favor.¹⁴ Within this newly emerged political and economic framework the ports and markets of the British-protected Ionian State had been orientated towards the Black Sea grains, and after the mid-nineteenth century towards the trade of the Danubian grains.

Before, however, proceeding with the terms of the development of Ionian commerce with the Black Sea, and mainly the Danubian ports, let us first examine the historical realities the Ionian Islands experienced during the nineteenth century. The termination, in 1797, of the – almost 400 years long – Venetian rule over the Ionian Islands, marked the beginning of a turbulent period in their history. The possession of the Islands, due to their valuable geographic position, in the middle of the commercial routes of the Mediterranean Sea, constituted the key objective for the main powers of nineteenth-century Europe.¹⁵ As a result, the Ionian Islands experienced the successive French, Russian and Ottoman dominions, for almost seventeen years, until their temporary occupation by the British naval forces in 1809, which became permanent and formal in 1815.

To be more specific, on November 5, 1815, the Treaty of Paris declared the creation of a free and independent state under the formal name of *The United States of the Ionian Islands* or otherwise *Ionian State*. The latter became part of the British Colonial Empire as a protectorate, with the tolerance of the major European powers of that time, namely Russia, Austria, and France.¹⁶ According to the treaty, Great Britain undertook not only the political and economic protection of the Islands, but also the obligation to recognize the constitutional rights of the newly established state. However, beyond this formal and rather liberal

14. Spiridon G. Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβειος* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube] (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975), pp. 45-72; Andreas Lemos, *Η ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων*, Τόμος Α [Greek Shipping] (Athens: 1968), pp. 152-153; see also Dunn John Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece, with suggestions for advancing our trade with the Turkish countries of the Adriatic, and the Danube* (London: J. Ridgway, 1859), pp. 73-76.

15. Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion. Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), Ch.1.

16. Eleni E. Koukkou, *Ιστορία των Επτανήσων από το 1797 μέχρι την αγγλοκρατία* [History of the Ionian Islands from 1797 until the British domination] (Athens: Papadimas Publications, 2001), pp. 197-207.

reading of the treaty, the cluster of the Ionian Islands constituted a significant part of the British Colonial Empire.¹⁷ The British domination ended in 1864 when the Islands were ceded to the Kingdom of Greece.¹⁸


The Ionians, the Adriatic and the Russian Black Sea

The rising significance of the Black Sea as a breadbasket region and its commercial importance for the economy of Western Europe resulted into a double effect: on one hand, it has determined, decisively, the entire economic and commercial environment of the Black Sea itself, whereas on the other hand, it has provoked a subsequent rapid commercial and shipping development in several regions of the Mediterranean world. The United States of the Ionian Islands constitute one of the most indicative paradigms of this developmental procedure.

17. Philip L. Cottrell, *The Ionian Bank. An Imperial Institution, 1839-1864* (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archive, 2007), pp. 118-119; Athanasios Gekas, "The Commercial Bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands under British Rule, 1815-1864. Class formation in a semi-colonial society", (PhD thesis University of Essex, 2004), pp. 43-52, 91-92; Charles-James Napier, *The Colonies: Treating of their Value generally – In particular of the Ionian Islands* (London: T. & W. Boone, 1833), pp. 1-17. See also *The Saturday Magazine* (11 July 1840): "the importance of these Islands to England has reference principally to their geographical position, by which they are admirably adapted for protecting our trade in the Eastern parts of Europe, and of extending our commerce as soon as Greece becomes more settled and civilized".

18. On the historical background of the Ionian Islands, from the fall of Venice to the union with the Greek State, see Panayiotis Chiotis, *Ιστορία του Ιονίου Κράτους από συστάσεως αυτού μέχρις Ενώσεως. Έτη 1815-1864* [History of the Ionian State from its creation up to the Union with the Greek Kingdom], (Zante: 1877); Nikos Karapidakis, "Τα Επτάνησα. Ευρωπαϊκοί ανταγωνισμοί μετά την πτώση της Βενετίας" [Ionian Islands. European competition since the fall of Venice], in Vassilis Panayiotopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία Νέου Ελληνισμού: 1770-2000*, Vol. I [Early Modern Greek History: 1770-2000], (Athens: Ellinika Grammata Publications, 2003), pp. 149-184; See also Nikos Karapidakis, "Ιόνια Νησιά, 1815-1864: Προστασία, το πρόσχημα της Αγγλοκρατίας" [Ionian Islands, 1815-1864: Protection and the guise of British rule], in Vassilis Panayiotopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία Νέου Ελληνισμού: 1770-2000*, Vol. IV, Early Modern Greek History: 1770-2000], (Athens: Ellinika Grammata Publications, 2003), pp. 265-184; Nikos G. Moschonas, "Navigation and Trade in the Ionian and Lower Adriatic Seas in the 18th century", in Vacalopoulos, Svolopoulos and Király (eds), *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies; From the mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914* (New Jersey: 1988), pp. 189-196.

Figure 1: Maritime regions-commercial partners of the Ionian-owned fleet (percentage presentation) based on Ionian arrivals in the Ionian State ports (1820-1859)



Source: processed data from *Odysseus Ionian Maritime History Database*.

In order to examine the importance of the Black Sea for the Ionian maritime trade, we have focused on the ship movements (arrivals) of the Ionian-owned fleet in the ports of the Ionian State, and the mapping of the main maritime regions – commercial partners of the Ionians (Figure 1).¹⁹ At this point we need to note that by the term “Ionian-owned fleet/shipping” we mean all merchant vessels – regardless of flag – that belonged to the Ionian State’s subjects, whereas by “Ionian fleet/shipping” we are referring to merchant vessels sailing only under the formal flag of the Ionian State. According to fig. 1, there are six main maritime regions – commercial partners for Ionian shipping during the period covering the years from 1820 up to 1859: a) the non-Mediterranean (ports of Atlantic Ocean, North and Baltic Seas included), b) the west Mediterranean, c) the central Mediterra-

19. By “Ionian-owned shipping”, we mean the ships, regardless of flag, belonging to Ionian citizens.

nean, d) the Adriatic Sea, e) the east Mediterranean region (Aegean Sea and the seas of the eastern Mediterranean included), and f) the Black Sea (Constantinople and the Danubian ports included).

At first sight it seems that the Ionian shipping experienced two principal phases. During the first, from 1820 until 1830, the commercial transactions with the ports of the Adriatic Sea are predominant, representing an average forty-four percent out of the total arrivals of Ionian vessels in the Ionian ports. On the other hand, the eastern Mediterranean holds the second position with its average share being twenty-four percent, and the Black Sea ports represent twenty-three percent. The trade with the western and eastern Mediterranean ports occupies the fourth and fifth position, respectively, whereas the non-Mediterranean trade is in fact non-existent and it will remain as such until the 1860s. However, during the second phase, which covers the years between 1845 and 1859, the reality of the 1820s will be totally reversed. The Black Sea is now emerging as the predominant commercial partner of the Ionians with an average share of 35%, followed by the Adriatic ports (32%), and the ports of the eastern Mediterranean (19%). The percentages of the central and western Mediterranean regions are respectively 10% and 4%.

In other words, we witness the increasing commercial importance of the Russian Black Sea for the Ionian-owned shipping and the Ionian ports; the commercial participation of the Black Sea in the total number of the Ionian ship's entrances in the Ionian ports has been steadily increased from a limited share of 10% in the year 1820 (six vessels) to a maximum of 53% (138 vessels) in 1859. Furthermore, whereas during the decade of 1820s the Ionian maritime trade was principally orientated towards the 'old' and familiar, for centuries, Adriatic markets, from the beginning of the 1830s Ionian commercial orientation started to change. The participation of the Adriatic ports in the development of Ionian commerce has been reduced from a maximum share of 66% to a minimum of 26%. The long lasted primacy of the Adriatic Sea markets has been replaced by that of the new Black Sea markets, with a temporary exception of the mid-1850s, as a result of the Crimean War and the subsequent closure of the Black Sea for all merchantmen.²⁰

20. On the Crimean War see Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, pp. 62-82.

It should be stressed, however, that not all Black Sea ports had the same contribution to the development of Ionian maritime trade. In spite of the noteworthy presence of Ionian traders and vessels in almost all major Black Sea ports (Taganrog, Berdiansk, Mariupol, Kertch, Odessa, Sevastopol, Theodosia, Nikolayev, Constanza, Burgas, and Constantinople) there is one maritime region, which attracted their commercial interest: the Danube and its main ports Braila and Galatz. But before proceeding further to the next section of this chapter related to the examination of the Ionian presence in the Danubian region, let us first have a closer look at the qualitative data relating to trade conducted between the Ionian and the Black Sea ports, as a whole during the period covering the years from 1845 up to 1860.

Table 1: Cargoes traded between the Ionian and Black Sea ports by Ionian-owned vessels, 1845-1859 (in brackets the % share of general & bulk products in total goods traded)

Merchandise exported from the Ionian Islands towards Black Sea ports		Merchandise exported from Black Sea ports towards the Ionian Islands	
General cargoes (93%)	Bulk cargoes (7%)	General cargoes (17%)	Bulk cargoes (83%)
olive oil	sugar	caviar	cereals (wheat, corn, barley, oat, rice, rye)
manufactures	cereals (wheat, barley, corn, rice)*	legumes	linseed
bricks	linseed	soap	coal
tiles		leathers	firewood
soap		salted fruits	cotton
wine		salted meat	tallow
timber		salted fish	shipbuilding timber
salt		iron	
coffee		anchors	
potatoes		skins	
rusks			
tobacco			
dried fruits			

*cereals re-exported from Ionian Islands' ports to the port of Constantinople

Source: processed data from *Odysseus Ionian Maritime History Database* and TNA, FO 359/1, 13.09.1827, James Yeames to Foreign Office.

The cargoes traded between these two maritime regions are presented in Table 1 above. First of all, we should mention that in order to study the cargoes traded from and to the Ionian ports during the aforementioned period we have distinguished them into general and bulk cargoes, and within these categories we have set out the exact nature of the cargo. By general cargo we mean high cost finished or semi-finished goods per unit with a relatively limited volume, while by bulk goods we mean cheap, large-volume products of which the volume and distance covered is more important than their value.²¹

According to the table, the Black Sea supplied the Ionian ships primarily with bulk cargoes (mainly wheat, corn, barley, oat, rice, linseeds, rye, cotton, and tallow), and secondarily with general cargoes (caviar, legumes, soaps, leathers, salted preserved fruits, meat, fishes and iron).²² The participation of the bulk cargoes in the Black Sea exports represents an 83%, whereas the general cargoes represent a mere 17%. On the other hand, the Ionian exports towards the Black Sea consisted almost exclusively of general cargoes (93%), with the bulk cargoes representing just 7%. The main general cargoes exported to the Black Sea ports from the Ionian State were local agricultural products, namely olive oil and wine, as well as the various West-European (mainly British) manufactures and industrial products; whereas the bulk cargoes consisted mainly of sugar and cereals.

Table 1, in conjunction with Figure 1, gives us an indicative picture of the role the Ionian merchant shipping had played during the mid-nineteenth century. And what was that role? That of a regional provider of maritime transport services to third European parties specialized in the export/transit trade of Black Sea grains, after having left behind the era of its “Adriatic isolation”. To be more specific, the Ionian merchantmen seem to have undertaken and been specialized in the transport of Black Sea grains through British protected Ionian ports to western Mediterranean ports, from where they were further transported by other flags to Great Britain and the rest of West-European markets. On the other hand, the

21. Martin Stopford, *Maritime Economics* (London: Routledge, 2009), Ch. 11; Donald F. Wood, Anthony P. Barone, Paul R. Murphy, Daniel L. Wardlow, *International Logistics* (London: Springer Science & Business Media, 2002), pp. 90-95.

22. Metaxas, *Αρχές Ναυτιλιακής Οικονομικής* [Principles of Maritime Economics], pp. 127-131, 147-150.

Ionian ports, and mainly that of Corfu, became important depots for British manufactures and colonial products, which were re-exported to all major ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In other words, Ionian shipping had acquired a regional but nodal place in the maritime trade routes connecting the industrializing and urbanizing Western Europe and the valuable, for its grains, agricultural Black Sea.

The Ionians are turning to the Danubian ports (1825-1864)

The Ionians in the Danube: maritime trade


The mentioned in the previous section noteworthy presence of the Ionians in the Russian Black Sea ports can be clearly seen in the case of the Danube River. The Danube and its ports during the mid-nineteenth century became the main commercial partner of the Ionians and attracted hundreds of people from there who decided to settle in Braila, Galatz and Sulina, foreseeing large profit opportunities in the near future by engaging in the export trade of the Danubian grains. The result was hundreds of Ionians migrating from their Islands to the Danube, a development that has further strengthened the orientation of the Ionian maritime trade and shipping to the Danubian port-cities and grain markets. For the moment, however, we are going to focus on the Ionian maritime presence in the Danube by studying the departures of Ionian merchantmen from the ports of Braila and Galatz in comparison to the existing data for Ionian departures from all the Black Sea ports, during the years from 1825 up to 1864.²³

Figure 2 below presents (a) the total number of Ionian vessels departed from the Danubian ports of Braila and Galatz and arrived in the Ionian ports during the years from 1825 up to 1864, and (b) the found data for the total number of Ionian vessels departed from all

23. For an overview of the Ionian presence in the Danube River, see Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του κάτω Δουνάβεως* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 45-57, 80-116; Maria I. Markopoulos, *Οι Κεφαλλήνες και οι Ιθακήσιοι στη ναυτιλία του Δουνάβεως* [The Cephalonians and Ithacans navigating the Danube] (Athens: 1967), pp. 12-35.

Black Sea ports and arrived in the Ionian Islands. According to this data, the share of the Danubian ports represents an amount ranging between a minimum of 7% in 1825, up to a maximum 86% in the year 1859, which in other words means an impressive growth of 336% within a period of 43 years. Figure 2 indicates that the importance of Danubian trade for the Ionian commercial shipping was rather limited during the decade of 1820, compared to the total Ionian presence in the Russian ports of the Black Sea as well as in Constantinople.

Figure 2: Departures of Ionian-flag vessels from Danube* and Black Sea (1825-1864)**



Source: processed data from: *Odysseus Ionian Maritime History Database* and; Nikos S. Vlassopoulos, *Η Ναυτιλία των Ιονίων Νήσων, 1700-1864* [Ionian Islands Shipping, 1700-1864] (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki Publications, 1995), vol. B, Table B.2; Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relatiile Comerciale Româno-Engleze în Contextul Politicii Orientale a Marii Britanii (1803-1878)* (Cluj-Napoca: 1986), pp. 61, 88, 146. (*Danube: ports of Braila and Galatz; **Black Sea: all Black Sea ports, Constantinople included).

This picture, however, is going to be reversed in the decade of 1830, when the Ionians will start getting steadily specialized in the Danubian trade. This is the consequence, first of all, of political developments in the Black Sea region. The Treaty of Akkerman (1826), signed between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires, re-

confirmed the free navigation of the Danube given to the Russian and Ottoman flags by the previous Treaty of Bucharest (1812).²⁴ The Ionians have apparently taken advantage of both treaties by using either their neutral Ionian flag or the Russian one, or even the Ottoman (on the numerous flags used by the Ionians during the period 1818-1864 see Figure 5 in the following subsection).²⁵

Based on Figure 2 we can say that the Ionians have seen in the Danube and its grains a fruitful future in commercial and business terms, a fact that motivated them leaving the Adriatic ports and starting to focus on the Danube.²⁶ However, the decisive signal for that change was the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, which led to the opening of the Danube River and the Bosphorus Strait to almost all ships and flags, especially the Russian (Treaty of Hünkâr Skelesi, 1833). The signing of the Treaty of Adrianople gave a new boost to Black Sea commerce in general. Russia undertook the protection of

24. On the Treaty of Adrianople see Nicolae Ciachir, "The Adrianople Treaty (1829) and its European Implications", *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 17:4 (1979), pp. 695-713.

25. This is the case of the flags of convenience, the use of which was not only a 20th c. reality. The letter of the British consul in Istanbul to his opposite number in Odessa (in 1821) stresses: "The British and Ionian governments have resolutely declared their opposition against the licence given to the Ionian vessels, which have abandoned their nationality, to reuse the Ionian flag; consequently, I do not comprehend why you should be authorized to grant requests of that kind, [...]. The subjects of the Ionian State have to understand that their flag is absolutely respectable for being treated as a simple opportunistic issue."; see Gelina Harlaftis, *Η Ιστορία της Ελληνόκτητης Ναυτιλίας* [A History of Greek-owned Shipping] (Athens: Nefeli Publications, 2001), pp. 114-119, for the whole text of the British consul and for a brief presentation of the Greek case of flags of convenience in the nineteenth-century.

26. Paul Cernovodeanu, "British Economic Interests in the Lower Danube and the Balkan Shore of the Black Sea between 1803 and 1829", *Journal of European Economic History* 5:1 (Spring 1976), pp.105-120, notes that: "The number of vessels flying the British flag on the Danube or the Black Sea increased when the Ionian Islands (Corfu, Cephalonia, Cerigo, Zante, etc.) were put under Great Britain's protection on 1st September, 1815 by the Congress of Vienna. Then a number of Greek merchants, trading for British companies, settled in Galatz and in Braila [In a report sent to the High Porte, concerning the number of foreign subjects in Moldavia on 7 April 1825, it was stated that of the 90 subjects, mainly Ionians recorded by the English consulate, almost 76 here lived in the Principalities "from remote time", were married to native women and also had "some outhouses" or even in some ports on the Black Sea.]

the Danubian Principalities, and tried to bolster their commerce by offering exemption from import duties to all foreign traders (1834) by establishing the ports of Braila and Galatz as free ports (in 1836 and 1837, respectively), and by granting exemption to foreigners from paying customs fees (1837-1838).²⁷

It is clear that the Ionians have exploited all these opportunities and taken advantage of their British citizenship, which offered them more safety in trading in these areas, along with the use of their neutral – but always under British protection – Ionian flag. The case of the Ponsonby Treaty, signed between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1838, is indicative, as it secured important advantages for British trade in the Ottoman Empire (free navigation in the Bosphorus Strait included), and further strengthened the Ionian presence in the Black Sea, as well.²⁸ Consequently, the aforementioned developments, combined with high shipping freight rates, have resulted in a significant growth of Ionian maritime presence in the Danubian ports, with an average annual growth rate of 31% for the years between 1831 and 1839.

The next peak is located in the mid-1840s, and it should be attributed to a good wheat harvest in the Danubian plains and a poor one in Western Europe and especially Great Britain and Ireland.²⁹ On the other hand, the uprising tendency in the beginning of the


27. For further details on the political and commercial status in the Black Sea in the 19th c., see Cernovodeanu, *Relatiile Comerciale Româno-Engleze în Contextul Politicii Orientale a Marii Britanii*, ch. 2; see also Ardeleanu, *Evoluția Intereselor Economice și Politice Britanice la Gurile Dunării*, Ch. 1.

28. Cernovodeanu, *Relatiile Comerciale Româno-Engleze în Contextul Politicii Orientale a Marii Britanii*, 86-87; Alexander Kitroeff, "The Greek Diaspora in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea as seen through American Eyes (1815-1861)", in Speros Vryonis (ed.), *The Greeks and the Sea* (New York: Aristide D Caratzas Pub., 1993), pp. 153-171; Ardeleanu, *Evoluția Intereselor Economice și Politice Britanice la Gurile Dunării*, Ch. 1; Martin Lynn, "Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire", in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 111-112.

29. Cormac O Grada, "Irish Agricultural Output Before and After the Famine", *Journal of European Economic History* 13 (1984), pp. 149-165. Paul Cernovodeanu and Beatrice Marinescu, "British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853", *Journal of European Economic History* 8 (Winter 1979), pp. 707-741.

1850s³⁰ should be ascribed to the abolition of the British Corn Laws (1846) and the Navigation Acts (1849), a reality that gave a new boost to wheat exports from the Danubian ports (especially towards British ports), in combination with new high shipping freight rates towards the mid of the 1850s.³¹

Figure 3: Tonnage of Ionian vessels departed from Braila and Galatz and total tonnage of Ionian fleet (1825-1860)



Source: see figure 6.2 and Ardeleanu, *Evoluția Intereselor Economice și Politice Britanice la Gurile Dunării*, table 6. (There is no available data for the total tonnage of the Ionian fleet for the years 1835 and 1840)

Yet the most significant and sharp rising trend of Ionian commercial and shipping activity in the Danubian ports occurred after

30. On the commercial status of the ports of Brăila and Galați and the general trends of their commercial development in the 1850s see Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Comerciale Româno-Engleze în Contextul Politicii Orientale a Marii Britanii (1803-1878)*, ch. 3.

31. Cernovodeanu and Marinescu, "British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853", 707-742. Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece*, pp. 73-76; see also Paul Bairoch, "European Foreign Trade in the XIX Century: The Development of the Value and Volume of Exports (Preliminary Results)", *Journal of European Economic History* 2 (1973), pp. 5-36. Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping* (London: J. Murray, 1990), pp. 287-288.

the end of the Crimean War and the subsequent establishment of the European Commission of the Danube.³² A new era had emerged marking the unrestricted opening of the Danubian grain markets to European trade, and the termination of almost all hindrances Russia had imposed on navigation on the river, as well.³³ The Ionians, as indicated in Figure 2, have successfully taken advantage of this new commercial reality; it is worth noticing that the average annual growth rate of Ionian commercial shipping in the ports of Braila and Galatz, for the years between 1856 and 1864, was 27%. Furthermore, this sharp rise in Ionian maritime presence in the Danubian ports can be clearly seen in Figure 3 above. According to the figure, the capacity (tons) of the Ionian vessels departing from the Danube has been tripled within thirty years; and whereas their capacity represented a negligible percentage of the total available tonnage of the Ionian fleet in 1825, thirty-five years later more than one third of the available Ionian tonnage was engaged in the Danubian grain trade.


Furthermore, this worthy Ionian presence in the Danube, during the years following the end of Crimean War, can be clearly seen in Figure 4. Ionian shipping, according to the data provided by the European Commission of the Danube River for the years 1856 up to 1864, possesses the sixth position, with the Greek flag holding the first, and being followed by Italy, Great Britain, the Austrian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. We do believe that the sixth position of the Ionian flag demonstrates the importance of the Ionians in the competitive commercial environment of the Danube River. Furthermore, the fact that the Ionians had to compete with the major maritime and commercial powers of nineteenth-century Europe is another reason demonstrating the significance of their maritime presence in the Danubian port-cities and grain markets.

Consequently, the Danube River had an important and decisive impact on the development and orientation of Ionian maritime

32. Ira A. Glazier and Vladimir N. Bandera, "Terms of Trade between South Italy and the United Kingdom 1817-1869", *Journal of European Economic History* 1 (1972), pp. 7-36.

33. Paskaleva, "Shipping and Trade on the Lower Danube in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", 131-51; Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβω* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 75-79.

Figure 4: Tonnage of the six major flags departed from Braila and Galatz (1856-1864)



Source: see figure 2 and Ardeleanu, *Evoluția Intereselor Economice și Politice Britanice la Gurile Dunării*, table 6. (The Italian flag for the years 1856 to 1860, i.e. before Italian unification (1861) includes the flags of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, and the flag of Tuscany)

trade. For the Ionians the Danube and its main ports emerged as the major determinant of their specialization in trading the bulk cargoes of the Danubian grains towards the depots of the British-protected Ionian State, and then towards the main ports of the central or western Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, from the data presented above we conclude that the development of the Ionian merchant shipping is directly connected with the general European commercial trends and food demands of the mid nineteenth-century. This is the result, we strongly believe, of the Ionian participation in the economic and political world of the British Empire. In other words, the Ionian case is an interesting example of how a local or regional shipping can be transformed into a player with an important role in peripheral transit maritime trade, by being subsumed – voluntarily or not – into the political and economic context of a global empire, as was the case with the British Empire.

The Ionians in the Danube: settlement

The Ionians, according to the data presented in the previous figures, have managed not only to enter successfully the Danubian grain trade, but also to become permanent or temporary settlers in the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. It seems that the rise of the Ionian maritime trade and shipping in the Danube was mainly due to the Mediterranean expansion of British Empire's trade.³⁴ The Ionian State, as a British protectorate, offered to its subjects a double citizenship: the Ionian and the British, as already mentioned in the beginning of the present chapter. The Ionian ship-owners and merchants used both in order to expand their shipping activity and respond to the British need for cereals as well as for new markets that could consume the British industrial products and manufactures. We do believe that the key to understanding Ionian specialization in Danubian grains and their consequent settlement in the major Danubian ports is the trade of the British Empire. But why is British trade the key?

Britain was facing great difficulties in trading with the Danube, especially after the Treaty of Adrianople and the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russia.³⁵ Furthermore, the decision of Russia not to improve navigational conditions on the Danube³⁶ resulted to a limited British presence there.³⁷ However, this limited


34. Niall Ferguson, *Empire-How Britain made the modern world*, (London: Penguin, 2004); Allen Larry, *The Global Financial System 1750-2000*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), pp. 184-210; Jones Geoffrey, *Merchants to multinationals. British trading companies in the nineteenth and twentieth century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); see also Sarah Palmer, "The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914", in Lewis R. Fisher and Gerald E. Panting (eds), *Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century* (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Maritime History Group, 1985), pp. 87-114 [98].

35. Cernovodeanu and Marinescu, "British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853", pp. 707-742.

36. Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece, with suggestions for advancing our trade with the Turkish countries of the Adriatic, and the Danube*, pp. 73-76;

37. Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβειος* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 68-70; Vassilis Kardasis, *Από του Ιστιού εις τον ατμόν. Ελληνική Εμπορική Ναυτιλία 1858-1914* [From sail to the steam. Greek Merchant Shipping 1858-1914] (Athens: Cultural and Technological Foundation ETVA, 1993), pp. 118-123.

Figure 5: The Ionian-owned fleet and its flags, 1818-1864 (Ionian flag is excluded)



* *Italian flags*: flags of Papal States and Kingdom of the Two Sicilies until the Italian Unification in 1861.

Source: processed data from *Odysseus Ionian Maritime History Database*.

British presence was counterbalanced by the shipping and commercial activity of the British Ionian subjects. The Ionians could sail under the Russian, Ottoman, Greek, British or Ionian flag without confronting any hindrances, and as a result they became the essential commercial partners of the British.

Figure 5 above is more than indicative of the numerous flags used by the Ionians during the period 1818-1864, apart from the Ionian. To be more specific, for the said period, 87% (corresponding to 4,160 ships) out of the total number of Ionian-owned vessels having arrived in the port authorities of the Ionian State had chosen to sail under the formal flag of the Ionian State, whereas the remaining 13% (equivalent to 566 vessels) chose to sail mainly under the Greek, Russian, British or the Moldavian and Wallachian flags. In other words, it seems that the Ionians did know very well the importance of the use of various flags (as is currently the case with flags of convenience) depending on what best fitted their

business/maritime interests (e.g. payment of lower custom duties or port charges).³⁸

The political and economic restrictions, however, that Russia had imposed on the Danube's navigation ended in 1856, after the termination of the Crimean War.³⁹ The latter put an end to the dominant role of Russia in south-eastern Europe, especially in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Yet, the most important consequence was the establishment of an international commission that improved navigation and trade on the Danube River.⁴⁰ Great Britain was the main European power that took full advantage of the new status of the River.⁴¹ And it is within this framework that Ionian presence and settlement in the Lower Danube can be understood.

When we refer to Ionian presence in Danube we refer in fact to the presence of the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca.⁴² The ship-owners, sailors and merchants of these two islands were the ones – among all the Ionians – more specialized in Danubian trade, and as a result they took the decision to settle in the major ports of the Danube: i.e. Braila, Galatz and Sulina. Their decision was based on the need to ensure and further strengthen their commercial transactions with the Lower Danube through the development of a network of agencies in the main ports of the Danube, connected directly to South Russia, Constantinople, the Greek Kingdom, the Ionian State, western Mediterranean ports and London. Before, however, presenting this Ionian network, let us first exam-

38. Metaxas, *Αρχές Ναυτιλιακής Οικονομικής* [Principles of Maritime Economics], pp. 65-59 and Harlaftis, *Η Ιστορία της Ελληνόκτητης Ναυτιλίας* [A History of Greek-owned Shipping], pp. 118-119. See also Cernovodeanu and Marinescu, "British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853", pp. 707-742.

39. Emil Palotás, "The Problems of International Navigation on the Danube in Austro-Hungarian Politics during the Second half of the 19th century", in Vacalopoulos, Svolopoulos and Király (eds), *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies; From the mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914* (New Jersey: 1988), pp. 99-114.

40. Op.Cit., pp. 112-113.

41. In 1852 almost the 40 percent of the ships departing from the Danubian ports of Brăila and Galați and conveying wares to England was of British interests, see Cernovodeanu and Marinescu, "British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853", pp. 707-742.

42. Op.Cit., pp. 116-117.


ine the main features of the Ionian movement towards the Danube.

In the State Archives of Cephalonia's Prefecture in Argostoli, and specifically in the registries of the Island's Executive Police, we found all the extant documents related to the issued passports belonging to the inhabitants of Cephalonia and Ithaca during the years 1837-1863.⁴³ At this point we have to note that the person, mainly the father, son or husband of a family, who applies to the Executive Police for a passport is most often accompanied by members of his family (wife, children, fathers, servants etc.), who also apply for passports. In other words, this is an important hint of the quality of the Ionian movement towards the Danube; a movement that had the characteristics of a rather dynamic and permanent settlement.


Figures 6 and 7 below present the six main geographical destinations/countries, as well as the main port-cities for which the 1,500 passports found in the archives were issued. The first position belongs to the Ottoman Empire, with Constantinople dominating among the other Ottoman destinations with 87%. This is a predictable result not only due to the central commercial and shipping role of the Ottoman capital, but due to the fact that Constantinople was a necessary first stop for all the Ionians wanting to continue their voyage to other Black Sea port-cities. Furthermore, we believe that for the Ionians Constantinople was an essential 'transit' stop, where they could collect all necessary information before taking the decision where to continue their journey.⁴⁴ At this point we have to note that 70% of the Cephalonians arriving in Braila and Galatz and 74% of them arriving in Sulina were given passports by the Cephalonian Executive Police, with Constantinople being noted as their final destination. However, after arriving in Constantinople and making all necessary contacts with their compatriots living there, they then visited the British Consul to whom they reported their next and final destination in order to have it written on their passports.

43. Georgios N. Moschopoulos, *Ο Θεσμός της Αστυνομίας στα Επτάνησα: Τα Κεφαλληνιακά Αρχεία της Εκτελεστικής Αστυνομίας (1815-1864)* [The Institution of the Police in Ionian Islands: The Files of Executive Police (1815-1864)] (Argostoli: 1997), pp. 5-12, 115-125.

44. Harlaftis, *Η Ιστορία της Ελληνόκτητης Ναυτιλίας* [A History of Greek-owned Shipping], pp. 96-102; Nikos Vlassopoulos, *Η ναυτιλία των Ιονίων Νήσων* [Ionian Islands' Shipping] (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1995), pp. 13-36.

Figure 6: Cephalonian passports and states for which they were issued (1837-1863)

Source: processed data from Greek State Archives of Prefecture of Cephalonia, Executive Police, Folders 471-484 (passports).

Figure 7: Cephalonian passports and port-cities for which they were issued (1837-1863)

Source: see figure 6

After Constantinople follows in second position the Kingdom of Greece. The main Greek destination for the Ionians was Patras with 47%.⁴⁵ This is the result of Patras functioning as a direct commercial, shipping and business interlocutor of the Ionian Islands, and as a main export center of firewood, wheat and, mainly, currants. The cultivation and harvest of currants is the reason for a great but seasonal moving of the Ionians towards the north-west Peloponnese region. The Russian⁴⁶ and Austrian⁴⁷ Empires are holding the fourth and fifth position respectively, with Taganrog representing a 38% among all Russian destinations (apart from the Danubian Principalities), and Trieste representing an 80% among all Austrian destinations. The last geographical destination/state for which the Ionian passports were issued was Great Britain together with her colonies, with a total of 3%. From that sum, Malta represents 70%, England 17% and Leghorn 13%.

So far we have refrained from any comments concerning the Danube and its main port-cities, but now it is time to study them in more detail. According to the total number of passports issued by the Executive Police in Argostoli, the Danube River as final destination for the Ionians holds third place with 20%. In other words, from both figures 6 and 7 what we observe is the great importance the Danube River had for the Ionians, especially for the inhabitants of the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca, the two main maritime islands of the Ionian State.⁴⁸ According to the *Blue Books of Statistics* and the dispatch that Lord High Commissioner Seaton

45. For a general overview of the history and economy of Patras, see, Nikos Bakounakis, *Πάτρα, 1828-1860. Μία ελληνική πρωτεύουσα στον 19ο αιώνα* [Patras, 1828-1860. A Greek capital in the 19th century] (Athens: Kastaniotis Publications, 1995).

46. Vasilis Kardasis, *Έλληνες Ομογενείς στη Νότια Ρωσία 1775-1861* [Greek expatriates in South Russia 1775-1861] (Athens: Alexandria Publications, 1998), ch. 6.

47. Fulvio Babudieri, "Maritime Commerce of the Hapsburg Empire: The Port of Trieste, 1789-1913", in Vacalopoulos, Svolopoulos and Király (eds), *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies; From the mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914* (New Jersey: 1988), pp. 221-244.

48. On the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca and their maritime supremacy within the Ionian State, see Panagiotis Kapetanakis, "Shipping and Trade in a British semi-colony: the Case of the United States of the Ionian Islands (1815-1864)", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 85 (2012), pp. 269-284.


sent to the Colonial Office and Earl Grey in the mid-1840s, we are informed that the trade between the Ionian Islands and the Black Sea (Danube included) was prosperous.⁴⁹ This reality mentioned by Lord Seaton is more than evident in the previous two figures. Furthermore, we must stress that it is trade with the Danube that led gradually to this significant Ionian movement towards its main ports, namely Braila, Galatz, Sulina, Tulcea and Ismail.

Let us now examine, though, the quantitative features of the Ionian movement/immigration towards the aforementioned Danubian ports. Figure 8, which follows, presents the passports issued annually from the island of Cephalonia towards the Danubian ports during the years from 1841 to 1863. The conclusions that can be drawn are the following: a) the presence of the port of Braila is predominant; the total number of issued passports is 137 with two main peak periods: the first one coincided with the Crimean War (1853-1856), whereas the second one is located in the beginning of the 1860s (1859-1860). Furthermore, we should note that Braila is the third main Ionian destination following Constantinople (454 passports) and Patras (141 passports). b) As second most important Danubian destination for the Ionians emerges the port of Galatz following the same peak periods as Braila. However, Galatz seems to experience one more Ionian boost towards the mid-1860s. c) On the other hand the port of Sulina follows the general trends of the Ionian movement/immigration towards the Danube, as those mentioned for Braila and Galatz, but not with the same vigor, whereas the presence of Tulcea and Ismail is restricted in our figure to just two years, and we thus cannot form a clear picture of their importance as settlement destinations for the Ionians.

Based on the data of Figure 8, we understand that the Ionians started moving and/or immigrating for a permanent or temporary settlement in the Danubian ports of Braila, Galatz and Sulina almost immediately after the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853). The Russian decision to put an embargo on all grain exports/sales to the

49. Miranda Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, *Πολιτειογραφικά Ιονίων Νήσων επί Αγγλικής Κυριαρχίας, 1815-1864. Τόμος Δεύτερος: Δημογραφικά Στοιχεία Αγροτικός Τομέας* [Statistics of the Ionian Islands during the period of English Domination, 1815-1864. Volume Second: Demographics – Agricultural Sector] (Athens: 1997).

Figure 8: Ionian movement towards the major Danubian ports, 1841-1863 (issued passports).



Source: see figure 6

Ottoman Empire and its allies from the ports of South Russia bolstered the presence of neutral flags, such as the Ionian or the Greek one, which could sail in the Black Sea undisturbed.⁵⁰ Furthermore, after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Danubian Principalities, the west-European fleets could reach Danube without any hindrance and as a result there was a steep increase in the exports of Danubian wheat. This is actually the background that provides a sufficient explanation for the Ionian settlement in the Danube.⁵¹

Actually, the choice of settlement in Braila, Galatz and Sulina was the result of the geographical position and economic/commer-

50. Kardasis, *Έλληνες Ομογενείς στη Νότια Ρωσία 1775-1861* [Greek expatriates in South Russia 1775-1861], pp. 165-169.

51. Op.Cit., p. 171; see also Harlaftis, *Ιστορία της Ελληνόκτητης Ναυτιλίας* [A History of Greek-owned Shipping], pp. 108-114.

cial status of these ports during the nineteenth century.⁵² Braila⁵³ had been a well-known commercial center with a direct connection to Brasov and central Europe since the fourteenth century.⁵⁴ However, Braila becomes a significant Danubian port during the nineteenth century, owing its importance to its large grain-handling and warehousing facilities, and to the fact that its port is accessible to small and medium-sized ocean-going vessels like the ones the Ionians had. On the other hand, Galatz used to be a fishing village back in the sixteenth century, whereas during Ottoman occupation (from sixteenth century until 1829) became an important port for the Ottomans and their Danubian trade.⁵⁵ Despite all, however, its rapid nineteenth century development actually took place after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), and thanks to the adoption of the status of a free-port from 1837 until 1883. Sulina, on the other hand, during the second half of the nineteenth century turned out to be a prosperous Danubian export and import center, an important shipyard, and since 1856. the seat of the European Commission of the Danube.⁵⁶

These are the three main ports of nineteenth-century Danube that attracted the maritime interest of the Ionians, making them take

52. Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβεως* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 75-79.

53. Kardasis, *Από του Ιστιού εις τον ατμόν. Ελληνική Εμπορική Ναυτιλία 1858-1914* [From sail to the steam. Greek Merchant Shipping 1858-1914], pp. 118, 123-124; Eleni D. Mpelia, "Ο Ελληνισμός της Ρουμανίας (1835-1878)", *Δελτίον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος* [Romania's Hellenism (1835-1878), Bulletin of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece], 26 (1983), pp. 6-62; Gerasimos K. Kolaitis, *Το χρονικό της Ιθάκης* [The Chronicle of Ithaca] (Piraeus: 1988), pp. 68-69.


54. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "Τα δίκτυα της ελληνικής εμπορικής διακίνησης", [Networks of Greek commercial business], in Speros I. Asdrachas (ed.), *Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία* [Greek Economic History], Vol. A (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2003), pp. 461-481.

55. Kardasis, *Από του Ιστιού εις τον ατμόν. Ελληνική Εμπορική Ναυτιλία 1858-1914* [From sail to the steam. Greek Merchant Shipping 1858-1914], p. 118; Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβεως* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 46-57. Kolaitis, *Το χρονικό της Ιθάκης* [The Chronicle of Ithaca], p. 70.

56. Focas, *Οι Έλληνες εις την ποταμοπλοΐαν του Κάτω Δουνάβεως* [The Greeks on the River Steamers of the Low Danube], pp. 75-76.

the big decision to settle there and set up their trading, shipping and banking businesses. The ports of Braila and Galatz became the main import and export centers of the Ionians, whereas Sulina and Galatz emerged as two of the most preferred ship-building centers of the Ionian-owned fleet. But having presented the quantitative features of the Ionian movement/immigration and settlement in the Danube, let us now study the qualitative ones presented in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9: Professions of Ionian settlers in the Danubian ports (1841-1863)



Source: see figure 5.6

At first sight, we can say that the Danubian ports attracted not only merchants and seamen, but mainly craftsmen, workers and peasants. By craftsmen, based always on what is reported by the Ionians in their passports, we mean coachmen, bakers, artisans, shopkeepers, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, chemists, doctors, chandlers, tailors, shoe-makers, cobblers, carpenters and builders. We strongly believe that this is an important indication of the permanent character of the Ionian movement/immigration towards the Danube. In other words, we believe that the Ionians sensed that the Danube was going to offer them many employment and business opportunities, and they consequently decided to move towards the Danube in order to man the newly-established communities of the

Ionian diaspora in Braila, Galatz and Sulina. To this we should add that 80% of the aforementioned craftsmen, workers and peasants were settled in the Danubian port-cities after the mid-1850s, which means after the end of the Crimean War and the restoration of normalcy in the Danubian and Black Sea maritime trade.⁵⁷

Furthermore, we need to note that the decision of the Ionians to settle in one of the aforementioned Danubian ports depended also on the already shaped ‘business’ and ‘commercial’ character of each port. Braila, as the major Danubian export and import center, emerged as the preferred destination of the Ionians, and mainly the Cephalonian merchants, shipmasters and seamen. On the other hand, Galatz emerged as the second important Danubian port, and with the status of a free port it attracted mostly merchants and craftsmen, and secondarily seamen and unskilled workers. Finally, Sulina was the port of choice primarily of craftsmen, followed by unskilled workers, merchants, and peasants. According to the processed data of the found passports, Sulina was preferred mainly by craftsmen such as carpenters and blacksmiths; apparently, this is the result of Sulina being an important ship-building center, where the Ionian ship-owners and merchants chose to build or purchase their vessels, and where Ionian workers could search for a profitable employment in Sulina’s shipyards.

However, Figure 9 draws our attention for one more reason: the presence of “landowners” or “gentlemen”. When the passport was issued, the applicants had to report to the Executive Police their main occupation/profession. What is interesting is that there are applicants who reported as their employment or occupation their social status quo. But this is not something strange for the Ionians, taking into consideration their Venetian past and the importance they ascribed to their social status. For nineteenth-century Ionian nobles, ‘nobility’ was based not only on their old titles and land-ownership, but primarily on their decision to exploit their accumulating capitals and to become the main financiers of the Ionian maritime industry.⁵⁸ We do

57. Kardasis, *Από του Ιστιού εις τον ατμόν. Ελληνική Εμπορική Ναυτιλία 1858-1914* [From sail to steam. Greek Merchant Shipping 1858-1914], pp. 140-144; Kolaitis, *Το χρονικό της Ιθάκης* [The Chronicle of Ithaca], p. 27.

58. For a short overview of the Ionian Economy during the British rule, see Evangelos Prontzas, ‘Οικονομικές επιδόσεις του 19ου αιώνα στην Επτάνησο’ [Fi-

believe that this is the key to understand not only the development of the Ionian shipping and commerce in general, but in particular the dynamic Ionian penetration and presence in the Danube. We further believe, according to the Cephalonian archives, that the Cephalonian landlords and gentlemen in the Danubian ports had a double function: as the main direct financiers of the Ionian merchants and ship-owners, and also as agents of the Cephalonian ship-owners, merchants and shipping-insurance companies. What is also interesting is that nine out of ten of the above mentioned 'landlords' and 'gentlemen' had chosen to settle in the Danube at the outbreak of the Crimean War; a period that portended a prosperous commercial future for Danubian exports.

Nevertheless, we must stress that the core of the Ionian presence in these ports were merchants, ship-owners and seamen; almost 40% of the issued passports during the years 1841-1863 were given to merchants and seamen from Cephalonia. The reason for this reality should be sought in the commercial transactions of the Ionian ship-owners and merchants dated back to the 1820s, which developed terms of a growing business-attractiveness of settling in the Danube. The Ionian merchants, ship-masters and seamen took advantage of the commercial and business opportunities in the Danube, especially in the 1850s and afterwards, and started establishing their diaspora communities in the Danubian ports. As a result, a significant part of the inhabitants of Cephalonia and Ithaca was actuated by this perspective of a prosperous 'Danubian' future and took the decision to immigrate to Braila, Galatz and Sulina.⁵⁹

nancial performance of the Ionian Islands the in 19th century], paper presented to the Scientific Congress *Η Ένωση των Επτανήσων με την Ελλάδα, 1864-2004* [The Union of the Ionian Islands with Greece, 1864-2004], Greek Parliament and Academy of Athens (Athens: 2005).

59. Traian Stoianovich, "Οι Τύποι και οι Μηχανισμοί της Αγοράς" [Forms and Mechanisms of the Market], in Speros I. Asdrachas (ed.), *Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία* [Greek Economic History], Vol. A (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2003), pp. 483-513; Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "Η ελληνική διασπορά: Η γεωγραφία και η τυπολογία της" [The Greek diaspora: geography and typology], in Speros I. Asdrachas (ed.), *Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία* [Greek Economic History], Vol. A (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2003), pp. 237-247.

Concluding remarks or the advantage of being a British semi-colony

In the introductory part of the present chapter we posed one critical question regarding the institutional role that Britain, as the protecting power of the Ionian Islands, had played in the development and growth of Ionian shipping. And since the *Odysseus* database has given us such valuable information concerning the Ionian maritime past, my question concerned the reason why such a notice-worthy maritime activity was practiced by the Ionians and not by other Mediterranean islanders, like the Maltese, for example.

The status quo of the British protection over the Ionian Islands was the major determinant of their economic, and particularly their commercial development, during the nineteenth century. The Islands were part of the British Empire as a sovereign state under the protection of the British crown,⁶⁰ but did not constitute a real colony.⁶¹ As a result, “the Islands did not fit neatly in the usual colonial categories”.⁶²

In order to conceive this ambiguous status of the Ionian Islands, it is worth looking at how British administration treated Ionian maritime trade. In his dispatch of 1844 to the Colonial Office and Lord Stanley, the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands Lord John Seaton states that “The political position in which these Islands are placed [...] will not admit of their enjoying the advantage of Colonies.”⁶³ In fact, the Lord High Commissioners of the Ionian

60. A. C. Bayly, “The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760-1830”, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26:2 (May 1998), pp. 28-47.

61. Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece, with suggestions for advancing our trade with the Turkish countries of the Adriatic, and the Danube*, pp. 64-65; Porter, “Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century”, 18; Bipan Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism* (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 1999), pp. 1-20, has attempted to present a general structure and typology of a colony, including the colonial state, the stages of colonialism, as well as the inner contradictions of colonialism; see also J. H. Parry, Philip Sherlock, and Anthony Maingot, *A Short History of the West Indies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), Ch. XIV.

62. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, pp. x-xi.

63. TNA, CO 136/122, Dispatch No.59, 21.06.1844, Lord High Commissioner of Ionian Islands to Lord Stanley.

State, appointed by the Ministry of Colonies in London, and having an absolute and unlimited responsibility and jurisdiction over the Islands, declared that the Ionian State was not a colony. Consequently, the Islands could not enjoy all the privileges that colonial status would have offered them.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the Ionians succeeded in constituting a powerful and specialized network of commerce and shipping during the period of British protection, with centers of activity being the Danube and the north Black Sea ports.⁶⁵

On the other hand, what is really important is the fact that the British administration did treat the Ionians as British subjects.⁶⁶ This meant that the Ionians enjoyed the important privilege of having double citizenship: the Ionian and the British. This reality offered them the opportunity to have protection provided by the British consuls or the British flag whenever they needed it. The formal government newspaper of the Ionian State, the *Gazzetta Degli Stati Uniti Delle Isole Jonie*, informs us of this broad network of British consuls and the offering of their ‘protection’ to Ionian subjects travelling or trading within or outside the Mediterranean Sea.⁶⁷

Moreover, in almost every commercial or political treaty that

64. Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece* (London, 1859), pp. 67-9, states that “Sir B. Lytton, in his Despatch appointing Mr. Gladstone as Special Commissioner, makes one very pertinent remark about the advantages both to England and the Islands that would probably arise from the application of British capital to them for commercial purposes; there is no doubt, and it is the remark of all foreigners, that we have greatly neglected the Islands in this respect [...]”

65. Harlaftis, *Η Ιστορία της Ελληνόκτητης Ναυτιλίας* [A History of Greek-owned Shipping], pp. 174-213.

66. An Ionian, *The Ionian Islands; What they have lost and suffered under the thirty-five years’ administration of the Lord High Commissioners sent to govern them. In Reply to a pamphlet entitled “The Ionian Islands under British Protection”* (London: 1851).

67. The British Administration of the Ionian Islands made frequent references in the official newspaper of the United States of the Ionian Islands saying that inhabitants of the Ionian Islands, who are outside the Ionian State, should notify the local British Consuls of their presence, in order to fall under British protection. This decision became an object of exploitation by the tradesmen and seamen of the Ionian Islands. Characteristically, we come across announcements by the British Vice-Consulates referring to the presence of Ionian subjects in the following regions: Batumi, Damascus, Alexandria, Istanbul, Belgrade, Albania, Erzerum, Trabzon, Tripoli (in Libya), Belgium, Austrian Empire etc.

Great Britain signed with a European or African state, during the time of her dominion over the Ionian Sea, it was clearly declared that “the Inhabitants of the Ionian Islands are [...] fully recognized and acknowledged [...] as British Subjects, and entitled as such to all the Rights and Security which British Subjects [...] enjoy, and it is [...] stipulated that their flag and commerce shall be henceforward respected as such accordingly in all their various Interests.”⁶⁸

This is the dual and ambiguous dimension of the status of the British protection over the Ionian State. The latter was neither a colony, as the Mediterranean island of Malta was,⁶⁹ nor an independent state.⁷⁰ Thus, the use of the term *semi-colony* for the case of the United States of the Ionian Islands seems to be the most appropriate.⁷¹

The Ionians managed to take full advantage of all the available opportunities and positive aspects resulting from this regime, and they succeeded in bolstering their commercial and shipping activity. Furthermore, the Ionian traders and ship-owners took advantage of the continuously expanding commercial and financial borders of their Protector in the Eastern Mediterranean, and succeeded in shaping the terms of a prominent position in the commerce of the Mediterranean Sea and especially in the Russian Black Sea and the lower Danube River.⁷²

68. TNA, FO 93.11/17, “Austria, Treaty (Seven Islands) signed at Paris, 5th November 1815”.

69. Carmel Vassalo, “The Maltese Merchant Fleet and the Black Sea Grain Trade in the Nineteenth Century”, *International Journal of Maritime History* 13:2 (December 2001), pp. 19-36.

70. Gardner, *The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece*, pp. 64-5, states characteristically that: “There is nothing in the Treaty of November 1815, signed at Paris, to prevent us giving any sort of Constitution we please to this race; [...] it is unfortunate that we received the Islands under the form of a Protectorate [...] but the conditions of the Treaty are extremely vague; [...] we have a directing hand in their internal government; [...] the term “Constitutional Charter” must be measured in its meaning by the period, when the Treaty was written; [...] at present they are swamped in the democracy, and lost [...].”

71. Henry Jervis-White Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfú and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands* (London: 1852), pp. 230-231; Cottrell, *The Ionian Bank*, 3, 26; Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, p. 17.

72. Panayiotis Kapetanakis, “Από την Αμφιτρήτη στον Οδυσσέα: πλέοντας με την ιόνιο ναυτιλία στα νερά της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου κατά την επαναστατική

On the other hand, Great Britain sought to utilize the key geographical position of the Ionian Islands and the trade networks they belonged to from the time of Venetian rule, in an endeavor to bolster its trade in the wider region of the central Mediterranean, and to safeguard new markets for its industrial products and new sources of food supplies for its increasing urban and industrial population. The decision of Britain to give the Ionian Islands' merchant navy the option to engage in a safe and independent business activity without the restrictions it normally imposed on its colonial acquisitions, was, we do believe, made with that consideration in mind.

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5.

From the Black Sea to the Pampas: the migratory movements to South America, 1870-1914

Maria Damilakou

In the period 1870-1914 a strong migratory dynamics towards the Americas developed in the whole Black Sea region. Although the bulk of this migration was directed to the United States, important groups of migrants also moved to South America, primarily to Argentina and secondly to Brazil. Various political and economic factors motivated this process: during that period the Russian and Ottoman empires that controlled the Black Sea regions experienced deep changes in their character as multiethnic and cosmopolitan societies; these changes were reflected in the gradual adoption of discriminatory and restrictive policies towards the ethnic and religious minorities that lived in their vast territories. In particular the Russian Black Sea regions ceased to be the “promised land” which had attracted thousands of Jews, Germans, Polish, Greeks, Armenians, and Rumanians among others, from the 1760s and onwards. At the same time, the gradual shift of the center of the global economy towards the Atlantic, to the detriment of the Mediterranean and the markets of East Europe and Middle East, negatively affected the economic potential of the Black Sea region. All these changes functioned as push factors and contributed, from the 1870s, to the development of important migration streams that in large part were channeled, through social networks and organized enterprises, towards North and South America.

This text analyses the migratory flows that linked the Black Sea to South America in the period 1870-1914 focusing especially on the organized and sponsored movements of large Russian-Jewish groups that settled as agricultural colonists in the pampas of Argentina. The first part studies the process of expansion, in the southern provinces of Russia (Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, Bessarabia), of a strong migratory mobility that transpassed ethnic borders and

national frontiers. It explores the factors that influenced this process and attempts to reconstruct the itineraries of the migrant groups that starting out from the Black Sea followed the “Mediterranean route” to South America, in which Odessa played a key role. The second part studies the migration policies of South American countries concerning immigration from South Russia; it focuses on the diplomatic activities of Argentina and Brazil in Russia and their connection with the shipping interests that had developed around the “market” for the transport of immigrants from East Europe to the Americas. The last part explores the experience of migrant groups from the Black Sea as colonists in the pampas of Argentina; analyzing the example of the Russian-Jewish colonies, it attempts to show the transcultural processes that conditioned their experience putting emphasis on group strategies and social networks and exploring how the migrant groups used their cultural backgrounds to shape their life and improve their position in the host country.

The primary sources I used for my research come from both public and private archives of Argentina. First, the diplomatic archives of the Consulate of Argentina in Odessa and of its Legacy in San Petersburg, included in the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires, offer important information not only about the diplomatic policies of Argentina but also about the migratory movements and other connections between Black Sea and South America. Second, the database of the Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA) includes the data of the passengers of the transatlantic ships that arrived at the port of Buenos Aires since the 1880s; from this large database I separated and studied the immigrants whose place of birth was Odessa; this information was completed with the reports of the Maritime Authority’s Inspections. Third, the important archive of the Jewish colonies in Villa Domínguez (Museo y Archivo de las Colonias Judías del Centro de Entre Ríos) contains valuable documentation about the Russian-Jewish migrant groups that settled in the colonies that the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) created in the Entre Ríos province of Argentina. Memoirs, biographies, personal correspondence and maps, and also the material heritage of these colonies, help to the better understanding of a complex process with transnational dimensions as it was the migratory movements that connected the Black Sea to the Americas.

The migratory dynamics from the Black Sea region to South America

Since the 1870s a migratory mobility towards the Americas gradually spread over the Russian Black Sea region, involving in particular the ethnic and religious minorities that lived in that zone. This was due to the fact that the Russian empire did not approve of the emigration of “genuine” Russians; instead it was tolerant of the emigration of the ethnic and religious minorities that had settled in its immense lands.¹ The impact of this outward dynamics was strong both in urban centers like Odessa and in the rural areas of the provinces of Kherson, Taurida and Bessarabia. These rural zones with their villages and small towns became, during the last decades of the 19th century, the “source” of the first organized migrations towards the Americas through colonization projects which basically involved Jewish and German groups that had previously settled in farming colonies in the fertile lands of the Russian south.

The first German colonies in the Russian Black Sea region had been formed at the end of the 18th century, as part of the modernization policies applied by the tsarina Catherine II in the south of Russia. The great immigration from Germany to that region took place during the rule of Alexander I: especially in the years 1804-1809 and 1817-1823 about 55,000 Lutheran, Catholic and Mennonite Germans settled in 148 agricultural colonies in the provinces of Bessarabia, Odessa, Taurida and Ekaterinoslav.² And as far as the Jewish colonies were concerned, their settlement in the Russian Black Sea areas became part of the “Jewish matter” and its management by the tsarist regime. This “matter” arose when the successive partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795 and the incorporation of large parts of its lands in Russia, multiplied the number of Jews living in the Russian empire.³ The tsars generally implemented the

1. Sofía Ehrenhaus – Marcela Garrido, *La inmigración rusa en la Argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Historia visual – Museo Roca, 2012), p. 4.

2. Víctor Popp – Nicolás Denning, *Los alemanes del Volga: Tras largo peregrinar por Europa hallaron patria definitiva en América*, (Buenos Aires: V. Popp – N. Denning ed., 1977), p. 126.

3. Ellen Eisenberg, *Jewish agricultural colonies in New Jersey, 1882-1920* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 4.

geographical confinement of the Jews to the so called “Pale of Settlement” that included the sparsely populated southern regions (map 1). From 1807 to 1866 the tsarist regime launched the experiment to turn Jews into farmers and resettled many of them in agricultural colonies in South Russia, in the provinces of Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Bessarabia, following the model of the earlier German colonies. Although many Jews abandoned these colonies – mainly after 1866 when tsar Alexander II cancelled the legislation pertaining to the transformation of Jews into farmers –, others remained there, kept their properties or moved to the nearby villages and small towns earning their life as agents of big landowners, creditors or innkeepers.⁴

Several economic and political factors contributed to the development of a migratory dynamics towards the Americas since the 1870s, first among the Russian-German colonists and then among Jewish farmers, land owners, artisans and middlemen. The above social categories were seriously affected by the fall of the grain prices after the “invasion” of American wheat on the European markets: from the 1870s until the end of the century, grain prices continued to fall and this decrease in prices drove several owners to ruin. Also not all colonists and independent farmers managed to adapt successfully to the changes induced in landownership after the emancipation of serfs in 1861. Speculation and “land hunger” which resulted from the disintegration of big holdings brought about a rise in land prices thereby excluding many rural families from the land market. Although some rich Jews and German colonists were among those who benefited most from the changes in private landownership, as they acquired the largest shares of the landlord estates,⁵ other members of their communities had no access to property. Several German colonists felt the effects of this shortage of land strongly as they could not purchase any property for themselves or for their older sons, who, according to their customary laws, had no right to the family heritage.⁶

The case of Jews was special: according to the May Laws of

4. Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa. A History, 1794-1914*, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1986), p. 27; Eisenberg, *Jewish agricultural colonies*, p. 5.

5. Herlihy, *Odessa. A History*, pp. 172-173.

6. Popp – Dening, *Los alemanes del Volga*, pp. 131-132.

Map 1: The Jewish Pale, 1835-1917



Source: Proper elaboration.

1882, they were not allowed to purchase, rent or manage farms and real estate outside the urban centers or to live in rural areas – villages and small towns – within the Pale. Although these regulations

were not always respected as several loopholes existed, they limited the possibilities of Jews in the rural areas. Also, all the changes produced by the beginning of modernization and industrialization in the Russian empire affected several traditional Jewish occupations in both rural areas and urban centers and many Jews experienced the process of proletarianization and pauperization.⁷ Moreover the harshening of the assimilationist policies of tsar Alexander II towards the ethnic minorities since the mid-1860s further fueled the migratory tendencies among them: the Germans faced the abolition of the privileges that their communities had enjoyed until then, in particular of their exclusion from compulsory military service; the Jews encountered since 1880s expulsions and further restrictions on entering certain professions and on enrollment in high schools and universities. In this context, the hostilities and pogroms against the Jews that broke out after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 – followed by rumors that the Jews were leading revolutionary forces – accelerated the immigration of the Jewish population of the Russian empire that then comprised about four million persons.⁸

Mass immigration to the Americas was one of the responses of the affected minorities to these pressures. Certainly United States became their main destination. The first to emigrate as organized groups, destined to settle in farming colonies, were Russian-German colonists from the Black Sea region: in 1872 a group composed of 35 families and in 1873 another one of 400 persons migrated to the US Midwest, motivated by railway companies' agents who were seeking European farmers to settle in the extended lands that the American government had granted them around Missouri river in the period 1850-1871. The companies offered free transport and lands at low prices to the potential colonists.⁹ As a result, in the 1870s hundreds of Russian-German families from the Black Sea colonies moved to the United States and settled principally as farmers in the North and South Dakota. The migration of Russian

7. Eisenberg, *Jewish agricultural colonies*, pp. 3-6.

8. Haim Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía, 1810-1950*, [trad. Etty E. de Hoter], (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria Magnes/Universidad Hebraica de Jerusalén/AMIA, 1983), p. 87.

9. Olga Weyne, *El último puerto. Del Rhin al Volga y del Volga al Plata*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tesis – Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1986), p. 91

Jews to the United States began in 1882: the Jews from the northern regions of the Pale were the first to emigrate in mass; whereas the Jews of the southern zones around the Black Sea were more resistant to the various pressures and their strong migratory flows to the Americas started somewhat later, after mid-1880s.¹⁰

The South American countries, especially Argentina and Brazil that since the 1870s started to recruit colonists, functioned as an alternative destination for the potential immigrants from the Black Sea regions. In the 1870s and 1880s a hard and not always honest struggle took place between the governments of Brazil and Argentina, both eager to attract the European immigrants to their respective countries. The emperor of Brazil Pedro II visited Europe in 1870 launching, through his agents, an active migration policy that offered the would be-colonists free maritime transport to Brazil, fertile lands to be paid in several payments, free tools and maintenance of their families for two years.¹¹ His invitation reached the Russian Empire where it was especially directed to the Russian-German communities. On his part, the president of Argentina Julio A. Roca appointed in 1881 by decree José M. Bustos as honorary migration agent in Europe with the special mission to attract Jewish emigrants from the Russian Empire.¹² This agent was to follow the strict instructions given by the Migration Department of Argentina concerning the concession of lands and other facilities according to the ambitious "Immigration and Colonization Law" ratified in 1876.¹³ After the mid-1880s the migration policy of Argentina became more active: in 1887 official migration agencies, dependent on the Foreign Affairs Ministry, were created in several European capitals with the mandate of promoting the image of Argentina as a promised land for potential immigrants; also, in that year the financing, by the national budget, of the transport of future colonists was ratified by the Parliament and the Senate.

Five types of agency operated over the migratory flows from the Black Sea to South America: a) small scale initiatives for the establishment of agricultural colonies in Brazil and Argentina, under-

10. Eisenberg, *Jewish agricultural colonies*, p. xx.

11. Weyne, *El último puerto*, p. 92

12. *Registro Nacional de la República Argentina, 1878-1881*, Vol. 8, p. 512.

13. Boleslao Lewin, *La colectividad judía en la Argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Alzamor Editores, 1974), p. 77-80.

taken in the 1870s and 1880s by German and Jewish communities of the Russian empire, b) large colonization projects sponsored by Jewish philanthropists, like Baron Hirsch, who attempted to organize and regulate the flows of Jewish immigrants to the West, c) the action of the South American states, especially Argentina and Brazil, through their migration policy and their diplomatic activity e) the initiatives of commercial agents who represented private colonization companies and big landlords and e) the gradual activation of social networks among the migrant communities. All these agencies shaped the first migratory movements to South America.

As far as the Russian-Jewish immigration was concerned – this was by far the most important – the first group that emigrated from the Black Sea region to Argentina in 1889 came from Bessarabia and in particular from Ismail. The “Ismail group” got to Argentina almost simultaneously with another large group of more than 800 persons from Podolia (Kamenetz Podolsk) which traveled to South America in the notorious ship “Weser” which is considered to be the “Mayflower” of the Jewish immigration to Argentina.¹⁴ In that year several groups of Jews, established in different zones of the Pale, sent delegates to the heads of the Jewish institutions in Paris and especially to the Alliance Israélite Universelle as they were alarmed by the pogroms and other hostilities and restrictions. They asked for support in order for them to get to Palestine. After protracted and futile efforts, some of these delegations contacted and started negotiations in Paris with Argentine agents who represented both their state and private interests. These negotiations provoked the active involvement of the Jewish organizations: the authorities of the Alliance Israélite, rich merchants and respectful rabbis were mobilized in order to verify the honesty of these from afar agents who were generously offering lands in the South American pampas. The “Ismail group” arrived, in the summer of 1889, in Berlin already divided in two sub-groups: the first one, composed by about sixty families, obtained free transport to Argentina and sailed from the port of Bremen; the other smaller second sub-group was excluded from the offer of the Argentine state but it received the economic support of the Jewish community of Berlin that

14. José Liebermann, *Tierra soñada. Episodios de la colonización agraria judía en la Argentina, 1889-1959*, (Buenos Aires: Luis Lasserre, 1959), p. 21.

accepted to pay the cost of the immigrants' transport to Argentina.¹⁵

Shortly after those first migratory flows, the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), that organized and transported large groups of Jews to Argentina, would be founded in 1891. Most of the Jews that emigrated from the Russian Black Sea region to Argentina during the 1890s and part of the 1900s did so through this large enterprise. This association was founded in London by the German Jewish philanthropist Baron Maurice Hirsch, with the purpose of purchasing lands in the Americas, forming colonies and helping Jewish colonists become owners after having paid in installments the price of their land.¹⁶ Obviously by philanthropy the Baron meant providing poor people with the necessary means to become self-sufficient and able to repay their benefactor.¹⁷ Baron Maurice de Hirsch endowed JCA with the large sum of 50 million francs and required the economic participation of the Jewish establishment of England and France. In the very first year of JCA's existence the Baron's collaborator Wilhelm Lowenthal was entrusted with purchasing land in Argentina in 1891; the Baron also put up 2,5 million dollars and created the Baron de Hirsch Fund in New York with the mandate to support economically a colonization project in Canada planned by a local Jewish organization there.¹⁸

Gradually Baron Hirsch refined his plan: after several exploratory expeditions and preliminary studies that stressed Argentina's good climate, fertile soil, availability of land and the democratic nature of its government, he decided to concentrate JCA's work on that country where he intended to settle several hundred thousand Russian Jews that would become independent farmers. The organization of the recruitment of potential immigrants started in 1892: the Baron's delegates toured the southern provinces of Russia, where, as mentioned above, Jews had settled in agricultural colonies in the early 19th century, and brought back enthusiastic reports about their character, sane habits and adaptability.¹⁹ The Baron also had to make ar-

15. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 115.

16. Fondo comunal. *Cincuenta años de su vida (1904-1954)*, (Villa Domínguez: Fondo Comunal. Sociedad Cooperativa Agrícola Limitada, 1957), p. 23.

17. Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the Jewish Colonization Association*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 19.

18. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 133.

19. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p. 20.

rangements to get Jews out of Russia: in 1892 his emissary obtained permission for JCA to establish a Central Committee in St. Petersburg with subordinate committees in provincial capitals whose function would be to select the settlers for the Argentine colonies and to assist would-be immigrants. According to the over-optimistic calculations that the Baron made in 1894, the JCA would be able in the next years to transport to Argentina and settle about 300.000-400.000 Jewish immigrants in agricultural colonies to Argentina.²⁰

Although the first groups sailed from Baltic and North Sea ports – Bremen or Hamburg – and followed the “northern route” to South America, established by the powerful German shipping companies, soon the Black Sea ports would become important links in the migratory process towards South America. The “southern route” that connected Odessa to the Mediterranean ports and them to the big ports of South American countries – Santos, Buenos Aires, Montevideo – was “set up” in the years 1893-1894. Throughout the 1890s the majority of the Jewish migrant groups from Bessarabia, Kherson and Taurida, unlike the groups from Podolia or Grodno which departed from Libau and the German ports to the Americas, flowed to Odessa; there they embarked on vessels, some of which were Italian such as “Nilo”, “Bosforo”, “Polcevera” or “Giava”, that transported them to Genoa in order to transboard on the big steamers that would take them to South America. Italian transatlantic vessels such as “Orione”, “Sirio”, “Birmanía”, “Regina Margherita” or “Arno” transported large groups of Jewish migrants to Argentina in the 1890s.²¹ The first Rumanian Jewish groups that immigrated to South America also followed the “southern route”: a typical case was the group of 301 migrants that in 1901 were transported to Le Havre in order to embark on the French steamer “Amiral Aube” that took them to Argentina.²²

Our primary sources help us to “draw” the geographical map and the itineraries of these migrant groups since their first steps. In the database that exists in the archive of the Jewish colonies in Villa

20. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 138.

21. Database of the “Museo y Archivo de las Colonias Judías del Centro de Entre Ríos”, Villa Domínguez, Entre Ríos, Argentina.

22. Archivo General de la Nación [Argentina], Archivo Intermedio, Actas de Inspección Marítima, “Ship Amiral Aube”, which arrived at the port of Buenos Aires in December 1901.

Domínguez, we can see that in the years 1893-1895 large groups of settlers in the Entre Ríos province of Argentina came from Bessarabia, the Kherson province, which then included the Odessa and Mykolaiv districts, and the province of Taurida that included the peninsula of Crimea. The migrant families had to travel from their villages to the nearby towns where, according to the JCA practices, they were assembled into groups of 40-50 families – that is about 500 individuals; the groups used to take the name of their “meeting point” which usually was an important regional locality.²³ The most common meeting points in those years were: Akkerman, Kilia, Soroki and Bolgrad in Bessarabia; Mykolaiv, Novi Bug, Novopoltavka and Rubanowka in the Kherson province; and Kersch in Taurida (map 2). From these localities the respective groups – Akkerman group, Novi Bug group and so on – flowed to Odessa where they started their transatlantic odyssey. In some cases even some “northern” Jewish groups, coming from the north of the Pale, migrated to South America via Odessa: for example in 1894 groups from Mohilna, near Minsk, got to Odessa where they undertook the “southern route” to South America.²⁴

It is remarkable that one of the first groups that immigrated to Argentina through the mechanism of the JCA departed from Istanbul: it's the case of the group known as “Pampistas”, named after the ship “Pampa” of the French shipping company Chargeurs Réunis, that took them to Argentina in 1891. The Jewish families that would form that group had departed from Odessa, Crimea and other regions of the Russian south and via overland and maritime routes they arrived at Istanbul with the purpose of settling in Palestine. Mauricio Chajchir, born in 1881 in Kerch, Crimea, remembers in his personal account how, “pushed by the pogroms and misery”, he abandoned Crimea, at the age of ten, together with his parents and brothers, and they crossed Caucasus in order to get to Turkey and from there to Palestine.²⁵ Due to the decision of the Ottoman authorities to prohibit the colonization of Palestine, these families remained stranded in the ottoman capital,

23. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p. 42.

24. Database of the “Museo y Archivo de las Colonias Judías del Centro de Entre Ríos”, Villa Domínguez, Entre Ríos, Argentina.

25. Mauricio Charchir, “Viaje al país de la esperanza. Documento inédito sobre el vapor Pampa y los primeros colonos judíos”, *La Opinión Cultural*, Buenos Aires (8 de Agosto de 1976).

Map 2: Main places of origin of the Russian-Jews Immigrants to Argentina, 1893-1903



Source: Proper elaboration.

living under appalling circumstances, until a JCA Committee started to register the families willing to immigrate to Argentina. The 750 immigrants that were selected among the five thousand registered in the lists, were first transported to Marseille with the French ship “Galatz”, rent by Baron de Hirsch for this purpose; from Marseille they were transferred by train to Bordeaux where they embarked on the transatlantic vessel “Pampa” that took them to Buenos Aires.

Due to the fact that the accelerated settling of those first groups in agricultural colonies in Argentina, under pressing conditions, met

several obstacles and misadventures, since 1893-1894 the JCA tried to control more rigorously and to better prepare the migratory flows: the migrant families were given time to sell their properties and each group had the opportunity to send one or two representatives to Argentina to inspect the colonies before the bulk of the would-be emigrants embarked.²⁶ The JCA also started to pay more attention to the migrants' selection process: the agricultural experience and the cohesion of the groups that would permit them to be self-governing became the basic criteria for the selection of the potential immigrants. This slowdown in JCA's operations was reflected in the numbers of Jewish immigrants transported from Russia to Argentina: far below Baron de Hirsch's initial estimations of 300,000, JCA transported only about 10,000 persons in the years 1891-1896.²⁷

The Russian-German immigration from the Black Sea region to South America was smaller. These German ethnic groups were known as "Odesser" in order to be distinguished from the "Saratover", named after Saratov, a major port on the Volga River. Whereas the Black Sea Germans moved in mass to the United States since the 1870s, their migratory flows to Brazil and Argentina were rather limited. Instead, the migration of the Volga Germans – established in colonies along the Volga River – to South America was quite important: their migration to Brazil started in the 1870s after contacts they had with Emperor Pedro's agents in Dresden; the first families immigrated there in 1877 and were settled as colonists in the Southern State of Parana.²⁸ In the following years some of these families, dissatisfied with the climatic conditions of Brazil, made agreements with national and local authorities of Argentina and moved there preparing the path for further migration flows from their Volga communities.

In the 1890s the migratory dynamics to South America also reached the Black Sea German colonies. Most of the German families from Bessarabia, Kherson and Taurida that migrated to Argentina settled as colonists or as independent farmers in the southern department of the Buenos Aires province and in the adjoining districts of La Pampa territory (map 3). The central pole of all this area was

26. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p. 41.

27. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 139.

28. Popp – Dening, *Los alemanes del Volga*, p. 134.

Map 3: Black Sea Russian-German & JCA colonies in Argentina



Source: Proper elaboration.

the port of Bahia Blanca from where most of those Black Sea Russian-German families entered Argentina.²⁹ Some of them settled in colonies close to the Volga Germans' settlements but separately from them; others were settled by colonization companies such as the Stroeder company (belonging to a German businessman established in Argentina) and the Drysdale company (its founder, Joseph Norman Drysdale, was a Scottish businessman who had obtained Argentine nationality) that founded colonies like "Winifreda", in La Pampa territory, which was populated by Black Sea Russian-German families.

By the end of the 19th century the migratory flows from the Black Sea to South America, that previously concerned almost exclusively the Russian-German and Russian-Jewish communities, had started to involve also other ethnic groups and they had expanded to a large part of the whole Black Sea region.

Migration, Diplomacy and Maritime Interests

At the turn of the 20th century the expansion of the activity of the Jewish Colonization Association to other parts of the Black Sea region as well as the growth of spontaneous flows based on social networks, increased the number of migrants that moved to South America. In Rumania, in the beginning of the new century, the migratory mobility grew considerably due to the economic and political conditions that prevailed there and especially because of the deep economic crisis that strongly affected the country in the years 1899-1900. Like in Russia, the first to emigrate in mass were the Jewish communities that had to encounter not only the severe economic crisis as well as their exclusion from full citizenship and restrictions on their occupations but also pogroms and other hostilities.³⁰ As modern anti-Semitism had already made its appearance in the adjacent Central-European

29. Sergio Maluendres, "Los migrantes y sus hijos ante el matrimonio: un estudio comparativo entre alemanes de Rusia, españoles e italianos en Guatrache (La Pampa, 1910-1939), *Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos*, 18 (1991), p. 195.

30. Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (AMREC), Argentina/Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Argentina, Box 833, 18 May 1903, "Report of the Consul of Argentina in Bucharest to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Drago".

countries, large groups of Jews decided, since 1900, to immigrate to the Americas and some of them tried their luck in South America. The Argentine consul in Bucharest warned his government about the mass “exodus” of Rumanian Jewish to the United States – supported by active social networks – and informed that some of them had moved to Argentina although he was unable to provide any official numbers.³¹ The urgent emigration of the Rumanian Jewish after the pogroms of the years 1900-1901 obliged the JCA to intervene, to collaborate in the evacuation of refugees and to organize their transport to Argentina; a special committee selected through fast procedures the families who seemed to have some farming experience and in 1902 about 300 Rumanian Jewish were settled in the colony Moisesville, in the Santa Fe province of Argentina.³²

In the following years 1904-1905, due to the increase of pogroms in the Russian south, the JCA had to intervene several times and organize through a quota system the transfer of hundreds of Jewish families from Bessarabia and the Kherson province to Argentina; the selection was not easy: in 1905 in the city of Kherson alone hundreds of families appeared before the Committee that was in charge of selection.³³ In its effort to find more land suitable for the establishment of farming colonies, the JCA expanded its activity to Brazil: after an exploratory expedition in the country’s southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul, in 1902 the company purchased a large estate there and established a settlement of about 300 migrants there known as the “Philippon” colony.³⁴ In 1910 JCA settled more families there and it also bought the immense property “Quatro-Irmaos”, of almost 100,000 hectares, in the northern part of Rio Grande de Sul.³⁵

Since 1910 the massive and organized transfer of immigrants diminished and, instead, the social networks of the migrants became more active in calling and bringing parents and neighbors who could also obtain the right to settle in the JCA colonies in South America. The families that immigrated to South America through the mech-

31. Ibid.

32. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 217.

33. Op.cit., p. 221.

34. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p. 90.

35. *Atlas des colonies et domaines de la Jewish Colonization Association en République Argentine et au Brésil*, (Paris: Jewish Colonization Association, 1914).

anisms of the Jewish Colonization Association were of course just a part of the totality of Jewish immigrants that moved from the Black Sea region to Argentina and Brazil in those years. By 1910 the migratory dynamics had expanded to both urban centers and rural areas and to all the social sectors of the Jewish community in the Russian South. This expansion was due to the intensification of anti-Semitism, expressed with cruelty in the Odessa pogrom of 1905, in which at least 400 persons died and 1,400 Jewish houses and shops were destroyed. In the database of CEMLA that includes the occupations of the immigrants that arrived in Argentina, we can see that among the Jewish immigrants who arrived in 1910 and declared Odessa as their place of birth, there were many merchants, tailors and seamstresses, carpenters and locksmiths, several bakers, painters, shoemakers, mechanics and just a few farmers.³⁶

Moreover, during the first decade of the 20th century considerable migratory flows to the Americas were developed in the Ottoman Black Sea region. The political and the economic changes which occurred in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and in particular the successful Revolution, in 1908, of the reformist and nationalist movement of the Young Turks which was generally hostile towards the ethnic and religious minorities living in the Ottoman Empire, contributed to the first migratory streams from Istanbul and other areas to South America. During these years groups of Armenian, Syrian-Lebanese and Greek immigrants set out from Istanbul on their odyssey to Argentina and other South American countries. Notably the Armenian migration to Argentina increased in the years 1909-1910 and was to reach about 2,000 persons on the eve of the World War I; while most of these immigrants came from Anatolia, there were also considerable numbers of immigrants coming from Samsun and Istanbul.³⁷

Apart from the strong push and pull factors and the gradual activation of social networks, the migration policies of the involved countries and their connection to maritime, commercial and shipping interests, influenced this process encouraging, discouraging or shaping

36. Database of the Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA), Buenos Aires, Argentina.

37. Nélida Boudgourdjian-Toufeksian, *Los armenios en Buenos Aires. La construcción de la identidad (1900-1950)*, (Buenos Aires: Edición del Centro Armenio, 1997), pp. 93-94.

the migratory flows. The active migration policy of Argentina, implemented throughout the 1880s, did not last long: in the 1890s, due to a short but severe economic crisis and ideological cleavages, Argentina opted for the spontaneous immigration and the active policies for the attraction of immigrants were abandoned starting with the suspension of subsidized transport. In that period the issue of immigration constituted an important topic for public debate in Argentina: powerful sectors of the local society were opposed to “artificial” immigration, which was viewed as condemned to fail, and they expressed particularly negative attitudes towards the organized Jewish migration from Russia. Juan Alsina, head of the Direction of Migration, who in 1901 had adopted discriminatory measures against the Jewish, later, due to orchestrated attacks against the Jewish immigration, felt obliged to defend the Jewish agricultural colonies.³⁸ By the end of the 1890s Argentina’s economic recovery and the push given to its agricultural production permitted its ruling class to rely on the country’s ability to function as a natural pole of attraction for immigrants and to reject any official support for the promotion of immigration.

In that context, since the end of the 19th century, Argentina made no special efforts to attract immigration from the Black Sea and other parts of Russia. Anyhow the perception of the Russian immigrant in the Argentine society was rather negative. Apart from his ethnic origins, the Russian farmer was not exactly considered the agent of modernization that Argentina was seeking at that time. Russia in general was seen as a big traditional society whose peasants, totally deprived of instruction, were accustomed to primitive methods of producing and commercializing grains. According to several reports of Argentine diplomats, the basic cause of Russia’s backwardness was the diffused communal system of land ownership – established after the abolition of serfdom – which slowed down rural development in Russia, reduced productivity, hampered small property, impoverished peasants, and negatively affected investment and innovation incentives.³⁹ On many occasions Russia’s “traditionality” became the

38. AMREC, Box 833, folio 18, 17 November 1903, “Letter of Juan Alsina to the General Consul of Argentina in San Petersburg”.

39. AMREC, Box 945, folio 5, 8 April 1906, “Quarterly Report of the General Consul of Argentina in San Petersburg”.

mirror in which Argentina was seeing its own modern face: according to several diplomatic reports, Argentina, if compared to Russia – a competing country in the international grain market – had a better system of grain classification, more profitable for the producer selling modalities, and better connections, transports and public services.⁴⁰ Later, after the 1905 Revolution in Russia and given the anarchist agitation that had many times shaken Buenos Aires since the turn of the 20th century, the Russian immigrant – especially the Russian Jewish – was frequently portrayed in the Argentine public opinion as “contaminated” by communist and anarchist ideas.⁴¹

Besides the official migration policies, the diplomatic management of these issues also played a role in forging the migratory dynamics. During the first decade of the 20th century the General Consul and Chargé d’ Affaires of Argentina in San Petersburg Eduardo García Mansilla was opposed to all initiatives taken by the Consul of Argentina in Odessa Alberto Rafaelovich Hari in order to promote migration from the Black Sea region to Argentina. The latter was open to the idea of mass immigration of Jewish farmers and craftsmen through the Jewish Colonization Association and he believed that the Argentine Consulate of Odessa could play a key role in that process.⁴² The negative attitude of the Chargé d’ Affaires towards these estimations was due to several reasons related to economic interests and matters of personal power but it also derived from his convictions and racial prejudices: from his point of view the migratory streams from the South of Russia were exactly the same as the Jewish emigration which he considered non profitable and even harmful for his country.⁴³ Instead he tried to foment the immigration from the north of Russia, mainly among the Finnish people whose Grand Duchy had been part of the Russian Empire since 1809: according to his instructions given to the Argentine Consulate

40. AMREC, Box 945, Document 12, 20 October 1906, “Quarterly Report of the General Consul of Argentina in San Petersburg”.

41. AMREC, Box 945, Document 20, 7 June 1906, “Letter of the Chargé d’ Affaires in San Petesburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

42. AMREC, Box 945, folio 7, 21 May 1906, “Letter of Argentine Vice-Consul in Odessa Albert Rafaelovich Hari to the Chargé d’ Affaires in San Petesburg”.

43. AMREC, Box 833, folio 18, 2 October 1903, “Letter of García Mansilla to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquín González”.

of Helsinki, its mission was to attract part of the migration oriented to the United States through a “discrete” press campaign that would present “the progress and immense future” of Argentina. In his opinion, the Finnish, compared to the Jewish were “more active and laborious”, “a robust race that had not degenerated”.⁴⁴

Migration policies were linked to the commercial strategies of the involved countries and to the big shipping interests around the migrants’ transport “market”. Several projects of this period studied the possibility of a direct connection of the Black Sea to Argentina and Brazil for the transport of immigrants and products. The port of Odessa was to play a key role in these projects. According to traces the Consul of Argentina in Odessa, the Jewish Colonization Association, that until then was sending the Jewish immigrants to embark at the ports of Libau and Odessa, was studying the possibility of concentrating the departures on the latter; this depended on whether the Company Navigazione Generale Italiana (NGI) would accept a reduced ticket price that would permit JCA to replace the “Hamburg route” by the “Genoa” one.⁴⁵ On his part, the Consul of Argentina in Odessa started, on his own initiative, negotiations with the Russian Steam Navigation Company (Russian S.N.Co, founded in 1856): he was motivated by the fact that this company established, in October of 1906, a direct line between Odessa and New York with the purpose of encouraging the Russian migration to the United States. The Consul discussed the possibility of the creation of a similar line that would connect Odessa to Argentina with intermediate stops in Greek, Italian and possibly Spanish ports. The representatives of the Russian company responded positively but they asked if the Argentine state would be willing to subsidize such a line and if the ships could return to Odessa with cargo. According to their calculations, every vessel could transport to Argentina about 1,000 immigrants and go back to Odessa with 3,000 tons of cargo.⁴⁶

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not remain outside

44. AMREC, Box 945, Folio 1, 26 March 1906, “Letter of García Mansilla to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Estanislao Zeballos”.

45. AMREC, Box 945, folio 7, 21 May 1906, “Letter of Argentine Vice-Consul in Odessa Albert Rafaelovich Hari to the Chargé d’Affaires in San Petesburg”.

46. AMREC, Box 945, Document 59, 7 November 1906, “Letter of Argentine Vice-Consul in Odessa Albert Rafaelovich Hari to the Chargé d’Affaires in San Petesburg”.

the plans for a direct maritime connection between the Black Sea and South America: the Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina in San Petersburg informed his superiors that the Sub-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia was very interested in the creation of a direct line between Odessa and Argentina and proposed the organization of conferences in Odessa and San Petersburg in order to show the great utility of such a connection.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina, always hostile to the encouragement of migratory flows from South Russia to Argentina – he made references to the “deplorable” Jewish immigration that Russia wished to send to Argentina – and as a defender of the immigration from Northern Russia, he opposed all the above initiatives for the establishment of a direct line between Odessa and Buenos Aires. Instead he tried to promote a direct maritime connection between Libau and Buenos Aires through deals with the company Russian Volunteer Fleet (Dobroflot), established in 1878.⁴⁸

The negative attitude of the Chargé d’Affaires and the denial of the Argentine state to give any subsidy to the ship companies did not help the establishment of a direct maritime connection between Odessa and Buenos Aires and all the relative projects – some of them reactivated in 1912 – failed. Anyway such projects faced serious limitations and problems: first, the relatively limited commercial relations between Argentina and Russia – Argentina basically exported timber to Russia – and second, the competence of the big German shipping companies that claimed the lion’s share in the market for the transport of migrants from East and North Europe to the Americas. After the failure of those projects and given its general economic decline in that period, the port of Odessa was condemned to play a marginal role in the migrants’ transport to South America: from 1910 onwards almost all of those born in Odessa immigrants who arrived in Argentina had departed from Libau or had sailed directly from the German ports of Hamburg and Bremen.

47. AMREC, Box 945, Document 12, 20 October 1906, “Quarterly Report of the General Consul of Argentina in San Petersburg”.

48. AMREC, Box 945, document 12, 20 October 1906, “Quarterly Report of the Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina in San Petesburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs”; Document 42, November 1906, “Letter of the Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina in San Petesburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs”.

The deliberate “passivity” of the Argentine migration policy in the first decade of the 20th century contrasted with the active policies followed by other South American countries. Brazil, in that period, implemented an active policy for the attraction of emigrants from the Russian South, which was linked to its commercial export interests. As a result, in 1912 Brazil made a deal with the company Russian Volunteer Fleet for the establishment of a regular line connecting Odessa to the Brazilian port of Santos. Previously the company had sent two agents to Brazil in order to visit the Russian agricultural colonies established there, to study the local market and to examine the possibility of transporting coffee through a direct line to Odessa without having to pass from Hamburg or London. According to the contract signed between the Brazilian state and the company, the connection would be effectuated by four vessels that would carry colonist families to Brazil and go back with coffee, rubber and cacao cargo; the Brazilian state would pay the Russian company eight liras for the transport of each immigrant.⁴⁹ The advantages of Brazil in comparison to Argentina were its shorter distance from Europe and its tropical products that could easily penetrate in the Russian market: as proof of this, around 1910 Russia used to import about 600,000 sacks of Brazilian coffee annually.⁵⁰

Also the smaller Uruguay tried to attract emigrants from the Black Sea region: in 1912 the General Consul of this country in the United States was assigned a mission to visit Southern Russia in order to find farming families willing to immigrate to Uruguay. He paid special attention into the German communities of the Kherson province and the religious minorities – like the Molokans and the Sabbatists – that had been coerced by the Russian government into moving to eastern Caucasus; all of them were considered to be excellent farmers. For this purpose the Consul made an agreement with the Bank Crédit Lyonnais of Odessa for a credit destined to finance, if necessary, the transport of 500 farmer families from Caucasus.⁵¹

49. AMREC, Box 1351, Folio 42, 14 August 1912, “Letter of the General Consul of Argentina in Odessa, Toribio Ruiz Guinazú, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernesto Bosch”.

50. Ibid.

51. AMREC, Box 1351, Document 43, 26 September 1912, “Letter of the General Consul of Argentina in Odessa to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernesto Bosch”.

These efforts made by Brazil and Uruguay had a limited impact on the migratory flows given that they concurred with the beginning of the World War I. As a result, Argentina remained until 1914 the South American country that had received the most immigrants from the Black Sea region.

The experience as colonists

As already stated, the majority of the migrants from the Black Sea region which arrived at South America in the period 1870-1914, through organized movements and sponsored projects, settled in agricultural colonies in the fertile plains of Argentina. The actual experience of these groups as immigrants and as colonists in the host country should be studied as part of further transnational processes in which the international dynamics of that period merged with national projects of the involved countries, ethnic histories, regional realities and family strategies. Their migrant experience and the process of their transformation into colonists are also an excellent window that throws light on the transcultural influences that forged those migrant communities which passed through an inevitable acculturation process in the host country being at the same time agents of ideas, visions, habits and practices that had travelled with them from their place of origin.

The itineraries and the history of those migrant groups – especially Russian-Jews and Russian-Germans – have been read and narrated through very different points of view: the memoirs of some colonists reconstruct personal odysseys and family sagas; they talk about the arduous beginning in the host country, the difficult adaptation to a hostile natural and social environment,⁵² about disillusionments but also successes, all of them immortalized in anecdotes that are still repeated as leitmotifs in the oral tradition and the collective memory of the colonies. The “official” histories of the migrant communities, apart from highlighting their contribution to the host country and the generosity of the latter, reinvented the eth-

52. See for example: Marcos Alpersohn, *Colonia Mauricio. Memorias de un colono judío*, (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2010), 3 vols.

nic characteristics of those groups that fully recovered their Jewish and German identity and reinforced their ethnic roots setting aside Russia as a remote and oppressive county of origin and as a sad background. Last, the official national history of Argentina treated them as part of the large liberal project conceived and implemented by its ruling class in the period 1870-1914. According to this project Argentina would be integrated into the world economy as an exporting country of primary goods; it would open its doors to the European immigrants, agents of civilization and strong manpower able to transform its inhabited lands into prosperous agricultural colonies; and it would become a vigorous and promising nation, able to assimilate the millions of welcomed immigrants. This narrative about assimilation is also reflected in the literature produced by some colonists Alberto Gerchunoff being the most typical example; Gerchunoff, a Russian-Jewish writer and journalist who arrived as colonist with his family in Argentina in 1891, immortalized in his famous homonymous novel (1910)⁵³ the figure of the “Jewish gaucho” that became the metaphor of the successful acculturation of the immigrants to the cultural codes of the host country.⁵⁴

All these different narratives, from the small family stories to the large national narratives, illuminate different aspects of a complex process that deserves further studying and more combined approaches that take into account both the immigrants’ background and the reality in the country of reception. The experience of those migrant groups, coming from the Russian Black Sea region, must be collocated in the context of the undergoing transition that was taking place both in the country of origin and in the host country. The first, Russia, was moving from cosmopolitanism to nationalism and was experiencing the impact of social conflict and radicalization of ideas; the host country, Argentina, was shaping its place in the world system and was forging its political orientation and its national identity. Their experience should also be understood within the dynamics of the “colony movement” towards the Americas that during the last quarter of the 19th century spread in the southern

53. Alberto Gerchunoff, *Los gauchos judíos*, (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 1910).

54. Judith Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío. Villa Clara y la construcción de la identidad argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2013), p. 28.

provinces of the Russian Empire;⁵⁵ but also within the “colonization euphoria” of the 1870s-1890s in Argentina which was decisive in its national history.⁵⁶ This euphoria resulted in the formation of the export-led economic model that dominated in the Argentine economy until the 1920s and was associated with the mass immigration that brought to the country, in the period 1880-1914, more than four and a half million of Europeans of various nationalities.

In this context the migrant groups from the Black Sea region were called to establish their colonies and make them prosper. In their majority they settled in the provinces Entre Ríos, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, which constituted the very heart of the agricultural and livestock farming activity that became the pillar of the Argentine economy. By 1896 about 7,000 people lived in the JCA colonies in the above mentioned provinces; the number of the farming families was to increase in the following years and in 1912 there were over 2,000 families in the JCA colonies comprising 15,501 persons.⁵⁷ Each family was given on arrival a plot of 100-150 hectares to cultivate. The most important crop by far was grain, mostly wheat; flax and maize were the other important crops. Some settlers were also dedicated to the production of milk, cheese and butter.⁵⁸ The new colonists found themselves inserted into a social environment under making, crossed by vertical and horizontal social relations, in which Argentine landlords coexisted with immigrants of different nationalities, established in tens of agricultural settlements, and with domesticated native “gauchos” transformed into rural workers. The case of the JCA colonies was more complex because they were also ruled by bureaucratic relations between the colonists and the JCA administration that controlled the lands where they lived and worked.⁵⁹ Several misunderstandings took place and in some cases the conflicting goals and expectations between colonists and administrators led to mass insubordination. The most common reason for such conflicts was the issue of mortgage payments: according to the contracts the colonists signed after their settlement, they were obliged

55. Eisenberg, *Jewish agricultural colonies*, p. xviii.

56. Weyne, *El último puerto*, p. 21.

57. Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía*, p. 139.

58. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p. 35.

59. Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío*, p. 11.

to repay all JCA's costs (for lands, transport, maintenance, houses, animals, equipment), plus interest 5%, in twelve annual payments.⁶⁰

Social divisions and hierarchies soon emerged in the interior of these rural communities. Their social organization on the one hand reproduced old hierarchies that had existed in the country of origin: the richest colonists brought gold from Russia which gave them the possibility to buy extended lands; some of them established societies with other colonists and purchased lands outside the JCA colonies.⁶¹ On the other hand social stratification was the result of adaptation to the new reality. The latter depended to a large extent on the colonists' previous labor experience. Most of the Russian-German were expert farmers but this was not the case of the Jews: although they were generally from regions with a large agricultural tradition (Bessarabia, Podolia, Kherson and Ekaterinoslav), many of them had no direct experience with agricultural labor and they had to learn the art of farming from the beginning. Even for those that had some farm experience – and this was also true for the Russian-Germans – farming activity in Argentina was not easy: in South Russia they had worked small plots intensively and with rather primitive methods; getting accustomed to cultivating the vast and virgin expanses of the Argentine pampas was a great challenge for them. Inequalities grew as some colonists prospered whereas others lost their lands and became rural workers. In the JCA colonies the colonists that did not uphold their obligations were expelled and some of them had to abandon even their tools. The land of the expelled colonists was purchased by others who concentrated large plots. The social puzzle of the colonies also included families of farm workers – in 1912 about 800 families of Jewish farm workers lived in the JCA colonies – and several artisans.

The daily experience in the colonies was shaped by transcultural influences. On the one hand the colonists acquired new habits and knowledge through their interaction with the native people – the gauchos – and with the other migrant communities with whom they exchanged agricultural practices. On the other hand the

60. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, pp. 31-32; Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío*, p. 88.

61. Letter of Noe Yarcho to Michael Zaharoff, 27 June 1893 (translation from Russian to Spanish: Katty de Hoffman): Museo y Archivo de las Colonias Judías del Centro de Entre Ríos”, Villa Domínguez, Entre Ríos, Argentina.

Russian-German and Russian-Jewish migrants brought with them habits, rituals, customs, social patterns and life styles that they had formed during their long stay in Russia. This cultural background guided them and helped them to adapt to their new social reality. The kinship networks became the main axes of the social organization and the channel through which the community exercised its control over its members.⁶² All the Russian-German colonists from the Black Sea, who settled in several colonies in the north of La Pampa territory, were connected by family ties. The sons and sons-in-law of the settlers were generally installed in the same colonies as their parents reproducing the traditional family structure. Some memoirs reconstruct the communitarian customs of the Russian-German and focus on how all of them worked in family.⁶³

In the JCA colonies the place of origin determined the organization of the geographical and social space. For example, Colonia Clara, the largest JCA colony (80.265 hectares) founded in 1892 in the Entre Ríos province, was divided into different sub-villages – Bélez, Feinberg, Sonnenfeld, Perliza, Desparramados among others – where groups of 150 to 250 persons from the same locality were established. Every village had neighborhoods made up of five or more similar houses built one next to the other. This trend – houses close together and rather far away from the agricultural plots – was common in both Russian-German and Russian-Jewish colonies in Argentina. It was coming from the migrants' experience in Russia, where the neighborhoods promoted sociability and contributed to the defensive needs of their inhabitants, and it differed from the dispersed American farmer model.⁶⁴ The social and kinship networks contributed to the institutional organization of the colonies: from the early years social clubs, synagogues, churches, libraries and schools were created in all the colonies. These networks also kept alive the contact with the country of origin. Many colonists paid for their relatives' passage to the colonies and others helped economically their family members who had remained back in Russia. In 1905, for example, more than 125,000 francs were transferred to

62. Weyne, *El último puerto*, p. 252.

63. Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío*, p. 57.

64. Popp – Dening, *Los alemanes del Volga*, pp. 165-166.

Picture 1: Remains of an old synagogue. Colonia Carmel, Villa Domínguez, Entre Ríos, Argentina.



Russia as gifts through the mechanism of the JCA, which set up an office to handle transfers of money in Europe.⁶⁵

The country of origin became for the colonists a close and at the same time a far away reality dressed up with contradictory feelings. Noe Yarcho, the first doctor of the colony Clara, wrote in a letter to his relative Michael Zaharoff: “Here we live very modestly. We live with the necessary, just to satisfy our basic needs, nothing to do with our opulent life in Russia. And what’s the utility of such a wealth if only damage can cause and nothing good can bring in my point of view?... Manichka has a horse now and she likes riding. Every day we ride twenty versts [about 15 miles]... That’s how we live in Argentina and we are happy with our new country... At least here we can live!” But then he confessed: “Imagine that everything is so wild here. Once you get off the ship, savagery waits for you at every step even though there are small groups of civilized Europeans, and there are so many difficulties... How can you compare our civilization

65. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, p.77.

to that of America? How can I not feel nostalgia and sadness if you also think that we live in a village? ... Even vegetation and animal life are much poorer here if compared to our Russia... I cannot hope to forget that we live in a village. And this sentiment is not only mine; all of us feel the same way”.⁶⁶ Despite these feelings, making a life in Argentina seemed easy to his eyes: “My dream is to buy 2,700 hectares of land; this can be done through the Bank, through an initial deposit and then little by little with payments; to buy 500 animals and let them pasture in these lands. One can wait for three years, then sell and have a very good profit, about 15,000 pesos. For that it is not necessary to be intelligent and the work is done alone. And the cost for the maintenance of the animals is insignificant.”⁶⁷

The transcultural processes that shaped life in the colonies were also evident in the field of broader ideological influences that guided the colonists’ actions and perceptions. In Argentina they met with the dominant liberal and positivist ideology of that period and with discourses on progress that forged their worldviews and the ways they understood their place in the host country; the progress for them became a concrete experience, palpable in the national economic growth, the rapid increase of the cultivated lands, the expansion of the railway that crossed the pampas, the consolidation of the institutional framework and the modernization of the local society.⁶⁸ On the other hand the ideological backgrounds that brought from their country of origin were also a very important influence. A good example of that is the emergence, in the beginning of the 20th century, of a strong cooperative movement in the Jewish colonies of the JCA, in the province Entre Ríos of Argentina. Contrary to the collective practices seen in Russian-German colonies of Argentina, that did not go beyond mutualism, the cooperativism that spread from the Russian-Jewish colonies became a successful strategy of survival, social ascension and struggling against external factors that affected the life of their communities.

The cooperative movement began with the founding of the “So-

66. Letter of Noe Yarcho to Michael Zaharoff, 27 June 1893 (translation from Russian to Spanish: Katty de Hoffman): Museo y Archivo de las Colonias Judías del Centro de Entre Ríos”, Villa Domínguez, Entre Ríos, Argentina.

67. Ibid.

68. Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío*, p. 116.

Picture 2: Management board of the Cooperative Fondo Comunal, years 1907-1908. Villa Dominguez, Clara colony.



Source: Museo y Archivo de las colonias judías del centro de Entre Ríos.

ciudad Agrícola” (Agricultural Society) of Lucienville in 1900. The second cooperative, “Fondo Comunal” (Communal Fund), was set up by 377 associates in Domínguez, part of the Clara colony, in 1904.⁶⁹ The basic objectives of these cooperatives were the sale for its associates of their products, the purchase for them of the materials needed for consumption and work, and obtaining credit for the development of productive activities.⁷⁰ Later the cooperatives, that would generally keep a combative attitude towards the JCA’s administration, also took over the financing and control of the colonies’ medical services. The first issue, the sale of crop production, was obviously crucial for the colonists. Until the creation of the cooperatives they depended entirely on the big commercial monop-

69. *Fondo comunal*, p. 31.

70. *Fondo comunal*, pp. 48-50.

olies (like “Bunge y Born” and “Dreyfus”) that fixed the prices and on the general stores where they made their provisions. The cooperative movement became for the colonists the channel through which they managed to protect themselves from the commercial monopolies: the cooperatives collected the output of the colonists’ production and they had the power to negotiate the selling prices with the big companies; also, they supplied the colonists with the tools and other important articles for their agricultural activity and family needs that could be paid with the next crop.

The emergence of the first cooperatives was in part due to the encouragement of the JCA’s administration that wanted the colonists to assume a greater share in the management of their affairs and to relieve the Association of certain administrative functions. But the cooperative movement became true thanks to the action of certain colonists, idealists and highly educated persons that assumed the role of “intelligentsia” in their communities. Michael Zaharoff and Michael Kipen were two of them. Zaharoff who is considered one of the fathers of the cooperative movement in Argentina, was born in Mariupol, Crimea, in 1873, in a prosperous family of merchants dedicated to the import and export commerce all over the Azov Sea. It was not a traditionalist Jewish family: at home they spoke Russian; Michael received secular education and spoke also German but not Yiddish.⁷¹ He studied agricultural engineering at the University of Hohenheim in Germany. He arrived at Argentina in 1899, accompanied by his wife Olga Kipen, thanks to the invitation of his brother in law, the doctor Noe Yarcho who was already established in Argentina. At his arrival Zaharoff settled in Colony Leven where he purchased a large plot of 497 hectares and he dedicated himself to farming activity and to cooperativism.⁷² Michael Kipen was born in Melitopol, Taurida province, in 1878. He studied in the Technological Institute of San Petersburg where he was initiated to the revolutionary ideas: he became affiliated to the Russian Social Democratic Worker’s Party and later he was deported to Siberia for socialist agitation; persecuted for his ideas he

71. Noé Sájaroff, *Miguel Sájaroff. El hombre y su familia*, (Buenos Aires: s/d, 1998), p. 5.

72. *Fondo comunal*, pp. 356-359.

emigrated to Switzerland where he studied Law and then, in 1912, he moved with his wife and child to Argentina where he settled in the Colony Leven, close to his brother in law Michael Zaharoff. He was the principal editor of the newspaper *El Colono cooperador* and he became an active member of the Argentine Socialist Party.⁷³

The protagonists of the cooperative movement that emerged from the JCA colonies were influenced by the Jewish “Back to the land” movement that spread in the 1880s among the Jewish population of South Russia. This movement combined the immigration project with a socialist agrarian philosophy as well as blending messianic imaginaries with realistic socio-economic perspectives, and advocated the creation of Jewish agricultural colonies in lands outside Russia. Its aim was the recovery of the productive capacity of the Jewish people. Its ideologues tried to break with the concentration of Jews in “unproductive” occupations that according to them fomented anti-Semitism; they focused on the “rejuvenation” of the Jewish people through productive labor, especially through agricultural activities. Baron Hirsch shared many of these ideas: he believed in the “generative” powers of the soil and supported the idea of “productivising” Jews through employment in agriculture.⁷⁴ Whereas the contemporary Zionist movement advocated the establishment of the first modern Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine, the Baron supported the creation of agricultural settlements in America.

The advocates of cooperativism were also inspired by Russian agrarian ideologies Tolstoy being one on their main influences. Tolstoy’s estate “Yansaya Polyana” where the famous writer founded a school for peasant children while living and working together with his *mujiks* became a source of inspiration for them. From their experience in Russia they were also familiarized with different forms of communal organization such as the MIR system that consisted of the existence of communally-controlled open fields with occasional repartitions of plots;⁷⁵ although this system was not so widespread among the peasant communities in South Russia, it did dominate in

73. *Fondo comunal*, pp. 367-369.

74. Norman, *An Outstretched Arm*, pp. 19, 20, 38; Freidenberg, *La invención del gaucho judío*, pp. 65, 86.

75. Weyne, *El último puerto*, p. 67.

Picture 3: Michael Zaharoff (adolescent, in the center) with his parents in Mariupol, c. 1885. His father was a prosperous merchant.



Source: Museo y Archivo de las colonias judías del centro de Entre Ríos.

public debates on the agrarian question in Russia and it was to become an important learning source. Michael Zaharoff had adopted agrarian ideas as well as the Rochdale principles of cooperation⁷⁶ – voluntary and open membership, political and religious neutrality, democratic control, economic participation of members, and ongoing education of the members among other things. His dream was the cooperativization of the economic organization of the world.⁷⁷ He strongly believed in the constant education of the colonists and in their baptism in the principles of social justice, common good, collective action and solidarity. His country of origin, Russia, shaken by revolutionary ideas at the turn of the 20th century, alimented him constantly with ideas: during his stay in the colonies he regularly received newspapers, pamphlets, literary reviews and books from Russia and he maintained a steady correspondence with relatives and friends that had remained behind.

The full flowering of the cooperative movement in the JCA colonies took place in the 1920s and 1930s when it gradually expanded to all the rural areas of Argentina and to other South American countries. By that time very important changes had taken place in the JCA colonies followed by a strong geographical mobility towards the urban centers and the abandonment of rural areas. Personal aspirations, social mobility – a common saying among the Jewish colonists in Argentina is “we have sown wheat and harvested doctors” –, the attraction of urban life and the rise of land values which tempted many colonists to sell their plots, were stronger than JCA’s attempt to create stable peasant communities in its colonies. Despite that, the Russian-Jewish colonists from the South Russia – as well as the Russian-German and of course all the immigrants who settled in the rural areas – contributed to the national making of Argentina. Even today the presence of the “Jewish gaucho” in Argentina’s national imaginary, the diffusion of rural cooperatives all over the county but also the small abandoned synagogues in the crossroads of Entre Ríos, are signs of that remote Black Sea “presence” in the Argentine pampas.

76. The Rochdale principles have formed the basis on which cooperatives all over the world operate. They were set out by a group of textile workers in Rochdale, England, who founded the “Society of Equitable Pioneers”.

77. *Fondo communal*, pp. 93-94.

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6.

The business of migration between Odessa and New York, 1892-1924. Managing maritime routes and passenger flows*

Per Kristian Sebak

Introduction

In November 1906, the Northern Steamship Company's *Gregory Morch* set sail from Odessa, Russia, bound for New York. On board were 174 passengers, 70 of them from Odessa itself. The steamer called at Piraeus, Greece, and Palermo, Italy, bringing the total number of passengers to 426 before heading through the Strait of Gibraltar. The steamer returned to Odessa and made a similar trip the following January, this time with 81 boarding at Odessa including 41 from the port itself. At first glance, there was nothing abnormal with this steamer and these voyages. The *Gregory Morch* was one of many steamers that arrived in New York from the Mediterranean in 1906 and 1907. Odessa was, at the time, a major Russian port with considerable demand, and a vast hinterland for passage to the United States. However, 70 passengers from Odessa in 1906 and 41 in 1907 were only a small fraction of the total registered number of 6,300 and 3,300 migrants who arrived in New York from Odessa during those two years respectively. Moreover, the *Gregory Morch*'s two trips were the sole scheduled passenger liner arrivals in the United States from Odessa during the period of the great transatlantic migrations between the mid-nineteenth century and 1930.

The following text will explore the limits and possibilities for migrants travelling between the port cities of New York and Odessa during the period from 1892 to 1924. New York was by far the most

* The article builds on the author's Ph.D. "A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass – Scandinavian Shipping Companies and Transmigration through Scandinavia, 1898-1929" (University of Bergen, Norway, 2012).

important gateway for immigrants entering the United States. Odessa was Russia's fourth largest city, Russia's busiest port in the Black Sea and one of the most important donors of U.S.-bound migrants. The main question addressed will not concern so much *why* people migrated between those two ports, which is the most common question in migration studies, but *how* the migratory process was at all possible along with who migrated. This does not mean, however, that the question of *why* can or should be totally disregarded. The question of *how* is arguably the least explored question in migration studies, but has received growing interest in recent years; especially relating to the relationship between the shipping business and migrants and shipping business and state and how these relationships affected migration flows and processes.¹ This study will broaden our understanding of these relationships with an in-depth analysis of how they played out in practice between two selected points of passage: Odessa and New York.

How did the migration processes between Odessa and New York work and evolve during this period? Who migrated from Odessa to the United States? What travel options were there for migrants going between Odessa and the United States, and what restricted and shaped their options? What migratory patterns may be detected among migrants from Odessa? Addressing these questions aims to position the port of Odessa in the wider transatlantic migration experience, and explore how Odessa related to the transatlantic passenger business. The main timeframe is limited by the main source material and main flows of migration, and will mostly concern the period from the 1890s until the outbreak of war in 1914 – but also to some extent into the early 1920s. These two timeframes constitute two distinct institutional frameworks in the transatlantic migration business and experience.

1. E.g. Torsten Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants – The Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its Impact on the European Exodus*, Research in Maritime History, 50, (St. John's: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2013); Per Kristian Sebak, "A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass – Scandinavian Shipping Companies and Transmigration through Scandinavia, 1898-1929" (PhD thesis, University of Bergen, Norway, 2012); Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914: Mass migration as a transnational business in long distance travel*, (Chronos Verlag, Zurich, Switzerland, Dec 2012); Tobias Brinkmann, "'Travelling with Ballin': The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880-1914", *IRSH* (2008), pp. 459-484.

While the period prior to the First World War was marked by largely 'open borders' and limited state intervention, the years after the war saw a considerably more active state alongside restrictions and direct or indirect selectivity on the part of the state and business actors alike in international migration. Focusing on Odessa, the Black Sea and the period up until 1924 sheds light on a largely overlooked part of the great transatlantic migrations. In relation to the passenger business, previous studies have mostly focused on Northern and north-western Europe and the period prior to the First World War.²

The main source: the passenger lists

The main source for migrants entering New York from Odessa during the period 1890s to 1924 is the passenger lists issued by the U.S. immigration authorities and filled out by shipping company representatives at the *port of embarkation*. Today, these lists are available online.³ Contrary to popular belief, the lists were not compiled upon entry to the United States. During the process at for example Ellis Island, one of several U.S. federal control stations from the 1890s onwards, the entries in the passenger lists were checked and amended, if necessary. The scope of this study is also interested in eastbound passenger lists; however, eastbound passenger lists are rarely available. The main source for insights into eastbound traffic is statistics from the companies showing passenger numbers for each departure.⁴ In addition, from 1908, the U.S. immigration authorities kept statistics on aliens and natives departing from the United States and their destination. The focus of the article is the port of arrival, i.e. New York, and not the passengers' ultimate destination. There were other arrival ports too for transatlantic liners during this period that some migrants from Odessa may have used, notably Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Galveston and Canadian ports.

2. E.g. Brinkmann, Feys, Keeling, Sebak.

3. <http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/EIDB/ellisgold.html> (date of access: 1 October 2015).

4. E.g. Gemeentearchief Rotterdam/ Rotterdam Municipal Archive (GA), Holland-Amerika Lijn (HAL), 318.04, 579, Transatlantic Passenger Movement (TPM), 1899-1929.

Picture 1: Passenger lists being checked and amended at Ellis Island, early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress).



On the basis of the westbound passenger lists, a database⁵ has been produced for this study covering the period 1892 to 1924, and with 28,300 migrants giving ‘Odessa’ as their ‘last permanent address’. ‘Last permanent address’ usually denotes the previous place in which the migrant had resided for one year or more. Some margin of error must be taken into account. The database is based on the transcribed version of the original lists. The original lists were handwritten and at times difficult to interpret until 1917; and thereafter typewritten. At the same time, Odessa is among the easier ports to study based on the passenger lists. The name ‘Odessa’ is fairly recognizable compared to many other Russian locations, reducing the possibility of errors in the process of transcription. Moreover, whereas some migrants did not necessarily distinguish between the Russian *governorate* and Russian city when giving their last residence in Russia in cases where these had identical names – e.g. Kiev, Kovno, Minsk, Vilna (Vilnius) – Odessa was only a city and part of the *governorate* of Kherson until 1922. Yet some

5. Hereafter: *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*.

migrants may still have travelled to Odessa and spent only a short time there before leaving for New York, and in doing so registered Odessa as their last 'permanent address'. For that reason, the entries may also include cases where migrants from Odessa spent a few months in, for example, Britain or France before deciding to proceed to the United States. However, most would have travelled directly from Odessa during the period in question. It must, of course, also be considered that some migrants may have given false, incomplete or inaccurate information, whether deliberately or not.

The transcribed lists on which the database is based does not distinguish between first, second and third-class passengers, or provide information on the migrants' reasons for travelling. However, all indications suggest that just about all migrants from Odessa travelled in third class, and with the intention of permanent residence in the United States. Distinguishing the class in which migrants travelled is relevant owing to the accords of the shipping conference agreements that will be discussed.

Throughout the period 1892 to 1924, the extent of data in the original passenger lists varies, from 10 columns of information in 1892 to 29 in 1915. Only parts of this data has been transcribed and included in the database covering the whole period of this study: name, last permanent address, age, gender, marital status, date of arrival ship and port of embarkation. Based on the ship name and port of embarkation, the shipping company has been added. Relevant errors have been rectified as far as possible in the database by comparing the original lists. There are for example several cases where the Russian port of Libau has been transcribed as Lisbon, or the Danish town of Odense as Odessa. Odessa is also a town in 10 U.S. states and in some cases the 'last permanent address' refers to one of those namesakes. The passenger lists became more elaborate during the years leading up to World War I. From 1899, 'race' (ethnicity) was added based on a specified official list issued by the U.S. immigration authorities. Due to the multi-ethnic composition of the Russian Empire, ethnicity, together with destination, is of particular interest when looking at migratory patterns and who migrated from Odessa. In the case of Russia, focusing on ethnicity gives a better understanding of migration patterns due to common languages, occupations, communities and specific regulations tar-

getting Jews. The U.S. authorities did not distinguish Russians from Ukrainians – Odessa being part of present-day Ukraine – as was the case in for example Canada during the 1920s.⁶ By 1897, Jews comprised 138,000 of Odessa's total population of 403,000. Other ethnic groups, by language, included 198,000 Russians, 38,000 Ukrainians and 5,000 Greeks.⁷ To get an impression of destination and 'race', random checks have been made by uploading the original passenger lists for the period 1892 until 1914.⁸ For the period 1914-1924, all destinations and ethnicities have been added to the database from the original passenger lists (1,700 names). Russia did not keep emigration records, meaning the U.S. records are the best source for getting an overview of Russian immigrants to the United States, and who they were.

In June 1897, a fire broke out on Ellis Island completely destroying the wooden buildings that made up the facilities. Most immigrant records for New York dating back to 1855 were destroyed. Therefore, although recorded statistical numbers from Russia are known, there is little data available revealing origins and destinations for migrants from Russia during the period 1892 to June 1897, including Odessa. '0' for 1894 and 1895, and only 15 in 1893 do not necessarily represent the actual numbers arriving in New York from Odessa during those two years. Migrants were processed elsewhere in New York until the new buildings, this time in brick, opened on Ellis Island in December 1900.⁹

Official statistics on migration to and from the United States are given in fiscal years. For example, the fiscal year of 1904 stretched from July 1903 to June 1904. When comparing to statistical numbers relating to migration, the numbers from the database have been

6. Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic – A History of Canadian Immigration Policy*, (University of Toronto Press, 2010), pp. 200-201.

7. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97_uezd_eng.php?reg=1665 (uploaded 11.01.2016); Robert Weinberg, "Workers, Pogroms, and the 1905 Revolution in Odessa", *The Russian Review*, 46 (1987), pp. 55-56; Gelina Harlaftis, *History of Greek-owned Shipping. The making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 6.

8. <http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/EIDB/ellisgold.html>

9. Vincent J. Cannato, *American Passage – A History of Ellis Island*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), pp. 107, 120.

adjusted to correspond with fiscal years. Unless otherwise stated, all years in this article refer to calendar years (i.e. January to December).

The text will first address how transatlantic migration and the transatlantic passenger business evolved during the main period of migration prior to 1914, with particular focus on the various dynamics and mechanisms affecting Russian transatlantic migration of which Odessa was a part. Thereafter, attention will be drawn to the specific case of Odessa with an in-depth analysis of migration routes and flows between Odessa and New York throughout the period 1890s until 1924.

The great transatlantic migrations and Russia

The great transatlantic migrations are generally understood as covering the period between the 1840s and 1930. To begin with, the flow was dominated by German, English and Irish migrants. During the 1840s and 1850s alone, upwards of 1.7 million Irish and 1.5 million German migrants arrived in the United States. Not before the early 1900s did a new group of migrants comprise such annual numbers.¹⁰ U.S. clipper ships dominated the early shipment of transatlantic migrants, with the most important route being between Liverpool and New York.¹¹ From the 1850s onwards, British steamers had the upper hand. A notable milestone in the development of ships on the transatlantic passenger run was the combination of steel hulls and propellers, as opposed to previous iron and paddle wheels, enabling a considerable increase in capacity for shipping migrants. After 1876, all transatlantic migrants arriving in New York did so by steamer.¹² Between the 1860s and early 1890s, the transatlantic passenger business was mainly Brit-

10. *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970, part 1*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975, pp. 105-106.

11. David Hollett, *Passage to the New World – Packet Ships and the Irish Famine Emigrants, 1845-1851*, (Abergavenny: P.M. Heaton Publishing, 1995), p. 76.

12. Raymond L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in Immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 55:2, (2005), 469-495; Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973 – A history of shipping and financial management*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975), pp. 59, 91.

ish and centered on a close-knit shipping community in the port of Liverpool, but also German, U.S., Dutch, Belgian and French companies played a pivotal role. Notable companies included the Cunard Line (established in 1839), the Inman Line (1850), the White Star Line (1871), Hamburg Amerikanische Paketfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft (the Hamburg America Line) (1856), Norddeutscher Lloyd (1858), Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (CGT) (1864), the Holland America Line (1873) and the Red Star Line (1873).

Picture 2: New York harbor, ca. 1905, showing the White Star Line's *Baltic*, which was the world's largest liner in 1904 (Source: Library of Congress).



The 1890s onwards marked a considerable change in the history of transatlantic migration. Absolute numbers reached unprecedented levels. From 1890 to 1914, almost 16 million Europeans, or twice as many as the preceding twenty-four years, landed in the United States. Six years between 1906 and 1913 saw more than a million transatlantic migrants. Not before the 1980s did the level of legal migrants entering the United States once again reach the

one-million mark.¹³ Moreover, the most important points of origin shifted from north-western Europe – including Germany, and often denoted as ‘old immigrants’ – to Eastern and Southern Europe (‘new immigrants’). 1882 was the first year with more than 10,000 Russian migrants heading for the United States. In 1902, Russian transatlantic migrant numbers passed 100,000 for the first time and stayed so until the outbreak of war. By the early 1900s, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian migrants far outnumbered German, Irish, British and Scandinavian migrants, who formed the four most important groups prior to 1890.¹⁴

At the same time, the flow more and more resembled a two-way movement, producing a growing share of eastbound traffic from America to Europe. Indeed, transatlantic migration was, to begin with, principally a one-way movement. From the 1890s onwards, increasing numbers visited the old country or spent parts of the year working in the United States and parts in the home country. Added to this was the growing number of tourists, especially noticeable in the growing number of second and first-class passengers. The shipping companies responded, adapted and facilitated by catering for repeat and return migration by way of enhanced space, standards and comforts on their steamers.¹⁵ Yet this pattern did not apply to all migrant groups. While the rate of return migration was high among Italians and most ethnic groups within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Britain, as well as the Greeks and the Scandinavians, the rate of return and repeat among Russian Jews remained low and therefore still followed the conventional pattern of predominantly being a one-way movement.¹⁶

13. *2010 yearbook of Immigration Statistics, office of Immigration Statistics*, (Department of Homeland Security, August 2011), p. 5.

14. *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970*, part 1 (U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975), pp. 105-106.

15. Drew Keeling, “The Improvement of Travel Conditions for Migrants Crossing the North Atlantic, 1900-1914”, in T Brinkmann (ed.), *Points of Passage – Jewish Transmigrants from eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, (Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 107-129; GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1899-1929.

16. Mark Wyman, *Round-Trip to America – The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 10-11; Keeling, *The Improvement of Travel Conditions for Migrants Crossing the North Atlantic*, p. 117.

Another notable feature during the period 1890 to 1914 was that migrants increasingly and inadvertently became *transmigrants*. Although the number of services increased from the Mediterranean and Baltic, and the majority of transatlantic migrants eventually came from countries adjacent to the Mediterranean and/or Baltic ports, the majority of emigrants always left for North America from British and Continental ports during the peak period of 1900 to 1914. While most migrants previously had a relatively short journey to their port of embarkation to America, the shipping companies now had to manage inland and maritime routes extending far beyond their traditional sphere of economic interest.

Prior to the 1890s, there were limited passenger services between the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and North America. Of the more than a hundred various passenger services, albeit mostly short-lived, established between Europe and North America during the period 1850 to 1890, less than 10 reached the Mediterranean.¹⁷ None of them operated between the Black Sea and North America. This reflects the wider picture of the transatlantic passenger business and migrant origins, with limited demand for transatlantic passage from Russia and the Black Sea region. Various studies also suggest that transatlantic migration from Russia prior to 1890 mainly originated from the north-western parts of the empire, close to the Baltic and Germany, undermining the demand for transatlantic services from Odessa even more.¹⁸

By 1900, Russia had the seventh largest merchant fleet in the world.¹⁹ The fleet was mostly involved in shipping between western and eastern parts of the vast empire.²⁰ Russia's overall involvement

17. N.R.P. Bonsor, *North Atlantic Seaway – An illustrated history of the passenger services linking the old world with the new*, (Prescot: T. Stephenson & Sons Ltd, 1955), pp. vii-xi.

18. Leah Platt Boustan, "Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants? Assessing the Persecution Theory of Jewish Emigration, 1881-1914", in T.J. Hatton, K.H. O'Rourke, A.M. Taylor, (eds), *The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson*, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), pp. 267-290.

19. Derek H. Aldcroft (ed.), *The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition 1875-1914*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968), p. 327.

20. Edwin Maxey, "The Russian Merchant Marine", *Mid-West Quarterly*, The, 1:3 (April 1914), pp. 209-219.

in passenger traffic was scarce. In the Baltic, British and Danish steamers dominated, in addition to partly Finnish, which belonged to Russia at the time. The main passenger routes connecting the Black Sea, Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Mediterranean were mostly in the hands of Austrian and French companies. An important exception was the Russian Steam Navigation Company, Russia's largest shipping company at the time, which maintained a passenger service between Odessa, other southern Russian ports and Constantinople.²¹ The dominance of foreign flags in passenger lines to and from Russia was not exceptional. At the time, Russian exports and imports were dominated by foreign flags, with some areas in the Black Sea being largely in the hands of well-established Greek enterprises.²²

Italian ship-owners, with strong state support, responded to the similar surge in Italian migration by increasing the number of Italian lines from one to six by 1914.²³ It was only in 1906 that Russia saw her first transatlantic passenger line with the inauguration of two services between the port of Libau in the Baltic and New York: the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Russian American Line. The Russian Volunteer Fleet was closely linked to the Russian Government, and was originally established to serve the Russian state in times of peace as well as war. The Russian American Line, though Russian-flagged and owned by the Russian East Asiatic Company, was in fact funded by the main Continental lines in an attempt to oust the Russian Volunteer Fleet.²⁴ After only two years in service, the Russian Volunteer Fleet suspended its route largely due to poor management, while the Russian American Line continued until 1916 as a subsidiary of the Danish East Asiatic Company which, in 1907, secured a controlling interest in the Russian East Asiatic Company.²⁵ The Russian American Line was the only sustainable Russian-flag involvement in the transatlantic passenger business.

21. Bradshaw's *Continental Railway Guide and General Handbook illustrated with local and other maps – special edition*, (unknown publisher, 1913), pp. 358-359.

22. Helen Louri and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, "Diaspora entrepreneurial networks in the Black Sea and Greece, 1870-1917", *Journal of European Economic History*, 26:1 (1997), pp. 69-104.

23. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 199-200.

24. Maxey, *The Russian Merchant Marine*, pp. 212-213.

25. William C. Fuller, jr., *The Foe Within – Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006), pp. 35-36.

Collusion and clashes among the companies – pre World War I

To understand what shaped migrant routes and options, including from Odessa, during the period 1892 to 1914, attention must be drawn to three key perspectives: how the transatlantic shipping business was organized, migration control, and the structure and role of agents. Parallel to the shift from Northern and north-western to Southern and Eastern Europe as the most important origins of migration, the shipping companies involved sought new and adaptable ways to deal with such a vast and complex transcontinental and transoceanic human movement. Indeed, the companies faced several obstacles, practical as well as economical. Between the 1850s and 1950s, the largest and fastest ship in the world was always found to be a transatlantic passenger liner. As the size, speed and costs of the ships increased, especially noticeable towards the end of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, it was largely unfeasible to follow the main flows of migrants eastwards by sending the transatlantic liner into the Baltic or even the Mediterranean and Black Sea. As with other shipping at the time, the big shipping companies tended to send their ships to the main ports of Europe – such as Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp – which offered adequate and well consolidated infrastructure, agents, networks and other essentials. For this reason, the main ports also increasingly became transit hubs, for freight as well as for passengers.²⁶ Therefore, the transatlantic shipping companies for the most part focused on bringing migrants to the port of embarkation in north-western Europe.

A further challenge for the companies was the highly seasonal nature of transatlantic migration, in addition to the fact the demand could vary considerably from year to year. In 1906 a total of 1.5 million third-class passengers crossed the Atlantic, in 1907 the total was 1.9 million, and in 1908 just over 1 million.²⁷ Between 1900 and 1913, only 40 percent of the passenger capacity was taken, meaning many ships, depending on season, left port half full or less.²⁸

26. Michael B. Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 23-35.

27. GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1899-1914.

28. Drew Keeling, "Transport Capacity Management and Transatlantic Migration, 1900-1914", *Research in Economic History*, 25:1 (2008), pp. 225-283.

Picture 3: Albert Ballin, director of the Hamburg America Line and a key figure in the transatlantic passenger business and conferences (Source: Library of Congress).



The solution for the companies was to devise methods that minimized the economic risk and burden in the short-term as well as in the long-term; a combination of limiting intercompany competition combined with influencing and appeasing legislators in order to avert unwanted state intervention. A key device in this strategy was to organize themselves in *shipping conferences*. To use Robert Greenhill's definition, shipping conferences were '[e]ssentially cartels or oligopolistic arrangements whereby sellers, independent but associated shipping companies, combined to set prices and services to their customers.'²⁹ In effect, shipping conferences regulated markets and

29. Robert G. Greenhill, "Competition or Co-operation in the Global Shipping Industry: The Origins and Impact of the Conference System for British Shipowners

created barriers of entry for possible newcomers. They were seen in most overseas liner traffic in the late nineteenth century.³⁰ The Liverpool transatlantic passenger companies had colluded as early as the 1860s to limit competition on the route between Liverpool and New York.³¹ By the 1890s, this conference system was termed the North Atlantic Passenger Conference and still based in Liverpool.

At the same time, by the early 1890s the German companies had gained a prominent position in the transatlantic passenger business, benefitting from preference legislation by the German state.³² In addition, the German companies were in a good geographical position to capitalize on the growing number of migrants from the east. The result was stiff competition with the British companies that saw their strong position in the transatlantic passenger business threatened. In 1892, a separate Continental shipping conference was formed as the *Nordatlantischer Dampfer Linien Verband* (NDLV).³³ Simultaneously, the German companies approached the British companies believing the best way forward was collaboration across the English Channel. A lasting agreement was concluded in 1898, with the Continental Business Agreement, setting the overall framework of the transatlantic passenger business from the Continent and Scandinavia for the next decade or so. Most importantly, the agreement defined minimum ticket rates, and limited and regulated the British share of the Continental market to six percent of annual numbers.³⁴ In effect, this gave the Continental companies the clear upper hand in the Russian market. It also kept the Continental lines away from the Scandinavian market, where the British lines held a dominant position.

before 1914", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds), *Global Markets: The internationalization of the sea Transport industries since 1850*, Research in Maritime History, 14, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1998), pp. 53-80.

30. H.J. Dyos and D.H. Aldcroft, *British Transport – An economic survey from the seventeenth century to the twentieth*, (Leicester University Press, 1969), p. 269.

31. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, pp. 94-100.

32. Stanley G. Sturme, *British Shipping and World Competition* (University of London, 1962), p. 25.

33. GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "Hamburg, January 19th 1892".

34. GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "Continental Business 7 June 1898", "Protocolle No. 18 15 March 1895".

However, the apparent harmony among the companies was regularly put to the test. In 1902, the equilibrium came under pressure when the U.S. business tycoon John P. Morgan acquired several major British and Continental transatlantic shipping companies and formed the International Mercantile Marine Company (IMM), creating the world's largest shipping combine at the time. IMM also formed an alliance with the remaining German transatlantic passenger companies of the Hamburg America Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd.³⁵ These events, fueled by a sense of inferiority towards the German companies on the part of the British Cunard Line, were major factors contributing to one of most comprehensive and publicized disputes involving the transatlantic passenger companies: the Atlantic Rate War of 1904, during which the conference agreements were temporarily set aside and ticket prices drastically cut.³⁶ For Russian emigration, the Atlantic Rate War had a notable effect in that it most probably influenced numbers to soar from 136,000 during the fiscal year of 1903 to 145,000 in 1904, and to 184,900 in 1905.³⁷ Studies dealing with Russian-Jewish emigration, which made up the majority of Russian emigration, often attribute the Kishinev pogrom (attack on the Jewish community) in 1903, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the first Russian Revolution (1905) to accelerating Jewish emigration from Russia during this period.³⁸ Yet such a premise is insufficient without considering the Atlantic Rate War and the impact it had on ticket prices and travel options from Russia.

35. Gordon Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development – The rise of large-scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870-1919*, (Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 100; Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, 137-138; Vivian Vale, *The American Peril, Challenge to Britain on the North Atlantic 1901-1904*, (Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 102-103.

36. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, p. 112; GA, HAL, 318.04, 229, 13 and 15 January 1905.

37. United States Immigration Commission, Vol. 3: *Statistical Review of Immigration, 1819-1910 – Distribution of Immigrants, 1850-1900*, (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1907-1910). pp. 41-42.

38. Irving Howe, *World of Our Fathers – the Journey of the East European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made*, (New York University Press, 1976), pp. 112, 125; Philip A. M. Taylor, *The Distant Magnet – European Emigration to the USA*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), p. 99.

For the companies, the Atlantic Rate War was a costly affair, inducing all parties to focus on reaching intercompany agreements in order to mitigate competition and avoid further conflicts.³⁹ The conflict proved an important stepping-stone towards more robust collaboration in the form of the Atlantic Conference in 1908. The Atlantic Conference was effectively a union between the North Atlantic Passenger Conference in Liverpool and the NDLV in Jena, Germany (encompassing the Continental lines), both of which continued as separate bodies for their respective group of companies. The accords of the Atlantic Conference covered just about all transatlantic passenger services between Northern Europe (ports between Bordeaux, France, and St. Petersburg including Scandinavia) and North America, and included regulations and pooling agreements for third class. *Pooling agreement* meant allocating each conference member a market share.⁴⁰ If the share was not reached compensation would be paid from the other companies' surplus. The conference regulations also effectively decided by which route and, to some degree, by which company migrants (i.e. third class) could take. The agreements also regulated parts of the first and second-class business; though passengers in those classes were free to choose route and steamer.

The conference system effectively divided the European third-class passenger market into three sub-markets; British-Scandinavian (including Finland), Continental and Mediterranean. A separate agreement was concluded for the Mediterranean business. From 1909, this concerned the *Mediterranean Steerage-Traffic Agreement* which was signed by two groups of companies: six Italian companies on the one part and the Anchor Line, Fabre Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd, the Hamburg America Line and the White Star Line on the other. The agreement came about following increasing Italian presence in the early twentieth century that undermined the conference agreements. The agreement concerned migrants board-

39. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, pp. 110-113; Erich Murken, *Die grossen transatlantischen Linienreederei-Verbände, Pools und Interessengemeinschaften bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges: Ihre Entstehung, Organisation und Wirksamkeit*, (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1922), p. 278; "International Marine Company A Heavy Loser", (*The New York Times*, 19 July 1905).

40. S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, p. 322.

ing at Italian ports, and also explicitly stated that lines operating direct services from Italy would not attempt to book Continental passengers, including Russians.⁴¹ A separate agreement was also concluded concerning Oriental passengers (Greece, Asia and Africa).⁴² At the time of the signing of the agreement, there was no sustainable Greek line. The first attempt for a Greek transatlantic line was made in 1907 when the firm of D.G. Moraitis placed an order for two steamers in Britain. However, the line lasted less than a year, because of 'enormous debt' combined with the dramatic slump in passenger numbers in 1908. Two Greek lines, however, were in service from mid-1909, the Hellenic Line (Greek Steam Navigation Company) and the National Greek Line.⁴³ It is unclear how the conferences viewed the Greek lines. It was mainly French companies, the Austro-Americana Line operating from the Adriatic and the Greek lines that took passengers from Greece at the time. Transatlantic migration from Greece rose significantly in the early twentieth century – from 8,000 arriving in the United States during the fiscal year of 1902 to 36,000 in 1906, and 26,000 in 1911 – making that market particularly interesting for Greek as well as for other companies.⁴⁴ There is no indication that the Greek companies attempted to exploit their favorable geographical position and well-established business networks in southern Russia by tapping into the Russian market, and especially Odessa, during this period.

Just about all shipping companies involved in the transatlantic passenger business were committed to or associated with the Atlantic Conference or the Mediterranean Agreement during the period 1908-1914, which was also the most 'peaceful' period as far as intercompany matters on the transatlantic run were concerned.

41. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, p. 200; GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "Mediterranean Steerage Traffic Agreement, February 1909".

42. GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "Special Agreement A, 18 February 1909".

43. Nicolas Maniatakis, "Transatlantic Emigration and Maritime Transport from Greece to the US 1890-1912", in T. Feys, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste, S. Vanfraechem (eds), *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, Research in Maritime History 33, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2007), pp. 63-74.

44. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922). 1921), p. 106.

Serious trouble for the Atlantic Conference did not arise before January 1914 when the Hamburg America Line pulled out of the conference over a dispute with Norddeutscher Lloyd. This triggered a rate war that lasted until the outbreak of war in August that same year, though without dissolving the conference.⁴⁵

The conference system faced minimal external opposition. One notable exception was in 1911 when the U.S. Government filed a petition against 13 members of the Atlantic Conference for violating the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act which had been enacted in 1890 to enable action against presumed violators of cartels and other forms of collusion. It was alleged that the conference had 'killed off' competition. In the end, the court dismissed the case, though declaring 'fighting ships' illegal.⁴⁶ 'Fighting ships' meant that the conference deployed a steamer to coincide as closely as possible with the competitor's service at drastically cut ticket rates. This was meant to drive out the competitor and the subsequent losses or 'fighting expenses' were shared among the conference members.⁴⁷

As far as the overall impact on migrant routes were concerned, the conference system had largely two-fold effect. Migrants had limited choices as to routes, companies and travel options. Despite the dramatic surge in passenger numbers after 1900, the number of independent companies involved in the shipment of passengers decreased. In addition, ticket prices increased, one estimate showing as much as 23 percent between 1900 and 1913.⁴⁸ It was not necessarily in the interest of the companies to ship as many migrants as possible. A greater concern was to avoid costly rate wars and state intervention, and maintain fragile intercompany and transnational agreements.

45. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, pp. 115-16, 118; Murken, *Die grossen transatlantischen Linienreederei-Verbände*, p. 659.

46. "Steamship Traffic Agreement Upheld, (14 October 1914); Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 200-205.

47. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 200-201.

48. Drew Keeling, "Costs, Risks, and Migration Networks between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914", in T. Feys, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste, S. Vanfraechem (eds), *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, Research in Maritime History 33, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2007), p. 132.

Migration control – pre World War I

Collaboration mitigated one side of the mounting challenges for the companies in shipping migrants between all corners of Europe and North America. The other challenge involved finding methods of limiting state intervention in the form of migration control. Simultaneously and to some extent interrelated, the late nineteenth and into the early twentieth century saw repeated calls for restrictions and regulations on immigration as well as on emigration in Europe and in North America. Hence, the shipping companies became more and more dependent on influencing and cushioning state actors in order to hinder such restrictions and keep their long-established business structures going.

To begin with, state intervention in the transatlantic passenger business mainly concerned *emigration acts*, imposing minimal standards on emigrant vessels and, to some extent, regulating the business itself, especially in view of the activity of migrant agents selling tickets on behalf of the companies.⁴⁹ This had the effect of limiting the extent of actors involved in the transatlantic passenger business. It also constrained foul play on the part of those selling tickets and organizing the journey for migrants.

At the same time, as far as state intervention was concerned, the state effectively played a key role throughout the period in facilitating migration. A vital precondition for the vast volume of transatlantic migration was the removal of the passport in most European countries between 1857 and 1863 – and also the state's unwillingness to stem emigration in other ways.⁵⁰ Russia, together with Romania and the Ottoman Empire, were notable exceptions by not abolishing the passport. The Russian policy on emigration had little impact on stemming emigration and, in addition, showed little consistency. On

49. Kristian Hvidt, *Flugten til Amerika eller Drivkræfter i masseudvandringen fra Danmark 1868-1914*, (Universitetsforlaget i Aarhus, 1971), pp. 40-46.

50. Ann-Sofie Källemark, "Swedish Emigration Policy in an International Perspective, 1840-1925", in H. Norman and Harald Runblom (eds), *From Sweden to America – A History of the Migration*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1976, pp. 94-113; Leo Lucassen, "A Many-Headed Monster: The Evolution of the Passport System in the Netherlands and Germany in the Long Nineteenth Century", in J. Caplan and J. Torpey (eds), *Documenting Individual Identity*, (Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 245-246.

the one hand, oppressive policies were imposed on the Jewish minority – the most important migrant group including from Odessa –, and high-ranking Russian officials frequently expressed the desire to drive Jews out of the Empire. On the other hand, many Jews were willing to leave, and networks within and beyond Russia assisted the movement. Yet no official Tsarist Russian policy was ever implemented to encourage or assist emigration. Emigrating from Russia with the intention of permanent residence in another country remained, in the words of Hans Rogger, ‘strictly speaking’ a ‘punishable offence’. Only temporary residence abroad, common among Russian Poles in particular, was permitted, though for no longer than five years.⁵¹

The result was a Russian system that, although clearly at variance with Russian law and fully exposed to the Russian authorities, remained largely accepted until the outbreak of war. Russian passports involved costly and lengthy application proceedings and a fee for the passport itself.⁵² Many, probably most, Russian emigrants therefore circumvented the official passport proceedings by paying agents under the protection of local authorities and who received part of the commission themselves.⁵³

The Tsarist Russian state really only showed interest in Russian emigration in 1906 when an inter-ministerial commission within the Russian Ministry of Trade and Industry was set up to consider methods of regulating the flow of Russian emigration – or exploiting it.⁵⁴ The timing was hardly coincidental. As mentioned, in 1906 the first two Russian-flag companies were established between Libau and New York, one of which was state-sponsored. This opened the possibility of an additional source of income for the state, provided that migrants were directed by way of the Russian

51. Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*, (University of California Press, 1986), pp. 177-180, 184; Leo Lucassen, “The Great War and the Origins of Migration Control in western Europe and the United States (1880-1920)”, in A. Böcker, K. Groenendijk, T. Havinga, and P. Minderhoud, (eds), *Regulation of Migration – International Experiences*, (Het Spinhuis Publishers, Amsterdam 1998), pp. 50-74.

52. Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*, p. 183.

53. Fuller, jr., *The Foe Within*, pp. 22-23; Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*, pp. 181-183.

54. Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*, p. 181.

steamers. The previous year alone saw close to 200,000 Russian subjects enter the United States, boosting the economic prospects for the Russian state even more. A bill was ready by 1910 proposing preferential treatment for Russian-flag companies. The bill included reduced railway fares and more easily obtainable passports for emigrants, provided that he or she left Russia via Libau on Russian-flag carriers. Moreover, it proposed that only Russian companies could engage migrant agents in the interior of Russia, thereby including Odessa.⁵⁵ The proposed bill was strongly opposed by the shipping conferences and ultimately stopped following protests involving the companies as well as the German, Danish and British authorities arguing that preferential treatment would violate trade agreements.⁵⁶ Whether it was collective lobbying that proved to be the decisive factor in blocking the new Russian emigration legislation remains unclear. Nevertheless, it shows how the companies collectively posed a powerful force capable of influencing state policies and hindering unfavorable legislation threatening their emigrant businesses. It also illustrates the obstacles Russian and other newcomers faced when attempting to enter a business heavily regulated by a conference system. At the same time, it further highlights how the Russian state effectively facilitated the migration movement.

State facilitating in terms of migration control and with the shipping companies' involvement also played out in the United States. In 1891, the enforcement of U.S. immigration policies went from being a state-level responsibility to becoming a federal responsibility in the hands of a government agency in Washington, D.C.. In addition, federal border stations were established with separate commissioners of immigration responsible for executing legislation, with Ellis Island in New York being the most important. During the years leading up to the First World War, Congress was constantly under pressure to impose stricter migration control, pointed towards limiting the 'new' substantial flow of migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe – including Russia – which was accused of undermining U.S. interests

55. Erhvervsarkivet/ Danish Business Archives (EA), DFDS, Dansk russisk Dampskibsselskab (DRD), 1898-1912 korrespondance, 7 February 1910.

56. Chr. R. Jansen, "DFDS og den russiske emigrationslovgivning 1908-10", *Erhvervshistorisk årbog*, 24 (1973), pp. 115-129; EA, DFDS, DRD, 1898-1912 korrespondance, 29/11 February 1910 and 12/2 October 1909.

and society.⁵⁷ One particular tool with the ability to reduce the rate of migration from Eastern and Southern Europe was by introducing a literacy test. As Torsten Feys found, between the 1890s and 1917, a proposal for a literacy test passed through Congress no less than 17 times without being enacted. One of the most important explanations for this was the influence and lobbying of the shipping companies. Indeed, while an anti-immigration league advocated stemming immigration, the shipping companies financed and mobilized pro-migration movements, including immigrant communities with members eligible to vote.⁵⁸ In practice, the companies were able to prevent any significant U.S. measure capable of undermining their business in the early twentieth century. Indeed, as mentioned, emigration from Eastern and Southern Europe to the United States rose dramatically.

Picture 4: Immigrants undergo a health check at Ellis Island in the early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress).



57. Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design – Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*, (Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 216-220.

58. Torsten Feys, "The visible hand of shipping interests in American migration policies 1815-1914", *Htijschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis*, 7:1, (2010), pp. 38-62.

Instead, U.S. migration control during this period predominantly involved enhancing the 'quality' of in-bound migrants and transferring the initial filtering from the U.S. borders to Europe and prior to embarkation – or what Aristide R. Zolberg has coined 'remote control'.⁵⁹ A key step in implementing 'remote control' was to impose fines on shipping companies that brought migrants at variance with the immigration regulations. The companies also became responsible for migrants up to one year – and eventually three years – after arrival, meaning if a migrant within that timeframe for example committed a crime he or she would be returned to the point of origin. All expenses, including medical and the return trip, were charged to the company that had brought the migrant to the United States.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the rate of deported or debarred migrants at the border remained low, staying at a ratio of two percent of the total annual number of immigrant numbers.⁶¹ By far the most common group expelled from the United States was of those deemed as 'likely to become a public charge'.⁶² For the companies, returning migrants became part of the calculation of transporting migrants to and from North America.

From a European perspective, and particularly relating to Russian emigration, a key turning point in migration control occurred in 1892, when an outbreak of cholera claimed the lives of an estimated 8,000 people in Hamburg which, together with Bremen, was the most important embarkation port for the growing number of Russian migrants at the time. The blame was pointed to Russian transmigrants, though there was no proof in the matter. Consequently, both the United States and the state of Hamburg temporarily banned Russian migrants from entry. Prussia, the only German state sharing a frontier with Russia, likewise barred Russian migrants from crossing the border. In the end, the parties came to an agreement allowing Russian migrants to pass through Prussia and

59. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design*.

60. United States Immigration Commission, Vol. 39: Immigration Legislation, (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1907-1910), pp 102-104, 111.

61. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1921), pp. 106-107.

62. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1914), p. 29.

Hamburg.⁶³ The U.S. authorities likewise lifted the ban on Russian immigrants after a short space of time.

As part of the solution between the German state authorities and the two German shipping companies, migration control in Germany was effectively privatized. 13 control stations were eventually established along the border with Russia and Austria-Hungary. The control stations were managed by the shipping companies. In addition to good health, a key criterion was the obligation of the migrant to hold a ticket for the transatlantic shipping company, limiting the possibility that he or she might remain in Germany. These transmigrants were also required to follow a specific route through Germany organized by the companies. Along the route Jewish migrants were aided by the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden*, established in Berlin in 1901. It distributed information among Jewish organizations and communities in Eastern Europe, including Russia, as well as in the United States, on ticket prices and immigration policies.⁶⁴ Overall, the well-structured transport system should be viewed as an important premise enabling such a vast human movement from east to west during this period. The system remained in force until the outbreak of war in 1914, and was the most important artery for Russian migrants.

Structure and role of agent-networks

A third key perspective shaping the framework for transatlantic migration, including from Russia and Odessa, during the years prior to World War I was the role and structure of agents – or middlemen – serving the shipping companies. Agent-networks on both sides of the Atlantic interacted, and were structured in mostly three levels: migrant broker, migrant agent and subagent. The migrant broker served the same function as the traditional *shipbroker* (for freight) with

63. Tobias Brinkmann, “Why Paul Nathan Attacked Albert Ballin The Transatlantic Mass Migration and the Privatization of Prussia’s eastern Border Inspection, 1886-1914”, *Central European History*, 43 (2010), pp. 37-83.

64. Tobias Brinkmann, “Points of Passage – Reexamining Jewish Migrations from Eastern Europe after 1880”, in T. Brinkmann (ed.), *Points of Passage – Jewish Transmigrants from eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, (Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 1-23.

responsibility to fill the ship's holds, and often functioned as the shipping company's official representative for a region or country. The broker typically had a high level of autonomy managing an extensive web of networks built up over time, giving him, in effect, a high level of first-mover advantage and a strong position within the market he was based. The next level – migrant agent – was generally connected to the broker or in some cases dealt directly with the shipping company. He possessed vital knowledge of the language, and cultural and religious customs among migrant communities. This put the migrant agent in an advantageous position for gaining trust among prospective clients, and could also help him function as an important information channel as to which route to take, about how to deal with various regulations and health inspections – and even how to cross frontiers. Migrant agents often combined their occupation with other trades relating to the migrant business, including arranging accommodation and other transportation, but also banking services such as money orders, money exchange, and even loans to buy tickets on credit.⁶⁵ This was particularly useful given the high fluctuations in demand.

The interaction between brokers, agents and migrant networks on both sides of the Atlantic gave the various agents a superior market position over the shipping companies' executives, effectively stimulating interdependency between the company and agent. A key question was then how the company could be assured that the broker/agent representing it, often far afield such as Odessa, was *motivated* to attend to the company's interests?⁶⁶ Indeed, agents could act opportunistically, and did not necessarily stay loyal to their principles. Erich Murken, who had first-hand experience from working for the Hamburg America Line during the pre-war period, recalled in his account of the transatlantic passenger business how migrant brokers were often more powerful than the shipping companies as far as the third-class business was concerned.⁶⁷ One way forward was to try to vertically integrate agent-networks, in practice

65. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 77-86.

66. Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development*, pp. 2-3; Gordon Boyce, *Co-Operative Structures in Global Business: A New Approach to Networks, Technology Transfer Agreements, Strategic Alliances and Agency*, (Florence, Routledge, 2000), pp. 5, 14.

67. Murken, *Die grossen transatlantischen Linienreederei-Verbände*, pp. 15-16.

by opening a passenger department or office, with company employees, omitting costly commissions to agents. This was only done with limited success for the companies.⁶⁸

A better solution for the companies was to devise methods of keeping their agents under control. There were two such monitoring mechanisms; the emigration acts that were introduced throughout Europe in part to monitor agent activities; and the self-governing conference agreements. The companies were well aware of cases where agents misused their position. Moreover, the business attracted subagents with underhand intentions. As a result, the conference agreements included numerous clauses, and enabled several practices to regulate the activities of agents. They also empowered the companies to disqualify troublesome agents by collectively excluding them from doing business with all conference members. A separate conference for brokers was also set up in New York – the most important nexus for migrant agent-networks –, which reported directly to the conference secretaries in Europe on local business matters.⁶⁹

Networks, autonomy and keeping agents under control are key elements in understanding the nature of migrant agents in Russia. Russia lacked an emigration legislation protecting migrants and regulating the activity of agents. As mentioned, migration was strictly speaking illegal, but nevertheless well-known to the Russian authorities. The nature of Russian agent networks was marked by most of those involved in the business being Jews and in need of protection from state officials against oppressive anti-Jewish policies. This was particularly the case in Libau, which lay outside of the Pale of Settlement, the area in western Russia stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and within which most of Russia's five million Jews were confined to live. As noted by U.S. officials, much of the emigrant business in Libau, including agents, money exchangers and lodging houses, was connected with the city's flourishing Jewish community.⁷⁰ Although the rights of the Jews in Libau were increasingly

68. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 96-97, 318.

69. Murken, *Die grossen transatlantischen Linienreederei-Verbände*, pp. 641-643; Torsten Feys, "Prepaid tickets to ride to the new world: The New York continental conference and transatlantic steerage fares 1885-1895", *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 26:2, (2008), pp. 173-204.

70. *United States Immigration Commission, Vol. 4: Emigration Conditions in Eu-*

challenged by Russian decrees, Jewish merchants were largely protected by their importance for Russia in Baltic commerce, including emigration.⁷¹ At the same time, as noted by William Fuller in his research, various hostilities occurred among the groups of migrant agents in Russia serving different companies in the transatlantic passenger business.⁷² The main British and Continental companies seem not to have interfered; instead giving Russian agents considerable autonomy and seemingly being content as long as migrants were provided in accordance with company and intercompany regulations. The result was an agent-network system protected by local officials, and with which the central Russian Government did little to interfere. At the same time, migrants intending to leave Russia, either legally or illegally in accordance with Russian law, were dependent on connecting with these agent networks for tickets, travel arrangements and also, as mentioned, passports and permits to leave.

For the case of Odessa, the structure of agent-networks in Russia may largely explain the difficulty of opening a direct passenger line from Odessa to New York. In the first place, opening such a business based on emigrants would be technically illegal according to Russian law. Emigrants from Odessa relied instead on seeking and connecting with existing agent networks based along the border to Germany and in Libau, in some cases also with the assistance of Jewish organizations located along the same route, both for purchasing tickets and for information and guidance on how to cross the border.

Flows and patterns between Odessa and New York 1892-1914

It was in this wider structural context that prospective Odessa migrants found themselves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There was no sustainable direct passenger line from

rope, (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1907-1910), p. 104; Nicolas J. Evans, "The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914", in D. Cesarani and G. Romain (eds), *Jews and Port Cities 1590-1990 – Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism*, (Valentine Mitchell, London 2006), pp. 197, 200.

71. Evans, "The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914", pp. 197-201.

72. Fuller, jr., *The Foe Within*.

Odessa to the United States. Yet Odessa remained a key donor of transatlantic migrants for much of this period. The most important explanation for this was Odessa's large Jewish community. The Jewish population of Odessa grew from 14,000 in 1858 (14 percent of the total population) to 140,000 (35 percent) by 1897.⁷³ From the 1870s, Jews also gradually took over much of the dominance Greek merchants had previously enjoyed in several trades in Odessa; including as brokers, merchants, agents, bankers and dealing with overseas commerce. By 1910, Jews also controlled 90 percent of Odessa's grain trade, from which the port had prospered during the nineteenth century.⁷⁴ Jews had much of the same cosmopolitan outlook as Greeks, with the same cohesiveness, family and business connections extending within and beyond Russia. David Freyberg was one such agent in Odessa engaged in the migrant business, with connections to Libau, Britain and the United States.⁷⁵

Historically, ethnic Russian producers and merchants had been geared towards the home market; a similar story is found in the emigrant business.⁷⁶ There is little trace of any ethnic Russians being involved in the migrant business in Russia, including Odessa. It has not been possible within the scope of this study to check the given ethnicity (race) of all migrants from Odessa that arrived in New York during the period in question. However, random checks and looking at given names in the passenger lists clearly emphasize that the vast majority were Jews. Together, this underscores that the emigrant business in Russia was predominantly a Jewish enterprise; with Jewish agents and Jewish customers. In addition, all indications suggest that the majority of migrants from Russia headed for New York, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia, which also had the

73. Weinberg, "Workers, Pogroms, and the 1905 Revolution in Odessa", pp. 55-56.

74. Harlaftis, *History of Greek-owned Shipping*, pp. 68, 83; Patricia Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3:4 (1979-1980), pp. 399-420; Louri and Minoglou, *Diaspora entrepreneurial networks in the Black Sea and Greece, 1870-1917*, pp. 79, 82; Weinberg, "Workers, Pogroms, and the 1905 Revolution in Odessa", p. 56.

75. Fuller, jr., *The Foe Within*, p. 35.

76. Louri and Minoglou, *Diaspora entrepreneurial networks in the Black Sea and Greece*, pp. 73, 87.

largest Jewish communities in the United States. Of the 1.1 million registered Jews who entered the United States between 1899 and 1910, 51,000 went to the state of Illinois (Chicago), 66,000 to Massachusetts (Boston), 690,000 to New York and 108,000 to Pennsylvania (Philadelphia). During the same period, Jews also comprised the second-highest immigrant group in New York after Italians.⁷⁷

Picture 5: The Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York, the most important destination for Russian-Jewish immigrants in the early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress).



Compared to the total number of migrants leaving Russia at the time, ethnic Russians were of little significance; though from 1910 onwards numbers stayed above 10,000 and in the fiscal year of 1913 reached 50,000. The most important ethnic migrant group in

77. *United States Immigration Commission, Vol. 3: Statistical Review of Immigration, 1819-1910 – Distribution of Immigrants, 1850-1900*, (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1907-1910), pp. 290-293.

Russia in addition to Jews were Poles, who in some years matched the number of Jewish migrants leaving Russia for the United States.⁷⁸ There is no trace of notable numbers of Greeks departing either from Odessa or other southern parts of Russia for the United States at the time, even though Greek migration was in the increase. Greeks in Russia were suffering from economic downturns in an increasingly hostile environment, and numbered 600,000 in southern Russia in the early twentieth century.⁷⁹

Although renowned for its liberal views and for welcoming Jews, Odessa also witnessed several pogroms. The most devastating pogrom during this period took place in the wake of the First Russian Revolution in October 1905, spurred by a combination of allegations that Jews did not support the war against Japan, opposed the manifesto giving Russians civil rights and played a part in the massacre of June 1905 when striking Russian harbor workers were gunned down by Tsarist forces. During the ensuing pogroms, more than 300 Jews were killed and more than 1,600 homes and businesses damaged.⁸⁰ Yet pogroms should not be regarded as the only factor explaining Jewish emigration from Odessa after 1905; at the time, many Jews in Odessa had friends and family members who had travelled in advance and established migrant networks in the United States. Since the 1890s, Odessa had also suffered an economic recession leading many, Jews and others, to seek other occupational prospects. Some estimates suggest nearly 50,000 Jews in Odessa were destitute and another 30,000 poverty-stricken. Jews also faced discriminatory legislation and policies excluding them from parts of society.⁸¹

As we have seen, prior to 1890, the number of migrants going from Russia to the United States stayed at a minimum. Odessa was, to begin with, not among the most important Russian points of origin. This also reflects the general early picture of Russian transatlantic migration showing the predominance of points of origin closer to

78. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1921), pp. 104-105.


79. Louri and Minoglou, *Diaspora entrepreneurial networks in the Black Sea and Greece*, pp. 78, 82.

80. Weinberg, "Workers, Pogroms, and the 1905 Revolution in Odessa", p. 53

81. Weinberg, "Workers, Pogroms, and the 1905 Revolution in Odessa", pp. 54, 56.

the Baltic.⁸² In 1892, around 700 registered migrants arrived in New York from Odessa out of more than 80,000 from Russia as a whole.⁸³

Figure 1: Emigration from Russia compared to Odessa, 1892-1914 (fiscal years) (Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970*, part 1, (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975), 105-106/ *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*).



1904 was the first fiscal year with more than 1,000 known migrants arriving in New York from Odessa, numbering 1,400 and an increase by more than 1,000 compared to the previous year. During the following fiscal year – stretching from July 1904 to June 1905 – the number of migrants from Odessa rose to 2,200. It is quite possible that part of this big increase attributed to the Atlantic Rate War that reduced ticket rates from Russia and opened new migrant routes for Russians (see below). The numbers from Odessa peaked again during the following three fiscal years, stretching from July 1905

82. Boustan, *Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants?*, p. 281.

83. *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970*, part 1 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census), pp. 105-106.

to June 1908, with a total of more than 12,000 leaving from Odessa – comprising upwards of half of the total number of registered migrants that left Odessa during the period 1892 to 1924.

Compared to Russia as whole, Odessa largely followed the trend in Russian emigration (figure 1). 1906 and 1907 were also peak fiscal years from Russia, with 215,000 and 260,000 migrants respectively, the only two years passing 200,000 before 1913. The fiscal years of 1913 and 1914 saw a new dramatic surge from Russia, reaching upwards of 300,000 and 260,000 respectively. The flow from Odessa, however, did not peak in the same manner during those two years. While the total number of migrants from Russia decreased from 1913 to 1914, numbers increased from Odessa during the same period.

Breaking down the numbers provides insight into migratory patterns from Odessa prior to the First World War. It must be noted that return migration was limited among Russian-Jewish migrants, meaning also that occurrences of repeat migration were rare.⁸⁴ This differed from ethnic Russians, where the rate of return, and probably also some repeat, was relatively high. Instead, Russian-Jewish migration was marked by a so-called pioneer migrant – often a father – and with the family following afterwards, in addition to unmarried men travelling alone.⁸⁵ This was also very much the case with migrants from Odessa. Figures 2 and 3 provide a good picture of married men travelling in advance being the largest group from Odessa during the period 1900-1904, whereas the group married women and children (12 years and younger) were more predominant during the following period from 1905 to 1909, implying many of these were going to breadwinners who had travelled in advance. Also, the number of single men combined with men aged between 21 and 29 increased significantly from 1905 onwards, reflecting the aftermath of the events in Odessa in 1905. Random checks also reveal that migrants from Odessa during the latter period were predominantly joining relatives and in New York. This also suggests that those migrating from Odessa during this period largely did so by connecting with existing migrant networks, meaning mainly family and friends.

84. Boustan, *Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants?*, p. 275.

85. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1921), pp. 104-105.

Whether this pattern distinguishes itself from Russian migration as a whole is difficult to determine without adequate comparable data.

Figure 2: Migrants from Odessa to New York by age group, 1892-1914
(Source: *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*).





Figure 3: Migrants from Odessa to New York by civil status (above age 16), 1892-1914
(Source: *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*).




Immigration from Odessa by month and season 1900-1914

Throughout the period of the great transatlantic migrations, the flow of migration was largely defined by season. To begin with, the elements made winter crossings impractical and undesirable on sailing vessels. As steamships grew in size and comfort, along with regular

liner traffic, emigration, as with other maritime trades, became an all-year enterprise. Still, it remained an issue for the companies that many ships left port far short of capacity during the winter months. Several factors continued to divide the year into 'migration seasons'. During the period 1900-1924, the months of April, May, September and October were by far the busiest for transatlantic travel.⁸⁶ In addition to the undesirable weather for many travellers, the pattern clearly reflects how transatlantic migration developed during this period. The large flows from Italy and Austro-Hungary had a high rate of return migration, in many cases only spending the spring, the summer and early fall in the United States before returning to Europe.⁸⁷ The summer months of June, July and August, with the perception of the best weather in the Atlantic, were, perhaps surprisingly, generally not the busiest months for transatlantic migration.

Figure 4: Migration from Odessa by month compared to all migration from Europe, 1900-1914.



86. Database, *Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*.

87. Walter Nugent, *The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914*, (Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 98-99; Drew Keeling, "The Improvement of Travel Conditions for Migrants Crossing the North Atlantic, pp. 116-118.

Migration from Odessa, however, differed from that of the overall transatlantic migration when it came to season (figure 4). Indeed, during the period 1900 to 1914 migration from Odessa was, on the whole, more evenly distributed throughout the year, with comparatively high numbers during the usually harsh winter months of January and December. The exact reason is unknown; however, it reflects how the agents and business worked, and the limited leverage migrants had in deciding routes and the date of departure. The agents were usually given a specific allotment, meaning it was not in their interest to limit migration to a confined space of time or send too many at once. Migrants who were not reliant on leaving within specific months of the year for example because of work, such as Russian Jews, were particularly useful for this system. Many also held prepaid tickets, entailing that a friend or family member sent a ticket order to Europe and the agent in Europe allocated the date of departure depending on the class of ship that was paid for. A comparison between Scandinavian and Russian-Jewish migrants going direct from Denmark by the Danish company *Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab* (hereafter DFDS) in 1904 during the Atlantic Rate War show a clear difference between the two groups. While the number of Scandinavian migrants dropped to a minimum during the late autumn and winter months – often because of the, for Scandinavians, well-known wintery conditions – the number of Russian-Jewish migrants going by DFDS to New York stayed relatively high.⁸⁸ This raises the question of to what extent Russian Jews from Odessa and other Russian origins knew of the harsh wintery conditions in the Atlantic, until experiencing it themselves.

From Odessa by company and route 1899-1914

Even though Odessa had no sustainable direct passenger connection with the United States prior to World War I, it was by no

88. Per Kristian Sebak, “Russian-Jewish Transmigration and Scandinavian Shipping Companies: The Case of DFDS and the Atlantic Rate War of 1904-1905”, in T. Brinkmann (ed.), *Points of Passage – Jewish Transmigrants from eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, (Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 130-147.

means cut off from the rest of the world. Odessa was well connected to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Berlin and other European hubs by railway, and to Constantinople and the Mediterranean by steamship. French lines offered sailings to Marseilles and Austrian Lloyd to Trieste, at least once a week.⁸⁹

Table 1: Embarkation ports for transatlantic migrants from Odessa, 1892-1914.

Period	Hamburg/ Bremen	Antwerp	Rotterdam	UK ports	Libau	Trieste/ Fiume	Other ports	TOTAL
1892-99*	1.010	105	161	141	0	0	79	1.496
1900	313	118	96	10	0	0	6	543
1901	214	131	103	6	0	0	31	485
1902	179	125	81	13	0	0	37	435
1903	333	240	110	54	0	0	42	779
1904	838	217	185	585	0	250	62	2.137
1905	744	321	421	855	0	59	38	2.438
1906	1.679	1.194	1.207	1.632	118	208	226	6.264
1907	602	443	411	1076	650	38	97	3.317
1908	285	277	218	320	256	14	17	1.387
1909	154	153	188	164	216	5	39	919
1910	241	213	205	217	179	7	14	1.076
1911	216	240	266	95	152	7	13	989
1912	248	260	332	109	252	6	50	1.257
1913	625	399	364	299	224	122	36	2.069
1914 (until August)	336	166	168	184	218	30	25	1127
TOTAL	8.017	4.602	4.516	5.760	2.265	746	812	26.718

* These numbers are incomplete because of the fire at Ellis Island that destroyed immigrant records.

Source: *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924.*

Yet it was going north-westwards by railway that became the main artery for migrants leaving Odessa for the United States. During the period 1892 to 1914, there were three main routes. The most

89. *Bradshaw's Continental Railway Guide*, pp. 358-359.

important went via Germany by railway; to the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam or Antwerp whence the migrants continued by four collaborating companies: the Hamburg America Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd, the Holland America Line and the Red Star Line respectively. A total of at least 17,100 or 64 percent of all known Odessa migrants to New York took this route during the period 1892 till August 1914. Although Norddeutscher Lloyd from Bremen had the highest number of passengers during the peak years of emigration between 1900 and 1914, this was not the case with migrants from Odessa.⁹⁰ The most frequently used service for migrants from Odessa was by the Hamburg America Line from Hamburg to New York, with a total of 4,900 migrants during those 14 years alone, compared to 2,100 from Bremen. The second most important port for migrants from Odessa was Antwerp, with 4,500 migrants.

Picture 6: Antwerp, Belgium, around the turn of the century. 4,500 emigrants from Odessa passed through here during the period 1900 to 1914 alone (Source: Library of Congress).



90. GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1899-1914.

Judging by the scheduled railway connections between Odessa and Berlin, it is plausible that most migrants from Odessa went through Lemberg (today, Lviv) and Cracow in Austria-Hungary before crossing the border into Germany at Myslowitz or nearby Ratibor. Myslowitz and Ratibor were two of the 13 control stations between Russia/Austria Hungary and Germany. In 1907, Myslowitz was the busiest of them all with 113,000 migrants being inspected (see figure 5). 1,969 were rejected.⁹¹

Figure 5: Main overland routes from Odessa to Western Europe for transatlantic migrants, pre World War I.



Beginning in 1893, the Danish company of DFDS shipped Russian migrants from Libau to the British ports of Hull and London. To begin with, most of these migrants would remain in Britain but eventually the service also functioned as a key feeder service for

91. Bradshaw's *Continental Railway Guide*, p. cix; *United States Immigration Commission, Vol. 3: Statistical Review of Immigration, 1819-1910 – Distribution of Immigrants, 1850-1900*, (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1907-1910), p. 96.

migrants circumventing the German control stations and heading direct for the British transatlantic lines. In effect, this opened a second main route for Odessa migrants. Libau was the main Russian ice-free port in the Baltic, and was connected to the Russian railway network in 1876.⁹² This contributed to turning Libau into the leading seaborne gateway for emigrant traffic from Russia in the early twentieth century.⁹³ According to statistics from DFDS, migrant numbers picked up from 1902, coinciding with the year the Cunard Line, the most important British company, left the Continental Agreement securing the British company a stronger position in the Russian market and ultimately triggering the Atlantic Rate War of 1904.⁹⁴ This was also very much the case for migrants from Odessa, with 585 leaving from U.K. ports in 1904 as opposed to only 54 the previous year. Prior to 1903, the Cunard Line had only taken 21 known migrants from Odessa, all in 1892, suggesting the company was not an alternative for Odessa migrants as long as it observed the Continental Agreement. Whereas two Odessa migrants went from Liverpool, at the time still the most important British port for transatlantic services, in 1902 and none the following year, 131 Odessa migrants left from Liverpool by the Cunard Line in 1904, most probably after having travelled via Libau, and another 46 by the White Star Line. As part of the deal that ended the rate war, Libau remained an important point of passage for Russians going via Britain, with more than 1,600 from Odessa in 1906 alone, almost corresponding with the number of Odessa migrants going from the German ports. In total, migrant numbers from Libau to Britain were upwards of 20,000 in 1906, 25,000 by 1912 and 30,000 in 1913.⁹⁵

The distribution of migrants among the British and Continental lines also changed in other regions of Europe as a result of the Cunard Line's actions and the subsequent Atlantic Rate War in 1904. The events opened two additional and temporary routes for migrants

92. EA, DFDS, DRD, 1898-1912 korrespondance, "Farten paa Rusland specielt Emigrant-Farten fra Libau".

93. EA, DFDS, DRD, 1898-1912 korrespondance, "Farten paa Rusland specielt Emigrant-Farten fra Libau".

94. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, pp. 107, 109.

95. EA, DFDS, DRD, 1898-1912 korrespondance, "Farten paa Rusland specielt Emigrant-Farten fra Libau".

from Odessa by way of the Mediterranean and Scandinavia. Indeed, prior to 1904 only four known Odessa migrants had departed from a Mediterranean port, all from Naples and including three with Italian names (meaning their previous residence for at least one year had been Odessa). In 1904, the number increased to 252, all but two from the neighboring Adriatic ports of Trieste and Fiume. 134 went on the Cunard Line from Fiume and Trieste and 116 by the Austro-Americana Line from Trieste. As part of the events causing the Atlantic Rate War, the Cunard Line had joined forces with the Hungarian Government and opened a direct service from Fiume to New York in 1903.⁹⁶ Fearing that these actions would undermine their Continental business, the Hamburg America Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd responded by securing a controlling interest of the Austro-Americana Line's newly established competing direct service from Trieste, partly to avoid a similar scenario as with the Cunard Line in Hungary. In addition, the Continental lines opened a direct line from Scandinavia for the sole purpose of inducing the Cunard Line to a settlement; Scandinavia being an important market for the British lines. The Austro-American Line seemingly only started tapping into the Russian market because of the rate war and with the support of the German lines.⁹⁷ Once peace among the companies had been restored, the Austrian company and the Cunard Line continued to take a limited number of Odessa migrants from Trieste/Fiume, with a total of 274 and 163 respectively during the period 1906 to 1914.

Following the rate war, the Cunard Line entered into a separate agreement with the Continental lines allowing 26 annual departures from the Adriatic with a maximum of third-class passengers amounting to six percent of the total number of passengers carried by the Continental lines.⁹⁸ It is unclear how migrants reached the Adriatic from Odessa, but they most probably went by Austrian Lloyd which operated a regular passenger service between Trieste, Constantinople and Black Sea ports including Odessa.⁹⁹

The other possibility for Odessa migrants that opened in 1904

96. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, p. 170; GA, HAL, 318.04, 229, 28 December 1903.

97. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, p. 170.

98. GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "27 October 1904".

99. *Bradshaw's Continental Railway Guide*, pp. 359, 722.

because of the Atlantic Rate War was to go via Scandinavia. At the time, DFDS (the America service was dubbed the Scandinavian-American Line) was the only company that operated a direct line from Scandinavia to New York; from Copenhagen, Denmark, via Christiania (Oslo) and Christiansand, Norway.¹⁰⁰ DFDS was in agreement with the Continental lines limiting its third-class business to the carriage of Scandinavian and Finnish passengers. As mentioned, DFDS was also heavily involved in shipping Russian migrants from Libau to Britain, including for the British transatlantic lines. Although the Continental companies' decision to open a direct line from Scandinavia in 1904 was mainly aimed at forcing the Cunard Line to negotiations over its new line from the Adriatic, it also undermined DFDS's business in Scandinavia. As a result, DFDS set aside the agreement it had with the Continental companies and took Russian migrants all the way to New York. This was easily manageable as DFDS had close ties to the Cunard Line, used joint agents in Libau, and DFDS's Britain-bound passenger steamers already passed by Copenhagen. The move resulted in more than 4,500 Russian subjects, just about all Jews, going from Libau to New York via Copenhagen in 1904.¹⁰¹ 50 of them came from Odessa, all Jews. They comprised of seven groups, with the largest arriving in October and November 1904 (13 and 12 respectively). They included eight mothers with a total of 31 children and on their way to join their husbands in the United States.

In January 1905, DFDS discontinued taking Russian subjects all the way to New York and no other Odessa migrants came through Copenhagen until the outbreak of war; though with two exceptions. In October 1907, seven migrants – one Russian woman and six Jews – from Odessa were among more than 800 Russian passengers on the Russian American Line's *Lituania* when it struck ground and was beached in The Sound between Sweden and Denmark en route from Libau to New York. All passengers were landed in Copenhagen, and a week later an exception was made to the conference agreements

100. Per Kristian Sebak, "Constraints and possibilities: Scandinavian shipping companies and transmigration, 1898-1914", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 27:4 (November 2015), pp. 755-773.

101. Sebak, *Russian-Jewish Transmigration and Scandinavian Shipping Companies*, pp.135-144.

Picture 7: Advertisement for the Scandinavian American Line in Chicago during the Atlantic Rate War in 1904, encouraging Russian Jews to purchase prepaid tickets to be sent to friends or relatives in Russia, including Odessa (Source: Danish National Archives).

THE UNITED STEAMSHIP CO.
OF COPENHAGEN.

SCANDINAVIAN - AMERICAN LINE

A. MORTENSEN & CO.,
GENERAL WESTERN PASSENGER AGENTS.
126 EAST KINZIE STREET, CHICAGO.

Russia to New York

From Libau, (via Copenhagen)
— TO —
NEW YORK
WITH
Regular Passenger Steamers

\$27.00

with Twin-Screw Steamers . . . \$36.00

Children between 1 and 12 years Half Fare. Children under 1 year \$4.00.

The passengers are forwarded by steamer from Libau to Copenhagen, where they embark on the Scandinavian-American Line Ocean Steamers direct for New York, but before

allowing the stranded passengers to continue by DFDS's *United States* to New York instead.¹⁰² The other case was a woman traveling in second class by DFDS in 1911; second class being exempted from the regulations deciding which route migrants could take.

The third main route, also via Libau, took shape from 1906 with the inauguration of the two direct passenger lines between Libau and New York: the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the above-mentioned Russian American Line. From August 1908, as the East Asiatic Company of Copenhagen had secured a controlling interest

102. "Lituania passenger tells of her wreck", (*The New York Times*, 13 November, 1907).

of the company, the Russian American Line agreed to limit its share to 2.5 percent of the total third-class business of the Atlantic Conference (excluding the Mediterranean) and 3 percent eastbound. It also committed itself not to take any Scandinavian or Finnish third-class passengers.¹⁰³ The Russian Volunteer Fleet's service from Libau was by then suspended. As for Odessa, the share of migrants going via Libau with the Russian American Line stayed around 20 percent during the remaining years until the outbreak of war. Libau was popular among Russian emigrants as it circumvented the experience some found humiliating at the German control stations.¹⁰⁴ Together with those going via Britain, Libau consolidated itself as a major gateway from Russia during the period from 1908 to 1914. Yet the conference agreements restricted how many migrants could take that route, including from Odessa.

Whereas Odessa migrants almost exclusively went via Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam or Antwerp prior to 1904, and to some degree Britain and the Adriatic in 1904 and 1905, the available options became more evenly distributed from 1907 onwards in terms of companies and routes. Going via Scandinavia or the Mediterranean remained practically barred for Odessa migrants. During the period 1907 to 1913 no single company or single port dominated with a clear margin as far as Odessa migrants were concerned. This reflects the concession made by the German companies allowing the British companies a larger share of the Continental market, including Russia, to avoid further conflicts. Whereas the Continental market was swelling, the British-Scandinavian market continued to retract by comparison.¹⁰⁵ Overall, the events shaping migrant routes from Odessa during this period clearly show how migrants were subjected to the intercompany agreements, migrants' limited leverage in choosing routes and companies, and the adaptable and opportunistic nature of agent-networks in organizing new and temporary migrant routes. The events also further reflect how far the companies were willing to stretch in order to observe the agreements and prevent costly conflicts.

103. GA, HAL 318.04, 580, "London 25/26 August 1908".

104. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, pp. 174-177.

105. Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants*, p. 199.

The S/S *Gregory Morch*

Returning to the steamer *Gregory Morch*, the question arises of how this service came into being and why in 1906, given the fact that no other attempt was made for direct sailings between Odessa and New York. The question is further highlighted when considering the fact that from 1905 onwards the majority of Russian migrants came from the southern parts of Russia and were Jews, making Odessa seemingly an ideal focal point for direct passage to New York.¹⁰⁶ When including the seven provinces surrounding Kherson of which Odessa was a part, the hinterland encompassed a Jewish population of 1.6 million representing a third of the total Jewish population in the European provinces of Tsarist Russia and which mostly had relatively easy access to Odessa by railway.¹⁰⁷ In addition, Odessa and the Black Sea had historically and contemporary strong trade and seaborne connections with Constantinople, Greece, Italy and Austria.¹⁰⁸

The story of the Northern Steamship Company, which operated the *Gregory Morch*, resembled that of the two other Russian services established between Russia and the United States in 1906; the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Russian American Line between Libau and New York. This was hardly a coincidence. In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the Russian Volunteer Fleet, having used its steamers shipping troops to the Far East, transferred parts of its fleet to the Baltic for the line to New York. According to contemporary reports, the move was a direct response to the economic prospects in the big increase in Russian emigration to the United States, combined with excess tonnage following the end of the war.¹⁰⁹ The Russian East Asiatic Company, parent company of the Russian American Line, was likewise involved in shipping to the Far East and was controlled by the Danish East Asiatic Company until 1906 (as mentioned, the Danish East Asiatic Company

106. Boustán, *Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants?*, p. 281.

107. David Vital, *A People Apart – The Jews in Europe 1789-1939*, (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 300-301.

108. Louri and Minoglou, *Diaspora entrepreneurial networks in the Black Sea and Greece*; Harlaftis, *History of Greek-owned Shipping*.

109. <http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/russianv.shtml> (date of access: 1 December 2015).

Picture 8: The port of Odessa in the early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress).



regained a controlling interest in the company from 1907). The Northern Steamship Company was likewise a subsidiary of a Danish shipping company, *Dansk Russiske Dampskipsselskab*. The company had much of the same outlook as the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Russian East Asiatic Company, being involved in trade with the Far East including between Odessa and Vladivostok. All three companies also had their headquarters in St. Petersburg.¹¹⁰ Although not confirmed, it is very likely that the Northern Steamship Company's short-lived America service spurred from the similar and intertwined initiatives in Libau and St. Petersburg.

The *Gregory Morch* was built in 1889 as the transatlantic passenger liner *München* for Norddeutscher Lloyd. She was purchased by the Northern Steamship Company in 1902, and was the company's largest steamer at 4,500 tons. According to a contemporary newspaper report, the company planned for a monthly service between Odessa and New York with two steamers, but that never material-

110. Jørgen Kamstrup, *H. N. Andersen – En ØK-logisk livsberetning*, (Books on Demand, 2010), p. 248.

ized. It is plausible that the service was a response to the big increase in demand for transatlantic travel from Odessa in the wake of the pogroms in October 1905. There were also other circumstances affecting the *Gregory Morch*'s service from Odessa. In January 1907, while the *Gregory Morch* was preparing her second voyage from Odessa, two attempts were made to blow up the steamer. During the first attempt, several seamen on the *Gregory Morch* were shot in the ensuing struggle with the perpetrators, while in the second attempt a bomb was detonated causing slight damage to the steamer. Whether security concerns had any influence on suspending the service is uncertain but according to the same report the company had already decided that the *Gregory Morch*'s second departure would be her last and the Northern Steamship Company made no further attempt at entering the transatlantic passenger business.¹¹¹

In any case, the outcome with the Northern Steamship Company, the Russian Volunteer Line and the Russian American Line clearly underline minimal interest, experience and skills on the part of the Russian state and Russian ship-owners in operating a transatlantic passenger line. Even though Russia had a sizeable merchant fleet in the early twentieth century and ranked among the countries with the highest demand for passage to the United States, it was by no means obvious that this should qualify Russia to run a transatlantic passenger line of any significance. This was not exceptional either. At the time, Norway and Sweden had among the largest merchant fleets in the world, and had, since the 1860s, seen the second and third highest rate of emigration to the United States. However, it was only in 1913 and 1915 respectively that separate sustainable America lines were established from those two countries, underscoring the fact that a transatlantic passenger company was a niche business requiring specific skills, experience, capital and networks.¹¹² This most probably also played a significant part in deterring any transatlantic passenger line from being established between Odessa and New York.

111. "Fight to blow up liner", (*The New York Times*, 2 January 1907); "Bomb on Russian line", (*The New York Times*, 17 January 1907); "Bomb for N.Y. Ship" (*The Barre Daily Times*, 2 January 1907)..

112. Sebak, *Constraints and possibilities*, pp. 755-773.

As for the total of 255 passengers who left Odessa on the *Gregory Morch* in November 1906 and January 1907, they followed much of the same pattern as other Odessa migrants at the time. 115 stated Odessa as their last permanent address. All but eight of them travelled in third class. 11 had previously been in the United States, including a Jewish family of eight who was returning to Montreal, Canada. 95 were heading to New York and 93 to relatives. 100 were listed as Jews. Just about all stated that they had paid for the ticket themselves, suggesting none were prepaid and that the Northern Steamship Company did not have a well-established migrant agency in New York. This is further substantiated by the fact that, according to passenger returns from New York, the *Gregory Morch* did not book passengers on the return trip to Odessa.¹¹³ 41 of the passengers from Odessa were women (13 of whom married), 30 were children below the age of 16 and 45 men above 16 (25 married).

World War I: 1914-1918

The outbreak of war in August 1914 had profound and lasting impact on the transatlantic passenger business and the overall framework of transatlantic migratory movements. As would be expected, total migrant numbers fell sharply. From Russia, westbound numbers dropped from 255,000 during the fiscal year of 1914 to 26,000 in 1915, 7,800 in 1916 and 12,700 in 1917. Jews still constituted the majority of Russian migrants. At the same time, 18,200 and 5,200 departed from the United States for Russia during the fiscal years of 1915 and 1916 respectively. Most of these were ethnic Russians and Poles and it is unlikely any of them headed for Odessa.¹¹⁴

Despite the dangers of mines and U-boats, most companies operating from Northern Europe as well as the Mediterranean were able to maintain their services, though with reduced capacity. Several belligerent companies transferred their steamers to war duty. Only in early 1917, with Germany's declaration of unrestricted U-boat

113. GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1906-07.

114. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922), pp. 100-107.

warfare combined with the United States entering the war, were transatlantic services reduced to a minimum. The companies of the Central Powers – the Hamburg America Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd and the Austro-Americana Line – though, immediately suspended their services in August 1914, leaving a considerable power vacuum in the transatlantic passenger business. Nevertheless, the conference system prevailed and was observed by the remaining companies to some extent. An important reason for this was that most companies believed the war would only be a short-term disturbance, meaning ‘business as usual’ would return within a short space of time. All overland routes between Russia and Germany were obviously cut off, as were seaborne lines in the Baltic due to blockades and mines. An additional hurdle in view of making a transatlantic voyage was that agent-networks in Russia and elsewhere were in many cases uprooted. At the same time, Petrograd (the new name for St. Petersburg) to some extent replaced Libau as the main focal point for Russian transatlantic migration during the war.¹¹⁵

For migrants coming from Russia, there were practically two remaining westward arteries to get to the United States; either via neutral Scandinavia for the Norwegian America Line (established in 1913) or DFDS, or from Archangel in the White Sea which became the new eastern terminus of the Russian American Line. However, operating a transatlantic passenger line from Archangel posed several practical difficulties, including limited capacity on the connecting railway line. In 1916, less than 500 passengers left Archangel and the service was suspended. Getting from Russia to Scandinavia involved railway connections to Petrograd and onwards by railway around the Gulf of Bothnia as all passenger connections in the Baltic had been severed. There was no continuous railway line because of differing railway gauges in Sweden and Finland (Russia). As a result, migrants from Russia had to use alternative means of transport across the Swedish-Finnish border, including sleigh during the winter.¹¹⁶

115. Sebak, *A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass*, p. 199.

116. Sebak, *A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass*, p. 193.

Picture 9: At least 36 migrants from Odessa went by DFDS from Denmark or Norway because of the war. Most of them arrived in New York on the company's steamer *Hellig Olav* (Source: author's collection).



From Odessa, a total of 142 migrants arrived in New York between September 1914 and throughout 1918, including 56 via Archangel, 37 via Norway, 3 via Copenhagen, 14 via Liverpool and 10 via Greece. Most of them were Jews. With Greece being neutral, the National Greek Line was able to maintain a service between Piraeus and New York largely undisturbed. It also became the transatlantic passenger line with the highest number of passengers in 1915 and second highest in 1916, after Transatlantica Italiana from Italy.¹¹⁷ For those going via Scandinavia, tickets were mostly bought in Petrograd or in Scandinavia. The Norwegian America Line, which prior to the war effectively had been confined by the Atlantic Conference to take Norwegian third-class passengers only, established its own agency in Petrograd in August 1915 aimed at tapping into the Russian market short term as well as long term. It believed post-war Russian subjects would refrain from passing through Germany, meaning Scandinavia

117. EA, DFDS, 278b, 1910-63 (div.år) diverse sager.1910-20, "passagerstatistik fra I verdenskrig".

would be the preferred choice. The Russian business was ultimately suspended following the Russian Revolution in 1917, and no further attempt was made by the Norwegian company at capitalizing on the Russian market.

The post-war period 1919-1924 – framework

Following the armistice in November 1918, the framework of the transatlantic passenger business did not immediately return to the same structure as before the war. First of all, the post-war period saw greater state intervention.¹¹⁸ The war reshaped the political map of Europe with a range of new nation states, including Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia which together took a large chunk of Russia's previous western territories. From 1922, Odessa became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, following several attempts at gaining Ukrainian independence since the end of the war. The new states of Europe endeavored to position themselves in the political and economic landscape, affecting shipping too.¹¹⁹ Increased state intervention also played out in the enactment and enforcement of migration control, in Europe as well as in the United States. By the end of the war, passports and visas had been introduced in most European countries. By 1919, a permit from the Soviet authorities was needed in order to leave the country, and from 1922 both the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet authorities issued general rules for travel that practically stemmed all emigration, with a special corps of the secret police organized to control the borders.¹²⁰

Into the 1920s, severe restrictions came into force in the United States. In May 1921, the *Emergency Quota Act* limited the number of immigrants to three percent of the number of foreign-born persons

118. Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty – Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium*, (Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 439-440.

119. Sturmeay, *British Shipping and World Competition*, p. 98.

120. Alan Dowty, "The Assault on Freedom of Emigration", *World Affairs*, 151:2 (autumn 1988), pp. 85-92.

of such nationality that resided in the United States as determined by the U.S. census of 1910.¹²¹ Three years later, in May 1924, the *Johnson-Reed Act* was enacted reducing the annual quota to two percent, together with applying the 1890 census as the baseline. For Russian subjects, and including from Odessa, this meant that annual quotas were cut from a flow of 255,000 during the fiscal year of 1914 to 34,247 with the 1921 quota and just 2,248 with the 1924 quota. Poland had its own quota and became the most important market for the shipping companies in Eastern Europe.¹²² Although the quotas were not absolute, some groups such as students, spouses and children of U.S. citizens and tourists remained exempted, Russian migrants were mainly found within the confines of the quotas.¹²³ The U.S. immigration legislation introduced during the 1920s also marked a significant change in how it was implemented. Most notably, the U.S. state played a larger role in the selection of migrants in Europe because of the necessity for U.S. visas.

Table 2: Migrants totals in 1913 and U.S. quotas for selected countries 1922 and 1924

Year	Poland	Bulgaria	Rumania	Russia	Turkey	Greece	TOTAL (ALL)
1913 (total)	*	1.753	2.155	291.040	25.383	22.187	1.197.892
1922 quota	20.019	302	7.419	34.284	656	3.294	356.995
1924 quota	5.982	100	603	2.248	100	100	164.667

* Part of Russia

Source: *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922 and 1925); LeMay and Barkan, *U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues*, p. 164.

In Europe, complications in crossing political borders arose as

121. M. LeMay and E. R. Barkan, *U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues – A Documentary History*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 133.

122. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922 and 1925); LeMay and Barkan, *U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues*, p. 164.

123. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922), p. 4.

a recognition of the new sovereign states varied. Lithuania, for example, did not receive full recognition before December 1922. Poland's final frontiers were not recognized by the Allied Powers before 1923.¹²⁴ Before that, Poland fought to establish her borders. The dispute over Poland's eastern borderlands culminated in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-21.¹²⁵ With the Russian Civil War that directly affected Odessa from 1918 to 1920, the pre-war route via Poland and Germany became extremely hazardous for migrants from Odessa. Although the United States did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union before 1933, visas were still possible for Soviet passengers. For many, these were obtained in Riga after crossing the border into Latvia.¹²⁶

At the same time, Poland endeavored to secure access to the Baltic Sea – this was not provided by the accords of the Treaty of Versailles. In January 1920 the Polish Corridor was created giving Poland direct access to the Baltic – though without a major port. The German-dominant port of Danzig – adjacent to the Polish Corridor – was turned into a Free City under the protection of the newly established League of Nations, with Poland being guaranteed access to the port.¹²⁷ From 1919, Danzig took over as the main embarkation port for migrants in the Baltic, much at the expense of Libau which became part of the new small independent state of Latvia. From 1921, the most important service from Danzig was by the Baltic-America Line, which was a continuation of the Russian American Line still with the East Asiatic Company of Copenhagen as its parent company. The company moved its main terminus from Libau to Danzig, though still taking some passengers initially from Libau.¹²⁸ Furthermore, DFDS became a significant player with its

124. R. F. Leslie (ed.), *The History of Poland since 1863*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 133-138.

125. John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, *The Baltic Nations of Europe – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Longman, 1991), p. 39.

126. James D. White, "Nationalism and Socialism in Historical Perspective", in Graham Smith (ed.), *The Baltic States – The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 61.

127. Carl Tighe, *Gdansk – National Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands*, (London: Pluto Press, 1990), pp. 89-90, 95.

128. GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1919-24.

own feeder service from Danzig to Copenhagen connecting to its transatlantic service to New York.

As far as the structure of the transatlantic shipping business was concerned, the Atlantic Conference had been reorganized as early as November 1917, comprising initially of the British lines, the French CGT and the American Line, and aimed at regulating the Continental market and make sure the German companies were stripped of any influence.¹²⁹ Yet its significance, to use Francis Hyde's words, only functioned in a 'skeleton form'.¹³⁰ Its main concern related to fixing ticket rates from points across a disordered Continental market marked by several years of war.¹³¹ Ticket prices were subject to the excessive fluctuating and uncertain economic and political conditions. Following the armistice in November 1918, the authority of the Atlantic Conference was undermined by the initial absence of the German as well as other key companies.¹³²

A new chapter in the post-war conference system dawned in March 1921 when the Atlantic Conference reappeared in a new format.¹³³ It was henceforth based on four contracts regulating and effectively setting the overall framework for most companies involved in the transatlantic passenger business. Some of the clauses were similar to those governed by the pre-war Atlantic Conference. One of the most significant differences, however, was the absence of a pooling agreement, meaning no member was given specific allotments of the market and could therefore, in theory, carry as many passengers as desired.¹³⁴ Instead, the most important task for the Atlantic Conference was to regulate ticket rates and find collective measures to administer the U.S. quota acts together with growing state intervention aimed at interfering with and capitalizing on their business – especially in Eastern Europe and Poland. Indeed, while

129. "Steamer alliance excludes teutons, (*The New York Times*, 31 January 1918).

130. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, p. 219.

131. GA, HAL, 314.03, p. 245.

132. GA, HAL, 318.04, 577, "Minutes of meeting Atlantic Conference", 2/3 March 1921: pp. 8-9.

133. GA, HAL, 318.04, 577, "Minutes of meeting Atlantic Conference", 2/3 March 1921: p. 5.

134. GA, HAL, 318.04, 573, "Record of Agreements and Resolutions 1921-1928", p. 123.

the pre-war conference system built on dominant market players being significant power structures, a virtually absent state and unrestricted passenger demand, it now had to deal with a combination of profound state intervention, unprecedented economic fluctuations, along with a dramatic curb in passenger demand. Added to this was the mounting operational and shipbuilding costs limiting the companies' economic capacities and influence.¹³⁵ Although subsidies and preferential treatments were not uncommon in shipping in general and the transatlantic passenger business in particular prior to the war, it now became more visible and more directly affected the equilibrium between the companies and the structure of the conference system itself. Most notably, the U.S. Government became a key actor. The weight of the shipping combine of IMM, which had been the most important U.S. involvement prior to the war, gradually declined due to economic difficulties.¹³⁶ Instead, it was the U.S. Shipping Board that constituted the most important U.S. involvement.

The U.S. Shipping Board had been established by the U.S. Government in 1916 to boost the country's merchant marine. It was given authority to establish steamship services either by itself or through private steamship companies.¹³⁷ As a result, the United States saw the biggest increase in world tonnage during the 1920s, with a considerable portion being confiscated German steamers as part of the Treaty of Versailles, including several of the Hamburg America Line's and Norddeutscher Lloyd's previous passenger liners. In the process, as many as 12 U.S. transatlantic services were initiated during the period 1919-1927; most were short lived. They included direct services from Danzig and Constantinople.¹³⁸ Yet the U.S. intervention should not be overrated. It lacked adequate managerial skills and networks in the transatlantic passenger business. Most of the services, although confiscated by the United States, remained under German management.¹³⁹

135. Sturmeý, *British Shipping and World Competition*, p. 64.

136. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, p. 192; Vale, *The American Peril*, pp. 213-217.

137. Sturmeý, *British Shipping and World Competition*, pp. 122-123.

138. Sturmeý, *British Shipping and World Competition*, p. 113; Bonsor, *North Atlantic Seaway*, pp. xi-xii.

139. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, p. 221.

Post-war migration flows and patterns between Odessa and New York

When exploring overall transatlantic migratory flows and patterns during the post-war period, the U.S. restriction acts had more impact than anything else. Above all, they effectively curbed immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe to a minimum, affecting Odessa too. While 652,000 immigrants had arrived from Europe during the fiscal year of 1921, 356,000 quota immigrants were admitted during the following year. While 198,000 of these were admitted from Northern and Western Europe, the figures for Eastern and Southern Europe stopped at 158,000. This was a vast reduction compared with the 921,000 and 540,000 immigrants who had arrived from Eastern and Southern Europe in 1914 and 1921 respectively – and clearly illustrates how the bias against these groups of migrants played out. During the fiscal year of 1920 – prior to the first restriction act – only 995 Russians (including Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians) arrived in the United States. The following year the numbers only rose to 6,400.¹⁴⁰

Table 3: Odessa migrants by embarkation port, 1919-1924

Embarkation port	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	Total
Constantinople	2	1	9	229	386	0	627
Greek ports	0	30	8	1	38	1	78
UK ports	2	2	12	32	84	56	188
Antwerp/Rotterdam	0	2	12	32	37	9	92
Bremen/Hamburg	0	0	2	26	59	6	93
Danzig	0	1	2	13	13	1	30
Libau	0	0	0	26	97	4	127
Cherbourg / Le Havre /Boulogne	7	13	34	47	127	22	250
Other	3	9	0	5	5	0	22
TOTAL	14	58	79	411	846	99	1.507

Source: *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*).

140. *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*.

For migrants from Odessa, the new legislation and framework also had notable consequences. The low numbers from Odessa in 1919 and 1920 reflect the limited services available due to passenger steamers being deployed to return troops to the United States and Canada, combined with the ongoing war between Poland, the Soviet Union and Ukrainians fighting for independence. Visas and passports were a further issue and obstacle. Many Russian quotas were filled by Russian subjects displaced in Europe because of the war, reducing the chances for prospective migrants still in Odessa.¹⁴¹ Further complications for Odessa migrants arose from how the quota system was practiced. Quotas were allocated on a monthly basis and with no more than 20 percent of the annual quota being permitted per month.¹⁴² This meant that a quota could be exhausted within five months of a fiscal year – meaning late summers and autumns became the most important periods for westbound third-class transatlantic travel. Passengers carrying valid visas risked being prohibited from entry because of quotas being exhausted. Initially, no penalty was imposed on shipping companies for bringing immigrants in excess of quotas. This practice was amended in 1922 introducing a fine and forcing the company in question to refund the ticket price and return the stricken immigrant to his or her point of origin free of charge.¹⁴³

The fact that most of the few migrants from Odessa in 1920 went from Greek and French northern ports, reflects that many Russians were displaced in Western Europe as a result of the war and the difficulties of re-entering the Soviet Union. At the same time, many Russians were unable to obtain U.S. visas or reach the embarkation port at all. Indeed, even though many Russian subjects were seeking a new life in the United States, often with the intention of joining relatives, and the U.S. quota for Russian subjects had been set at 34,284 in 1921, a significant part of the quota remained unused.¹⁴⁴

141. EA, Registratur 278b DFDS, 1919-1936 sager vedr. baltiske/polske agenturer for SAL (I), 1923-25 agentur i Riga, russiske forretninger, 6 May, 23 May, and 15 August 1924.

142. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922), p. 3.

143. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States Department of Labor, 1922), p. 4.

144. *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration*, (United States

Despite the obstacles of emigrating from the Soviet Union, the shipping companies prepared and geared for a passenger business from Odessa during the early 1920s. In November 1923, prior to the second restriction act, the Atlantic Conference agreed on a third-class cash and prepaid rate of \$120 from Odessa. A separate rate for the 'Russian spot market' in Constantinople was set at \$115.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, according to contemporary reports, emigration from the Soviet Union and including Odessa was viewed by the companies as both legal and illegal. For those taking the northern route, legal emigration concerned individuals who had received the mandatory permits from the Soviet authorities to leave the country, in addition to visas to enter Latvia. Their travel arrangements were organized by authorized migrant agencies in Moscow – including at least one representing the Cunard Line.¹⁴⁶ The emigrant thereafter went by railway from Moscow to the town of Rositten on the Latvian side of the border to the Soviet Union. Awaiting agents of the companies escorted them from the railway platform to the compulsory quarantine station for health checks. For assistance on both sides of the border, the companies involved in Soviet emigration appointed several middlemen – and these were predominantly Jews whose experience most probably stemmed from the pre-war period in Tsarist Russia.¹⁴⁷ As for illegal Soviet emigrants, they were still taken to the quarantine station at Rositten and given a considerable fine by the Latvian authorities for not carrying the necessary permits, before being permitted to continue the journey westwards.¹⁴⁸ From Rositten, the Soviet migrants were taken to Riga, where most companies were represented due to the presence of a U.S. consul authorized to issue visas for entering the United States. As men-

Department of Labor, 1922), p. 7.

145. GA, HAL 318.04, 575, "Atlantic Conference Minutes, p. 227.

146. EA, Registratur 278b DFDS, 1919-1936 sager vedr. baltiske/polske agenturer for SAL (I), 1923-25 agentur i Riga, russiske forretninger, "Rapport over rejse til Helsingfors, Riga og Libau".

147. EA, Registratur 278b DFDS, 1919-1936 sager vedr. baltiske/polske agenturer for SAL (I), 1923-25 agentur i Riga, russiske forretninger, 4 September 1923.

148. EA, Registratur 278b DFDS, 1919-1936 sager vedr. baltiske/polske agenturer for SAL (I), 1923-25 agentur i Riga, russiske forretninger, "Rapport over rejse til Helsingfors, Riga og Libau".

tioned, the United States did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1933. With visas and bookings confirmed, the migrant continued onwards to Libau and the passage to the United States.

It is plausible that all 127 migrants from Odessa who embarked at Libau for the Baltic-America Line from 1922 throughout 1924 followed the route via Rositten. In addition, most of the 341 migrants from Odessa who embarked at Antwerp, Rotterdam, British or German ports most probably followed the same route before continuing by a feeder service from Libau. Only a handful crossed the border into Poland and proceeded to the port of Danzig. The low number may well have resulted from the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-21 and the strain it put on Polish-Soviet relations and border crossings.

Table 4: Odessa migrants by ethnicity and destination, 1919-1924

Ethnicity	Destination	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	<i>Grand total</i>
Jew	<i>New York, NY area</i>	1	26	27	199	374	45	672
	<i>Philadelphia, PA area</i>	0	0	14	50	62	8	134
	<i>Chicago, IL area</i>	0	0	0	39	74	8	121
	<i>Boston, MA area</i>	0	4	0	0	7	1	12
	<i>Other/ N/A</i>	2	14	24	91	178	28	337
	Total	3	44	65	379	695	90	1.276
Russian	<i>New York, NY area</i>	4	3	9	11	105	5	137
	<i>Philadelphia, PA area</i>	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
	<i>Chicago, IL area</i>	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
	<i>Boston, MA area</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	<i>Other/ N/A</i>	7	2	4	16	19	0	48
	Total	11	5	13	28	133	5	195
GRAND TOTAL		14	49	78	407	828	95	1.471

In addition were 34 who belonged to other ethnic groups than Russians or Jews.

Source: Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924.

The most significant change in terms of migrant routes from Odessa to New York during the post-war years was the importance of Constantinople in transatlantic migration. From 1918 to October 1923, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople

was under British, French and Italian occupation. During this period, many thousand Russians fled from southern Russia, including Odessa, to Constantinople escaping the Russian Civil War and hoping to find refuge elsewhere. In November 1920 alone, following the defeat of the White armies that fought the Bolsheviks, 170,000 civilian and military refugees crossed the Black Sea to Constantinople. Several relief organizations rendered them whatever assistance possible.¹⁴⁹ During 1922 and 1923, the American Red Cross, in collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church in New York, assisted the transfer of 2,000 Russians from Constantinople to New York. Most of them settled in New York.¹⁵⁰ 51 of these refugees came from Odessa and were registered as Russians.

Picture 10: Constantinople in the early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress)



149. A. Balawyer, "Russian Refugees from Constantinople and Harbin, Manchuria Enter Canada (1923-1926)", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 14:1, (Spring, 1972), pp. 15-30.

150. James E. Hassell, *Russian Refugees In France and the United States Between the World Wars*, (The American Philosophical Society, 1991), pp. 53-54.

Added to the misery of the civil war itself, the lawlessness in Russia led to widespread pogroms fueled by accusations that Jews supported the Bolsheviks. In 1919 and 1920, an estimated 100,000 Jews in southern Russia were killed.¹⁵¹ According to temporary reports, the situation for Jewish refugees in Constantinople was particularly grave. Many had hoped to join relatives in the United States, but that possibility became increasingly remote following the restriction act of 1921.¹⁵² Unlike most European countries, the U.S. immigration legislation did not distinguish between immigrant and refugee, meaning the given quota for each country applied.¹⁵³ For at least 88 Odessa Jews who arrived in New York from Constantinople in 1922 and 1923, aid was provided by the Jewish Colonization Committee and other Jewish relief organizations in Constantinople.¹⁵⁴ The Jewish Colonization Committee had been established in 1891 to assist Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe. The committee had a separate bureau in Constantinople from 1910.¹⁵⁵ To some extent, these relief organizations replaced the role of the shipping companies' agent-networks that organized migrant routes prior to the war. While there are strong indications that mostly Russian-Jewish agents assisted and connected with Russian-Jewish migrants prior to the war, Russians and Jews from Odessa were assisted by two separate relief organizations in Constantinople. The American Red Cross aided ethnic Russians and Jewish organizations aided Jews.

A total of 1,500 migrants arrived in New York from Odessa during the period 1919 throughout 1924. Most of them came via Constantinople in 1922 and 1923. A clear pattern was that the majority connected with existing migrant networks in the United States; they were chiefly Jews heading for New York.

151. Peter Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920. The Defeat of the Whites*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 167-177.

152. "Constantinople feels our immigration curb", (*The New York Times*, 14 June, 1921).

153. Hassell, *Russian Refugees In France and the United States Between the World Wars*, p. 33.

154. *Database, Emigration from Odessa to New York 1892-1924*.

155. <http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8633-jewish-colonization-association> (date of access: 2 January 2016).

The weakened position of the Atlantic Conference paved the way for newcomers and other companies to take advantage of the demand for transatlantic passage from Constantinople. The Fabre Line and the National Greek Line extended their Mediterranean services to Constantinople. Other shipping ventures saw a new business opportunity as well. In July 1922, for example, 14 migrants from Odessa arrived in New York on the American Black Sea Line's *Acropolis*. The company had been established in New York the year before by Stephen D. Stephendis, most likely of Greek origin and linked to the U.S. Shipping Board. All but four from Odessa stated that they were refugees and had no relatives in the old country. Stephendis' shipping venture was short-lived. The following year, he sold the *Acropolis* to another U.S. company, the Greek-American Booras brothers. They renamed the steamer *Washington* and undertook two round trips to Constantinople and Piraeus, Greece. At Constantinople in August 1923, 97 passengers from Odessa boarded the *Washington*. Their journey to New York was organized by the Jewish Colonization Committee.

Picture 11: The port of Piraeus in the early 1900s (Source: Library of Congress).



In view of company, the National Greek Line, which did not join the Atlantic Conference, brought the biggest share of migrants from Odessa to New York during the post-war years, with 466 embarking at Constantinople in addition to 31 at Piraeus from 1920 throughout 1923. It seems likely that the Greek company found the business prospects from Constantinople particularly appealing following the first restriction act in 1921 that allowed a quota of only 3,292 Greek immigrants, making it hardly feasible to base a transatlantic passenger company on Greek migrants alone. As mentioned, the National Greek Line had been one of the most important transatlantic passenger companies during the war, benefitting from Greece being neutral. Still, three of its passenger liners were lost during the course of the war. Following the armistice, the company took advantage of owing a British subsidiary, the Byron Steamship Company. As a result, the company had priority in purchasing German steamers requisitioned by the Allied Powers following the Treaty of Versailles. The National Greek Line put into service the former Hamburg America liner *Cleveland*, renaming her *King Alexander* and under British flag.¹⁵⁶ She was the largest passenger liner that sailed from the Mediterranean in the early post-war years. However, passenger numbers by the National Greek Line remained low, with only a total of 5,630 westbound third-class passengers spread over a total of 18 trips to New York in 1922 (also 3,065 second class and 804 in first) and 743 on 16 trips in 1923 (1,048 in second class and 510 in first).¹⁵⁷

With the second U.S. restriction act of 1924, maintaining a regular passenger line partly based on the Black Sea region was no longer profitable. The new restriction act allowed for 2,348 Russian subjects in addition to a further total of 900 from Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Greece. In addition, services between New York and Constantinople were discontinued following the entry of Turkish forces in October 1923 and recognition of the Republic of Turkey.

In 1924, only 99 migrants arrived in New York from Odessa, and 56 of these embarked at a British port suggesting some of them may have spent a period in Western Europe before heading for the Americas. In practice, the restriction act combined with stringent

156. Bonsor, *North Atlantic Seaway*, pp. 472-474.

157. GA, HAL, 318.04, 579, TPM 1922-1923.

Soviet regulations on emigration put an end to any further significant migration between the ports of Odessa and New York.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to conduct an in-depth analysis of migration between the ports of Odessa and New York during the period 1892 until 1924 and how the flow was managed by the shipping companies. New York was the most important gateway for U.S. immigration; Odessa was among the Russian origins with the highest number of emigrants to the United States. The main question was not *why* people migrated between these two ports, but how – which is also one of the least explored questions in migration studies. How did the process of migration between the two ports work? What options were there, and what restricted these options for migrants? To answer these questions, it was also important with insight into *who* migrated and migration patterns. To find out who, a database was produced with the names of 28,000 migrants that departed from Odessa to New York during this period. With Odessa being a major Russian port in the Black Sea, well connected, and with a vast hinterland for prospective transatlantic migrants in the early twentieth century, a key objective in the discussion was also to explore why a sustainable passenger line between Odessa and New York was never realized. Combined, these perspectives and methodology aimed at providing a further understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms involved in managing and shaping migrant routes during the period of the great transatlantic migrations in general, and the options and limits for migrants between Odessa and New York in particular.

As for migration patterns, emigration from Odessa followed much of the same situation as that of all Russian migration to the United States. During the early stages of mass transatlantic emigration from Russia, in the 1890s, most migrants came from the northwestern parts of the empire. As with emigration from southern Russia, the number of migrants from Odessa picked up later and peaked in 1906-07 which were also the most important years for Russian transatlantic emigration as a whole. Moreover, looking

at who migrated from Odessa to New York unveil that just about all throughout the period were Jews. Though other Russian migrant groups were important, Jews encompassed the largest group from Russia too.

With these patterns and numbers in mind, it is possible to get an understanding of how the migrant processes worked and how the framework posed by the shipping companies and state played out on specific migrant flows such as the case with Odessa. As clearly illustrated by examining which route Odessa migrants took, the migrants were subjected to the agreements and structures within the confines of the shipping conferences, including third-class quotas. Well in line with accords of the conference agreements, the vast majority of Odessa migrants travelled via Germany, and to some extent Libau and Britain, prior to World War I. These migrants were not free to choose route and company. Only when the conference agreements were temporarily set aside, because of conflicts amongst the companies, were more routes open for migrants from Odessa. Prior to World War I, this was particularly noticeable during the Atlantic Rate War in 1904 that saw migrants from Odessa take unconventional routes by way of Scandinavia and the Adriatic.

As the discussion also has shown, much of the constraints put on migrant routes attributed to the connections and interplay between state, shipping company and agent-networks. One of the biggest paradoxes in this relationship was that despite emigration from Russia with the intention of permanent residence abroad being technically illegal, numbers soared in full view of the Russian authorities. It was the nature of the transatlantic shipping business that allowed this to happen. The shipping companies gave agents that sold tickets and organized migrant routes a high level of autonomy. Agents in Russia were dependent on protection from state officials in order to conduct their business; especially owing to the fact that most of them appear to have been Jews, just as the main clients were. These networks alone had significant impact on shaping migrant routes from Odessa. They also help explain why any sustainable transatlantic service between Odessa and New York was ever realized.

To understand why a sustainable direct passenger line between New York and Odessa was not established prior to World War I, the

discussion has also addressed the various obstacles involved in operating a transatlantic passenger business. One of the most important was the niche nature of the transatlantic passenger business; it involved a limited number of shipping companies capitalizing on well-established and specific networks, skills and experience. Russian shipping did not possess these features. This was illustrated further by the fact that the first sustainable Russian line, established in 1906 from Libau, was initiated by foreign interests. Even the only and short-lived service that operated direct from Odessa to New York in 1906-07 – the Northern Steamship Company – was foreign (Danish).

Following the end of World War I, the transatlantic passenger business re-emerged in a different format. It also faced new hurdles, including greater state intervention including, from 1921, the first U.S. restriction act that curbed transatlantic migration to a minimum. At the same time, the Soviet authorities practically closed off their borders, affecting Odessa which became part of the Soviet Union in 1922. As the discussion has shown, the new framework also opened new possibilities. A combination of many thousand Russian refugees flocking to Constantinople, including from Odessa, in the wake of the Russian Civil War, combined with the weakened position of the shipping conferences, made the former Ottoman port a major point of passage. It also opened the possibility for new companies, usually short-lived, to enter the transatlantic passenger market.

Focusing on two points of passage in the transatlantic passenger business – Odessa and New York – has provided a deeper understanding of the many complexities involved in the process of migration. Migrants just about always made the decision to leave themselves, but they had little insight and influence as to what shaped the process of getting to their final destination. As an in-depth study of a point of origin like Odessa shows, migrants were largely subjected to, in effect, the confines of a *migration chain* or *system* produced and managed by the companies that brought migrants from all corners of Europe to North America. This underlines the importance of considering the role of the shipping companies, their agents and ties to the state when exploring the framework of migration and how the great transatlantic migrations were at all possible – and to some extent, why the European exodus was not even greater.

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Abbreviations

- EA: Erhvervsarkivet/ Danish Business Archives, Aarhus (from 2016 part of the Danish National Archives)
- DRD: Dansk russisk Dampskibsselskab.
- GA: Gemeentearchief Rotterdam/ Rotterdam Municipal Archive
- HAL: Holland-Amerika Lijn
- TPM: Transatlantic Passenger Movement (TPM).

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