

Edhem Eldem, Sophia Laiou, †Vangelis Kechriotis

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PORT-CITIES OF THE SOUTHERN
BLACK SEA COAST AND HINTERLAND,
LATE 18TH – BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY



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Front page: The post card belongs to the private collection of Professor Edhem Eldem.

The text in French says: "Dear friend, lately I received a nice post card, but I am complaining because I expected a long letter describing in detail your trip and your impression from beautiful Constantinople. Greetings, Philippe, 14/6/1907".

*In memory of
Vangelis Kechriotis and Evrydiki Sifneos*

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Table of Contents

Introduction	vii
 Chapter I: The role of Istanbul in the Black Sea and international trade	
1. Sophia Laiou, The Ottoman state and the Black Sea Trade, 18 th –beginning of the 19th century	1
2. Gerasimos Pagratis, The Ottoman Empire and the Ionian maritime enterprises (late 18th-early 19th century)	17
3. Christos Hadziiossif, Parallel lives: Greek shipping and the port of Istanbul	27
4. Katerina Galani, The Galata Bankers and the international banking of the Greek business group in the 19th century	45
 Chapter II: The development of the Black Sea economy in the 19th century	
1. Edhem Eldem, Scanning the Ottoman Black Sea in 1900 through the <i>Revue commerciale du Levant</i>	83
2. †Evrydiki Sifneos, “Was the extraction of coal at Kozlu and Zonguldak mines profitable?” An attempt at an answer from the Courdgi papers	109

3. Ekin Mahmuzlu, The Transformation of the Mercantile Shipping in Eastern Anatolian Black Sea Ports between 1834 and 1914	123
4. Stavros Anestidis, Samsun (Amisos). Aspects of financial development and cosmopolitanism in the late 19 th century	157
5. Şahika Karatepe – Mustafa Batman, The Rising of a Muslim Merchant Family: The Nemlizade's	167
6. Mehmet Yavuz Erler – Mucize Ünlü, Refugees in the basin of the Canik mines: Greek Orthodox from mining to agriculture (1790-1884)	183
 Chapter III: Politics, Administration and the Ottoman Greek communities in the Black Sea	
1. Kudret Emiroğlu, The Interaction of the State with the Communities in Trabzon based on the Salnames, the Official Year-Books (1869-1904)	221
2. Hamdi Özdiş, Some Observations on the Structure of Power Relations and Ottoman Administration in the Late Nineteenth-Century Trabzon Vilayet	293
3. †Vangelis Kechriotis, Greek-Orthodox in politics and the economy of the Black Sea port cities at the end of the Empire	305
4. Elia Kyfonidou, The Greek-Orthodox communities of Pontus at the beginning of the twentieth century: A glimpse at the Greek bibliography	315

Introduction

Edhem Eldem – Sophia Laiou

The southern coast covers the Ottoman and later Turkish area from Istanbul to east of Rize, an area populated until the beginning of the twentieth century mostly by Muslims, but with also a significant non-Muslim population both in the port-cities and the hinterland. From the fifteenth century until the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 after the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774) the Black Sea remained an “Ottoman lake”, since no foreign ship was allowed to pass the Straits. In this way, the Ottoman empire wished to fully control the Black Sea trade and impose Istanbul as the obligatory transit station for all the trade routes. Only with the afore mentioned treaty and the treaty of Aynalı Kavak in 1779 Russia and other foreign states managed to trade freely in the Black Sea and pass through the Straits. Since then and throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Black Sea coast and its hinterland developed economically, and the two port cities, Samsun and Trebizond, served as transit stations for the connection between East,- especially Iran-, Anatolia, the Russian coast and Istanbul¹.

The volume on the Ottoman Black Sea is divided into sections based on thematic criterion. In the first section the focus is on Istanbul as the prominent economic and consuming centre, which connected the Black Sea with the eastern Mediterranean and the West. The enormous consuming demands of the Ottoman capital had already urged for a close economic relation between the imperial centre and the Western Black Sea coast, that is the Ottoman province of present day Bulgaria and the then autonomous Danubian Principalities (today Moldavia and Wallachia); for centuries both regions supplied Istanbul with significant amounts of grain, dairy, animals and other products. From the eighteenth century onwards,

1. X. de Planhol, “Kara Deniz”, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., v. IV, p. 575-577.

when the trade with the Russian part of the Black Sea increased and the latter gradually ceased to be exclusively under Ottoman control, the Black Sea trade became all the more important for both economic and political reasons. The state, on its behalf, regularized the provision trade from the western Black Sea and imposed specific rules to those who engaged in it, in order to continue the smooth provision of the capital with foodstuff. On the other hand, the policy of granting official permission for free navigation in the Black Sea by the Ottoman administration empire in 1780s until the beginning of the nineteenth century demonstrated the Ottomans' effort to control the economic competition between Ottoman, Russian and European merchants and ship-owners in an area that was considered by them of vital economic and strategic importance; more so because it became apparent that the trade especially with the Russian part of the Black Sea was more profitable than with the western coast.

In this respect, it was not only the geographical location of Istanbul-at the entrance to the Black Sea- but also the political power concentrated in the City that made up the Istanbul's image. In this framework "the 'port city' identity of Istanbul was always tempered or modified by the overlapping and often conflicting identity of a 'capital city'".² In the first chapter of the volume, Sophia Laiou's paper explores the ways the Ottoman government organized the Black Sea trade aiming to the regularization of the provision of the Ottoman capital. It also demonstrates how Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman and foreign merchants availed themselves of the Ottoman trade policy concerning the Black Sea economic zone, which, as already mentioned, became free by necessity; the Ottoman state endeavoured to balance between the priority given to the provision trade of Istanbul and the trade which did not aim to serve any demands in provision. Nonetheless, in the late eighteenth century and onwards the Ottoman empire not only wished to "Ottomanize" the trade and navigation to and from the Black Sea, but also to avail itself politically and diplomatically from the need of the western

2. Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: from imperial to peripheralized capital", in E. Eldem-D. Goffman-B. Masters (eds.), *The Ottoman City between East and West. Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.140

states to enter the new (for them) economic zone. In this respect Gerasimos Pagkratis analyses the specific role of the Ottoman state in the development of the Ionian trade in the Black Sea during the Septinsular Republic in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The Ottomans –as one of the guardians of the aforementioned Republic- granted to the Ionian traders a privileged status similar to the one the latter enjoyed as Venetian subjects on the basis of the capitulations, or similar to the status of the Ragusans. Thus, the Ionians actively participated in the Black Sea trade, connecting the Ionian market with the Southern Russia, the Ottoman capital and Livorno. The crucial role that Istanbul played in the development of the shipping and trade with the Black Sea can be observed in the development of the Istanbul port. The paper of Christos Hadziiossif refers to the development of the Greek shipping bound to the Black Sea and vice versa as well as of the Istanbul port. Especially, the archival material of the Bureau of Commerce of the Greek Embassy in Istanbul reflects the fluctuations in the development of the Greek shipping trade and the paper traces it until the outbreak of the First World War. Interestingly, it was not, however only the Greek subjects who invested during the same period in the shipping trade with the Black Sea using the Ottoman capital as the major transit port. After a temporary cessation of their economic activity during the turbulent period caused by the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830), the Ottoman Greeks of Istanbul continued to participate in it. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards Ottoman Greeks as well as Greeks from the newly-established Greek state acted as entrepreneurs and financiers in Istanbul, but also as the intermediaries who facilitated the flow of credit capital from the European states to the Ottoman empire. They were the so-called ‘Galata bankers’, a group of financiers-investors comprised of Ottoman Greeks and Armenians whose networks extended to London and other European capitals. Katerina Galani’s paper focuses on the involvement of the Ottoman Greek bankers into the finance market of Istanbul, and their connection to London, the world finance centre of the 19th century. Her analysis brings forward the economic activity of well-known Greeks of diaspora such as Sygros, Rallis family, Ionides and others.

In the second chapter of the volume the emphasis is on the

economy of the Ottoman Black Sea coast during the “long” Ottoman 19th century. More specifically, the paper of Edhem Eldem analyses the quantitative data provided on a regular basis by the *Revue commerciale du Levant* of the French Chamber of Commerce of Constantinople referring to the trade with the southern Black sea coast. The paper focuses on 1899-1900 as sample years and provides an overview of the general economic and commercial trends in the specific trading zone, namely the volume of shipping in the southern coast of the Black Sea, the tonnage differences between the sail ships and the steamships along with the flag and the harbours’ activities. In a more specific way, Evridiki Sifneos refers to the entrepreneur Panos Kourtzis from the island of Lesbos, who was established in Istanbul in order to proceed his business. Based on his private archive, Sifnaios analyses his investments in the Black Sea economy, namely in the mining industry and shipping. Kourtzis acted by the end of the Ottoman period, namely in the very beginning of the twentieth century, and he can be considered a typical example of an Ottoman Greek entrepreneur, financier and investor, who facilitated his business by cultivating good relations with the Ottoman government. All the above, a few years before the annexation of his native island to the Greek state and the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. Thus, besides the obvious economic aspect of Kourtzis’ activity, Sifnaiou’ paper indirectly poses the multiple identities that big entrepreneurs as Kourtzis and the ‘Galata bankers’ had, combining the Ottoman and Greek identities. In a more general framework, Ekin Mahmuzlu examines the development of the port of Trebizond, an import and export centre for foreign and local goods, with a special emphasis in shipping trade. Based on Ottoman statistical series as well as on foreign archives, Mahmuzlu aims to present a history of the maritime trade in the Trabzon area. Thus, he refers to the competition between sailing ships and steamships, the type of ships and their cargos as well as the important role of the Ottoman Muslim ship-owners and entrepreneurs. The paper of Şahika Karatepe and Mustafa Batman refers to the economic activity of the family of Nemlizade and explores its trade network in the province of Trebizond in the second half of the nineteenth century as well as their investments, especially in the profitable tobacco cultivation. The Nemlizades can be considered as a

typical example of the emerging Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie in the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, which based its power on the combination of economic activity and the politics. However, Trebizond was not the only significant port of the Ottoman Black Sea coast that concentrated the economic activity of Ottoman Muslim and Greek capital-owners. Samsun developed in the nineteenth century from a small town of Canik area into a significant transit port that connected the Anatolian hinterland with Russia, providing also an alternative solution for communication with the Russian coast in comparison to Istanbul throughout the century. Anestidis' contribution focuses on Samsun's development in important provincial shipping and trade centre, which attracted Ottoman merchants and entrepreneurs from Anatolia, as well as from the Aegean islands. Finally, mining constituted a significant feature of the local economic activity, extending from the province of Trebizond to the hinterland of Samsun (Canik). Mehmet Yavuz Erler and Muzice Ünlü's research focuses on the operation of the state mines in the region, the –failed- attempts for investment on behalf of individuals as well as on the employment of the Ottoman Greek population; the latter were settled by the state in the Maden Kabı area of Samsun by the end of the eighteenth century. However, the exhaustion of the mine reserves in the nineteenth century forced the Ottoman Greeks to turn to tobacco and fruit cultivation, a choice that proved wise considering the fertile and flat hinterland of Samsun. Thus, the hinterland area witnessed a worth mentioning commercial activity, legal or illegal (smuggling), in which the Muslim local population played a crucial role. Ottoman Greek communities in the Black Sea region.

Moving from economic to a more political aspect of the history of the Ottoman coast of the Black Sea in the 19th century, the third chapter of the volume begins with the paper of Emiroğlu on the interaction between Ottoman state and communities in Trabzon. Emiroğlu's research is based on the Ottoman year-books (salnames) that refer to the province of Trabzon, and focuses on the question of modernism. To what extent the Tanzimat Reforms have contributed to the modernization process in this remote province of the empire and how successful was the interaction between state and the various communities within the framework of Tanzimat?

Having these questions as the basis of his analysis, Emiroğlu reveals the socio-economic hierarchy of Trabzon and the formation of new local elites -Muslim and non Muslim, that the implementation of the Tanzimat enabled. The existence of multiple identities -religious, state and local (Trabzonite)- for the Ottoman subjects of the area (and not only that one), is an issue that the writer brings forward as a means to understand the complexities of the period that make difficult a definite answer on the question about modernism.

The chapter continues with the political and administrative aspects of the Ottoman government in the southern coast of the Black Sea area along with a critical historiographical approach regarding the fate of the Pontos' inhabitants in the Greek historical discourse. The Ottoman westernizing reforms (Tanzimat), the Hamidian government, the impact of the Young Turk revolution and the short but very critical period between 1908 and the establishment of the Turkish Democracy in 1923, are topics which are discussed in this section of the volume. Hamdi Özdiş analyses the new power structure established in the Trabzon province in the period 1880-1902 as a result of the state efforts for centralization. On the basis of Ottoman and British archives, he questions whether the Ottoman state succeeded in imposing strict control over the various local power holders, such as the afore mentioned Nemlizade family, since the latter managed to form successful political alliances and survive against any attempt to reduce or control their local power by the centrally appointed Governors. On the other hand the paper of Vangelis Kechriotis refers to the dynamic role of the Greek communities of the region, their active involvement in the local political structure, enabled because of the Tanzimat reforms, and the emergence of important local personalities. The general scheme of the combination of politics and economy in the Ottoman state as described in Kechriotis' paper, becomes even more interesting, considering that his research focuses on the turbulent period of the Young Turks government after 1908. His analysis focuses on three Greek deputies in the Ottoman parliament, elected in the Black Sea area after the Young Turks revolution in 1908. Through their socio-economic background the writer brings forward the question of the internal divisions within the large Ottoman Greek community and the antagonism between the Greek bourgeoisie and the

upper middle-class of professionals. He also reveals the ideological “departure” of the three Greek deputies from the Black Sea region –and not only them- from the ideology of Ottomanism and their initial support to the Young Turk Revolution because of its politically liberal and constitutional agenda, to their involvement to the Pontic movement after the end of the World War II. Finally, Elia Kyfonidou’s paper presents a historical outline of the Pontic research in the overall Greek historiography. By dividing it into two distinctive periods, that is from 1922 to 1980 and from 1980 until today, she distinguishes the works of the first period as the “refugees’ account”, since the historical accounts were produced by Pontic Greeks who were expatriated from the Black Sea region after the First World War, and those from the second period, the “specialists’ account”. By using specific examples, Kyfonidou marks the shift from the sensitive and personal approaches of the first period to more sober historical narratives of the second one, characterized by new pursuits and the use of new methodological tools. Her paper presents the latest historiographic ‘state of the art’ concerning the bibliography of the Pontic Greek history, while she also points to the historiographical gaps, one of which is a general overview of the commercial activity of the ottoman Greek communities in the Black Sea region.

The volume in hand presents the efforts for gradual integration of the Black Sea economic zone into the global economy of the nineteenth century. People, ports, commodities and the state policies as well as the role of the hinterland in the support of the extrovert economy and the development of the local communities are analysed in the above mentioned papers. Istanbul remained the major economic and financial centre of the empire, the reference point of all the commercial and financial networks that started from the imperial city and reached other ports of the Black Sea, mostly Odessa, as well as European port-cities such as Livorno, Amsterdam, Trieste and London. On the other hand, one should take under consideration that the commercial routes that passed through the Ottoman lands had already lost much of their importance as a result of the emergence of new trade routes and areas of economic interest. In this respect, the two major Ottoman Black Sea ports of Samsun and Trabzon followed a more ordinary rhythm of development in

comparison to the Ottoman capital, considering that they served mostly provincial needs or the communication with Odessa and Iran, respectively. Even then, however, their economic development in the nineteenth century was noteworthy. The Ottoman Black Sea hinterland on its behalf witnessed the development of Muslim bourgeoisie along with the Christian one. Both attempted to base their power on economic activity and the intervention in politics. The rise of nationalism in the beginning of the twentieth century imposed a new political agenda that resulted to the dissolution of the Ottoman empire and the expatriation of the Ottoman Greeks of the Black Sea region.

The research on the Ottoman Black Sea coast was funded by the EU “Thales Project: The Black Sea and the Port-Cities from the 18th to the 20th Centuries. Development, Convergence and the Connection with the Global Economy” of the Ionian University under the supervision of Professor Gelina Harlaftis. The preliminary results were presented in the workshop held at the Boğaziçi University in October 2014. Gelina Harlaftis managed –once more- to pass her enthusiasm to a number of colleagues from different academic environments and to make them work on a subject that- at least- in Greek historiography is under researched.

During these fruitful years two friends and colleagues that contributed a lot in both the organization of THALES project and the historical research, Vangelis Kechriotis (Boğaziçi University) and Evrydiki Sifneos (National Foundation of Historical Research), passed away. The volume is dedicated in their memory.

Chapter I

The Role of Istanbul in the Black Sea and International Trade

1.

The Ottoman state and the Black Sea Trade, end of the eighteenth –beginning of the nineteenth century

*Sophia Laiou**

The eighteenth century for the Ottoman empire was marked by deep socio-economic changes, which initiated the process of the states' transformation. The economic changes were more intense in the second half of the eighteenth century until the 1830s and were accompanied by the foreign infiltration in the Ottoman external trade along with a global trend towards the domination of a free-market economy, which affected the Ottoman empire too. The state response to the above was expressed in various centralizing policies, which aimed: a) to remind to all the 'players' in the field of the economy and politics the states' power and b) to put under direct control phenomena of social mobility, which were resulted by the accumulation of wealth especially on behalf of non –Muslim Ottoman subjects. In the field of economy, the centralization process attempted to balance between the trend towards a more liberal economic environment, as it was expressed in the opening of the Black Sea economic zone to foreign intervention after the 1774 treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and on the other hand the implementation of some steady pillars of the Ottoman economic policy applied as early as fifteenth century.¹ One of them was 'provisionism', that is the policy of the provision of Istanbul and other major cities with plenty and good quality basic foodstuff at reasonable prices, seen as one of the most significant tasks of the state. Despite the moral and religious attitude this police might have had in the Ottoman empire, in actual practice this state priority was not different from

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1. Ç. Keyder-E.Özveren-D.Quataert, "Port-cities in the O.E.: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives", *Review* 16:4 (1993), p. 527.

similar policies applied in the early modern period in the Western Europe. In both cases the need to avoid the social upheavals in the cities caused by the lack of foodstuff was an important parameter that had to be taken under consideration².

In the period under study the Black Sea economic zone became an area where the state policies for a normal flow of provision trade and the mercantile activities of foreign and Ottoman subjects co-existed and to some extent competed with each other. In this framework the aim of this paper is to explore the possibilities for the Ottoman merchants, especially the Ottoman Greeks, to involve into profit-making business endeavours in the Black Sea region, taking under consideration a) the concrete institutional framework that the Ottomans implemented in order to secure the provision trade and b) the effect of the development of the Black Sea region into a free economic zone in combination with the Russian policy in this matter.

Provision trade

The Ottoman state formed an institutional framework which aimed to regulate the provision process by determining the provinces which would serve as its basic sources for foodstuff as well as the means of remuneration of the local suppliers. The Black Sea region became of great importance for the Ottomans for the provision of grain, meat, animal fat and dairy products, and for that reason the government established a firm control over its trade and navigation from the fifteenth until the end of the eighteenth century, thus, rendering the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake³. This status remained under strict Ottoman control until the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which ended a Russo-Ottoman war with the Ottoman defeat. The stipulations of this treaty and those of Aynalı Kavak that followed in 1779 enabled the economic activity of the Russians in the

2. M. Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* [State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire], (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000), p.76; Ch. Tilly, "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe", in Ch. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National State in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 380-455.

3. H. Inalcik, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans", *Arхeіόν Πόντου* 35 (1979), pp.74-110.

Ottoman Black Sea area and, in general, in the ottoman territory. Thus, since 1774 and especially after the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russians in 1783, the Black Sea itself ceased to be an Ottoman lake and Russia, Austria, Great Britain and France actively participated in the economic activity in the area, having the right to trade and navigate in the Black Sea with their own ships instead of being obliged to use the Ottoman ones⁴. These new political and economic developments did not change the Ottoman priorities that continued to focus on the provision needs of Istanbul, and the special role the Black sea area had as an important supplier with basic foodstuff⁵. Nonetheless, under the new circumstances the Ottoman government had to assure the normal flow of the provision trade by eliminating or putting under control the foreign commercial intervention and the temptations that were created for smuggling basic Ottoman products, mostly grain, to Europe instead of Istanbul or other Ottoman ports. The measures taken during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) aimed towards a more efficient centralizing provision policy through the establishment of the Zahiré Nezareti (Grain administration)⁶. In addition the policy of “rayic” (current) price aimed to encourage the sale of grain by the producers to the state agents by imposing a price that it was higher than the so-called “state price” (miri), but lower than the actual market one. The latter policy, however, did not last long, since the heavy fiscal

4. Olexandr Halenko, «Έλληνες επιχειρηματίες και ναυτικοί στις βόρειες ακτές της Μαύρης και Αζοφικής Θάλασσας την περίοδο της οθωμανικής κυριαρχίας και των ρωσικών κατακτήσεων, 15^{ος}-18^{ος} αι.» [Greek Eentrepreneurs and Seafarers in the Northern Coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof during the Period of the Ottoman Domination and the Russian Conquests], in E. Sifnaiou-G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Οι Έλληνες της Αζοφικής, 18^{ος}-αρχές 20^{ου} αιώνα. Νέες προσεγγίσεις στην ιστορία των νέων Ελλήνων της Νοτίου Ρωσίας* [The Greeks of the Area of Azof, 18th- Beginning of the 20th Century. New Approaches to the History of the Greeks of the Southern Russia], (Athens: National Institute of Historical Research, 2015), p. 248 fn. 11.

5. Marie-Mathilde Alexandrescu- Dersca Bulgaru, « L’approvisionnement d’Istanbul par les Principautés roumaines au XVIII^e siècle : commerce ou réquisition », *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, N°66 (1992), pp. 73-78. H. İnalçık “Boghdan”, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, v. 1, 125;

6. Rh. Murphey, «Provisioning Istanbul», *Food and Foodways* 2 (1988), pp. 220, 231.

demands obliged in 1807 the Ottoman government to abandon that policy and return to the state -very low -prices for the purchase of grain, making the sale similar to a tax payment. Thus, specific areas-including the Danubian Principalities- were obliged to annually sell for the fulfilment of the state needs certain amounts of grain at a very low prices, a situation that did not differ from what it prevailed before the short interval of the rayic policy.⁷

As far as the actual participants in the Black sea trade is concerned, the Ottoman state organized it by imposing a division following geographical lines. More specifically, in the period under study the Black Sea trade was divided between: a) the kapan merchants⁸, b) those who did not belong to the kapan group but they were Ottoman subjects, and c) the foreign merchants; the latter were divided between the foreign subjects who traded in the Ottoman Empire under the stipulations defined by the capitulations (müstemin), and the Ottoman subjects who had the status of the protégées (beratlı) of certain foreign states and traded under the same -favorable - conditions with the foreign merchants. The kapan merchants were organized in a guild-like structure under state control and were considered the official providers of the Ottoman capital with foodstuff from the western (Balkan) coast of the Black Sea, namely the Danubian Principalities and the Ottoman Balkan provinces. They were comprised mostly of Muslims who used ships that also belonged to the kapan group, and functioned with the state's permission. It is to be noted that the religious dimension, demonstrated in the Muslim superiority in this group, may reflect the state's intention to keep the strategically important provision trade away from the Ottoman Christians⁹. However, the kapanlı group included also merchants who acted as intermediaries and were responsible for the purchase and the transfer to Istanbul of the merchandise. In an Ottoman register of 1801, the Ottoman Christians comprised 8.8% and they were both merchants

7. Seven Ağır "The Evolution of Grain Policy : The Ottoman Experience", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 43:4 (2013), 589-590.

8. For the kapan merchants see M. Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships*, (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp.117-122.

9. S. Aynural, *İstanbul değirmenleri ve fırınları. Zahire ticareti (1740-1840)*, [The Mills and Bakeries of Istanbul. The Foodstuff Trade, 1740-1840], (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), p. 52.

together with their partners¹⁰. A few years before, in a register of 1792/3 that contained the names of the captains of the “ships of the kapān” that brought certain amounts of grain from the port of Vraila on behalf of the state, there were 5 Ottoman Christians in a total of 72 entries: 3 as ship-owners and 2 as captains, that is 7%¹¹.

The trade with the Russian coast

On the other hand, the non-kapānlı merchants and the foreign ones or *beratlıs* were private individuals who participated in this trade, focusing on the Russian and Ottoman coasts of the Black Sea. The three groups functioned under specific rules imposed by the Ottoman state. The latter intended to control not only the vital issue of the provision of Istanbul as in the case of the kapān merchants but also the navigation to and from the Black Sea, an issue that concerned the members of all the above-mentioned groups. In this respect, the procedure followed after 1805 concerning the navigation permissions aimed once more towards the imposition of a more strict state control and the limitation of the infiltration of the kapān merchants into the trade with the Russian Black Sea coast, a topic that will be analyzed below. Thus, the permissions were granted under the supervision of three different departments (Gümrük Emini Ağa, Zahiré Nazırı and Tersane Emini) and followed specific rules: namely, they applied only for three months and for only one trip to and from the Black Sea; a guarantor –usually the captain himself– was responsible for the return to the Ottoman state of all the Ottoman members of the crew; finally, certain products were

10. BOA, D.MKF 31156. The register contains the names of those who brought various kind of merchandise from Wallachia to Istanbul on behalf of the kapān merchants of the Karaman area in the capital during the period 30/09-10/11 1801. In a total of 68 entries, 9 were Ottoman Christians. Considering that some of the names appear more than once, the Muslim merchants were 45 and the Christians 4, lowering thus the percentage of the latter to 8.8%. Also in a total of 16 entries of ships, 5 had Ottoman Christian captains, but all belonged to Muslims.

11. BOA, D.MKF 31061. It appears that not all of the registered ships belonged to the kapān group, but they were leased by the latter. In this way, we can explain the use of the ships that belonged to Christians from Izmir and the island of Chios.

not allowed to be exported¹². Moreover, since 1780 the merchants were obliged to sell in the capital the merchandise brought from the Black sea ports, if the local circumstances demanded so¹³.

Undoubtedly, the opening of the Black Sea trade provided to the Ottoman Greeks new space of business activity under new favorable terms. Indeed, the Ottoman Greek merchants availed themselves of the Russian settlement policy at the northern Black Sea coast, culminated in the establishment of Odessa (Hocabey) and Taganrog in late eighteenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century the Greek communities of the Russian port cities flourished, especially after the eruption of the Greek war of Independence¹⁴. It is not coincidental that well-known Ottoman Greek commercial houses, based in the Ottoman capital, soon established branches in the southern Russia and took advantage of the increasing importance of the Russian grain and other commodities for the world economy¹⁵.

As in the case of the provision trade with the Ottoman western Black Sea coast, the Ottoman sources provide the institutional framework of the commercial transactions with the Russian ports, the opportunities it offered, and the limitation imposed by the state policy. More specifically, an Ottoman register of 1792 /3¹⁶ gives an

12. İ. Bostan, «İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz’de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları, 1780-1846)» [The Register of the Navigation Permissions and the Ottoman Merchants who Traded with Russia in the Black Sea, 1780-1846], *Türklük Araştırmalar Dergisi* 6 (1990), pp. 24, 27; See for instance BOA, C.İKTS 23/1140, 1816.

13. Idris Bostan “Rusya’nın Karadenizde Ticarete Başlaması ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1787” [The Beginning of the Trade with Russia in the Black Sea and the Ottoman Empire, 1700-1787], *Osmanlı Denizciliği*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 4 baskı, p. 290.

14. V. Kardassis, *Έλληνες ομογενείς στη Νότια Ρωσία, 1775-1861* [Greek Expatriates in Southern Russia 1775-1861], (Athens: Alexandraia, 1998), pp. 45-63. Notably, in 1804 Odessa became a free-port, a development that facilitated even more the increase of the volume of the external trade of its port, Kardassis, *Έλληνες ομογενείς*, p. 146.

15. Keyder et als, “Port-cities”, p. 534 for the decline of the Ottoman grain trade in the nineteenth century in comparison to the American and Russian ones.

16. BOA, D.BŞM.İGE.d. 17203 (“İl-ecil at-ticaret Kara Deniz’de Rusya iskelelerine varub gelmek üzere be evamir-i aliyye mezun olub derun-i evamirde mün-deric şurut-i lazimesince avdet eylediklerini müşir Gümrük Emini Ağa ilamıyla

interesting glimpse on the business's collaborations and intrareligious partnerships between the participants in this trade. The register contains the names of 23 captains authorized to trade in the Russian part of the Black Sea, as well as those of the freighters, the guarantors and the latter's occupation. Out of 23 entries, the Muslim captains were 3 (13%), while 2 (out of 3) belonged to the *kapan* group; the freighters of their cargos were merchants from the Crimean peninsula and their guarantors were also Muslim *kapan* merchants. The rest of the captains were Ottoman Christian subjects (20) mostly from the Aegean islands, while in 15 entries the freighters of their cargoes were Russian *berat*-holders and in 2 cases Nemçe (Austrian) *berat*-holders. Interestingly, 3 out of 20 Ottoman Christian captains had Muslims as guarantors¹⁷.

A few years later, in 1796/7¹⁸, a less detailed register was completed that included the captains who were again authorized to trade in the same area for the year 1211. The total number of entries is 88 and the Muslim captains cover 26% (23 out of 88) of the total. They came from the Ottoman Black Sea and Marmara region and their guarantors were again Muslims artisans and shop-owners in Istanbul, and in 2 cases *kapan* merchants. In 2 cases also the Muslim captains had as guarantors Ottoman Christians from Istanbul¹⁹. The rest of the captains were Ottoman Christians, again mostly from the Aegean islands, who had as guarantors Christian artisans of Istanbul and the dragoman of the fleet, and in 15 cases (17%) Muslim artisans, shop-owners and merchants of Istanbul²⁰.

henüz evamiri kaleme gelmiyenleri defteridir”.

17. In 2 entries, the guarantor is identical, that is the merchant Hasircizade molla Ahmed, who in almost one year guaranteed for 2 different Christian captains from Crete.

18. BOA, DBŞM. TRE. d. 15286 (“İki yüz on bir senesinde Rusya diyarına azimetine ruhsat verilen sefainin defteridir”). In this register the freighters of the ships are not mentioned.

19. Mustafa from Varna had as guarantor Hacı Panayot yağcı (oil/fat seller) in the *bal kapan* of İstanbul. Mehmed from Sakız (Chios) had as kefil (guarantor) Mike Norum, a merchant established in the Çakmakçılar han in İstanbul.

20. Some entries, however, refer to the same person. For instance, a certain sail maker (yelkenci) Ahmed guaranteed for 3 Christian captains from Misivri, while the bakkal (grocer) Mehmed Emin in Çardak port guaranteed for 2 Christians, who came from the same town (Kurşun).

It is to be noted that a most certain criterion for the formation of these intra-confessional collaborations was origin from the same or neighboring area.

Table 1

Year: 1792/3 (BOA, D.BŞM.İGE.d. 17203)
Number of entries of Muslim captains: 3
Muslim guarantors (kefils) for Muslim captains: 3
Number of entries of Christian captains: 20
Christian guarantors for Christian captains: 17
Muslim guarantors for Christian captains: 3
Year 1796/7 (BOA, DBŞM. TRE. d. 15286)
Number of entries of Christian captains: 66
Number of entries of Muslim captains: 22
Muslim guarantors for Muslim captains: 20
Christian guarantors for Muslim captains: 2
Christian guarantors for Christian captains: 51
Muslim guarantors for Christian captains: 15

Both registers were compiled during the re-organization of the trade with Russia aiming to the implementation of a more effective centralization process. As mentioned above, an important aspect of this effort referred to the involvement of the kapam merchants in this specific trade. Already in 1793, the latter were not allowed to participate in the Black Sea trade, except the Eflak and Buğdan areas; this prohibition was repeated in 1805/6 and was still valid in 1817. It is noteworthy that the kapam merchants had either oligopsony or even monopoly rights for trade in the Danubian Principalities, but on the other hand they were under strict state control concerning the profit margin²¹ and the port of landing (which had to be always Istanbul)²². Thus, it seems that at least some of the kapam merchants wished to maximize their profits by –indirectly– entering

21. In fact, the kapam merchants were obliged to buy the grain at low price, so that they could sell it in Istanbul at a not very high price, Çizakça, *A Comparative Business Evolution*, p. 121.

22. Çizakça, *A Comparative Business Evolution*, 118-120.

the trade with the Russian ports of the Black Sea. To achieve this, the kapan merchants used to transfer grain from Russian ports either using the ships of the kapan or they secretly rented ships from Anatolia, or even they paid the freight in other ships²³. In addition, some of the kapan merchants acted as kefiles, that is guarantors, of those who were officially permitted to trade with the Black Sea, as is shown in both registers. Although the kefil role does not reveal the actual economic agreement between the relevant parts (the kefil, the captain and the freighter), it is certain that it provided to the kapan merchants a means for investment in short-term trade transactions with the part of the Black Sea from which they were officially excluded. The reason for the above was that “the trade in Crimea is bigger than in the other ports”, a statement that reveals the intense commercial activity and the chances for increased profits for the merchants in this part of the Black Sea, as opposed to the Tuna (Danube) area²⁴. Thus, it appears that the Ottoman Muslim merchants preferred to trade in the Russian ports, where commerce was more profitable and free, than in the Rumeli part of the Black Sea, which served as the official state’s granary and where the state’s control was intense. The participation of the kapan merchants in the trade with Russia intensified the competition and was, certainly, not welcome by the other Ottoman merchants.

The competition was also intensified by the participation of the “foreign” (müstemin) or protégés merchants and ship-owners (beratlı), such as the “Russian” Yeorgandopoulo²⁵, who in 1803 brought from the port of Kerç 8,000 kile of grain (204,800 kg) with the ship of Ibrahim (from Rhodes) and he transshipped the cargo to Konstantin Kapa’s ship, an Ottoman subject from the island of İpsara, in order to transfer it to the Aegean. According to the

23. See BOA, HH 227/1266, 1802/1803 (1217).

24. “Kırım tarafında ticaret sair iskelelerden ziyade olduğu ecilden...”, BOA, HH 777/36429. The same argument is used in BOA, C. İKTS 496. For the increase of Odessa external trade see Norman Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807*, Chicago-London 1970, p. 179.

25. In 1804, Yeorgandopoulos appears to be a Russian merchant, settled in Galata (BOA, C.HR. 1137). Also a certain Yeorgandopoulos from Yenikale in Crimea was a ship-owner in the beginning of the nineteenth century (V. Kardassis, *Έλληνες ομογενείς*, p.131)

current regulation, the transshipment and transfer of the grain to the Aegean was permitted by the Ottoman government, because the cargo was bought in Russia (and not in Ottoman territory and, thus, it was not meant to be used for the provision of the capital) and no-one from the crew was established there²⁶. A year before, in 1802, the Russian Pietro Lokont from Taygan sent with the ship of the Ottoman subject Ispiro (from the island of Santorini) 980 kile of grain (25,088 kg) to his partner Toron, a foreign merchant in Istanbul. The grain was not sold in the capital, because the price demanded was high enough, and, thus, it was asked by the Russian embassy the permission to transfer the cargo to the Aegean Sea. Permission was granted²⁷. These two cases reflect the diversity of the commercial networks extended in the Black Sea trade, in which merchants and ship-owners of different legal status cooperated in a way that outreached the official policy of piecemeal and thus controllable organization of international and local trade.

After 1812 the Ottoman state endeavored to increase the number of the Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman merchants involved in the Black Sea trade, reacting, in this way, against the increase of the Ottoman protégés. Thus, the government allowed the Russian protégés (but) Ottoman subjects to trade with the Russian ports only on the basis of an Ottoman firman (permission for navigation), without being obliged to obtain a Russian permission (patent) and the contract (kontrato) provided by the Russian port officials. The rationale behind this decision, as stated in the hatt-i hümayun was: a) to stop the increase of the Russian protégés in the Ottoman Empire, which resulted to the loss of the state control upon these Ottoman subjects; b) to stop the loss of profits (from the trade) and c) to cease the sale of various commodities to the “unbelievers”. The only stipulation posed with emphasis was the prohibition of export for certain Ottoman goods (olive oil, soap, coffee and sulphur) considered “strategically important”²⁸. Moreover in the same –undated– document it is stated that in order to prolong the

26. BOA, C.HR 6688. The initial application on behalf of Yeorgandopoulo was submitted by the Russian minister plenipotentiary.

27. BOA, C.HR 5987.

28. BOA, HH 777/36429, C.İKT 496/1817.

provision of Istanbul with grain, certain kapan merchants could be “occasionally” allowed to transfer grain –and only that– from the Black Sea; a suggestion that allowed a certain degree of freedom to the otherwise strictly controlled kapan group to participate in the rich Black Sea trade, which can be considered as a response of the government to the pressures expressed by that group.

Indications of the “Ottomanization” policy at least regarding the external trade can be also traced in the permission granted in 1816 to an Ottoman Christian from the island of Hydra to transfer to the Aegean Sea 1,500 kile of grain (38,400 kg) brought from Russia and purchased on behalf of Russian subjects. The permission was granted on the following basis: a) the cargo was Russian (and not Ottoman) grain, b) the transport would be made with an Ottoman ship and thus, the profit derived from the freight would be gained by an Ottoman subject and c) the population of the capital would not suffer from lack of grain because of this transfer.²⁹ From the above it appears that the Ottoman state under Mahmud II endeavored to continue the trade policy under Selim III, which aimed to a gradual “ottomanization” of the trade with specific concern on the limitation of the economic activity of the protégés Ottoman subjects³⁰.

Although the main merchandise brought from the Black Sea was grain, there are few Ottoman documents from the period under study (excluding the Russo-Ottoman war period, 1806-1812) referring to the import to Istanbul of wrought iron, and in some cases its transport to the Aegean Sea. The importers were either Russian protégés established in the Ottoman capital, some of whom were also engaged in the grain trade such as the above mentioned Yeorgandopoulos, and some were Ottoman subjects; the latter either belonged to the *Avrupa tüccarları* (henceforward: AT) group, namely the group of Ottoman Christian merchants, which was established by the Ottoman government in order to compete with the Ottoman protégés (*beratlı*),³¹ or they belonged to the ‘*galvanı bazirgân*’, the big merchants who imported iron for the needs of the Ottoman

29. BOA, A.DVNS.TCR 6/53

30. G. Harlaftis-S. Laiou, “Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c. 1780-c. 1820”, in M. Mazower (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece* (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), pp. 17-30.

31. Harlaftis-Laiou, “Ottoman State Policy”.

state. As is shown below, the state fulfilled its needs by combining the above possibilities depending on how acute the latter were. The amount of the imported iron fluctuated between 200 and 7,000 kantar, while the documents do not mention the port of loading. In 6 out of 7 cases the importers requested the permission to transfer the iron to the Aegean Sea in order to be sold there, since they did not manage to sell the iron in Istanbul at the price they wanted. It is noteworthy that in 2 out of 3 requests on behalf of the AT, the amount of iron that would be transferred to the Aegean Sea was almost 2/3 of the total, which means that 1/3 remained in the capital, most probably bought by the state at a low price for the needs of either the Imperial arsenal or the foundry. Thus, in 1812 Georgios Petrokkokinos, one of the most active and wealthy *Avrupa Tüccar* of the period, brought from the Black Sea 7,000 kantars of wrought iron for reasons of trade and after 6 consecutive requests submitted to the Imperial council within almost one month, he got the permission to transfer to the Aegean Sea 72% of the cargo. Again, in 1813 another member of the same group brought 3,000 kantars of wrought iron and applied for the sale in the Aegean islands of the remaining 1,900 kantars (63.3% of the total)³². The same procedure was applied in 1810 even for the 200 kantars of wrought iron brought from Taygan to Istanbul by Yorgi Konsanti son of Anastasis, another AT, although it is not known whether a percentage of it was withheld for the needs of the Ottoman state. It is noteworthy that in most cases of foreign merchants or Ottoman *beratlıs*, who also brought Russian wrought iron in Istanbul and applied for a permission to sell it at a higher price at the Aegean islands, permission was granted for the whole amount, although there was an expressed concern whether the state arsenal needed iron (which could be bought at a low price).³³ An exception is the case of the Russian merchant, probably an Ottoman *beratlı* himself, who in 1816 was confronted by an Ottoman custom official, who demanded 5% of the cargo to be delivered to the Ottoman state and the rest to be sold at a price defined by the latter.³⁴

32. BOA, A.DVNS. TCR 3/9, 3/51

33. BOA, C.HR. 6128, 5984, 1137, 4614.

34. Th. Prousis, "Risky Business: Russian Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the

Table 2: Iron imports in Istanbul from the Black Sea,
beginning of the 19th century

Year	Quantity in kantars	Origin	Merchant	Legal identity	Source
1800	2,000	Russia	Ciorci Yannopoulo	Russian merchant- Istanbul	C.HR 6128
1802	1,000	Russia	Kostanti Spanopoulos	Russian merchant	C.HR 5984
1804	408	Russia	Yeorgandopoulos	Russian merchant- Istanbul	C. HR 1137
1810	200	Taganrog	Yorgi Kostanti son of Anastasi	AT-Istanbul	A.DVN. TCR 2, σ. 41
1811	5,000	Russia	Marko Lenti	French Merchant	C. HR 4614
1812	7,000	Black Sea	Yorgi Petrokokkino son of Pandeli	AT-Istanbul	A.DVN. TCR 3, σ. 9
1813	3,000	Black Sea	Hatzifoti son of Theodosi	AT-Istanbul	A.DVN. TCR 3, σ. 51
1816	1,386 + 56 liter	-	-	Galvani bazirgan- Istanbul	C.BHR 3021

Apart from the ottoman state's interventionism, other issues concerning the trade of Russian iron refer to the possible profits for the merchants in combination with the level of the external and internal demand. It seems that the trade of iron could become quite profitable for the merchants. The testimony of Evliya Çelebi, who described the iron merchants of Istanbul of the late 17th century as "rich"³⁵, pro-

Early Nineteenth Century". *Mediterranean Historical Review* 20:2 (2005), pp. 208, 219. Although it is not stated whether the merchant was a Russian subject or a protégé of the Russian empire, the fact that he owned a warehouse in Istanbul points towards the assumption that that he was a protégé.

35. *Evliya Çelebi Narratives of Travels in Europe Asia and Africa in the 17th c.*, trans J von Hammer London, vol I part II, p. 186.

vides a hint to the profitability of that investment for that period. As for the eighteenth century, an estimation based on Russian sources of the late eighteenth century asserts that only the export of iron sheets from Taganrog to Istanbul could be a profitable investment, and not the export of long iron pieces³⁶. However, an information provided by an Ottoman chronicle that in 1810 a ship that belonged to a high Ottoman official was provided with state permission to bring foodstuff from the Black Sea and instead it brought iron and wire, indicates that the trade of the latter was more profitable, especially in the middle of the Ottoman-Russian war³⁷. On the other hand, if one compares: a) the reimbursement of a Russian merchant in 1795 with 12.5 ğuruş/kantar of wrought iron, bought by the state³⁸ and that of the official providers of the Imperial arsenal with iron (the above-mentioned ğalvanı bazargân) in 1816 with 28 ğuruş/kantar³⁹, and b) the data provided by Mehmet Genç on iron state provisions and the fluctuations of its price in the eighteenth century, it becomes apparent that the acuteness of the level of the state demand defined the price of the iron, imported or not⁴⁰. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the expected profits from the export of the iron were quite high. For instance, if we estimate the price of wrought iron in 1812 at (at least) 30ğuruş/kantar, the Petrokokkinos' profit (before any other expenses and dues) for the 5,050 kantars that sold in Aegean was 151,500 ğuruş. In any case, in the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian cereals were not the exclusive merchandise that was transferred with foreign and Ottoman ships to Europe, but there was also demand for Russian iron that would further accommodate the military needs of Europe before the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 as well as the constant needs of the Ottoman arsenal and

36. Ev. Sifnaiou- G. Harlaftis, "Το Ταϊγάνιο των Ελλήνων: ελληνική επιχειρηματικότητα στην παραμεθόριο του διεθνούς εμπορίου" [The Taganrog of Greeks: Greek Entrepreneurship at the Frontier of the International Trade], in Sifnaiou-Harlaftis (eds.), *Οι Έλληνες της Αζοφικής*, pp. 83-84.

37. *Câbi Tarihi*, c.1, Ankara 2003, p. 60. As a result, its captain was imprisoned and the ship returned to its owner.

38. BOA, HH 222/12374

39. BOA, C.BHR 3021.

40. M. Genç, "L' économie ottoman et la guerre au XVIIIe siècle", *Turcica* XXVII (1995), pp. 191-192.

foundry⁴¹. The cease of warfare in Europe on the one hand and the continuous need for the Russian grain on the other-- despite the price- decrease and the protective policies that France and Great Britain followed against the imports of grain--⁴², turned the big merchants from Russia and Ottoman Empire once again to the trade of grain. This explains why there is no other information-at least to my knowledge- for further exports of (Russian) iron from the Ottoman ports contrary to the ongoing exports of the Russian and Ottoman grain to Europe. Nevertheless, even for this brief period, those of the Ottoman subjects who had the financial means to get involved in the export of iron, despite the steady state's demand for a sort of "taxation" such as the obligatory sale at a low price, they seized the opportunity to increase their profits. Petrokokkinos, for instance, freighted 14 ships⁴³ to transfer the iron to the Aegean Sea, a fact that demonstrates the size of his entrepreneurial initiative from which – under normal circumstances- he expected a considerable profit. In a smaller scale, the AT Hacifotis son of Theodosios in 1813 freighted 4 ships to transfer from Istanbul the 1,000 kantars of iron to the Aegean Sea⁴⁴. Finally, as to the Aegean ports of export, at least in one case, it was the port of Chios from which in 1804 the cargo of 408 kantars of wrought iron brought by the Russian beratlı Yeorgandopoulo from Russia was exported⁴⁵.

In sum, despite the changes in the power structure in the Black Sea area and the eastern Mediterranean occurred by the dynamic appearance of Russia in the international scene, the Ottoman empire did not cease to consider the Black sea area as an important food supplier. The provision trade between Istanbul and the western Black Sea coast was considered as the monopolistic area of the *kapanlı* merchants. The trade between Istanbul and the Russian Black Sea coast attracted the interest of Muslim, Ottoman Christian

41. For the provision of iron on behalf of the Imperial arsenal in the seventeenth century see İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı. XVII yüzyılda tersane-i amire* [The Ottoman Imperial Shipyard in the 17th Century] (Ankara: The Isis Press, 1992), pp. 123-124.

42. Kardasis, *Έλληνες ομογενείς*, p. 154-155.

43. BOA, A.DVN.TCR 3/9

44. BOA, A.DVN.TCR 3/51.

45. BOA, C.HR 1137

and foreign merchants. Interestingly, despite the state regulations that forbade the involvement of the *kaplan* group, the latter tried to find ways for investment in it, since the profit must have been higher in comparison to the trade with the western coast of the Black Sea. The Ottoman Greek merchants, on their behalf, seized the opportunities which the Black Sea trade offered and took advantage of the Russian policy to expand its maritime trade. Above all, however, they availed themselves of the opportunities that the Ottoman trade policy offered either through the trade concessions provided to the European states or through the state efforts to further "Ottomanize" the external trade by restricting the number of the *beratlıs*. The Ottoman Greek merchants adapted themselves in both - antithetic - situations, and through them the most dynamic members of them managed to expand their entrepreneurial activities in and outside of the Ottoman state by establishing branches in the major European and Russian city-ports. Still, however, until the outburst of the Greek war of Independence Istanbul remained the center of their activities and for some of them, even after 1820s. Besides, the consuming and financial demands of the Ottoman capital and its geographical location created hopes for enrichment against which the most dynamic Ottoman Greek merchants could not remain indifferent. Thus, one cannot but remark that the major Greek commercial houses in Odessa and elsewhere in the region of the Black Sea after 1820s were only but a branch of a family trade network of which Istanbul remained the basis or an important nub.

2.

The Ottoman Empire and Ionian Maritime Enterprises in the late 18th and early 19th Century

*Gerassimos D. Pagratis**

On the morning of Friday, March 8th, 1801, Sultan Selim III observed a modest ceremony with his binoculars from the Sarai kiosk chiefly involving one ship: the Holy Trinity brig manned by the Kefalonian Gerasimos Kontogouris. Kontogouris's ship was the first to raise the banner of a new government, the Septinsular Republic. He then saluted the Sultan with twenty one cannonades and continued to Tophane, where he was received in a similar manner, a manner not customary for privately owned ships. The idea of organizing this ceremony belonged to Antonio Lefkokilos, by his own declaration, who was an envoy of the Ionian State to the Ottoman Porte and author of the statement. As Lefkokilos supported, he wanted with this gesture to show to the Ottoman Porte, named a driving force in his document, the guardian and protector of the Ionian State, gratitude on behalf of himself and the state he represented¹.

Regardless of the essential significance a spectacle such as this had for the Porte, the above description creates a series of scenes subject to multiple readings and interpretations.

The role of the Ottoman Empire in the process of the Ionian State's formation is known. This state was born on the Ionian Islands in 1800, not by demand of its own residents but thanks to a diplomatic agreement between the Russians and the Ottomans, who had also secured the concordance of the British. But there is little mention of the effect the Porte's protection had at this exact historical moment on the islander's shipping trade. Instead, much research in,

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1. General State Archives of Corfu, Septinsular Republic, vol. 39.

chiefly Greek, historiography, has to do with the importance of securing Russian protection for Greek merchant shipping from the last quarter of the eighteenth century onwards. And all the above despite the recent studies of Gelina Harlaftis showing that the use of the Russian flag amongst Greek vessels has been overestimated².

Thus, this paper examines the specific role of the Ottoman Empire in the development of Ionian shipping enterprises, and includes: a) the relationship of the Ottomans and the Ionians, especially in the last stage of Venetian sovereignty; b) the nature of this “protection” by the Ottomans during the seven year life of the Ionian State; c) the reciprocal obligations and benefits that characterized this relationship.

A) Like most Mediterranean islands in the early modern period, the islands of the Ionian Sea were systematically threatened by the specter of hunger. The usually failed Venetian policies towards ensuring adequate nutrition for island territories and the agricultural choices of the Ionians motivated chiefly by marketability drove the islanders constantly to the opposite shore. There, in Epirus, Ksimeros and the Peloponnese was the end of a zone rich in food items and raw materials that included much of the Balkan area in addition to an extensive market to sell their merchandises.

Essentially, these regions functioned as the mainland of these islands, forming an economic union together. But this land belonged to someone else. It was Ottoman and therefore governed by other laws and political realities.

In general, this did not create a hindrance for the transient and stable movements of Ionians in the Ottoman territories, whose continuity was only threatened by emergency situations such as wars or epidemics. These routes also had an opposite trend. Already in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman, Christian and Muslim, trade on the islands with Venice as the final destination had developed a strong institutional character as evidenced by the establishment of

2. Gelina Harlaftis & Katerina Papakonstantinou (eds.), *Η Ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων 1700-1821* [The Shipping Trade of Greeks, 1700-1821] (Athens: Κέδρος, 2013), pp. 778-781.

consulates for various trading communities of the Ottoman Empire³.

For the Ionians the Ottoman land represented the only way to properly nourish themselves, largely because the stifling legal framework established by the Venetian state.

Ionian choices are reflected quantitatively in the eighteenth century, when the flow of trade multiplied on an international level. In the century of the triumph of economic liberalism many Ionians found an outlet in the use of the Ottoman flag, which 7% of the Ionians had raised. Others chose to transport their businesses and/or families to the Ottoman territories. Others, finally, invested in Ottoman merchant shipping, while still residing in the Ionian islands⁴.

The movement of Kefalonians to Messolonghi and Etoliko is the most visible case but certainly not unique in its kind. At the end of the eighteenth century the Ionians had a relatively dense presence, more or less stable, in Ottoman territories such as Patra, Smyrna and of course Constantinople, but also in Aegean ports such as Chios, Tinos etc. Of course, not all the Ionians were involved in maritime trade. The communities of the Ionian islanders, organized or not, were relatively stratified. Apart from traders, they included landowners (the Zakynthians in Patra), farmers and artisans (Kythirans in Smyrna), small vendors and the like, some of whom occasionally invested in maritime trade⁵.

3. Mitsa Oikonomou, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου των Ελλήνων εμπόρων κατά την περίοδο της Τουρκοκρατίας. Το εμπόριο του Αρχιπελάγους και το ελληνικό προξενείο της Βενετίας* [The Institution of the Consul of the Greek Merchants during the Tourkokratia. The Trade of the Archipelagos and the Greek Consulate of Venice], unpublished Ph.D thesis, v. 1-3, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens 1990.

4. Gerassimos D. Pagratis, «Shipping enterprise in the eighteenth century: the case of the Greek subjects of Venice», *Mediterranean Historical Review* 25/1 (2010), pp. 67-81.

5. Gerassimos Pagkratis, «Η Επτανησιακή παροικία της Σμύρνης στις αρχές του 19^{ου} αιώνα (1800-1807)» [The Ionian Community of Smyrna in the Beginning of the 19th Century], *Επετηρίδα της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών*, 36 (2004-05), pp. 223-255; Idem, “From the Septinsular Republic to the “White Sea”. Ionian Shipping in the Port of Smyrna (1800-1807)”, *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 19/2 (2010), pp. 335-350.

B) That Kefalonians represented the majority of Ionian ship-owners is also documented. Throughout the eighteenth century and up until the first seven years of the nineteenth the Kefalonians accounted for two thirds of all Ionian captains. Their recognizability, inevitably, had an international dimension, and not always a positive one. They had a distinct reputation for involvement in various violent incidents in the seas and ports of the Eastern Mediterranean.

As an example we refer to the specific role of seafarers from Kefalonia, who with the assistance of Zakynthians and Dalmatians provoked the famous Janissarian rebellion in Smyrna the spring of 1797. In this incident, which began with the murder of a Janissary (most likely at the hands of two Kefalonians, Matthew and Petros Panas), the Christian quarter of Smyrna was burned by the Janissaries causing over 1,500 deaths. For the seafarers the negative impact of this was the Sultan's firman on May 15 1797 that banned seamen of Venice, claiming that those who came from Kefalonia, Zakynthos, Corfu and Dalmatia should disembark in Ottoman ports only with a good reason, and even then always unarmed⁶.

For the Ionians this ban had no particular significance. Three days before its implementation, Bonaparte's troops marched into the square of San Marco, putting an end to the State of the perpetrators of the rebellion. Gradually, international conjuncture would change as well. Russians and Ottomans would come closer together, agreeing on the establishment of the Ionian state.

Although the Ionian State in its final phase of existence was similar to something that an American scholar in 1965 called "Russia's first satellite in the Balkans"⁷, the Sultan's role in its organization and administration counted as much as the Tsar's. Equally crucial were the concessions that the two forces would make in the trade and economy of the islands, both on land and sea. Specifically, the treaty establishing the Septinsular Republic on March 21, 1800, as well as the so-called *diploma*, added to the treaty a few months later by the Sultan, established a similar to the Ragusans treatment for

6. Richard Clogg, "The Smyrna 'Rebellion' of 1797: Some documents from the British Archives", *Δελτίον Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών* 3 (1982), pp. 71-125.


7. James McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The genesis of Russia's first Balkan Satellite*, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin 1965.

the Republic's inhabitants. Thus the Ionians would be exempt from the poll tax collected from non-Muslim subjects, they would pay reduced customs duties when trading in Ottoman ports, and they would enjoy freedom of choice in their daily lives when they found themselves in Ottoman territory.

A careful study of these terms shows that they essentially reproduce applicable articles on capitulations that the Sultan had given to the English, Venetians, French and Dutch. Even if this escaped our attention, it would suffice to study reports of A. Lefkokilos regarding the Ionian Senate for the *diploma*, in which the word *diploma* is interchangeable with the word *capitulazione*. In other words, the *imperial diploma* in fact played the role of a new treaty that replaced the agreements that the Ionians, former subjects of Venice, had received from the Sultan by way of the Venetians⁸.

With this choice the sultan not only reinforced Ionian subordination to the Porte relative to what was foreseen in the establishing treaty of the Ionian state in 1800, but also showed a positive symbolic and institutional attitude thinking of the Ionians as "heirs" to the Venetians. This instance confirms the representative symbol of the Ionian state.

Image 1: The emblem of the Septinsular Republic (1800-1807)



8. Gerassimos D. Pagratis, «Lo status giuridico degli ex sudditi Veneti nell'Impero Ottomano tra la fine del Settecento e il primo decennio successivo al crollo della Serenissima», in Cristian Luca-Gianluca Masi (eds.), *La storia di un ri-conoscimento: i rapporti tra l' Europa Centro-Orientale e la Penisola italiana dal Rinascimento all'Età dei Lumi* (Braila-Udine: Muzeul Brailei-Istros Editrice-Campanotto Editore, 2012), pp. 411-429.

The committee that from November of 1799 negotiated the final form of the Ionian flag, decided on the adoption of the Venetian lion with a blue background, with some significant changes. The characteristic symbols of the Catholic Church, present on the lion of St. Mark, were absent. Seven arrows symbolized the unity of the islands into one administrative unit. The year of establishment was marked on the upper left corner of the flag during the year of Hijra (1214=1800). Finally, a red border was placed on the flag, indicating that finally the Venetian lion, or rather its legacy, was in Ottoman hands.

Especially for people in sea trade, beyond the protection offered by Russia to the Greeks since the era of Catherine the Great, a firman by the Sultan had special significance, since it aimed to protect them from the Barbary corsairs. The power of the firman is shown in the Genoese and Neapolitan practice of selling their ships falsely so as to gain the right to fly the Ionian flag. In this way the captains of these two states, which had hostile relations to the Barbary corsairs, obtained a buffer of protection from the corsair attacks⁹.

Another Ionian privilege is not well known. We know that the Ionians in the first years of their state's existence had the possibility of raising the Russian flag, as did other Christian ships, while they were always treated as Russian, even when the use of the Ionian flag was fully formalized. Beyond this, with the Sultan's permission, the Ionians could legally raise the Ottoman flag and travel as if their vessels were Ottoman.

Having developed a web of protection covering them from significant dangers lurking in the Mediterranean seas that period –Ottoman, Russian, Berbers – the Ionians amassed a trade fleet that reached unprecedented numbers in the area.

9. Gerassimos D. Pagratis, «I Consolati della Repubblica Settinsulare (1800-1807) in Sicilia», in Michela d'Angelo-Gelina Harlaftis-Carmel Vassallo (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2nd Mediterranean Maritime History Network Conference, Messina-Taormina (4-7 May 2006)*, (Messina: Istituto di Studi Storici "Gaetano Salvemini, 2010), pp. 419-432.


Table 1: Merchant Fleet of the Septinsular Republic

capacity (ton.)	number of ships	%
20-100	185	41.95
101-200	193	43.7
201-300	54	12.2
301-450	9	2
TOTAL	441	100

Thus, in a period of seven years 441 licenses were granted to seagoing ships capable of sailing across the Mediterranean, with an average carrying capacity of 129 tons per unit.

The geography of the Ionian trade during this period is a clear indication of the changes that had occurred since the eighteenth century. The ports along the coastline of Constantinople until Cyprus and Alexandria were the destinations or starting point of almost 2/3 of the trips taken by Ionian vessels. So it would not be inappropriate to claim that the conditions that led to the founding of the Ionian state acted as a strong commitment to Ionian captains, indicating the region in which they should be active.

Map 1: Geography of the ionian maritime trade



The above mentioned considerations and especially the role played by the Ottoman Empire and its capital for the Ionians corroborate a series of quantitative data found in Ionian archives: the moment that Gerassimos Kontogouris raised the flag of the Ionian state before the Sultan's kiosk in Sarai, he was surrounded by four other ships that did the same and some other ships, whose total number is unclear, flying the Russian flag. After the closing of the ceremony Lefkokilos welcomed 60 Ionians to his home. Eighteen of them would remain for lunch. They were all captains and merchants.

That year, in 1801, 51 Ionian ships flying the Russian flag were chartered by the Porte to carry loads from the Black Sea to Constantinople. These vessels were free from the consular rights¹⁰.

Lefkokoilos provided a total of 335 temporary permits for shipping trade (called *passavanti*) to the Ionian captains. 269 concerned travel to or from Ottoman ports, while 199 of these permits had been given for travel to and from Constantinople. (39).

To understand the size or dimensions of the Septinsular Republic's maritime activities in the Black Sea in relation to how important the Ionian merchant fleet was, a comparative perspective is necessary: in 1803, in a record of the ships arriving at the ports of southern Russia, the fleet flying Ionian flags occupied the fourth place, after those of the Ottoman Empire, Austria and Russia and before the French and British fleets¹¹.

From another perspective, the perspective of the reports from the Ionian consulates in the Black Sea, it is evident that in their travels to the Black Sea the Ionians exported their islands' agricultural produce to markets that showed interest in their products: wine, oil, raisins, salt.

Contrarily, on the return journey the vast majority of these ships loaded wheat on board in Odessa headed to Constantinople. But in reality only one in three ships had the Ottoman capital as its final destination. The rest were headed to Livorno, the storage warehouse of British in the Mediterranean. However, even those ships

10. General State Archives of Corfu, Septinsular Republic, v. 52, no. 39.

11. Norman Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1798-1807* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

headed to Livorno would make a stopover in Constantinople, during which they would leave a portion of their cargo. In this manner the Ionians ensured the supply of Constantinople, and, to a much lesser extent, their homelands.

From a business point of view these policies were largely reminiscent of what was happening during the peak years of Venice's prosperity. Then Ionian ships in Venice loaded wheat and other grains and raw materials on western coasts of Epirus and Peloponnese and transported a small amount to their own lands, and the lions share to Venice. The difference is that, in addition to the state encouragement towards participation in foreign trade, Constantinople had now taken Venice's place and constituted the main administrative point of reference for the Ionians.

In conclusion, everything mentioned above reflects the incentives Ottomans and Russians had in the management of the political and economic affairs of the Ionian Islands. By extension, they suggest the compromise upon which the Ionian state was founded, as well as on a more practical level the role played by Ionian shipping merchants.

On a political level, for the Russians the Ionian State was their first territorial possession in the Mediterranean and their fleet one of the means of commercializing grain production in southern Russia and serving the consumptive needs of its residents. The Ionian State had political symbolism and economic value for the Sultan as well. In fact it represented the integration of the Venetian lion into the Ottoman political system. The granting of a series of privileges to Ionian traders was designed to form yet another group of traders and captains that recognized his sovereignty and in return enjoyed preferential conditions of trade on the Ottoman seas. The result of their actions was to serve the needs of food and raw materials for the cities of New Russia and Constantinople, as well as the interests of the Russian grain producers, of merchants and captains of the Ionian State, and lastly of the British traders of Livorno, who received the main portion of these cargos.

3.

Parallel lives: Greek shipping and the port of Istanbul

*Christos Hadziiossif**

The most important hub of the maritime trade in the Black Sea during the nineteenth century lay just outside this sea basin, in the harbor of Istanbul. All merchant vessels coming from the Mediterranean bound for some Black Sea port had to call at Istanbul to accomplish the formalities required by the Ottoman administration, before letting them to proceed into the strait of Bosphorus. According to a British consul, Istanbul was the “turnpike” of the Black Sea. Generally, the captains profited from this stop by taking the opportunity to complete their supplies and to make arrangements for their further course. If we add to this transit movement the ships coming to supply the largest urban center of the day after Naples in Italy in terms of population, we can see that Istanbul was the most important hub of maritime traffic in the Mediterranean.¹ For the historian Istanbul is an excellent observation point from which to follow the changes that took place in shipping during the long nineteenth century.

For Greek shipping the importance of Istanbul was even greater than for other merchant fleets, and this for two reasons. The first is that the transportation of cereals from the Black Sea was by far the most important occupation of the Greek shipping industry².

* Institute for Mediterranean Studies –Foundation for Research & Technology Hellas, Rethymno. This chapter is a preliminary report of an ongoing research. I wish to thank here my colleagues Dr.A.Delis and Ph.D. candidate G.Gassias for their support.

1.This chapter is a preliminary report of an ongoing research. I wish to thank here my colleagues Dr.A.Delis and Ph.D. candidate G.Gassias for their support. See the population data in Brian R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750 – 1975*, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 86 - 89

2. Christos Hadziiossif, “La marine marchande grecque et les mutations du

The second reason is that Istanbul was home of the largest Greek population of the day. According to the population data compiled by Kemal Karpat, in 1844 the total population of the city including the boroughs of Galata, Beşiktaş and Üsküdar, came to 213,693 people. Some 45,780 of them were Greek³. Even if we take into account the fact that the Ottoman documents counted the subjects of the empire according to their religious faith, and thus the term Greek (Rum) included all Greek – Orthodox people and not only the ethnic Greeks, there is a high probability that more Greeks lived in Istanbul than in the most populous town of the Hellenic Kingdom. Athens, the capital, broke the glass ceiling of 40,000 inhabitants only in the early 1860s⁴. This means that the Greek maritime community in Istanbul possessed a social depth that went beyond the professionals (merchants and their employees, chandlers, money-lenders, brokers, insurance agents etc.) who were directly involved in the maritime businesses. This social environment was at the same time both Greek in ethnic terms and Ottoman from the institutional and economic point of view. The encounter of the Greek merchant fleet, sailing under the flag of the new Hellenic Kingdom and operating according to legislation inspired by Western European, and more precisely French models, with the Ottoman realities is characteristic of the gradual disengagement of the economy of the new Greek state from its Ottoman environment. The acceptance by the European powers of the Greek independence in 1830 and the arrival of the first King in 1833 certainly constitute a break on the political level. The shipping sector was organized along new lines, but its external environment, i.e. the markets, the customs and the people, had remained the same as before the independence. This is obvious in the case of Hermoupolis on the island of Syros, where most of the Greek merchant vessels were registered. The founders of Hermoupolis sought to create a modern city out of which they

commerce des céréales XVIIIe – XXe siècles”, in Klaus Friedland (ed.), *Maritime Food Transport*, (Cologne, Weimar, Wien: 1994), pp. 233 - 244

3. Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830 – 1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 203

4. Γραφείον Δημοσίας Οικονομίας, *Στατιστική της Ελλάδος. Πληθυσμός του έτους 1861* [Bureau of Public Economy, *Statistics of Greece. Population of the Year 1861*], (Athens: 1862), pp. 84 – 85.

could continue to supply their traditional markets in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the novelty of Hermoupolis served to maintain the old ties. As late as in 1864, two-thirds of the ships sailing from a Greek port were bound for an Ottoman one⁵. In this period, the Ottoman Empire still ranked second among the commercial partners of the Hellenic Kingdom, after Great Britain⁶. This antinomy suggests that the break of the 1830s, which is currently adopted in the histories of Greek shipping, was indeed less thorough than is generally thought.

The Bureau of Commerce of the Hellenic Embassy in Constantinople is characteristic for the entanglement of the new Hellenic realities with the old Ottomans structures. The Bureau of Commerce was established in 1834 along the lines of similar offices operating inside the Istanbul Embassies of the main maritime nations of that time. However, the institutionalization of Greek-Ottoman commercial exchanges proved to be a very delicate enterprise. During the negotiations for the conclusion of the first treaty of navigation and commerce between the two countries, the Greek side requested all the privileges conceded by the capitulations regime to the European powers. This was too big a demand for the Ottoman government to swallow, because, unlike the other European countries which had a limited number of citizens in the Empire, the subjects of the Hellenic kingdom were numerous and deeply enrooted in the Ottoman world. For instance, numerous artisans, members of the different Ottoman guilds, became from one day to the next Hellenic citizens. From the Ottoman point of view, membership of the guilds was incompatible with the fiscal exemptions claimed by the Greek side. Moreover, it appears that in the upper echelons of the Ottoman power apparatus there was a widespread reluctance to recognize the former provinces of the empire as a legitimate state. It is therefore not surprising that the first ambassador sent by the Greek government to Istanbul in 1833, Konstantinos Zografos, had to wait for four years before he was permitted to present his credentials to the Sultan. In May 1840, Zografos signed the first treaty of navigation

5. A. Mansolas, *Πολιτειγραφικαί πληροφορίες περί Ελλάδος*, [Statistical information about Greece], (Athens: ek tou ethnικού typographeiou, 1867), p. 203.

6. Ibid. pp. 182 - 183

and commerce between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, but the agreement was rejected in Greece both by public opinion and the cabinet for allegedly including excessive concessions to the Ottoman side. Eventually, the first trade treaty between the two countries was ratified during the Crimean War in 1855⁷.

Despite the diplomatic stalemate, the commercial intercourse between the two countries was expanding and the Greek Bureau of Commerce fulfilled all its duties as if it was officially recognized. Its main mission was to accomplish on behalf of the Greek ships all the formalities required by the Ottoman authorities. The Bureau collected the various dues and fees from the agents of the vessels and paid them to the Ottoman offices. The list of these dues is quite long and their names reminiscent of the times when the Black Sea was an Ottoman lake and the control exercised by the empire on the straits was effective.

Table I: List of dues paid by vessels frequenting
the port of Istanbul in 1864

Anchorage dues
Firman fee if bound to the Black Sea
Firman fee if bound to the Mediterranean
Health Office fee
Kavak fee if bound to the Black Sea
Turkish bill of health if bound to an Ottoman port
Light dues for vessels arriving from the Mediterranean and discharging or receiving cargo at Istanbul and vice versa
Light dues for vessels sailing from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea in ballast
Light dues for vessels sailing from Istanbul to the Black Sea and v.v.

Source: *Foreign Office, Annual Series: Report of the British Consul – General on the Trade and Commerce of Constantinople for the year 1864/Constantinople 30 June 1865*

7. Edouard Driault, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, v.2, (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France. 1925), pp. 112-115, 145, 199, 406.

The Greek ships had to pay an additional duty collected from the Bureau of Commerce and used to support the Greek Hospital of Constantinople, the so-called Hospital of the Nation. The Bureau paid to the Hospital a subsidy initially fixed to 80 drachmas per month and gradually raised to 200 drachmas. The Hospital was established and administered by the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate to cater principally for the local congregation of the Church. To denote the Nation the Church used the old term of gens, γένος in Greek. In 1855, in a letter to the Greek envoy in Istanbul the Director of the Hospital described the mission of his establishment in the following terms: "In the so called Hospital of the Nation our compatriots from the free Greece suffering from incurable, chronic or light diseases are treated together with the entire Greek tribe...in the same establishment we place the women we want to save from depravity as well as the youngsters without protectors of whom we assume the moral education..."⁸. In other Mediterranean ports too, the establishment of Greek Hospitals was tied to the development of Greek shipping. In Alexandria, the increasing number of Greek-owned ships calling at this port meant that the hospital had to be transferred from the Monastery of Saint Sava to new premises in 1817 in order to accommodate the rising number of seamen. After Greek independence, a Royal Decree of 1834 fixed the dues the Greek ships had to pay for the hospital⁹. The British too possessed a hospital for seamen in Istanbul. In his report for the year 1892 the acting Consul-General Wrench noted that "ship-owners in England may be glad to hear, too, that it has been decided to devote the surplus funds accruing to the British seamen's hospital here to purchasing a new site and building a new hospital more worthy of the nation"¹⁰. The subsidies to the Hospital represented one part of the money collected by the Bureau of Commerce. The rest served to support needy Greeks in situ or to pay for their repatriation. The hospital dues charged by the Bureau amounted to 1 drachma for vessels under 30 tons, 1.5 drachmas for vessels from 31 to 100 tons,

8. Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs(AGMFA) file 59,1/1855, Pera 29.7.1855.

9. Christos Hadziiossif, *La colonie grecque d' Egypte, 1833 – 1856*, thèse de doctorat de 3ème cycle, Université Paris IV, 1980.

10. Foreign Office, Annual Series N° 1224, Constantinople April 24, 1893.

and 2.5 drachmas for vessels exceeding 100 tons of burthen.¹¹

The Bureau of Commerce also performed the judicial and notarial duties of a consulate. Every year several hundreds notarial deeds were drawn up in the Bureau. Next to dowry agreements, sales of real estate in Greece, loans, etc. the Bureau also registered a great number of private transactions concerning ships. We know the exact number of these private agreements for the year 1857: 98 sales of ships, 1 constitution of ownership of a vessel, 36 new maritime loans and 26 reimbursements of previous maritime loans¹². This means that at least one out of twelve ships under Greek flag were bought in Istanbul, whose money market was during the nineteenth century an important source of capital for the Greek merchant shipping. It was in the same city that two of the first cargo steamers ever registered under Greek flag were bought, second hand, in the year 1869. The first was bought by Katinakis, a businessman coming from the island of Chios, and she set sail for Hermoupolis in the island of Syros, and the second was bought by Syrigos, a ship-owner from the island of Santorini, and she sailed directly to the Danubian ports to charge grain¹³.

Among the judicial functions of the Bureau two were particularly delicate. The consul-director of the Bureau and his harbor-master had to resolve the labor disputes arising between captains and seamen by applying the customary laws of the sea. The second mission was fulfilled by a special officer, whose duty was to arbitrate the quarrels that arose among the numerous immigrants from the Aegean islands under Hellenic sovereignty, who tried to make a living in Istanbul. The officer of the "Aegean Sea" (*του αιγαίου πελάγους*), as this functionary was called, applied the customary laws of the insular communities the immigrants came from. The departure in these cases from the new Greek legal system was justified by the fact that many immigrants were Roman Catholics.

The multiplicity of the duties of the Bureau of Commerce asked for a considerable number of employees in order to fulfill them. The

11. AGMFA, file 59,1/1837, file 59,1/1847 Constantinople 1/13.4. 1847.

12. AGMA, file 59,1/1858 Table of the notarial deeds established in the Bureau of Commerce of the Greek Embassy in Constantinople during the year 1857.

13. AGMA, file 59, 1/1869 Ministry of Maritime Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens 8.7.1869.

Bureau was the most populous office of the Hellenic Embassy in Istanbul and its personnel increased with the growth of the Greek shipping traffic in this port. In 1836 the Hellenic Embassy employed fewer than ten people in all. Twenty years later the embassy had three sections with a total personnel of twenty-eight people. The ambassador was at the head of these sections which otherwise operated separately. In the diplomatic section the ambassador was assisted by two secretaries and one usher. The translation section was served by three dragomans, three apprentices plus one guardian. The Bureau of Commerce headed by a consul-director was the more populous service of the embassy. It comprised one cashier, four secretaries, one overseer, three scribes, one harbor master, two guardians, one door keeper, and two ushers¹⁴.

The inflated personnel numbers are certainly a consequence of the tendency for the bureaucratization of the state apparatus. This interpretation is corroborated by the introduction of modern accounting standards and the control exercised occasionally on the Bureau by the *Cour des Comptes* of Greece. However, in this aspect too, modernity coexisted with tradition. The choice of the consul-director of the Bureau lay in the discretionary power of the government. Generally, the person chosen combined the competence of a member of the judiciary with the connections of a native of the Aegean islands. As for the harbor masters, they were scions of former sea-fighters of the Greek Revolution. Andreas Miaoulis, a grandson of the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary navy, held the post in the 1850s and in the 1860s. He had succeeded A. Tetsis and Kriezis who were both natives of the island of Hydra. When Miaoulis resigned for health reasons in 1869, among the seven people who applied for the vacant position were three Hydriots and two Ipsariots, scions of illustrious families¹⁵. Eventually, the cabinet named a candidate from Mani, showing that the progress of the bureaucratization was accompanied by the patronage proper to the parliamentary system. A Greek Orthodox priest in the 1840s was characteristic for some self-appointed middlemen, who gravitated around the Bureau in the hope of being rewarded by the

14. AGMFA file 31,1a/1856

15. AGMFA file 59,1/1869 Constantinople 8.7.1869.

people whose business they took care of. Their presence spoke of corruption inside the office. Bribes are documented for one dragoon, whereas the accusations of embezzlement of funds against some directors of the Bureau were periodically raised without being always proved by the inquiries ordered by the central administration in Athens.

Inflated numbers of personnel and occasional corruption does not mean that the Bureau of Commerce was a burden for the Greek budget. Indeed, the opposite was the case. Until the 1860s the revenue of the Bureau covered all the expenses of the embassy and left a small surplus. During the first semester of 1836 the revenue of the Bureau amounted to 22,651 drachmas and the expenses to 19,427 drachmas. In 1851 the revenue of the Bureau rose to 178,125 drachmas and the payments to 172,996 drachmas. In 1857 the receipts reached 219,341 drachmas and the payments 236,138 drachmas. The accounts for the same year show that the Bureau accepted deposits for 93,402 drachmas, whereas it returned to their owners deposits amounting to 82,310 drachmas. From the 22.4.1865 until the end of that year the Bureau received 312,052 drachmas and paid out 237,475 drachmas¹⁶.

The steadily rising number of ships under Greek flag calling at the port of Istanbul is the main reason for the surpluses. In 1849 the accounts of the Bureau show that 2,396 Greek vessels called at the port of Istanbul, in 1852 their number rose to 3,118 and in 1860 the consul at the head of the Bureau claimed in a report 5,500 ships a year¹⁷. If we take into account that in 1852 there was a total of 1,375 sailing ships under the Greek flag carrying more than 30 tons¹⁸ of burthen, then we can assume that several Greek ships called at the port of Istanbul many times during the same year. Greek shipping's great competitors in Istanbul were the Italian ships sailing under the flags of the various Italian states. After the unification of Italy, the Greeks trailed behind the Italians for

16. AGMFA files: 59,1/1836; without register number/1852; 59,1/1858; 59,1/1866

17. AGMFA files: 59,1/ 1854 Report of the Cour des Comptes, Athens 12.10.1854; 59,1/1853. Constantinople 4.5.1853; 59,1/ 1860.

18. Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day*, (London: Routledge, 1996), Appendix 4.1, p.351.

some years. Eventually, the Greek ships recaptured the first rank in the port movement after the Union of the Ionian islands with the Kingdom of Greece in 1864.

Table II: Number and Tonnage of Ships
entered the port of Istanbul

	1861		1862		1863		1864	
Flag	vessels	tonnage	vessels	tonnage	vessels	tonnage	vessels	tonnage
British	1,323	442,085	1,345	465,395	1,230	434,568	1,007	571,344
Ottoman	3,690	360,612	9,129	458,502	9,901	430,458	12,504	635,502
Italian	2,028	621,469	2,040	626,400	2,056	576,000	2,280	643,410
Greek	3,210	527,131	3,358	568,510	3,394	579,796	4,628	755,846

Source: *Foreign Office, Annual Reports, Report by Mr. Consul – General Logis on the Trade and Commerce of Constantinople for the Year 1864, Constantinople, 30th June, 1865*

The second reason for the surpluses in the balance sheets of the Bureau of Commerce was the difference between the amounts collected by the Bureau from the Greek ships and the sums it restituted to the Ottoman authorities for the dues of anchorage, firmans etc. The price of the firmans paid by the Greek ships in order to be allowed to pass through the straits was unilaterally fixed by the Bureau at a higher level than the amount asked by the Ottomans. The difference increased further because the Bureau had fixed the amount of the dues in drachmas and paid the port authorities in piasters, thus profiting from the devaluation of the Turkish currency.

The Ottoman treasury was not the only local player that profited from the maritime movement. 15,000 or 20,000 vessels a year manned by at least 50,000 seamen created additional demands on the local market. Shipping stores and grocers profited most from this demand and, alongside them, inns, brothels and all the other trades intrinsic to great ports. The head of the Greek Bureau of Commerce twice asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens to

be allowed to move the offices to another building because the existing one was “near to taverns, stinking workshops, infamous inns”. Some 20,000 of the foreign mariners roaming in Istanbul belonged to the crews of the Greek sailing ships. Their number was equal to 50% of the Greek- Orthodox population of the Ottoman capital. They were particularly connected with some trades exercised by Greek-Orthodox subjects of the Sublime Porte. The sellers of salted fish, the *havyaracı*, together with a subdivision of grocers specialized in supplying the ships with foodstuffs, but also with varnishes and paints, pitch, ropes and other goods necessary for the navigation, maintained close relations with the Greek captains. These relations explain the, at first sight, surprising inclusion of the names of 36 captains from the maritime town of Galaxeidi in the gulf of Corinth among the subscribers of a book on the history of Synasos, a small town in the province of Kayseri in Anatolia, written in Istanbul and published in Athens. The Rums of Synasos, to whom the author of the book belonged, were overrepresented in the guild of the *havyaracı* and in the ship-stores of the Ottoman capital¹⁹.

The number of Greek sailing ships and their tonnage remained at high levels, but their importance in the total traffic of Istanbul's harbor declined after the 1860s. In 1879 some 3,511 Greek sailing vessels with a total capacity of 684,415 tons entered the harbor of Istanbul. In absolute terms, these numbers are comparable with those of the 1860s; however, in the meantime, the commercial fleets of other nations, especially the British, had grown more rapidly. At the end of the 1870s, the British fleet in Istanbul was predominantly composed of steamers. In 1879, some 3,103 British steamers with a total capacity of 2,576,335 tons representing 42.57% of the total movement entered the harbor of Istanbul, whereas the Greek sailing vessels accounted only for 11.32%. These figures do not include the coastal shipping and the mail steamers calling regularly at Istanbul. British supremacy in the movement of the steamers became overwhelming in the 1890s. In 1893 the tonnage of the British steam-

19. Rizos Eleftheriadis, *Συνασός : Ήτοι μελέτη επί των ηθών και εθίμων αυτής* [Synasos, i.e. Treatise on the Manners and Customs of it], (Athens: typois Hellinikis Anexartias, 1879); see more in Christos Hadziiossif, *Συνασός. Ιστορία ενός τόπου χωρίς ιστορία*, [Synasos. History of a Place without History], (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2005), chapter 6, “η οικονομία”.

ers accounted for 75 percent of the total and it remained above 60 percent until the end of the century²⁰.

The available statistics show that the total number of Greek sailing vessels remained relatively stable, but this stability conceals the dramatic deterioration of the profitability of the shipping ventures and it is more precise to speak of stagnation rather than of stability. In his annual report for the year 1870, the British Consul- General in Constantinople cited some of the deleterious effects on the sailing vessels of the progress of the steamers: “ it is a melancholy thing to see fine and large brigs and barques laying for months in the Bosphorus finding it impossible to obtain remunerable charters.” The ship-owners tried to react to the falling freights by cutting labor costs and as a consequence the quality of the services offered by the British ships declined: “...it is true that British sailors are deteriorating, the British ships are now very largely manned by foreigners, that the character of British ships and seamen is not so high as formerly”²¹.

The British consul expected that the Greek, Italian and Austrian sailing ships having lower labor costs could resist the competition of the steamers for longer. However, symptoms of crisis were discernible in the Greek shipping too. The pressure of the diminishing profit margins had pushed ship-owners and masters to ask the Greek Government to lower some navigation taxes. This was granted by law in the summer of 1860. As a result the revenue of the Bureau of Commerce fell and it could no more cover the expenses of the Embassy. In the following years the Embassy and the Bureau asked repeatedly the central administration to send them additional funds²². In 1864 the Bureau was even forced to borrow 40,000 drachmas on the local market and it had long suspended the monthly allowance to the Hospital, owing it 9,000 drachmas²³. The improvement of the financial situation of the Bureau during the year 1865 seems to have been short lived, as from the next year

20. Foreign Office, Annual Series, Constantinople July 9, 1880 ; Foreign Office, Annual Series N° 2650, Received at Foreign Office, May 15, 1901.

21. Foreign Office, Annual Series, Report by Consul – General sir P. Francis on the Commerce and Trade of Constantinople for the Year 1870.

22. AGMFA files: 59,1/1861 Pera 25.12.1861; 59,1/1862 Constantinople 3.1.1862, 59,1/1863 Constantinople 28.12.1862.

23. AGMFA file 59,1/ 1864 Constantinople 19.3.1864.

the complaints regarding the dire financial situation of the Embassy and the Bureau resumed. The correspondence between the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on masters firing their sailors and abandoning them penniless in Istanbul is an additional sign of the problems of the merchant shipping at that time²⁴. Under these circumstances, the establishment of NAT, the Greek Mariners Pension Fund in 1861, was not a proof of vigor, but rather the result of the rising difficulties in the sector²⁵. In any case, the importance of the Pension Fund for the maritime community increased. It is therefore not surprising that in November 1869 the mayor of Hydra and many masters from that island criticized the management of the NAT and demanded reforms. Their demands kicked off a public debate which lasted several months in the Greek Parliament and in the newspapers²⁶.

The available evidence does not allow us to evaluate the effects of the structural changes in international shipping on the market of Istanbul. The passage from the sail to the steam in navigation furthered the process of specialization in the trade of the ship stores as the steamships needed special, industrially produced items. So some former grocers evolved into specialized ship-chandlers and others turned to the production of paints and varnishes for ships. New trades exclusively devoted to the service of steamships appeared. Particularly prosperous was the operation of steam tugs and the coal trade, both businesses being firmly in British hands. Overall, the passage from sail to steam favored British shipping and other business from the United Kingdom. So whereas in the early 1860s British ships represented less than 20 per cent of the total tonnage in the port of Istanbul, by the end of the following decade British steamers accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total. As was the case in other Mediterranean ports and industrial towns, British mechanics and foremen were also reported to have worked in the Arsenal of Istanbul²⁷.

24. AGMFA file 58,1b/1867 Athens 24.5.1867.

25. The NAT was established by law XΛΘ'(639)/1861.

26. See aspects of this debate in *Refutation of the Answer of the President of NAT G. Zochios to the Petition addressed to the Parliament by the Masters of Hydra*, Athens 1870 (in Greek)

27. Foreign Office, Annual Series, Report by Consul – General sir P. Francis

In the merchant fleets of the Mediterranean nations the passage from sail to steam proceeded more slowly. In 1878, when the 58 Greek steamers cleared from the port of Istanbul accounted for 0.49 per cent of the total tonnage, no one could foresee that by the beginning of the twentieth century Greek steamers would hold the second place behind the British and well before Italian and Austro-Hungarian shipping, which ranked in third and fourth place.²⁸ Paradoxically, the rise of Greek shipping reflected its relative weakness. The British had deserted the transport of grain from the Black Sea, turning to the more profitable trade with the Americas. This move followed the reorientation of the grain imports into the United Kingdom from Southern Russia toward the Americas.

Table III: Quantity of Wheat Imported
into the United Kingdom

From	1895	1899
Atlantic ports of America	14,006,430 Cwts	28,315,948 Cwts
Southern Russia	13,185,307 Cwts	7,739,530 Cwts

Source: *Foreign Office, Annual Series, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, N° 2650, Turkey Report for the Years 1899 - 1900*

The number and the tonnage of British ships in Constantinople would have been even be lower if it were not for the cargos of oil from the Black Sea. The first tankers were an almost exclusively British business. The Greek ship-owners rushed into the void left by the British in the transportation of grain. According to the British consul, the grain trade from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean was carried by vessels of 500 to 1,500 tons net registered tonnage.

on the Commerce and Trade of Constantinople for the Year 1870, Constantinople September 2, 1871.

28. Foreign Office, Annual Series, Diplomatic and Consular Reports N° 3140, *Report on the Trade of Constantinople and its District for the Year 1903*, Movement of Shipping at the Port of Constantinople exceeding Sailing and Small Coasting Vessels.

Indeed, in 1903 the average tonnage of the Greek steamers was 1,000, or 1,625 tons depending on the mode of measurement²⁹. The older, generally second-hand Greek ships were ill suited to crossing the Atlantic and, moreover, their owners lacked the backing of old commercial networks such as those existing in the Black Sea ports. These commercial networks financed the purchase of the steamers, helping a few chosen old masters of sailing ships to become modern ship-owners. Gradually a joint stock bank, the Bank of Athens, concentrated the largest part of the outstanding loans to Greek ship-owners. Extending maritime loans constituted the core business of its Istanbul branch. In 1909 on the balance sheet of The Bank of Athens appear 26 mortgage loans on steamers for a total of 4,463,961.76 drachmas.³⁰ In reality, these sums were the remainders of previous operations, because in 1907 the Bank had ceased to extend maritime loans. If we take into account that between 1900 and 1909 the number of Greek steamers increased from 191 to 287, then the contribution of the Bank of Athens and of the Greek merchant bankers in Istanbul to the growth of Greek shipping must have been overwhelming.

Technological progress in shipping induced structural changes in maritime business. Everywhere, the passage from sail to steam caused a concentration of capital. Thus the 200 Greek steamers around 1900 had the same aggregate tonnage than 1,000 brigs, the standard type of Greek sailing vessel. Great incorporated banks replaced the merchants in the financial support of shipping. At the same time, the concentration of capital proceeded across national borders. In the nineteenth century, the majority of the sailing vessels entering the harbor of Istanbul had been built in their respective national shipyards. In contrast, the majority of the steamers of the early twentieth century were built in Britain. The shipyards of Hermoupolis in Syros, the largest in Greece, became marginalized and were downgraded to mere repair facilities. In Piraeus the policy of the ship-owners to buy cheap second hand vessels had the same

29. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping*, Appendix 4.1.

30. Christos Hadziiosif, "Banques grecques et banques européennes au XIXème siècle: le point de vue d' Alexandrie", in Georges B. Dertilis, (ed.), *Banquiers, usuriers et paysans. Réseaux de crédit et stratégies du capital en Grèce (1780 – 1930)*, (Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 1988), pp. 196, 276.

effect on the two great engineering firms of this port, Vassileiadis and McDowall & Barbour. At the same time the development of the Greek steam shipping attracted in Pireaus new service businesses. Characteristic for this tendency was the establishment in Pireaus in 1906 of the ship Chandler John Lazopoulos & Co, a member of the Greek-Orthodox group of traders from the Anatolian town of Synasos specializing in supplies for ships in Istanbul. The port of the Greek capital became a direct competitor of Istanbul as a bunkering port too. Already in the early 1890s, London coal traders in association with Greek ship-owners established a bunkering facility in the port of the island Kea (Zea), on the route from the straits to the Mediterranean³¹.

In Istanbul the technological change resulted in a series of public works aiming at improving the port facilities. Modern quays constructed and operated by a foreign company had ready existed in 1895 on both sides of the entrance to the Golden Horn. The new installations alleviated the chronic congestion of the Istanbul port, the cause of many accidents and delays in the past. At the same time, efforts were undertaken by the Quays Company to build new warehouses, but these stopped short before establishing the bonded warehouses demanded by foreign traders. In the long run, the improvements in steam shipping represented a threat for the port of Istanbul as steamers were able to pass easier and hence more quickly the straits than the sails, and they could therefore spare themselves the stop at Istanbul. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that from the 1890s the attention both of the Ottoman government and the foreign observers turned to the railroads. Railroads served both a strategic and an economic goal. They would facilitate the transfer of troops across the Empire and give access to the export markets to hitherto isolated provinces with great agricultural potential. German involvement in the Anatolian railway, which once completed would circumvent the British control of the seas, made this project the object of particular diplomatic attention. In one sense the Anatolian railway reversed the hierarchy between ports and railroad. The previous railroad projects aimed at connecting

31. Foreign Office, Annual Series N° 2650, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, *Report for the years 1899 – 1900 on the Trade of Constantinople*.

the hinterland with existing ports. The Anatolian railroad called for the development of new ports to handle the produce of the provinces made accessible through the new line. In the Istanbul area the quay on the south shore of the Golden Horne was constructed in order to serve the existing Sirkeci railroad station. On the contrary, the new port installations at Haydar Paşa were constructed to serve the projected terminal of the Anatolian railroad³². Despite the fact that the project of the Anatolian railroad was conceded to a foreign private consortium like all major public works in the recent past, its finality reveals a gradual shift in public economic policy toward a more outspoken developmental agenda and a greater role of “national” capital. Already in 1901, the British consul described the change in the economic policy of the Ottoman authorities in the following terms:

*“There has been a growing desire of the part of the Turkish Government to curtail the privileges of the foreign trading communities, and this finds expression in the continual promulgation of new regulations, on the model of those in force in more civilized countries, but without any attempt to assimilate their application to the practice of those countries. The condition of Turkey at the present may be described by saying that she is going through the transition period between tutelage and emancipation, and is laboring under double disadvantages in consequence.”*³³.

The trend toward a new way of cooperation between private interests and the state influenced also the foreigners doing business in Istanbul. Thus, alongside the consulates emerged the foreign Chambers of Commerce as new institutions which channeled the support which each European state brought to the private businesses of its nationals. The older and most prosperous foreign Chamber of Commerce was the French one, founded in 1883. The Italian Chamber of Commerce was a flourishing institution too, according to the British consul. The French, Italian and German Chambers

32. Foreign Office, Annual Series N° 2650, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Turkey, *Report for the Years 1899 – 1900 on the Trade of Constantinople*.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

of Commerce were publishing periodicals providing their nationals with information about trade and economy in their district and beyond.³⁴ The Greek Government followed the trend with some delay establishing a Greek Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul and simultaneously in Izmir and in Alexandria in 1891.³⁵

The nationalist turn in Ottoman policy intensified after the coup of the Young Turks, and not only in the economic domain. The new government, in the name of the equality before the law of all subjects of the Empire, introduced the compulsory military service for the non-Muslims and questioned the validity of the so-called privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, i.e. the particular family and inheritance rules applied by the Church in the affairs concerning its folk. These political developments affected the social environment in which the Greek maritime community in Istanbul operated. In these context, the boycott of Greek shipping by the porters in the Ottoman ports in 1910 was particularly alarming. The evidence available does not allow me to say if the Ottoman authorities were conscious that the political as well as the technological changes made it necessary to find a new mission for the port of Istanbul. Neither is it clear if the Greek maritime community realized the permanent character of the changes. In any case, the outbreak of First World War and the closure of the Straits catapulted Greek shipping into its new oceanic era.

34. *Ibid.*, pp.36 - 37

35. Christos Hadziiossif, “ Η εξωστρέφεια της ελληνικής οικονομίας στις αρχές του 20^{ου} αιώνα και οι συνέπειές της στην εξωτερική πολιτική” [The Extrovert Greek Economy at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and its Consequences for the foreign policy], in K. Svolopoulos et als, (eds.), *Η Ελλάδα των Βαλκανικών Πολέμων, 1910 – 1914*, (Athens: ELIA, 1993), pp. 150-151.

4.

The Galata Bankers and the international banking of the Greek business group in the nineteenth century¹

*Katerina Galani**

The nineteenth century was marked by fundamental developments in banking and financial institutions to befit the needs of a swelling and globalizing economy. The incredible expansion of trade and the interconnectedness of markets world-wide had created on the one hand capital surplus, accumulated in production markets and redistribution hubs. On the other hand, states, firms and individuals were in increasing demand for capital either to finance running costs and investments (e.g. in infrastructure and industrialization) or to conduct trade on an international scale. The mediation of financial institutions was thus indispensable to bridge supply and demand ushering in a “banking revolution” whose forerunners in Europe were Britain, France and Germany².

The expansion and sophistication of the financial sector in Europe was driven by economic growth to meet ever-growing and diverse demands. In practice, it led to the consolidation of institutions, to the proliferation of services as well as to the evolution in

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1. The paper presents some preliminary results of two combined research projects: my post-doctoral research under the title “From Constantinople to the City of London; Greek merchant bankers, 1820-1880” and the Thalys Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774-1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”. Both programmes were conducted at the Ionian University between 2012 and 2015. They were co-funded by the EU and the Greek Secretariat of Research and Development.

2. Youssef Cassis, “Private Banks and the Onset of the Corporate Economy”, in Y. Cassis-Ph. Cottrell (eds.), *The World of Private Banking*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), p. 43.

the structure, organization and function of banks³. In this transitory period, financial services were carried out by old and new agents: traditional forms, such as individual merchant bankers, and novel financial institutions co-existed. The latter spanned from central banks to joint-stock banks with limited liability, to early syndicates and banking groups. Private banking had dominated finance for centuries, while the emergence of corporate banking in the second half of the nineteenth century had swiping effects on international finance and economy. Although joint-stock banks soon pervaded the sector, private banking has survived to the present day in the form of customized assets management and investment services⁴.

The boom of world trade, the connectivity of international markets and the concomitant maturing of the financial sector orbited around a number of traditional and ascending economic centers that coordinated and financed trade: London, Paris, Vienna, Frankfurt, Geneva in Europe as well New York in the United States or Odessa in the Black Sea. Among these economic centers, Istanbul played an important role in the East. The city, the seat of the Ottoman administration, was a gigantic consumer market due its dense population. Furthermore it was the redistribution hub for the Empire, allocating goods within its realm, and bridging the Anatolian inland and the Black Sea to the West. Grain poured in from the Western shores of the Black Sea, i.e. wheat and barley from the plains of the Danube and the granary of Southern Russian provinces. Products were also concentrated from the Anatolian inland while colonial products and manufactured goods were imported from Europe. In the nineteenth century, through the implementation of the *Tanzimat* policy, the Empire underwent a process of modernization and westernization; reforms were applied more or less successfully in the fiscal and financial domain paving the way to economic and financial integration with Europe⁵.

3. Anne Murphy, "The financial revolution and its consequences", in R. Foul, J. Humphries, P. Johnson (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, v. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), pp. 321-341.

4. Lyn Bicker, *Private Banking in Europe*, (New York: Routledge, 1996).

5. For an interesting notion of political integration in the aftermath of the Crimean War see Edhem Eldem, "Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt", *European Review* 13/3 (2005) 431-433.

While the evolution of the financial sector has been systematically investigated in European historiography⁶, anglophone studies on the finances of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century strive to follow suit. In the last decades, the establishment of banks has dominated the economic and financial literature on the nineteenth century; some of the most popular topics involve foreign i.e. Western direct investment in the Ottoman capital market, the consecutive loans over a period of twenty years that led to the insolvency of 1875 and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.⁷ The mushrooming banks of the nineteenth century, either long-lasting, short-lived or even merely planned but never brought to being-account for the historiographical bias towards the corporate side of the sector with limited research on private banking.⁸ There was

6. For a brief overview on the related European historiography Youssef Cassis (ed.), *Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880-1960*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Youssef Cassis, *Capitals of Capital: A history of International financial centres, 1780-2005*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Alain Plessis, *Histoire de la Banque de France*, (Paris: Albin-Michel, 1998); Neal Ferguson, *The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998); Geoffrey Jones, *British multinational banking 1830-1990*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); H. Pohl (ed.), *Europäische Bankengeschichte*, (Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1993).

7. For a dense overview see Edhem Eldem, "Banking history in Turkey: Issues, Sources, Phases and Shortcomings", in O. Feiertag- I. Pepelasis Minoglou (eds.), *European Banking Historiography. Past and Present*, (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2009), pp. 41-60. Also, indicatively see Reşat Kaşaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: the Nineteenth Century*, (New York: SUNY Press, 1988); Şevket Pamuk, "The evolution of financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire", *Financial History Review* 11/1 (2004) 7-32; Charles Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; Şevket Pamuk, *A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christopher Clay, *Gold for the Sultan. Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 1856-1881*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); V. Necla Geyikdagi, *Foreign Investment in Ottoman Empire: International Trade and Relations 1854-1914* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

8. Edhem Eldem, *A History of the Ottoman Bank*, (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research Centre, 1999); Christopher Clay, "The origins of modern banking in the Levant: The branch network of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1890-1914", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994) 589-614; Edhem Eldem, "Sta-

in fact a banking mania in the Ottoman Empire especially in the 1870's with the participation of local and foreign capital: in 1871, within a year (11/1871-11/1872), ten new banks sprang in Istanbul⁹.

It is noteworthy that private banking in the Ottoman Empire does not seem to have received the same attention even though its agents were an extremely influential group in ottoman finances¹⁰. Private bankers were known as the *Galata Bankers*, a term coined upon the district of Galata in Istanbul, where banks and bankers concentrated in the nineteenth century. In the existing references, the Galata Bankers have been treated as the natural descendants of the *sarrafs*, the traditional financiers of the East who were involved for centuries in money changing and tax farming. These local bankers stemmed from the non-Muslim millets of the city-Jews, Armenians and Greeks along with a limited number of Levantines, i.e. European settlers in the Levant. Embedded in family and religious networks, the private bankers were predominantly

bility against all odds: The Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1875-1914", in J. Consiglio, J.C Martinez Oliva, G. Tortella (eds.), *Banking and Finance in the Mediterranean*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 95-120; John Karatzoglou, *The Imperial Ottoman Bank in Salonica the first 25 years, 1864-1890*, (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2003); Philip Cottrell, "A survey of European investment in Turkey, 1854-1914; Banks and the finance of the state and railway construction", in P. Cottrell (ed.) *East meets West: Banking, Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 59-96

9. Haris Exertzoglou, *Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850-1861*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, King's College London, 1986, pp. 159-160.

10. For a critic on the silence of Turkish historiography on the topic see Eldem, "Banking history in Turkey", pp. 44, 50-52. One of the few exceptions is the work by Exertzoglou, who has thoroughly researched Greek bankers in Constantinople see Haris Exertzoglou, *Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850-1861*; H. Exertzoglou, *Προσαρμοστικότητα και πολιτική ομογενειακών κεφαλαίων. Έλληνες τραπεζίτες στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Το κατάστημα 'Ζαρίφης-Ζαφειρόπουλος', 1871-1881* [Adaptability and Policy of the Expatriate Capital in Constantinople, the House of 'Zarifis-Zafiroopoulos' 1871-1881], (Athens: Ίδρυμα Έρευνας και Παιδείας της Εμπορικής Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος, 1999). More recently, Ioanna Pepelasis-Minoglou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking: Greek diaspora bankers and Ottoman state finances, c. 1840-1881", *Financial History Review* 9 (2002) 125-146. For an early study on the case of the Levantine banker Edouard Dervieu see David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas. International finance and economic imperialism in Egypt*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

engaged in short-term loans to the Ottoman State. Originally they invested their proper wealth, accumulated primarily from trade, but in due course they became involved in partnerships and joint-stock ventures with public subscriptions. They were indispensable to the financial circuit due to their connections on the one hand with the sultan and high-rank administrators and on the other hand with bankers in the European capital markets¹¹.

The paper probes the Greek group of Galata bankers, who were among the most prominent financiers of Istanbul in the nineteenth century. It examines the function and evolution of their services and their interrelation with European financial markets. The analysis anchors to two postulates: The first conceptualizes the Galata bankers as a manifestation of private banking in the East, pointing out the common features of international private banking while taking into consideration the peculiarities fostered in the Ottoman market. The second postulate acknowledges Greek bankers in Istanbul as members of a merchant diaspora, which combined trade, shipping and finance¹². They took part in a transnational business group, which granted them access to resources, capital and intelligence across international markets. The Greek business group in the nineteenth century consisted of about one hundred business families, with a loose internal structure and organization, albeit with strong informal ties spanning from eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea to Western Europe.

The network of the Greek group was widely-spread, yet structured through major nodes: London, Paris, Marseilles, Livorno, Alexandria, Istanbul, Athens and the cluster of south Russian port-cities, from Odessa to Novorossisk. The paper focuses on the imperial

11. Pamuk, "Institutional evolution", p. 22.

12. Maria Christina Chatziioannou – Gelina Harlaftis, «From the Levant to the City of London: Mercantile Credit in the Greek International Commercial Networks of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries», in Ph. Cottrell – E. Lange – U. Olsson (eds.), *Centres and Peripheries in Banking* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 13-40; Gelina Harlaftis, «Εμπόριο και ναυτιλία των 19^ο αιώνα. Το επιχειρηματικό δίκτυο της ελληνικής διασποράς: 'η χιώτικη φάση'» [Trade and Shipping in the 19th century- the entrepreneurial network of the Diaspora Greeks, The Chiot Phase (1830-1860)], *Mnimon* 15 (1993); This article with further changes formed chapter 2 of Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

city of Istanbul and on the Greek financiers therein engaged in a variety of services: they financed the Ottoman public debt, endorsed loans to the nascent Greek state and secured credit for private commercial ventures. Drawing upon banking sources such as the archive of the Bank of England, memoirs and the surviving *Annuaire Orientales du commerce et de l'industrie*, the annual guide to the social and economic life of the city of Istanbul, the paper maps the Greek financiers and places them within the wider transnational business group, underlying the relations with the western markets.

The paper unfolds in three parts. A brief introduction summarizes the principal attributes of the banking sector in the West, placing emphasis on the evolution of financial institutions in the transitory nineteenth century. The second part focuses on the Ottoman Empire to investigate how these developments were transplanted in private banking, taking into account the idiosyncratic nature of the economy and politics of the Empire. An estimate of the Greek population of bankers, their settlement in Galata and the scope of their activity are some of the issues raised in the second section. The last section probes the connection of the Galata bankers with the Greek bankers in the City of London; the co-operation between the two sub-groups is corroborated by numbers and words, e.g. through the ledgers of the Bank of England and the narratives of one of the prominent actors, i.e. the banker Andreas Syngros¹³.

Part 1: The financial revolution of the nineteenth century

Stanley Chapman in his analysis of banking in the nineteenth century referred to its “amorphous nature”, as financial services were in constant change.¹⁴ The volatile economic circumstances of the nineteenth century fostered ever growing demands for credit: wars and budget deficits; public debt; world trade; investments in industrialization and large-scale infrastructure to promote the integration

13. Andreas Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], v.1-3, (Athens, Εστία, 1908). The *Απομνημονεύματα* were republished in 1998, edited by A. Angelou and M-Chr. Chatziioannou.

14. Stanley Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 57-60.

and connection of markets. High on the agenda were works on transport at land and sea such as the construction of ports, the broadening of the road network and water roads, the construction of canals and primarily the establishment of the railway system¹⁵.

The financial sector, in terms of its business organization, was dominated until the mid-nineteenth century by private banks; they were in fact family businesses, where ownership and directorship converged, while the members of the family ran the different branches located in strategic commercial and financial centers. The distinctive feature of this business, in comparison to the later corporate forms of banking, was the use of private funds: the bankers invested in banking their fortune, which was usually built on trade¹⁶. In practice, they were merchant bankers, combining and supplementing economic activities. These merchant bankers were embedded in networks, be they social, kinship or ethnoreligious ones.

In terms of their legal status, private banks were either individual firms or partnerships where partners had unlimited liability¹⁷. Private bankers were not a homogenous group: based upon the scale and scope of the business, one can identify a banking aristocracy, known from the French case as the *Haute Banque* i.e. that is the most prestigious, international bankers. The banking elite consisted of a few families across Europe, with strong political connections and resources who levered international trade, financed states and state leaders, and became heavily involved in industrialization. The Rothschild, the Baring, the Barclays in London, the Mallet, Fould and Pereire in Paris, the Oppenheim in Cologne, the Bischoffheim in Brussels, the Mendelssohn, Bleichröder, Hansemann in Russia and the Camondo in Istanbul are some of the most striking examples¹⁸.

15. Dan Bogart, "The transport revolution in industrializing Britain", in R. Floud, J. Humphries, P. Johnson (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, v. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 368-391; Simon Ville, "Transport and Communications", D. Alcroft –S. Ville (eds.), *The European Economy, 1750-1914. A Thematic Approach*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 184-215.

16. T. M. Rybczynski, "The Merchant Banks", *The Manchester School* 41:1 (1973), pp. 108-9.

17. Cassis, "Private Banks and the Onset of the Corporate Economy", p. 44.

18. Fergusson, *The World's Banker. The History of the House of Rothschild*; Peter

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards private bankers were gradually ceding their place to corporate financial institutions, with a broader capital base, that could handle the growing demands of the globalizing economy. Y. Cassis summarized the three distinct features of the new form of bank: the limited liability provided by the joint stocks, the establishment of a network of branches to accommodate deposits and the funding of investments¹⁹. Despite fierce competition from corporate banks, merchant bankers were preserved throughout the nineteenth century, while private banking has survived to the present day in the form of asset and investment management e.g. Barclays, Lazard, Baring and the Rothschild group to name a few. Merchant bankers bore a significant contribution to the expansion of world trade and the connectivity of international markets through the circulation of goods and capital. They contributed in the economic transformation of the nineteenth century, on an international scale, paving the way to globalization; As Geoffrey Jones has argued it was individuals and firms, rather than states and markets that shaped globalization²⁰.

Merchant bankers either in London, Paris or Istanbul were involved in a broad range of economic activities. The first and foremost was trade²¹. Even when they diversified into banking, the continuation of trade was indispensable to generate capital, sustain business networks and access a number of markets. Trade was considered a reliable source of income as opposed to banking which was riskier and volatile. The second large cycle of business involved the financial services. Banking activities were divided in two aggregate categories a) the circulation of bills of exchange and

Austin, *Baring Brothers and the Birth of Modern Finance* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2007); Margaret Ackrill- Leslie Hannah, *Barclays. The Business of Banking, 1690-1996* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Manfred Pohl, Sabine Freitag (eds.), *Handbook on the History of European Banks* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994); David Landes, *Dynasties. Fortune and Misfortune of the World's Great Family Businesses* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 13-116.

19. Cassis, "Private Banks and the Onset of the Corporate Economy", p. 43.

20. Walter Friedman-Geoffrey Jones, "Business History: Time of Debate", *Business History Review* 85:3 (2011), pp. 5-6.

21. Geoffrey Jones, *Merchants to Multinationals. British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 21-27.

b) the circulation of issues/securities. In both cases, the reputation of the firm was an invaluable and irreplaceable asset, as transactions were interpersonal be they in bills or bonds²². In fact, the mediation of a trustworthy house added value to the underwritten bills and securities, as it sealed a presumably reliable transaction. Besides the financial circles, the matter of trust and reputation was vital for minorities and diaspora peoples, such as the members of the Greek business network that sprang from the Eastern Mediterranean to western markets and beyond. Within ethnoreligious minorities, the fear of moral and social sanctions regulated business behavior and the implementation of contracts among the members of the group.

The expansion of trade in far-off markets, where capital was not always accessible on the spot, instigated the use of bills of exchange as the common means of credit. The acceptance, circulation and discount of bills were the main functions of merchant bankers in the financial capitals of the world. In addition to securing liquidity, bills of exchange were in practice a negotiable instrument, leading to the creation of a secondary market, based on the discrepancies in exchange rates among the different markets, where bills were traded prior to their maturity.

Trade in bills of exchange was a short-lived venture, repetitive, profitable with swift returns. On the contrary, trade in securities –bonds or shares- rendered larger profits; It was a long-run business, with a continual pay-off, in the form of coupons or dividends. Trading in promissory notes and bonds appealed to an extensive pool of investors through public subscription. This development in financial markets was made feasible due to idle capital awaiting to be invested. The market for bonds and shares did not necessarily require large capital on behalf of the investors and were thus appealing to a large audience-large and petty investors- who would collect their dividends on a pre-determined date, usually half yearly.

The bond and share market was flourishing in the nineteenth century²³. This market involved both corporate and sovereign

22. Mark Casson, *Enterprise and Leadership: Studies on Firms, Markets and Networks*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000), pp. 172-174

23. George Frankfurter-Bob Wood, *Dividend Policy: Theory and Practice* (San Diego: Academic Press, 2003), pp. 18-20.

bonds; capital was vital not only for merchants and firms but also for countries and thus sovereign debt emerged in intermediary financial markets, e.g. in London and Paris, where bonds were traded to raise capital. Governments received the agreed amount with the extraction of a commission fee. The lists of traded securities was advertised in newspapers, pamphlets and coffee houses to stir public interest. Access to financial markets was feasible through the mediation of private bankers or syndicated banks who would bear the risk of underwriting the debt and distributing issues to the public²⁴. The intermediaries were also burdened with the repay of coupons. The reputation of the mediating agent(s), due to the subscribers' asymmetric information about the borrower and its financial situation, was a guarantee for the contracting of the loan. To mitigate the moral hazard, one would either resort to the most acclaimed merchant bankers or to his proper ethnoreligious group. As we will see in detail, Greek bankers from Istanbul cooperated with the Greek merchant bankers in London in order to secure credit and overcome liquidity issues.

By 1900, internationalization of state debts was a common practice in world economy and thus a number of countries began raising capital in foreign markets by issuing and circulating bonds²⁵. Through issues they covered fiscal shortages, waged wars or invested in public works. Amsterdam was the first capital market to initiate sovereign debt, but by the 1820's it has ceded its supremacy to London, followed by Paris²⁶. This rising market in sovereign debt was further driven by an array of nascent states following the political turmoil and the revolutionary movements in Latin America and Europe in the nineteenth century: Mexico (1821), Brazil (1822), Argentina (1824) are some of the countries that traded bonds in Lon-

24. Marc Flandreau-Juan H. Flores, "Bonds and Brands. Lessons from the 1820's", *CEPR Discussion Paper Series-International Macroeconomics* No 6420 (2007), pp. 12-14.

25. John Orbell, "Private Banks and International Finance in the Light of the Archives of Baring Brothers", in Cassis-Cottrell (eds.), *The World of Private Banking*, p.149

26. Larry Neal, *The Rise of financial capitalism. International capital markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Marc Flandreau-Juan H. Flores, "Bonds and Brands", pp. 6-8.

don through private bankers such as the Rothschild and Barings. Greece also raised two loans in 1824 and 1825 for the purposes of the revolutionary war. The Greek loans were issued by the houses of Loughnan, Son & O'Brien and the house of David Ricardo, i.e. the political economist, who had also been involved in state loans during the Napoleonic Wars²⁷.

In Constantinople, the issue of state loans -either short-term or longer- turned into a crucial financial service from the mid-nineteenth century due to the recurrent liquidity crises and the ineffectiveness of the fiscal system to sustain the budget. The growth of the bond market and the internationalization of the public debt to attract funds abroad were carried out by private bankers and corporate banks that were in close connection to the Sublime Porte and the Treasury. Following the Crimean war, from 1854 until 1875, when the Empire officially defaulted, the Ottomans had drawn 15 loans from external markets and had found themselves in a situation of perpetual borrowing, both foreign and domestic, to cover the floating debt²⁸. Synergy between private bankers, i.e. the Galata bankers, and corporate banks was indispensable to sustain public finance, although each had its separate role in the financial market of Istanbul.

Part 2: The financial market of Constantinople

In the nineteenth century, a slow process of economic and financial integration with Europe was under way, even though the steps taken were in retrospect considered incomplete or, at best, moderately successful²⁹. Following two decades of political unrest among the non-Muslim populations at the turn of the century, the Ottoman Empire launched a series of internal reforms, ushering in the

27. Maria Christina Chatziioannou, "War, Crisis and Sovereign Loans; the Greek war of Independence and the British economic expansion in the 1820's", *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 10 (2013), pp. 33-55.


28. The first two loans, in 1854 and 1855 loans of £ 3,000,000 and £ 5,000,000 respectively, were issued by Dent, Palmers & Co. and the Rothschilds of London.

29. Pamuk, "The evolution of financial institutions", pp. 8, 30-32; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1981), p. 116.

Tanzimat era (1839-1876) to consolidate the empire and ground it on *Ottomanism*, a policy of greater political, economic and social integration across the different ethnoreligious communities. On the economic level, attempted reforms in economic, monetary and financial institutions were driven by the growing demand to meet budget deficits, to wage war and promote international trade. The Tanzimat reforms secured property rights, moved to the first issue of paper banknotes and established the Stock Exchange.

In 1838, the Anglo –Turkish commercial Treaty boosted British trade and it was followed by a series of agreements with western countries such as France, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Denmark et al. This outward-looking policy solidified commercial relations with the West and promoted the Empire’s external trade. The effects are illustrated in the figure below; After a few years of stagnation in the early 1830’s, ottoman foreign trade rose significantly throughout the century, both in imports and exports, until 1875, when the declaration of insolvency had naturally impacted on trade, causing a drop.

Figure 1: Ottoman Foreign Trade, 1830-1880 (million £)



Source: Şevket .Pamuk, *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Dış Ticareti*, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi, v.I (Ankara, 1995), p. 25

In addition to European powers, the Greeks were also favored by the expansion of international trade fostered by the Tanzimat. Like the Armenians and the Jews, they were traditionally a minority of middlemen, who played a significant role in economic growth in the Eastern Mediterranean³⁰. In the nineteenth century they diversified in trade, shipping and finance, with a broad geographic scope reaching out to the West (e.g. Livorno, Paris, Vienna, London, New York) and the East from the Black Sea (e.g. Odessa, Taganrog), to Persia and India³¹. However, their ascendancy as an important economic actor dates a century earlier. In a favorable economic and political conjuncture in the Mediterranean, the Greeks were transformed from a local fleet into a peripheral and international carrier, conducting trade from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe and the Black Sea, forging partnerships abroad, acquiring business know-how and accumulating wealth³².

The menace of European domination over trade in the Levant urged the Empire to actively promote domestic shipping and trade³³. In the early nineteenth century, non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were proclaimed as “merchants of Europe” (*Avrupa tüccarları*) indulging

30. Edna Bonanich, “A theory of middleman minorities”, *American Sociological Review* 38(1973), pp. 583-594; Katerina Galani, “Caught between Empires: Agency, neutrality and a middleman minority”, *Greek maritime history: from the periphery to the centre, Research in Maritime History* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, forthcoming)

31. Indicatively stating here some works on Greek diaspora communities Evrydiki Sifneos - Gelina Harlaftis, “Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade. The Greek Merchant community/paroikia of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, 1780s-1830s”, in Viktor N. Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period (15th – 18th Centuries)* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 157-180; Michael Contopoulos, *The Greek Community of New York City. Early years to 1910*, University Microfilms, New York, 1992, pp. 31-49; Dioni Markou-Dodi, *To Χρονικό των Ελλήνων στις Ινδίες, 1750-1950*, [The Chronicle of Greeks in India. 1750-1950] (Athens-Ioannina, 2001);

32. Gelina Harlaftis-Katerina Papakonstantinou (eds.), *Ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων, 1700-1821* [*Greek Shipping, 1700-1821*] (Athens: Kedros, 2013).

33. Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “The Coastal trade of the ottoman empire, from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries”, in John Armstrong-Andreas Kunz (eds.), *Coastal Shipping and the European Economy, 1750-1980*, (Mainz-am-Rhein: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2002), pp. 131-149.

the same privileges as the *protégés* of the European nations settled in the Ottoman Empire, albeit receiving their protection directly from the Sublime Porte³⁴. The reforms allowed non-Muslims, and particularly the Greeks, to exit their status of second class subjects (*reaya*) and to venture freely into extensive shipping and trade³⁵. A number of privileges were granted to the Greeks to entice them in the service of the Sublime Porte carrying the Ottoman flag.

As a result, a number of Greek merchants in Istanbul were licensed to trade under the auspices of the State. Licenses were handed to some of the most prominent Greek merchant houses such as Schilizzi, Petrocochinos, Rodocanachis, Rallis, Scaramangas, Avgerinos, Negrepontis, Havas, Psychas, Galatis, Sinas, Mavrogordatos et al³⁶. They were members of an international business network and were established in commercial and financial centers from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.³⁷ Along the nodes of the network, Greek diaspora circulated capital, commodities, intelligence and human resources. The outbreak of the Greek Revolution (1821) and

34. Gelina Harlaftis and Sophia Laiou, "Ottoman State Policy in the Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-1820: The Rise of Greek-owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet", in Mark Mazower (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece*, (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2008), p. 15; Bruce Masters, "The sultan's entrepreneurs: The Avrupa Tüccarıs and the HayriyeTüccarıs in Syria", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24:4 (1992), pp. 579–597; Triantafylos Sklavenitis, "Τα συστήματα των εμπόρων της Σμύρνης και της Κωνσταντινούπολης (1806-1820)" [The systems of traders in Smyrna and Constantinople], *Ο Εξωελληνισμός. Κωνσταντινούπολη και Σμύρνη. Πνευματικός και Κοινωνικός βίος* [Hellenism abroad. Constantinople and Smyrna. Cultural and Social Life], (Athens: Σχολή Μωραΐτη, 2006), pp. 67-75.

35. Harlaftis - Laiou, "Ottoman State Policy in the Mediterranean Trade and Shipping", pp. 17, 20.

36. Sophia Laiou, "The Ottoman Greek 'Merchants of Europe' at the beginning of the 19th century", Evagelia Balta (ed.) *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis Teocharidis. Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, v. II, (Istanbul: the Isis Press, 2014), pp. 313-332. For the detailed list of merchants see pp. 326-331. The data are drawn from the licences records between 1806 and 1815. Although the source is not exhaustive, as it captures a fraction of Greek merchants, it is indicative of the Greek merchants under Ottoman protection in the early 19th century, both in terms of identification and quantification.

37. Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 47-63.

the nascent Greek State (1830) reshuffled the cards in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed the remnant Greeks of Constantinople in a disadvantageous position; in practice their economic activity was suspended. Greek merchants either sought for foreign protection or fled abroad, to safer environments, dismantling Greek trade in the Levant³⁸. Nevertheless, the Greek community of Istanbul was soon restored and by the early 1840's a new wave of economic actors handled trade and banking³⁹.

The rise of Greek banking was almost simultaneous in the 1840's across the network of Greek diaspora, in London, Paris, Istanbul and the port-cities of Southern Russia, adapting to the broader reforms in the banking sector that were driven by market integration. Greek merchant-bankers in London had already set their commercial houses in the City and embarked on the business of finance, while they had gained access to official banking institutions such as the Bank of England.⁴⁰ They retained strong connections with the Eastern Mediterranean, from where they mostly pooled their partners and clients.

Moreover, banking in the fledging Greek state was still in "a state of infancy" revolving in practice around the central bank, *the National Bank*⁴¹. In the following decades the cooperation of the Greek network of bankers would become tighter facilitating the mobility of capital; in practice all contracting parties benefited whether in Greece, the Ottoman Empire or the Western financial centers. On the one hand, Greek financiers in London reinforced their position

38. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, p. 88.

39. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, pp. 100-101; Pepelasis-Minoglou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking", pp. 127-130; Maria Christina Chatziioannou- Dimitris Kamouzis, "From a multiethnic empire to two national states: the economic activities of the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul, ca 1870-1939", in Darja Reuschke, Monika Salzbrunn and Korinna Schönhärl (eds.), *The Economies of Urban Diversity: Ruhr Area and Istanbul*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), pp. 122-123.

40. The Bank of England Archives, C 30/4 *Discount Office: Greek Accounts* (1848-1852).

41. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, p. 145; G. Dertilis, *Το ζήτημα των τραπεζών, 1871-1873* [The issue of Banks, 1871-1873], (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 1989), pp. 9-14.

by concentrating and circulating funds on behalf of their partners and clients in the Levant. On the other hand, cooperation with their diaspora counterparts strengthened the position of Greek bankers in the Ottoman financial circuit securing access to foreign capital markets and spurred the formation of partnerships and banking syndicates. For example the Rodocanachis participated in the London Financial Association in the 1860's and the *Petersburg International Trade Bank* (1872), while the Rallis participated in the *Bank of Alexandria*, the *Bank of Constantinople* (1872), the *Ottoman Bank* and the *Odessa Discount Bank* (1879)⁴².

Despite the boom in trade in the nineteenth century, capital was not in abundance in the Ottoman Empire predominantly due to the lack of investments in industrialization. The drained market rendered domestic borrowing an expensive venture: interest rates ranged from 12% to 40%, with acute discrepancies across the different regions of the empire that indicate a fragmented market⁴³. On the contrary, western markets had capital surplus which was channeled towards foreign direct investment. It was only a matter of time before cash flowed from the supply market to the demand market. In this process, the intermediaries, be they private bankers or corporate banks played an instrumental role.

The strengthening of commercial links between the Empire and the European markets further increased the need for credit and sophisticated financial instruments. Traditionally, the ottoman financial market was in the hands of individual financiers, the *sarrafs* who emerged among the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, i.e. the Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks of the city. Following the reforms of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman credit market became more refined in par with the equivalent development in Western capital markets. The internationalization of Ottoman finance demanded in practice an able body of private bankers to act as intermediaries⁴⁴. Originating primarily from trade, distinguished individual financiers- the 'Galata Bankers'- conducted an array of services: trade in currency,

42. Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking*, p. 166.

43. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, pp. 106-108.

44. Pepelasis-Minoglou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking", p. 126.

discounting bills of exchange, tax farming, provisions for the army and navy, and financing the Ottoman public debt¹.

From the 1840's, Greek private bankers with access to foreign capital markets, carried out the internal borrowing of the Empire to ensure liquidity for the state, and issued loans to individual members of the royal family and other administrators. For example T. Baltazzis had close relations with Mustafa Reshid Pasha, while G. Zarifis was personal banker to Sultan Abdul Hamid. They provided primarily short-term advances for high interest rates; they would often secure as a guarantee of repayment the anticipated proceeds from taxes or other concessions. Banks in the Ottoman Empire made their appearance in the 1840's². The Greek Galata Bankers were the first to leap into the establishment of proper, albeit short-lived, banks. These institutions, the fruit of collaboration of private bankers- were usually placed under the auspices of the government to promote a central monetary policy and lend to the state³. The first banking attempt, the *Bank of Constantinople*, was founded in 1847 by the Greek Theodore Baltazzi and the Jew John Alleon with an initial capital of £200,000 and yearly state subventions as its statute dictated compliance with the monetary policy of the government. Banking in Istanbul in the nineteenth century yielded the highest returns compared to the other sectors of the economy⁴. The majority of Greek bankers were also engaged in shipping and trade in the 1850's and 1860's as it is demonstrated by the examples of Baltazzi Bros, Petrocochino, Vlastos, Zarifis, Rallis, Rodocanacochis, Schilizzi⁵. However, investments in public utilities, industry and transportation was limited and could not outdo the earnings from banking.

However, with the outbreak of the Crimean War, the financial situation of the Ottoman Empire deteriorated with excessive demand in credit. The domestic financial market was inadequate to

1. Pamuk, *A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 200-205; Zafer Toprak, "The financial structure of the stock exchange in the late ottoman empire", in P. Cottrell, M. Pohle Fraser I. Fraser(eds.), *East Meets West: Banking, Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 145-150.

2. Pamuk, "The evolution of financial institutions", p. 27.

3. Pamuk, *A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 207-212.

4. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, pp. 148-150.

5. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping*, pp. 44-45.

carry the burden and inevitably resorted to the internationalization of the public debt. In 1854, on the onset of the Crimean crisis, the Ottoman state signed the first external borrowing agreement. In the next twenty years until the bankruptcy of 1876, 15 foreign loans brought over £200m to the Ottoman state in a vicious circle of unrepayable debt. Despite the impressive influx of capital, the state absorbed only a limited fraction of it. The most striking case is the loan issued at 1865, when the Treasury actually received a mere 50% of the agreed loan, to the amount of 20,000 liras⁶.

The internationalization of the public debt signaled the penetration of European direct investment in the Empire⁷. A ‘bank mania’ possessed the capital and the provinces manifested by the proliferation of banks due to Western investors who wished to service primarily the issue of bonds. Greek private bankers followed suit, forming alliances with foreign financial groups and participating in the new banks with mixed capital such as the *Société Générale de l’Empire Ottomane*, the *Société Ottomane de Changé et de Valeurs*, and the *Banque Austro-Turque*. A landmark was set in 1863, when joint British and French capital established the *Imperial Ottoman Bank* (BIO), which combined the attributes of a quasi-central bank and a private firm, running most of the transactions of the Treasury⁸. It operated a network of branches in Izmir, Beirut, Salonica, Galatz and Bucharest and by the 1880’s it had expanded across the Empire running 80 branches⁹. Following the path of modern corporate banking, the Imperial Ottoman Bank also became involved in direct investment by financing railroads, ports and public works.

The course of ottoman borrowing, (see figure 2), reflects the

6. Seda Ozekicioglu-Halil Ozekicioglu, “First borrowing period at the Ottoman Empire (1845-1876): Budget policies and consequences”, *Business and Economic Horizons* 3:3 (2010), p. 34.


7. Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism 1820-1913*.

8. On the BIO see E. Eldem, “Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt”, *European Review* 13:3 (2005), pp. 431-445; Christopher Clay, “The Imperial Ottoman Bank in the Later Nineteenth Century: A Multinational “National” Bank”, in G. Jones (ed.), *Banks as Multinationals*, (London, 1990)

9. Clay, “The Origins of modern Banking in the Levant”, p. 590; Pamuk, “The evolution of financial institutions”, pp. 28-29.

dwindling importance of Galata bankers under the pressure of foreign corporate banking and direct access to international capital. Their position was reinforced once again in the post-bankruptcy period (1875-1881), due to the suspension of international credit. The state then resorted to the home financiers, appealing to their patriotic contribution to the salvation of the Empire.¹⁰

Figure 2: Ottoman foreign and domestic borrowing



Source: S. Ozekicioglu-H.Ozekicioglu, “First borrowing period at the Ottoman Empire (1845-1876): Budget policies and consequences”, *Business and Economic Horizons* 3/3 (2010) 44. Data drawn from Emine Kıray, 1995. *Osmanlı’da ekonomik yapı ve dış borçlar*, İstanbul, 1995, p. 85.

Although Greek Galata bankers were not directly involved in the sovereign debt, they were an indispensable player in the public finances of the Empire. There seems to be a distinctive segregation of the market: issue of loans were made through European banks that were established in the Empire or directly at the international financial markets, while domestic banking supported the state’s floating debt with short-term advances. In effect, the Galata bankers

10. Pamuk, “The evolution of financial institutions”, p. 25.

facilitated the repayment of interest and coupons of the public debt and covered the immediate expenses of the administration.

2b. The Galata Bankers in Istanbul

The imperial capital was the headquarters of private bankers and played a pivotal role in the financial evolution of the Empire. In fact, the nineteenth century was a period of prosperity for the city as a result of the boom of international, domestic and transit trade. Due to its geographical location it controlled the flow of commodities from the Black Sea and the Balkans. Its population rose exponentially, along with its manufacture and trade. However, the lack or imperfections of censuses renders the estimate of population a challenging task. The censuses, conducted for tax and military purposes, were unsystematic and gendered-biased, as their principal subject were taxable males. Furthermore, non-Muslim populations were recorded by their religious leaders and were largely undercounted to minimize the tax burden. The first official census dates back in 1830 although after several attempts in the following decades, the first general and reliable census was not delivered before the end of the century¹¹.

In a rough estimation, Greeks in Istanbul was a rather sizable minority representing 25% of the capital's population in the mid-nineteenth century. Although their percentage dwindled towards the end of the century to 16% of the overall, in absolute figures the Greeks of the city grew significantly, from 58,500 to 162,000¹². If a rough estimate of the Greek population is a challenging task, a record of their professional capacities is even harder to compose¹³. In the capital of the empire, the Greek population covered all social strata: the economic, religious and political elites,

11. Servet Mutlu, "Late Ottoman Population and its ethnic distribution", *Turkish Journal of Population Studies* 25 (2003), pp. 4-7.

12. Chatziioannou, -Kamouzis, "From a multiethnic empire to two national states" 121. The values are drawn from the official Ottoman censuses of 1856 and 1896 respectively.

13. Meropi Anastassiadou, *Les Grecs d' Istanbul au XIXeme siècle. Histoire socio-culturelle* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 165-178.

e.g. the descendants of the Byzantine nobility and the Phanariots, as well as the new economic bourgeoisie of merchant bankers, followed by the middle class (merchants, doctors and other liberal professions) to laborers, petty shopkeepers and craftsmen.¹⁴ The size and activities of the Greek professional population of Constantinople in the nineteenth century still remains an open question. It is therefore extremely difficult to produce a systematic and continuous record of the sheer numbers of Greek bankers in the city

The earliest available compilation of Greek merchants in Istanbul conveniently dates back in 1840, when the new wave of Greek entrepreneurs appeared, following the turmoil of the Greek revolutionary war.

Table 1: Greek firms registered in the Stock Exchange of Galata (1840)

1.	Abbott B. B.	33.	Papaluca Brothers
2.	Agelastos & Rodocanachi	34.	Petrococchino Brothers & Co
3.	Asclipiadi Co	35.	Petrococchino G.
4.	Baltazzi Emanuel & Co.	36.	Ralli Antonio
5.	Braggiotti P.	37.	Ralli Thomas & Co
6.	Caisserli & F. Corpi	38.	Rizzo Santo
7.	Capitanachi amiro & Co	39.	Rizzo Thomas
8.	Castelli Guistiniani &Co	40.	Rodocanachi L.
9.	Copsida Eust. & Son	41.	Rodocanachi Stamati
10.	Corpi J.	42.	Rodocanchi M.
11.	Damiano N.	43.	Scanavi Brothers & Co
12.	Dendrino P. & C.	44.	Schilizzi G. & C.
13.	Fachiri Gio. & Son	45.	Sechari G. & P. Argenti
14.	Fotiadi D. & C.	46.	Sevastopoulos sons & Co.
15.	Fottio Teodoro & Co	47.	Sgouta , Zola & Co
16.	Francovich & Braggiotti	48.	Simeriotti G. & C.
17.	Giovanni Lambro	49.	Stavrinachi S. di G. & T.
18.	Glavany Jaques	50.	Stefanovich Q. & C.
19.	Glavany Sons &Co	51.	Sterio N. C.

14. Chatziioannou-Kamouzis, "From a multiethnic empire to two national states", p. 122.

20.	Guidici Constantino	52.	Terliezoglou Gio. & Co
21.	Hava Elia & Son	53.	Tinguiroglou Stefano
22.	Inglessi Ant.	54.	Valiano Ant.
23.	Kilaiditi Brothers & Co	55.	Vlastarachi G.
24.	Kissisoglou Abramo	56.	Vuro Constantine & Co.
25.	Kissisoglou J. & P.	57.	Vuro E.M. & Co
26.	Maurogordato & Co	58.	Vuro Gio.
27.	Maurogordato D. L.	59.	Zafropoulo Demetrio
28.	Maurogordato P.N.	60.	Zarifi Brothers
29.	Maurogordato, Petrococchino & Co	61.	Ziccalioti Brothers & Lambichi
30.	Menzalopoulo Gio	62.	Zucca Chiriaco
31.	Negroponte B.J.		
32.	Notara Gregorio		

Source: Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Levantiner. Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gemeinschaft im osmanischen Reich im "langen 19. Jahrhundert"*, (Munich, 2005).

In 1840 over sixty Greeks engaged in trade, were registered in the stock exchange located in Galata¹⁵. It is only reasonable to assume that those who feature in the catalogues of the predecessor of the bourse represent the most active and prominent traders of the city. Out of the 148 registered members, the Greeks amount to 42% overall, an evidence of the power and impact of the Greek business group in the city. Although they were not explicitly involved in banking, we can identify among them, firms that became well-established banking houses in the course of the nineteenth century. At this early stage it has been roughly estimated that eleven Greeks were acknowledged as bankers¹⁶. A survey of the names of the list of traders reveals a farraginous group: descendants of the Byzantine elites (e.g. Baltazzis, Notaras), catholic Greeks of Latin origin from the

15. Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Levantiner. Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im osmanischen Reich im "langen 19. Jahrhundert"*, (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2005)

16. Pepelasis-Minoglou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking", pp. 128-129.

Aegean such as Corpi and Castelli Guistiniani¹⁷, one hellenized British family of the Levant, i.e the Abbots¹⁸, a nucleus of Chiots (Schilizzi, Rodocanachi, Maurogordato, Ralli, Scanavi, Petrocochino)¹⁹.

The Greek Galata bankers were inevitably an elitist community, a small caucus of men of wealth. In the second half of the nineteenth century, there seems to be a more delineated distinction between merchant and bankers. Exertzoglou gives us an indication of their population for the late 1860's. There seem to be 47 bankers (and 37 money changers) in the city who retained commercial activities although we cannot identify the Greek fraction of the group²⁰. At the turn of the 20th century, the size of the banking population remained alike; in 1912, out of a total of 40 bankers, 12 were Greeks, 12 Armenians and 8 Jews²¹. In contrast to the scarcity of references for most of the nineteenth century, we have detailed data for 1880 (see table 1) drawing upon the *Annuaire Orientales du commerce et de l'industrie*, the annual guide to the social and economic life of the city of Istanbul.

Table 2: The business population of Istanbul,
bankers and big traders, 1880

Bankers and traders	Number	B/A %
A.Total bankers	58	
B. Greek bankers	18	31%
A. Total traders (negociants)	414	
B. Greek traders	149	36%

Source: *Indicateur Oriental Annuaire de Commerce de la Magistrature etc. Turquie, Russie, Grece et Bulgarie, 1880*

17. Philip Cottrell, *The Ionian Bank. An imperial institution, 1839-1864* (Athens, 2007).

18. Despoina Vlami, "Entrepreneurship and relational capital in a Levantine context: Bartholomew Edward Abbot, The 'Father of the Levant Company in Thessaloniki' 18th-19th centuries", *Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 6 (2009), pp. 129-164.

19. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping*, pp. 38-70.

20. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, p. 76

21. Chatziioannou-Harlaftis, "From the Levant to the City of London", p. 26.

Among the registered professionals of the city, 58 individuals appear under the title ‘bankers’, out of which 18 are Greeks as they are included in Table 3. Another category named “negociants” include the big traders of the city. One third of the bankers and big traders of Istanbul as they appear in the *Annuaire* volume of 1880 are Greeks. Once again, the names of Ralli, Guistiniani, Baltazzi, Negroponte, Mavrogordato appear in the list, as we have seen them earlier, showing the evolution of merchants into bankers and pointing to the extended network of these families in London and the international commercial and financial centers. Besides the individual bankers that feature in the city guide, the Greek financiers can be further traced in the banking institutions: in 1880 out of the six official banks registered at the yearly almanac, three of them were fully or partly owned by Greeks.

Table 3. Greek bankers of Istanbul, 1880

	NAME	PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY	ADDRESS
1	Coronio G.	Administrator of the <i>Banque de Constantinople</i>	
2	Baltazzi Alex	Banker	Baltazzi Han
3	Nomides G.	Banker	R. Tchamakdjilar Yocoussou
4	Psiachis D.	Banker	Kourchoum Han
5	Ralli Alex S.	Banker	Ralli Han
6	Ralli Stefano	Banker	Ralli Han
7	Zafiropoulo G. D.	Banker	Mehmet Ali Pacha
8	Zografos Christaki Effendi	Banker	Mehmet Ali Pacha Han
9	Zarifi Pierre	Banker	R. Tepe Bachi
10	Angelidis G. J	Merchant and banker	Haviar Han
11	Calvocoressi J. M.	Merchant and banker	Halil Pacha Han
12	Corpi Alexandre	Banker and owner of the steam mill of Djoubali	Guil Camondo Han
13	Guistiniani B.	Banker and owner of the French Theatre	Guil Camondo Han
14	Zarifi Georges	Banker	Embassy of France

15	Demetriadi Cosma et Cie	Banker	Halil Pacha Han
16	Lazarides Freres	Banker	Haviar Han
17	Mavrogordato A. P. et fils	Banker	Halil Pacha Han
18	Zafriropoulo et Zarifi	Banker	Halil Pacha Han
19	Negroponte U et M	Merchant and banker	Rue Zulfarisse

Source: *Annuaire oriental du commerce, de l'industrie, de l'administration et de la magistrature* (Constantinople, 1880)

Besides the identification of the group of Greek bankers, the city guide provides us with an additional information: the location of these banking firms in the city. The urban tissue of Istanbul was reshaped in the nineteenth century following the shifts in the economic and political profile of the city. In practice, the city centre was divided in three regions: Galata, Pera and Stamboul, each one with its idiosyncratic characteristics and services. Stamboul was the historic centre and gradually lost its significance as a commercial district ceding its place to Galata, which evolved into the economic heart of the City. It concentrated the majority of banking and commercial activities. Galata and Pera were the westernized regions of the city which concentrated the majority of European citizens and non-Muslim Ottomans. Along the *Grande Rue de Pera*, a series of embassies were housed, adjacent to synagogues, orthodox churches, the European high-school, domiciles and offices of merchants and bankers.

Since the mid 19th century, a scheme for the re-organization of town planning was implemented in the districts of Galata, Pera and Tophane which succeeded in modernizing the area. The financial elite of the city, like the Camondo, the Zarifi and the Baltazzi, played a leading role in the revamp of the area²². By 1865, the southern part of Galata hosted the banking centre, where one could see the headquarters of the banks e.g. *Ottoman Imperial Bank*, *Credit Lyonnais*, *La Societe Ottomane de Change et de valeurs*, *Banque de Constantinople* of the Zarifis, and the Stock Exchange. The designated street

22. Nora Seni-Sophie le Tarnec, *Les Camondo ou l'eclipse d'une fortune* (Arles: Actes Sud, 1997), pp. 36-37.

was known as Bankalar Caddesi or Voyvoda Street²³. The banking institutions were housed in a series of newly built constructions known as the hans. Originating from the traditional inns that accommodated the caravans and traders, the hans in the nineteenth have turned into offices for the commercial and banking population of the city. They were ascribed different names and quite often they were named after their proprietor. As we can see from the almanac of 1880 (see table 3) the Rallis, Camondo, Baltazzi housed their business in homonymous hans.

Part 3: Galata Bankers and the City of London

The Greek Galata bankers in the nineteenth century, while being a substantial economic actor in the Ottoman financial market, were also members of an international business group. The study of the Greek diaspora network reveals a core of approximately one hundred entrepreneurial families, who were scattered in the financial markets and trade hubs²⁴. They formed the Greek business group and their members were stationed in the nodes of trade. It is therefore no coincidence that the same names, Rallis, Negreponite, Scaramangas, Schilizzi, Ionides, Rodocanachi, Vagliano et al appear in the lists of Greek merchant communities in London, Marseilles, Vienna, Smyrna, Constantinople, Taganrog etc. This last section of the paper focuses on two nodes of this network; it probes the connection between the international capital market in London and the peripheral market of Istanbul through the network of Greek private bankers.

In the nineteenth century London was transformed into an imperial and world capital. The city witnessed an unprecedented demographic boom, urban expansion and accumulation of wealth. It grew to become the biggest emporium, industrial supplier and banker to the world²⁵. At the heart of the British Empire, it attract-

23. Eldem Edhem, *Voyvoda Street from Ottoman times to today/Bankalar Caddesi. Osmanlı'dan günümüze Voyvoda Caddesi* (Istanbul, 2000).

24. Katerina Galani, "Greek Merchant Bankers in the City of London; The first settlement (early 19th century)", *Anglo-Greek relations; Aspect of their modern history* (Athens: Hellenic Parliament Foundation, forthcoming).

25. Jerry White, *London in the 19th century* (London: Vintage, 2008), pp. 163-196.

ed entrepreneurs e.g. Dutch, Americans, Jews, Germans, Huguenots who moved to London to benefit from a thriving economic environment²⁶. Among them, Greeks arrived and became involved in trade, shipping and merchant banking. While other entrepreneurs directed their attention to India, the Far East and the Latin American markets, the bulk of Greek transactions was focused on the Eastern Mediterranean. This strong geographic specialization was in fact a competitive advantage in the financial circles of the City²⁷. In that part of the world, the Greeks employed their network to collect information about commodities and market preferences and secured agents, partners and clients.

The population of Greek merchant firms grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century. In 1820 only a handful of men had settled in London to carry trade with the eastern Mediterranean. In the following years more Greeks were lured in, reaching a peak of 105 firms by the 1875²⁸. The vast majority of Greek firms in London were registered as ‘merchants’. The use of this generic term in practice encompassed trade, shipping and financial services. It was late in the nineteenth century that two Greeks were registered, for the first time, under the distinct profession of “banker” in the City’s professional guide: it was Antonios Al. Rallis, “a foreign banker”, and Demetrios Mich. Katinakis, the managing director of the Anglo-Foreign Banking Co. Ltd²⁹.

In London, in an unfamiliar and competitive environment, the Greeks operated as a distinct group: a set of individual firms which

26. Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking*, pp. 1-5.

27. Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking*, pp. 58-9. Among others the examples of Blyth, Green & Jourdain in Mauritius, Balfour, Williamson & Co in Chile, Ladenburg in Romania, etc.

28. Processed data from the Post Office Directories, 1820-1880. *Post Office London Directory*, *Comprising among other information, Official Directory, Street Directory; Commercial Directory; Trades’ Directory; Law Directory; Court Directory; Parliamentary Directory; Postal Directory; City Directory; Conveyance Directory; Banking Directory*. From 1820 to 1835 data were drawn from *The Post Office London Directory Being a list of upwards 20,000 Merchants, Traders & c. of London and parts adjacent*, published in London by Critchett & Woods (v.226, 233, 238, 243). From 1837 onwards the directories, published by Frederick Kelly, were hence known as Kelly Postal Directories.

29. *Post Office London Directory*, 1880.

were not legally bound, though interconnected through formal and informal relations³⁰. To control moral hazard, the Greeks recruited partners and agents from a controlled pool embedded on kinship, common religion and ethnicity. Their firms retained the characteristics of family businesses in their organization and structure, while endogamy among the members of the group was a widely used practice to secure social mobility and capital merge. The coherence of the group can be conceived even in spatial terms, as they clustered in the same area, the same streets and even the same buildings around Finsbury Circus in the City³¹.

A closer look at the community of London shows that the Greek business group was not homogenous; it comprised of a number of individuals of varied economic and social capacity, and it was characterized by internal hierarchy; the most prominent merchants were key figures in the diaspora network and played a central role in the lives and works of the members of the community. They were the driving force, usually the first to settle, and the pioneers who became well-integrated in the new environment and acted as mediators for the other members of their group. The synthesis and cooperation of the asymmetric components of the group was beneficial for all contracting parties: the weakest members were represented by the strongest and acquired access to international markets, while the strongest members reinforced their position by concentrating and circulating funds and commodities on behalf of small-scale traders and investors³².

In 1850, 49 Greek commercial houses operated in London³³. Out of the lot, 33 houses (70% of the total) appear in the ledgers of the

30. Mark Granovetter, "Business groups and social organization", in Neil Smelser-Richard Swedberg (eds.) *Handbook of Economic Sociology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 429.

31. Galani, "Greek Merchant Bankers in the City of London"; in Timotheos Catsiyannis, *The Greek Community of London* (London 1993), p. 53.

32. Interestingly, Pepelasis-Minoglou on the Greek bankers in Constantinople discerns between an "inner-core" of the long-established bankers and the "new-comers", or in fact, the latecomers in the ottoman financial market towards the end of the 19th century. See Pepelasis-Minoglou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking", pp. 125-146.

33. *The Post Office London Directory*, 1850.

Bank of England, carrying out financial transactions³⁴. These firms, merchant bankers of London, had the credentials to deal with the central bank. However, only 16 of the Greek firms were allowed to discount bills of exchange through the Bank³⁵. They were the “hard core” of the group: the few and most powerful houses with the necessary liquidity and creditworthiness. Discounters’ accounts were only allowed to a limited number of clients, upon the recommendation of a member of the bank’s board, who would vouch for the financial standing and suitability of the candidate³⁶. These firms included some of the most influential members of the Greek diaspora houses, with agents and partners in the biggest cities and ports, spanning from the Atlantic and Western Europe to the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean: the Ralli, Schilizzi, Baltazzi, Rodocanachi, Ionidi, Hava, Mavrogordato, Petrocochino, Balli, Spartali, Scaramanga et al. They circulated thousands of bills of exchange that amounted in millions of pounds. Indicatively, in 1847, 14 Greek merchant bankers discounted with the Bank of England 3,410 bills of exchange of £4,165,000 value in total³⁷.

The business was characterized by internal hierarchy and cooperation among the members of the Greek group. The leading houses had secured their position in the London market, due to their wealth and scope of activities. They had secured access to banks, the insurance companies, the Baltic Exchange, the Stock market, which was indeed a difficult endeavor. On commission, they conducted trading, shipping and financial services for the members of the Greek group, a large body of clients and partners. These were in practice small houses, unknown and insignificant in Britain, who would have been, otherwise, excluded from the international market for credit.

The wealth of the market and the assimilation of the Greeks in the financial circles of London awed their fellow countrymen in Istanbul. Andreas Syngros, one of the most proactive bankers in the Ottoman capital, in his visit to London in the 1860’s was astounded by the sophistication of the sector. His reactions are best captured in his

34. The Bank of England Archives, *Greek Firms* C 30/4 (1848-1852).

35. The Bank of England Archives, *Discounters Ledgers*, C 22.1-22.22.

36. The Bank of England Archive, C 29/20 *Discount Applications* (1839-1849).

37. The Bank of England Archives, *Discounters Ledgers*, C 22.1-22.22.

own words: “*I knew only by hearing and due to my long-lasting relations with the London market, of the greatness of (banking) business there and the ease and simplicity in which transactions were carried out; However there is one thing to hear and another to see and experience it firsthand*”³⁸.

Syngros, with a background in trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, became involved in banking in the 1860's, when he set a banking house with his partners Koronios, Vlastos, Scouloudes. He also proceeded to the foundation of the joint-stock *Banque de Constantinople* (1872) with a nominal capital of £1,000,000 to finance the Ottoman public debt. His banking ventures expanded beyond the Ottoman Empire, to Greece, where the banking sector was slowly taking shape. In Athens, he cooperated with Ev. Baltazzis from Odessa to found the *General Credit Bank* and in 1882, when Thessaly was annexed to Greece, he established the privileged *Bank of Epirus and Thessaly* to contribute in the economic integration of the new territories.


Syngros, an ambitious international player was only reasonable to turn to the London market in quest of foreign capital when he first set his banking house with his partners. He was not an exception; In a globalizing economy, Greek private bankers had recourse to their diaspora network to secure commodities, capital and intelligence. In the course of the perpetual, self-feeding debt-crisis of the Ottoman state, the Galata Bankers found themselves short of the necessary credit and relied on foreign capital markets to raise money. The dependency on the London market grew even more after 1865, when the foreign bonds of the Ottoman debt were traded in the Stock Exchange in London. This was a profitable business for the intermediaries who would profit from the interest rate differential between the Ottoman and the European market. Greek bankers would provide short-term advances to the Treasury for an interest rate of 12-18% and would receive in exchange a guarantee for repayment. This deferred payment involved bills, concessions and bonds; these were not meant to be used e.g. for tax farming, but were in fact promissory notes, of a mean duration of three months, that could be renewed before maturity. The securities were traded abroad to raise fresh credit that could be re-invested in the ottoman

38. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, p. 244. The original text in Greek- the translation was provided by the author.

debt cycle. What's more, western credit was cheap as the papers were discounted at an interest rate of no more than 3%-4%³⁹.

The importance of the Anglo-ottoman channel of credit for Greek private bankers- in either end of this channel- is illustrated in the ledgers of the Bank of England. Although the Bank of England was not the sole banking institution where Greeks held accounts and carried out transactions in London, "the Old Lady" was the most esteemed institution, i.e. the central bank, which set the tone for the entire banking sector⁴⁰. On a detailed analysis of the bills of exchange discounted at the bank by Greek firms, one cannot fail to notice the wide geographic spread of the network: bills were drawn at 120 different sites, from Shanghai and Madras to Caracas and Lima in Peru. However 2/3 of the total is concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean- basically Greece and the coastline of the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul, is the most frequent location of drawings (40%) followed by Smyrna (9%), while in particular the *Bank of Constantinople* represented 30% of the total bills⁴¹.

Figure 3: Bills of exchange discounted by Greek firms in the Bank of England (1848-1852)



Source: Processed data from The Bank of England Archives, C 30/4 *Greek firms discounted Bills (1848-1852)*.

39. Exertzoglou, *Greek banking in Constantinople*, pp. 132-138. Pepelasis-Mino-glou, "Ethnic minority groups in international banking", pp. 131-136.

40. Andreas Andreades, *History of the Bank of England, 1640-1903* (Abington: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1966) 4th edit

41. Processed data The Bank of England Archive, *Discounters Ledgers C22/1-C22/22*

However, access to the international capital market, in a highly-competitive environment, was not an easy task, especially for peripheral actors that did not have a name. It was therefore indispensable for any outsider in the London market to have the right contacts that would introduce them in the financial circles, vouch for their good reputation and disclose the know-how of the business. Syngros' initiation to the London market is revealing of the socio-economic strings that connected the nodes of Greek diaspora. When he first tapped London, he was given the cold shoulder by the members of the Greek business group, as he was "a newcomer, who did not know either the habits, the life, the language, or the people and the way of business"⁴².

Syngros first approached an old acquaintance, Constantine Ionides, a well-established merchant banker in the City who was born in Istanbul and was well-disposed to a private banker from his place of origin⁴³. Ionides informed Syngros about the two pre-requisites for all bankers who wished to do business in the City: he had to open a bank account and have an office⁴⁴. In a manifestation of solidarity, Ionides offered him a room in his own premises to pass as an office and a clerk to run it. He also suggested the *Union Bank* for the account and provided the necessary recommendation. He encouraged Syngros to deposit as much as possible to impress the banking circles in the City and thus the latter opened his account with £20,000 followed by another £100,000. The next step was the Baltic Exchange, a "kind of a mercantile club", the biggest commodity and freight market in Europe⁴⁵. The Baltic was the meeting point of the elite of the business community, where they conducted all trade, banking and financial activities. Greeks had played an important role in the Baltic Exchange: they were members of its committee, while M.E Rodocanachis and A. Ralls were elected as directors⁴⁶. At the Baltic, Ionides introduced Syngros to the most prominent members of the Greek business group such as M. Zarifis, X.Ballis, M.Rodocanachis. E. Rallis, P. Vaglianos, P. Rodocanachis

42. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, p. 235.

43. Timotheos Catsiannis, *Constantine Ionides-Ipliktsis*, London, 1988.

44. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, p. 235.


45. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, p. 236

46. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-owned shipping*, pp. 57-60.

and A. Rallis, who were cautious towards the newcomer; Greeks in the City distrusted financiers- especially those without connections- engaged in the borrowing of the unstable Ottoman state and feared a potential bankruptcy that they might contaminate them.

However, we need to keep in mind that the flow of credit from London to Istanbul did not solely service the financing of the imperial state but was, to a great extent, related to commercial activities.

Figure 4: Bills from Constantinople discounted by Greek firms at the Bank of England, 1845-1855, (n. and value)



Source: Processed data The Bank of England Archives, *Discounters Ledgers*, C 22.1-22.22.

The figure shows the bills of exchange drawn at Constantinople and discounted by Greek firms at the Bank of England between 1845 and 1855. In a nutshell, the rate of bills, both in value and numbers, had a downward trend. It seems that the spike of 1847 is associated to the establishment of a new bank, the *Bank of Constantinople* by Baltazzis and Alleon that meant to connect Constantinople with London and directed a bulk of bills to the City market to be discounted. The performance is rather poor in the early 1850's,


with a steep drop in both numbers and value of bills in 1853, on the outbreak of the Crimean war. This year is in fact a milestone for the Ottoman public debt, as it was internationalized to secure immediate liquidity to the warring state. While the public debt rose exponentially, the war on the contrary destroyed trade in the Levant, as exports from the Black Sea were obstructed¹. The data from the Bank of England suggest that the Greek business group in London was primarily engaged in the financing of trade rather than in the trade in bonds and loans. When Syngros tried to discount an ottoman bond of £100,000 at the City, the Greek merchant banker Ballis took him to a private discount house that agreed to discount the bill for a low commission of 2%. Ballis suggested that in the future, Syngros should contact Jewish bankers in London as the Greeks were absorbed in commercial transactions especially in the Danube and the Black Sea². It was only a matter of time before Syngros reached the house of Bischoffheim and Goldschmidt who were keener to invest in the Ottoman public debt.

In the course of the century, especially from the 1880's onwards, the economic growth in Britain reached a standstill, while the Ottoman Empire and Greece confronted insolvency, with the concomitant collapse of the banking sector and the constraint of private bankers. The height of their strength and influence was in the mid-century; in the aftermath of the Greek Revolution, a new wave of entrepreneurs composed the Greek business network, in Greece, the Ottoman Empire and the Western markets, and combined trade with shipping and finance. These international economic actors played a significant role in the process of globalization, assisting in the integration of markets and the circulation of capital.

1. Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

2. Syngros, *Απομνημονεύματα*, v. II, pp. 244-245.

Post card of 1905 with a general view of Trebizond
(source: Edhem Eldem)



Post card of 1903 with a view of acropolis and the house of captain
Yorği Paşa in Giresun (source: Edhem Eldem)



Charter II

The Development of the Black Sea Economy in the 19th Century

1.

Scanning the Ottoman Black Sea in 1900 through the Revue commerciale du Levant

*Edhem Eldem**

Introduction: the Revue commerciale du Levant

Established in 1887 as a handwritten and mimeographed information bulletin, the *Revue commerciale du Levant*, also known as the *Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, was a monthly publication intended to inform its readers on the ways and nature of trade in the Ottoman Empire, with particular focus on the capital. Its initial readership was extremely modest, largely limited to the members of the French Chamber of Commerce, itself a rather recent creation, dating back to 1884. French presence in Constantinople was not recent, and acquired some formal structure in the sixteenth century as the treaty of capitulations granted to the French placed traders from this nation under the responsibility of the ambassador in Constantinople and of the consuls in the provincial outposts, known as the *échelles [du Levant]*. By the eighteenth century, an additional body was created formed of generally two *députés* nominated by the community of traders and appointed by the ambassador, who acted as representatives of the French merchant community in the city. Despite radical changes in the nineteenth century, and most notably the quantitative leap of trade with the West, this antiquated structure was maintained until the creation, on October 6, 1884, of the French Chamber of Commerce of Constantinople. When one of the most active members behind the project, the Marseillais Ernest Giraud, who had set up his business in Istanbul in the late 1860s, was appointed secretary to the

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Chamber in 1887, one of his first contributions was to start this publication. Giraud soon became president, but never relinquished his role as editor of the *Revue* until he left the country for good in 1924.

Despite a very modest start, the Chamber's publication soon proved to be a real success. Some fifteen years into its career, by the turn of the century, its monthly issues had reached an impressive size of more than 200 pages and a print run of over 1,500. Its focus had changed accordingly: from a news bulletin for members of the Chamber, it was now sent out to a large number of subscribers in France and Europe, with the avowed aim of informing them about the vicissitudes of trade in the Ottoman lands.

To do so, the publication relied on the network of correspondents and informers set up by the Chamber throughout the Empire. Initially, the aim had been to establish similar committees in the country's commercially significant cities, with the first three examples in Bursa, the Dardanelles (Çanakkale) and Smyrna (Izmir). While the latter eventually developed into a bona fide Chamber of Commerce, the French Ministry of Trade rejected the idea of provincial committees. As a result the Chamber had to resort to a compromise by seeking "collaborators" throughout the Empire, who at the same time became "correspondents" of the *Revue*. By the turn of the century the number of these informants had reached 127, of whom 81 were located in Ottoman cities and towns, while the remaining 46 resided in neighboring countries, including no less than 15 in Russia.

"These devoted collaborators send us reports that are inserted in the Revue commerciale du Levant, they provide intelligence on their clients and all other information useful to French trade. Consequently, our traders and industrialists have at their disposal in most commercial centers of the Levant assistants who are always willing to help them. This is a precious advantage, which a large number of compatriots have greatly appreciated. Every month, the Bulletin mensuel examines, as a special article, one commodity imported in the Levant or exported from this country, or one category of commercial activity in the region. The journal's editor-in-chief writes a general article, while the correspondents provide details concerning their region. Every issue of the Revue commerciale du Levant therefore specializes on one item,

on top of numerous other studies, thus forming a precious collection of information. We wish this publication could be less read abroad, and more in France.”¹.

Of the Chamber’s 81 correspondents in “Turkey” – meaning on Ottoman soil – six were responsible for four Black Sea ports, namely, from West to East, İnebolu, Samsun, Giresun, and Trabzon. İnebolu (Ineboli) and Giresun (Kerassunde) had one representative each, Victor Velasti, British and Italian consular agent and representative of the Ottoman Lighthouses (Phares ottomans) for the former, and the trader Aristotle G. Néophytos, for the latter. The larger cities of Samsun and Trabzon (Trebizond) had two correspondents each: in Samsun, Henri de Cortanze, French consular agent and representative of the Messageries Maritimes shipping company and François de Zara, inspector of the Tobacco Regie; in Trabzon, the trading house of Hochstrasser et C^{ie} and Boghos A. Marimian, trader and commissioner².

To complete the picture, one would have to add the Chamber’s correspondents in a number of Black Sea ports in neighboring countries: Burgaz and Varna in Bulgaria; Brăila, Bucharest, Galați and Constanța in Romania; and Batum, Odessa and Poti in Russia. However, as my focus is on the Ottoman ports of the south shores of the Black Sea, I will not include these particular localities in this study.

Yet another limitation that I will impose on this study concerns the period covered. As noted above, the *Revue* had started in the late 1880s, grown in the 1890s, and continued practically until the outbreak of the Great War. The return of peace and the occupation of Istanbul by the Entente powers brought it back to life in 1919 and it did continue its existence into the mid-1920s. The format had been reduced, however, due to the dire conditions of the market during the period and, especially from our perspective, to the shrinking and demise of the Empire that once constituted the background for lively and prosperous commercial activity. For all practical purposes, then, the *Revue*’s proper and consistent coverage

1. On the Chamber and its publication, see Ernest Giraud, *La France à Constantinople* (Constantinople: Imprimerie française, 1907), pp. 93, 150–6.

2. *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/142 (January 31, 1899), pp. 38–40.

of trade and navigation in the Black Sea covers a period of about two decades, extending from the mid-1890s to World War I. Then again, as my objective here is not an exhaustive treatment of the Black Sea as seen through the lenses of the French Chamber of Commerce, but rather an examination of this phenomenon through a significant and consistent sample, I have chosen to pick two whole years more or less in the middle of the period, namely the 1899-1900. My assumption is that the arbitrariness of this choice is offset by the rather repetitive way in which the same information is covered year after year by the *Revue's* editor and informants: general statistics relating to trade and navigation in the area, focused analyses of the particular situation in each of the principal ports, data concerning the communications between some of these trade centers and the caravan trade bound for Iran...In other words, in a period of relative stability, the risk of uncontrolled and unaccountable variations in yearly data produced by pretty much the same people and using pretty much the same sources is low enough to assume that two consecutive years – 1899 and 1900 – will be to a large extent representative of the entire period.

This brings me to a last point concerning the data, namely the sources of information they were obtained from. In the case of certain statistics, especially those general figures on trade and navigation in the Ottoman seas, the *Revue* simply used Ottoman official statistics, as evident from the fact that these series are dated according to the Ottoman fiscal calendar – called *Mali* or *Rumi* – which combined the Hegirian year with the Julian calendar. This leads to an inevitable, but from our perspective unimportant, discrepancy with the *Revue's* own chronology – based on the Gregorian calendar. In the case of these general statistics, I have used the data for the year 1313 AH, corresponding to the period between March 13, 1897 and March 12, 1898, which were published in the 1899 edition of the *Revue*. Most of the other reports and statistics, however, were signed by the *Revue's* correspondent in a certain town, thus attesting to firsthand information collected through these individuals' local networks of intelligence. Considering that many of them were either businessmen directly involved in the region's trade or representatives of institutions likely to have access to this kind of information: consulates, the administration of lighthouses, or the Tobacco Régie...

A quantitative assessment: volume of shipping

The most basic information that the *Revue* offered to its readers was of a purely quantitative and statistical nature, and of a macro scale. Taking up the shipping statistics provided by the state, the bulletin examined produced every year a series of articles on the “*mouvement maritime de l’Empire ottoman*,” i.e. all shipping activities throughout the imperial domains³. These statistics were rather succinct, as they reported only on the number of ships, their flag, their type (sail or steam) and their gross register tonnage. By collapsing almost twenty-five different flags into two broad categories – Ottoman⁴ and foreign – one can reduce this general picture to its simplest expression. (Table I)

Table I – Total volume of shipping in Ottoman waters, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

flag	sail	tons	steam	tons	total	tons
Ottoman	129,765	1,829,350	9,670	3,659,591	139,435	5,488,941
foreign	4,294	377,787	30,010	28,786,729	34,304	29,164,516
total	134,059	2,207,137	39,680	32,446,320	173,739	34,653,457

According to this table, the total yearly gross tonnage of Ottoman shipping reached almost 35 million tons, 85 percent of which consisted of ships flying foreign flags. A closer look at these statistics reveals that Britain by far dominated all this shipping, with over 34 percent of the tonnage, followed by Austria and Hungary (15.7 percent), the Ottoman Empire (14 percent), France (8.7 percent), Russia (8.1 percent), Italy (6 percent), and Greece (4.2 percent).

More importantly, however, this statistical information allows for a rough subdivision of all shipping into three major regions, defined with respect to the central position attributed to the Em-

3. “Mouvement maritime de l’Empire ottoman,” *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/148 (July 31, 1899), pp. 121–30.

4. “Ottoman” includes two vassal flags, namely Samos and Egypt.

pire's capital and major port, Istanbul. Thus, Istanbul itself can be accounted for roughly one third of all shipping (Table II), while another 60 percent accrues to all ports located south of Istanbul, thus constituting a very wide area including the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Red Seas (Table III). The remaining volume of shipping, a little under 10 percent, corresponded to whatever lay north of Istanbul or, in other words, the Black Sea (Table IV).

Table II – Volume of shipping at Istanbul harbor, 1313 AH
(13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

flag	Sail	tons	steam	tons	Total	tons
Ottoman	22,110	370,846	1,120	385,354	23,230	756,200
foreign	413	89,640	8,658	10,464,638	9,071	10,554,278
total	22,523	460,486	9,778	10,849,992	32,301	11,310,478

Table III – Volume of shipping in Ottoman ports of the Mediterranean, Aegean and Red Seas, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

flag	sail	tons	steam	tons	total	tons
Ottoman	81,119	1,229,316	7,037	1,930,935	88,156	3,160,251
foreign	3,731	277,812	19,761	16,572,990	23,492	16,850,802
total	84,850	1,507,128	26,798	18,503,925	111,648	20,011,053

Table IV – Volume of shipping in Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

flag	Sail	tons	steam	tons	total	tons
Ottoman	26,536	229,188	1,513	1,343,302	28,049	1,572,490
foreign	150	10,335	1,591	1,749,101	1,741	1,759,436
total	26,686	239,523	3,104	3,092,403	29,790	3,331,926

Some 3 million tons out of a total of almost 35 million was certainly marginal; in fact, shipping in the Black Sea ports did not even total a third of the volume of shipping arriving at Istanbul. Of course,

one could always argue that Istanbul itself was a port on the Black Sea, but the inclusion of an element of such exceptional nature and status in the sample would have very heavily distorted our general vision. Moreover, it should be stressed that the Black Sea covered by these statistics consisted only of the Ottoman shores of this sea, to the exclusion of a very considerable volume of trade concerning the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Russian harbors of the same area. In that sense, it is obvious that a sizeable portion of the 11 million tons listed under Istanbul represented shipping to or from these foreign destinations, most likely in much greater quantities than the Ottoman ports of the northern Anatolian shoreline. The Ottoman Black Sea under study here, therefore, is limited to a series of thirteen ports lined up from Ereğli (Heracleia), just east of Istanbul, in the west, to Rize, in the east, a short distance from the Russian border.

A simple table regrouping these thirteen ports reveals the great variations observed from one location to another in terms of the volume of trade. Roughly, one can distinguish four categories of ports in terms of their volume of shipping. Samsun, Trabzon (Trebizond), Giresun (Kerassunde), and İnebolu form the first group of large ports, with a volume varying between 400,000 and 650,000 tons. The five following ports (Ordu, Ereğli, Sinop, Rize, and Ünye) form an intermediate category, between 100,000 and 300,000 tons. Finally, the four small ports at the lower end of the scale, Zonguldak, Platana, Bartın, and Amasra, the latter two lagging far behind with barely 20-30,000 tons every year. (Table V, Figure I)

Table V – Distribution of local and foreign shipping among the Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

Port	Ottoman	foreign	total
Samsun	195,522 (30.8 %)	439,100 (69.2 %)	634,622
Trabzon	209,927 (33.4 %)	418,859 (66.6 %)	628,786
Giresun	165,370 (34.4 %)	315,384 (65.6 %)	480,754
İnebolu	190,799 (47.9 %)	207,247 (52.1 %)	398,046
Ordu	154,570 (61.5 %)	96,700 (38.5 %)	251,270
Ereğli	190,301 (95.6 %)	8,826 (4.4 %)	199,127
Sinop	132,325 (70.9 %)	54,328 (29.1 %)	186,653

Rize	67,260 (60.2 %)	111,710 (39.8 %)	178,970
Ünye	109,337 (76.3 %)	34,019 (23.7 %)	143,356
Zonguldak	54,429 (59.3 %)	37,302 (40.7 %)	91,731
Platana	38,629 (44.6 %)	47,955 (55.4 %)	86,584
Bartın	30,007 (99.3 %)	220 (0.7 %)	30,227
Amasra	21,763 (99.8 %)	37 (0.2 %)	21,800
Total	1,572,490 (47.2 %)	1,759,436 (52.8 %)	3,331,926

The variations in the volume of shipping were paralleled by significant structural differences in the ratio of Ottoman and foreign shipping. Not surprisingly, there seems to have been a certain degree of positive correlation between the volume of shipping and the proportion of foreign maritime presence in the harbor. Indeed, in the three largest ports of Samsun, Trabzon, and Giresun, foreign shipping represented about two-thirds of all maritime activity, while the figure dropped to 30-50 percent in the more modest locations of İnebolu, Ordu, Sinop, Rize, Zonguldak, and Platana. In Ereğli, despite a sizeable volume of trade, and in the tiny ports of Bartın and Amasra, foreign shipping almost literally disappeared.

Figure I – Volume of shipping in Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)



A quantitative assessment : sail versus steam

Ottoman statistics also revealed another important structural distinction in shipping, namely that between sail and steam. At a general level, approximately 6.3 percent of the shipping was still made by sail, a proportion which dropped to 4.1 percent in Istanbul, but stood at 7.5 and 7.2 percent in the Mediterranean-Aegean region and in the Black Sea, respectively. Not surprisingly, most of these sailing ships flew the Ottoman flag: almost 83 percent overall, 80.5 in Istanbul, 81.6 in the Mediterranean and Aegean, and up to 95.7 in the Black Sea.


A closer look at the corresponding figures for the Black Sea ports petty much reproduces the hierarchy reflected in the tonnage figures. The largest and most active ports are those where sailing ships remain extremely marginal compared to steamships, their participation in trade rarely exceeding 5 percent of the volume. On the contrary, the more modest harbors are characterized by a strong presence of sails, reaching up to almost half the volume in the extreme cases of Bartın and Amasra. Clearly, the survival in such large numbers of sailing ships needs to be taken as an unmistakable sign of relative underdevelopment. Yet another factor that may have played an important role is the proximity of these ports to a major commercial harbor. This would probably explain that sail-powered shipping was still very considerable in Ereğli and Zonguldak, close to Istanbul, despite their relatively high volume of trade. A similar explanation could be proposed for Platana, which functioned mostly as a winter refuge for ships that wanted to avoid being exposed to strong northwestern winds in the bay of Trabzon. This ancillary function may have led to the development of this harbor as a kind of annex of Trabzon, thus leading to the development of a coastal trade between the two ports, further reinforced by a biweekly market of local produce held in Platana.⁵(Table VI and Figure II)

5. "Mouvement maritime de l'Empire ottoman," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/149 (August 31, 1899), p. 381.

Table VI – Distribution of sail and steam shipping among the Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, in tons, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)

Port	sail	Steam	total
Samsun	13,099 (2.1 %)	621,523 (97.9 %)	634,622
Trabzon	37,342 (5.9 %)	591,444 (94.1 %)	628,786
Giresun	16,980 (3.5 %)	463,774 (96.5 %)	480,754
İnebolu	8,023 (2.0 %)	390,023 (98.0 %)	398,046
Ordu	6,869 (2.7 %)	244,401 (96.3 %)	251,270
Ereğli	55,979 (28.1 %)	143,148 (71.9 %)	199,127
Sinop	19,859 (10.6 %)	166,794 (89.4 %)	186,653
Rize	14,215 (7.9 %)	164,755 (92.1 %)	178,970
Ünye	6,158 (4.3 %)	137,198 (95.7 %)	143,356
Zonguldak	19,424 (21.2 %)	72,307 (78.8 %)	91,731
Platana	16,585 (19.1 %)	69,999 (80.9 %)	86,584
Bartın	14,610 (48.3 %)	15,617 (51.7 %)	30,227
Amasra	10,380 (47.6 %)	11,420 (52.4 %)	21,800
Total	239,523 (7.2 %)	3,092,403 (92.8 %)	3,331,926

Figure II – Distribution of sail and steam shipping among the Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, in tons, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898)



However marginal sail power may have been, it still accounted for a sizeable portion of shipping in Ottoman seas and ports. Beyond that, the statistical information on the type of power used in ships is also useful to get a sense of the nature of the ships themselves. Indeed, as these statistics systematically include both the number

of ships and their total tonnage, one can easily calculate their average size. Concerning the entire maritime trade of the Empire, these figures speak of a two-tiered distinction. On average, sailing ships represented a displacement of 16.5 tons, while steamers reached about fifty times that size, at about 820 tons. These figures showed some variations across the three maritime regions covered by the statistics. Sailing ships could measure 18 to 20 tons in Istanbul and the Mediterranean-Aegean, and their capacity could drop to about 9 tons in the Black Sea. Steamers, on the other hand reached 1100 and 1000 tons in Istanbul and the Black Sea, respectively, while their tonnage dropped to about 700 tons south of the Straits.

Yet what these averages hid was a major distinction between local and foreign ships with regard to size. Throughout the Empire, Ottoman sailing ships averaged 14 tons, while those flying foreign flags – more than thirty times less numerous – measured almost six times that figure, with an average of 88 tons. A similar, if somewhat less pronounced, difference characterized steamships, locals measuring 380 tons on average against almost 1000 tons under foreign flag.

In the specific case of the Black Sea, the difference was much more marked for sails than steamers. The average Ottoman sailing ship measured less than 9 tons, against 69 for foreign ships, while steamers were much closer in size, at 890 tons for the locals and 1100 for foreign vessels. A closer look at this phenomenon across the thirteen ports of the region (Table VII) shows both consistencies and variations, some of which may need to be ascribed to intrinsic weaknesses of the statistical data. Indeed, given the marginality of foreign sails – a mere 150 ships against over 26,000 flying the Ottoman flag – the representativeness of some of the figures becomes highly debatable. Thus, apart from the four ports from which foreign sails were totally absent (İnebolu, Zonguldak, Bartın and Amasra), the figures for Sinop and Ünye (marked with an asterisk) were based on such a small number of ships – two and one, respectively – that they can hardly be taken to bear statistical relevance.

Table VII – Average tonnage of sail- and steamships in the Ottoman ports of the Black Sea, 1313 AH (13 March 1897-12 March 1898) in gross register tons

Port	sail power		steam power	
	Ottoman	foreign	Ottoman	foreign
Samsun	6	170	1068	1193
Trabzon	5	68	1110	1205
Giresun	4	155	1088	1174
İnebolu	7	–	1062	1145
Ordu	3	93	1111	1192
Ereğli	52	443*	625	180
Sinop	11	294	1180	1112
Rize	6	4	1186	960
Ünye	4	582*	1192	1238
Zonguldak	15	–	300	466
Platana	8	186	1086	1212
Bartın	24	–	181	37
Amasra	40	–	187	37
average	9	69	890	1100

Skewed as they may have been, these figures nevertheless allow for some tentative observations. While the tonnage of most sailing vessels corresponds to the overall average of under 10 tons, a few ports seem to distinguish themselves by significantly higher figures. This is particularly the case of Bartın, Amasra, Zonguldak, and Ereğli, whose common characteristic may well have been their relative proximity to Istanbul. When combined with the previous observation that these were precisely the ports where sail power controlled the largest share of shipping, one gets a sense that most of the maritime activity in these ports was handled by a relatively important number of boats capable of handling a journey of 100 to 150 nautical miles between Istanbul and these ports. The much smaller boats that filled the other ports in great numbers but in small volume were most probably catering to a local and coastal trade connecting neighboring harbors to each other or to their immediate vicinity. Interestingly, steam shipping displays the exact reverse profile, with large ships linking the larger ports, while the four ports of the western coast seem to have received much smaller vessels, ranging from an occasional maximum of some 600 tons to a much more frequent low of about 200. Interestingly, one notices no significant difference between foreign and Ottoman shipping within this context.

In all likelihood, what all this information points at is the existence of several regions and levels of shipping activity along the entire coast. It seems rather obvious that the westernmost ports, from Ereğli to Amasra, constituted a region that was interconnected at a local level, but which, more importantly, benefited from direct links to Istanbul. The fact that both Ereğli and Zonguldak were first and foremost the outlets of the Empire's major coal producing area makes this all the more likely: ships must have come empty to these ports from Istanbul, loaded coal and made their way back to the capital, definitely the largest center for coal consumption. As to the other ports, it is probable that they constituted a series in stops for steamships of relatively high tonnage that regularly sailed back and forth along the coast. One gets a sense that the eastern end of the coast – Rize, Trabzon, and Platana – may have reproduced on a smaller scale the pattern observed in the west. That almost all of the foreign sails in these ports were Russian suggests that they may have been connected to the neighboring ports of Batum and Poti, only a short distance east of the Russo-Ottoman border.

The schedules of shipping companies confirms to a large extent these patterns. The “Russian Navigation Company” had a regular departure every Tuesday from Odessa, which would follow a set itinerary : Istanbul-İnebolu-Sinop-Samsun-Ordu-Giresun-Trabzon, with Batum as its final destination, at the end of ten days. The return trip followed the exact same itinerary in reverse.⁶ The French company “Paquet” followed more or less the same path, starting this time from Marseilles and then calling at Samsun, Giresun, Trabzon, and Batum. The company further advertised that the service used “first class ships,” ranging from 3,000 to 1,500 tons, the only exception being the 400-ton *La Moselle*⁷.

A focused vision: the ports

While the *Revue* published the Ottoman government's statistics on shipping, it also used its network of correspondents to focus on

6. *Annuaire oriental*, 1896-1897, p. 174.

7. *Annuaire oriental*, 1896-1897, p. 175.

some of the ports that were somewhat hastily covered by Ottoman statistics. True, Ernest Giraud, who had a particular taste for history and anecdotes, made a particular effort to liven up this statistical survey with a narrative he attributed to a friend well versed in history. Informative as this may have been about the kingdom of the Amazons and the historic toponymy of the region, a more detailed information about the trading conditions and potential of the ports had to come from those men who, thanks to their local knowledge, were in a position to share some of the details of their own commercial turf. Unfortunately, as representatives of the French Chamber of Commerce, they felt obliged to spend most of their energy in explaining what France's share was in the shipping and trade of their "hometown." Nevertheless, these reports, generally presented as a "letter from..." did provide detailed figures on the harbor's trade and some qualitative information on the way this trade was conducted. Not surprisingly, the most detailed information had to do with the major ports of the area, while the smaller ones were easily dismissed as being of little consequence. Each of the principal harbors had its particular profile, as reflected in the yearly statistics of its trade. İnebolu exported the equivalent of a little less than 8,000,000 francs, or approximately 350,000 Ottoman gold liras. Among these exports, two items made up for some 3,300,000 francs or about 40 percent: timber and mohair. Apart from the mohair exported to Britain, most of the other products were destined to domestic consumption, representing about 55 percent of all exports. Imports, on the other hand, were much more diverse, with one item – cotton yarn and cotton textiles – making up about half of a total of 5,200,000 francs. Interestingly, these manufactured and half-manufactured goods did not originate from Britain, but mostly from Italy (1,200,000 francs), Germany (520,000 francs) and the Ottoman lands (500,000 francs)⁸.

Yet another important port – in fact one of the two leading ones, together with Trabzon – Samsun exported almost double the value of İnebolu: 18 million francs in 1898, and 13.5 million in 1899. Here again, exports were concentrated in a few major items, which,

8. "Lettred'İnéboli," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/155 (February 28, 1900), pp. 147–156.

together, represented almost two thirds of the total. Wheat and flour added up to 28 percent, a proportion reached by the port's major export item, tobacco, while hides came next, at 8.5 percent. All of the cereal products left for destinations within the Empire, as did about one third of the tobacco. All in all, a little over half of the port's outgoing trade was absorbed by the domestic market, the rest being exported to Europe, especially France and Britain. Imports, reaching an average of 12 million francs, were likewise roughly divided equally between Ottoman and European provenances. Cotton yarn and cotton textiles, like in İnebolu, made up for almost half of the imports; the most important provenance for these items was the Empire itself, in the form of European exports re-exported from Istanbul. In fact, Samsun itself was not the final destination for this voluminous trade; according to local observers, almost all of it was destined to be distributed in the Anatolian hinterland, especially in the major towns of the province of Sivas: Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya. Observers were unanimous in describing Samsun as one of the most promising ports of the area, not least because of the advantages to be expected from the projected construction of a railway linking this city to that of Sivas, in the Anatolian heartland⁹.

Yet another significant, if more modest, port on which the *Revue* collected information was Giresun, generally taken together with the neighboring localities of Ordu and Tirebolu. Exports from Giresun showed even less variety than the previous cases: almost 90 percent of the 4.6 million francs they amounted to consisted of hazelnuts shipped mostly to Russia, Austria, and France. Imports displayed the usual mix of manufactured goods and agricultural produce, most of which was evidently destined for the hinterland¹⁰.

Perhaps the most atypical of all the Black Sea ports was that of Trabzon, the largest coastal town close to the Russian border. In terms of its volume of trade, Trabzon came immediately after Samsun, at the very top of the thirteen ports under study. The

9. "Mouvement commercial de Samsoun pendant l'année 1899," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/155 (February 28, 1900), pp. 230–249.

10. "II^{ème} lettre de Kerassunde," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/157 (April 30, 1900), pp. 514–522.

two ports' shipping figures were practically identical, with about 600,000 tons, one third of which was handled by local vessels, while the remaining two thirds were entrusted to foreign ships¹¹. Interestingly, despite these similarities in shipping figures, the value of Trabzon's annual trade was considerably higher than Samsun's. Imports reached about 35 million francs, almost double the value fetched by Samsun's imports at their best. The difference in exports was less marked, Trabzon totaling about 16 million francs against Samsun's 12 million. However, what really set Trabzon apart from the rest of the ports, was the sizeable part played by the transit trade to and from Iran in the city's commercial activity.

The importance of the Iranian transit trade is most obvious in the port's import figures. (Table VIII) Out of a total value of over 33 million francs, 12.5 million consisted of goods that entered the port only to be re-exported in the direction of neighboring Iran. Among these, textiles – especially cotton fabrics and cotton yarn – held an overwhelming share, well before other manufactured goods, sugar, and tea. This trade was dominated by the “usual suspects,” namely Britain, Germany, Austria, and France.

Against this lively transit trade, imports for local consumption – including the hinterland – represented a very substantial value of over 20 million francs. The nature of this trade was rather different, however, as suggested by the much lower ratio of value to volume. Indeed, imports destined to be re-exported represented a value of 12.5 million francs for a volume of some 5,300 tons, placing the ton at an average value of about 2,350 francs. Imports with Trabzon as their final destination, on the other hand, fetched a total volume of about 42,000 tons, representing a value 22 million francs, or, in other words, 525 francs to the ton. This five-fold difference pointed at the very different nature of the commodities traded in each case. The Iranian trade consisted mostly of manufactured goods of a higher value, while the local trade fed on a number of cheaper and bulkier goods, such as cereals, flour, and construction material. This also entailed the participation of actors that had been absent from the

11. Boghos O. Marimian, “Lettre de Trébizonde,” *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/156 (March 31, 1900), pp. 450–453.

transit import trade. While Britain, Germany, Austria, and France still accounted for more than half the value of the local trade, the Ottoman Empire and Russia controlled about a third of this value. Yet another indicator of this shift was the considerable role played by sail power in these two actors' shipping figures: about one third of the value and three quarters of the volume of Ottoman and Russian shipping to Trabzon was handled by sailboats. This situation was even more marked in the case of Russian imports, where a mere 17 percent in value and 4 percent in volume was loaded on steamers. If anything, this is a solid confirmation of what was suggested earlier with respect to the existence of a strong coastal trade in the area connected with the Russian ports of Batum and Poti.

Table VIII – Trabzon imports, 1899, in francs

	transit trade to Iran						local imports
	textiles	manufactured goods	tea	sugar	other	total	total
Turkey & Egypt	4,000				21,100	25,100	4,422,515
Russia					13,000	13,000	1,842,980
Britain	6,021,000	3,600	1,560,000		205,600	7,790,200	5,701,645
Austria & Germany	1,858,800	162,000			228,600	2,249,400	3,366,090
Belgium, Holland, Sweden	317,000	16,000			52,500	385,500	477,598
Bulgaria & Romania					5,000	5,000	492,980
France	919,000	15,400		481,200	194,000	1,609,600	3,169,680
Greece & USA					65,000	65,000	218,450
Italy & Switzerland	332,000	12,000			49,000	393,000	888,582
total	9,451,800	209,000	1,560,000	481,200	835,800	12,537,800	20,580,520

The situation for exports differed in several qualitative and quantitative aspects. The value of goods exiting the harbor of Trabzon was much lower, about half that of imports, at about 14.5 million francs. Only a quarter of the value of exports had to do with

the Persian trade, against well over one third of imports. These export goods were predictably “Oriental” in nature: about 45 percent consisted of carpets, 25 percent of shawls and silk fabrics, while tombak – a very finely chopped tobacco used in water pipes (*nargile*) – and raisins made up about 12 percent each.

A major difference in this trade had to do with its destinations. Contrary to the domination of Persian-bound transit trade by the major western countries, 75 percent of the trade in the reverse direction was shipped to Ottoman and Egyptian ports, evidently almost exclusively to Istanbul. Of course, in many of the cases, there is little doubt that these Ottoman ports, especially Istanbul, were merely another point of re-export towards European and American destinations. Indeed, a number of specialized articles in the *Revue* indicate that Istanbul was a major export center for carpets from Anatolia as well as Iran¹². This may also have been partly the case for shawls and silk fabrics, although it is very likely that a sizeable proportion of this commodity was also marketed to local customers in Istanbul and other major cities. Finally tombak – *tönbeki* in Turkish – catered almost exclusively to the needs of a local clientele, the numerous Ottomans who smoked the water pipe only with this very finely chopped and highly aromatic tobacco.

Local exports outside of the Persian transit trade displayed a somewhat similar profile. Out of a total a little less than 11 million francs, nearly 7 million or about two thirds were bound for Ottoman ports. Among the remaining destinations, Russia represented about 4 percent, approximately one quarter of which was transported by sail. Tobacco and hazelnuts constituted the bulk of these

12. According to the *Revue*, carpet exports from Istanbul in 1899, albeit without any distinction between Turkish and Persian, reached an estimated 30 million piasters or 7 million francs (Louis Santi, “Lettre de Mossoul,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, pp. 198–200; “Les tapis à Trébizonde,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, p. 336; E[rnest] G[iraud], “Tapis,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, pp. 352–64; François de Zara, “Lettre de Samsoun,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, p. 542; Gabriel Kasperkhan, “Lettre de Bagdad,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, pp. 629–30; “Lettre de Damas,” *Revue commerciale du Levant*, 1900/II, pp. 840–42). Keeping in mind that Istanbul was the major center for the re-export of Persian carpets, the total value of this transit trade might well be estimated at over 20 million piasters (4.5 million francs).

exports, followed far behind by sheep, white beans and a number of other agricultural products.

As in the case of imports, a considerable difference existed between the average value of local commodities and of Persian transit goods. The average ton of local goods stood at a little less than 600 francs, against 2,500 for a ton of re-exported Iranian commodities. With carpets and shawls constituting the bulk of the transit trade from Iran, it should not come as a surprise that these re-export commodities should have fetched a price level comparable to that of manufactured goods imported from Europe. In fact, one could even find it disappointing to see that the price of highly desirable handmade rugs and carpets should have apparently been comparable to that of machine-made imported textiles.

Table IX –Trabzon exports, 1899, in francs

	transit trade from Iran						local exports
	carpets	shawls & silk fabrics	tombak (tobacco)	raisins	other	total	total
Turkey & Egypt	1,377,000	912,800	482,000		72,040	2,843,840	6,780,597
Russia					3,000	3,000	997,170
Britain	136,200			188,800	19,890	344,890	123,832
Austria & Germany	63,600			257,600	33,480	354,680	677,156
Belgium, Holland, Sweden	1,800			12,500		14,300	225,400
Bulgaria & Romania		10,000		1,150		11,150	227,300
France	37,200				68,760	105,960	1,719,042
Greece, USA, Italy, Switzerland	85,800	10,000		5,500	12,000	113,300	147,570
total	1,701,600	932,800	482,000	465,550	691,080	3,791,030	10,777,407

The *Revue* provided an interesting follow-up on the Persian transit by publishing monthly reports dedicated exclusively to this very particular trade. Under the title of “Trafic de Trébizonde” (Trebizond Trade), the journal’s local correspondent, Boghos O. Marimian provided detailed weekly figures on the number of parcels (*colis*) received and sent out (Figure III), on the variation in transport rates (*cours du transport*) to Tabriz in qualitative terms (*ferme* (stable), *changeant* (variable), *calme* (still) and in krans¹³, on the number of camels (and sometimes mules) expected from Erzurum and Kızıldize¹⁴(Figure IV), and, finally, on the exchange rates on London, Paris, Vienna, and Russia¹⁵.

13. The kran or qiran was a Persian currency used between 1825 and 1932, worth 20 shahi, 1,000 dinar or 0.1 toman. The exchange rate of the kran during the period under study was 4.8 pence to the kran or 20.8 kran to the pound sterling.

14. Known today under the name of Ortadirek, Kızıldize is a village located just south of Bayezid (today’s Doğubeyazıt), close to the Ottoman-Iranian border.

15. Boghos O. Marimian, “Trafic de Trébizonde,” *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/142 (January 31, 1899), pp. 140–41; XIII/143 (February 28, 1899), pp. 365–366; XIII/144 (March 31, 1899), pp. 531–532; XIII/145 (April 30, 1899), pp. 798–799; XIII/146 (May 31, 1899), pp. 949–950; XIII/147 (June 30, 1899), pp. 1151–52; XIII/148 (July 31, 1899), pp. 44–45; XIII/149 (August 31, 1899), pp. 305–306; XIII/150 (September 30, 1899), pp. 507–508; XIII/151 (October 31, 1899), pp. 734–735; XIII/152 (November 30, 1899), pp. 864–865; XIII/153 (December 31, 1899), pp. 1104–1105; XIV/154 (January 31, 1900), pp. 61–62; XIV/155 (February 28, 1900), pp. 228–229; XIV/156 (March 31, 1900), pp. 456–457; XIV/157 (April 30, 1900), pp. 663–64; XIV/158 (May 31, 1900), pp. 832–833; XIV/159 (June 30, 1900), pp. 971–972; XIV/160 (July 31, 1900), pp. 165–166; XIV/161 (August 31, 1900), pp. 412–413; XIV/162 (September 30, 1900), pp. 584–585; XIV/163 (October 31, 1900), pp. 694–695; XIV/164 (November 30, 1900), pp. 878–879; XIV/165 (December 31, 1900), pp. 976–977.

Figure III – Weekly number of parcels received in Trabzon to be re-exported to Iran, January 1899 to December 1900





Figure IV – Weekly number of camels expected from Erzurum and Kızıldize, January 1899 to December 1900



added to the 7,733 parcels still in stock, formed a total of 55,185 parcels. Of these, 49,665 were exported to Iran, thus leaving a stock of 5,520 at the end of the year. What this meant is not very clear, but Marimian's "Letter from Trebizond" of late March underlined that there had been a drop compared to the preceding year, when 52,303 parcels had been received. He also observed that in previous years, yearly averages had reached up to 60,000, more than 20 percent above the 1899 figures. The *Revue*'s correspondent linked this drop to a decrease in imports bound for Iran amounting to 137 tons and one million francs¹⁶. This may allow us to estimate the average weight of a parcel at about 30 kg, and its value at some 200 francs. Yet Marimian's comments about some of the causes of this drop suggest that such simplistic correlations are extremely risky: "[the decrease in the volume and value of imports] is due to a depression of almost all imported goods, especially woolens and cotton textiles that concern Britain and Germany. This drop would have been more discernible if there had not been such a high demand for sugar, and if a group of silver ingots worth 25,000 Turkish liras had not been imported from Britain for the Persian Imperial Mint."¹⁷

Clearly, a proper understanding of the nature and evolution of this trade would require a separate study in its own right, apart from the fact that this particular commercial network extended far beyond the Black Sea, deep into the Anatolian and Iranian hinterland. At any rate, from the limited perspective of this study, what needs not be noted is simply the constant attention that the *Revue* directed at this distant and marginal trade: the monthly two pages that were devoted to the transit trade with Iran spoke of a persistent interest for the potential benefits that could be derived from this traditional network.

16. Boghos O. Marimian, "Lettre de Trébizonde," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/156 (March 31, 1900), p. 451.

17. Boghos O. Marimian, "Lettre de Trébizonde," *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIV/156 (March 31, 1900), p. 451.

Concluding Remarks

This study does not, and cannot, claim to have gone beyond the superficial level of a survey of the way in which one particular source is likely to contribute to a better understanding of trade and navigation in the Black Sea in the last decades of Ottoman rule. Its limitations are evident: this is a vision heavily tainted by French commercial interests, and circumscribed in a very short time period at the turn of the twentieth century. As such, it can hardly claim to do justice to a much more complex and fluctuating reality. A thorough and systematic use of this documentation, especially by focusing on the diachronic dimension offered by the serial nature of the publication, would certainly reveal a much more dynamic and detailed picture of the region's commercial and maritime activity. Nevertheless, the consistent way in which the *Revue commerciale du Levant* pursued its mission to provide its readers and subscribers with a general assessment of trade in the Ottoman lands does allow for a certain degree of coherence in the documentation and information it compiled and provided. The regularity with which its correspondents submitted their "letters" about the commercial activity in the major ports and the almost obsessive way in which they drew statistical tables based on government figures and local observation ended up forming a rather substantive documentary base on which one can try to build a general evaluation of the Ottoman Black Sea trade.

Perhaps the most striking aspect has to do with its relative marginality compared to the rest of the Empire. Shipping figures show that maritime activity in this area was approximately seven times lower than in the rest of the Ottoman waters. True, the Black Sea coast was a smaller area, but it was first and foremost a dead end compared to the bustling activity that characterized Mediterranean and Aegean shipping, or even Istanbul's northbound connections with Bulgarian, Romanian, and Russian ports.

This marginal character was further reflected in the nature of shipping. A strong presence of sail power was certainly an indication of a relative underdevelopment. True, the figures were somewhat similar throughout the rest of Ottoman waters, but some distinctions need to be made. First, it must be noted that sail shipping along the Black Sea coast was almost exclusively Ottoman, while a

stronger foreign presence – predominantly Greek – could be sensed in other areas. More importantly perhaps, one should remember the basic differences between the Black Sea and other Ottoman waters. The Black Sea was a tricky, even dangerous, sea to navigate, with no islands and practically no other outlet for navigation by sail than the coastal trade linking harbors of some proximity. By contrast, the southern seas, most particularly the Aegean, were characterized by a jagged coastline and a dense network of islands, which facilitated the use and survival of traditional forms of navigation.

Clearly then, the Ottoman Black Sea was still to a large extent an economic backwater, tenuously connected to the Empire's center by modest and infrequently used maritime routes. The bulk of this trade, on the export side, consisted of subsistence goods and of a number of local commodities, among which tobacco and hazelnuts held a prominent place. Imports, rather predictably, combined a number of staple western manufactured goods, especially cotton yarn and cotton fabrics. In other words, a rather conventional trade, determined by the rather limited local capacities for production and consumption. Much of this activity depended on the capacity of the major ports to extend their trade in such a way as to integrate their hinterland or to connect to wider commercial networks. İnebolu and Samsun did the former, serving as ports for the central Anatolian provinces of Kastamonu and Sivas; Trabzon managed to do both, by adding to its trade with the landlocked province of Erzurum a lively caravan trade extending as far as the Iranian city of Tabriz and beyond. Still, even these incursions into the inner regions and beyond the Empire's borders remained modest in scope and volume.

Indeed, one recurring observation was that the area and its ports had a great potential for growth, which needed to be exploited through greater efforts and an improved infrastructure. Part of this discourse was typically Franco-French, in that it reflected the frustration felt at the sight of a greater presence and a better performance of British, Austrian, and German trade and shipping. In a more general way, however, it confirmed the marginality and underdevelopment that characterized the region: insufficient port facilities, the silting of harbors, the absence of proper wharfs and quays, the lack of proper communication networks with the hinterland...

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of a promise of devel-

opment was that of the coal producing area of Zonguldak and Ereğli, whose development was still too recent to impact significantly the region¹⁸. “The state has some coal deposits operated by concessionaires who use primitive methods; some individuals have obtained concessions, and, finally, an Ottoman company, of French origin and capital, has started a rational and serious exploitation.”¹⁹. The Société d’Héraclée had been created in 1896 and had immediately engaged in the construction of harbor facilities at Zonguldak. From an initial 40,000 tons, its production had tripled the following year and the *Revue* expected it to reach about 300,000 tons within a few years²⁰.

The *Revue* was partly correct in its forecasts, as coal production, in particular, did sustain serious development in the following years. Yet generally speaking, and for a variety of reasons, the commercial and economic development of the Ottoman coasts of the Black Sea seems to have to a large extent stagnated well below the *Revue*’s expectations and, possibly, its wishful thinking. It was only in 1927 that the Samsun-Sivas railroad, enthusiastically mentioned in 1899, would start its operations. Of course, the human and material destruction unleashed by a decade of war and ethnic conflict between 1912 and 1922 was at the center of this arrested development and interrupted growth. Yet it seems that the reconstruction of the Republican era has also failed to change significantly the fate of this region. Once an Ottoman backwater, the Black Sea coast of Anatolia was up for a long career of marginalization in a transformed Turkey.

18. On Ottoman coal mines and production, see, Donald Quataert, *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: The Zonguldak Coalfield, 1822-1920* (New York: BerghahnBooks, 2006).

19. “Mouvement maritime de l’Empire ottoman,” *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/150 (September, 1899), p. 502.

20. “Mouvement maritime de l’Empire ottoman,” *Revue commerciale du Levant. Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, XIII/150 (September, 1899), pp. 502–504.

2.

“Was the extraction of coal at Kozlu and Zonguldak mines profitable?” An attempt at an answer from the Courdgi papers

*†Evrydiki Sifneos**

In a slim and tall house built in 1896, in the town of Mytilini, following the stambouliote architecture, Panos Courdgis (1850-1931), the multifarious entrepreneur of Lesbos island, allocated his residence in the following way: ground floor for entrance, first floor, dining and living room, second floor, bedrooms, and third floor his personal cabinet, fourth floor, workshop for weaving. After coming back from a twenty five years stay in Istanbul (since 1867) and cooperating in various ventures with the group of the Galata Greek bankers, Panos Courdgis possessed the largest immovable property of olive groves on the island, an olive press, and a factory for the extraction of olive-kernel oil. During his stay in Istanbul he founded the commercial firm P. M. Courdgi and Co, the “Aegean” steamship liner (1884), the Bank of Mytilini (1891). He also increased his income by adding tax farming revenues from the olives’ tithe in Lesbos, Ayvalık and Edremit regions, in collaboration with G. and later Leonidas Zarifis.

This microhistorical investigation on the performance and strategies of a single operator in the mines of Kozlu and Zonguldak, since 1887, draws on the documents of the Courdgi’s Historical Archive of the Aegean “Ergani”¹. Their history of discovery merits a few words². The archive together with a box of films super 8 of

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1. K. Konnaris (ed.), *Ιστορικό Αρχείο Αιγαίου. Εργάνη, Αρχείο Κουρτζή* (Historical Archive of the Aegean “Ergani”, Courdgis Archive, Historical documentation), (Mytilini, 2007).

2. See the documentary film “My Mytilini, 1925-1927”, by A. Kovotsos, Production of the research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2005.

the Pathé Baby model were found at the garbage dump of Mytilini, after the demolition of the building which hosted the Bank of Mytilini on the port. This paper will portray the entrepreneurial activity of Panos Courdgis outside Mytilini, and more specifically the relationship between the Aegean Steamship company and the Zonguldak mines. I will attempt to answer my title's question from the view of a private operator, by examining the documents of Courdgi's personal archive and namely, his *Memoirs*³, his personal notebook, *Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895*⁴, and a study of a French expert, *Étude Sommaire sur les Mines de la Banque de Mytilène à Cozlou et Zonguldak, 1901*⁵.

I acknowledge that a useful comparison with the performance of the *Société Ottomane des Mines d' Heraclée* would answer fully the question of my title. I predict though that the answer to my question cannot be merely interpreted by the difference in size and economies of scale. Historical enquiry should include exploration of the Ottoman and French sources and information on the prices of coal in the market of Istanbul, so as to understand if extraction was worth the expenditure in order to achieve competent prices for sale.

In his elaborate office on the third floor of Isavron str., Panos Courdgis kept detailed accounts and personal notebooks concerning the performance of his enterprises. There, interesting artifacts and devices of modernity were displayed, like cameras, photo collections printed by his son, barometers, watches etc. Oral sources contend that in order to get inspired about growth strategies of his business, P. Courdgis often looked at the ceiling of his cabinet that was decorated with a series of paintings representing his entrepreneurial ventures: Olive-groves, olive-mills, steamships and coal mines⁶.

The phenomenon of such a successful businessman as P. Courdgis cannot be understood within the limits of an insular economy,

3. *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, *Memoirs of Panos Courdgis* [IT1859].

4. *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, *Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895* [IT 0648].

5. *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, *Étude Sommaire sur les Mines de la Banque de Mytilène à Cozlou et Zonguldak, 1901*, [IT1191].

6. On P. Courdgis' various enterprises, see, K. Konnaris, "Courdgis Archive: Historical notes on enterprises and individuals", in K. Konnaris (ed.), *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, *Courdgi Archive*, pp. 19-25.

that of the island of Lesbos, although he had used various modern methods to increase his productivity in the olive-oil business from cultivation of trees, extraction of oil and trade⁷. His upward mobility to a highly respectable wealthy businessmen milieu in Istanbul was due to his connections with the powerful group of the Greek bankers of Istanbul⁸. He had stayed for a long time in the capital of the Ottoman empire [1867-1903] and had been acquainted with Zarifi's circle and its lobbying tactics within the ottoman bureaucratic hierarchy and the sultans' environment⁹. According to his Memoirs, Zarifis' employed him as an assistant and partner in the following ventures: collection of the tithe in the Bursa department in 1887, management of the steamship company of the Golden Horn, membership of the directorate of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (1881), project to buy immovable property, on his behalf, in Cyprus right before it was placed under British rule (June 1878)¹⁰.

Being in Istanbul, Panos Courdgis understood the importance of connectivity between the capital and the emerging Aegean and Black Sea port-cities. Appointed by Zarifis on his behalf he managed, between 1880-1882, the passenger steamers in the gulf of the Golden Horn¹¹. Aware of the utility of scheduled shipping to trade and aspiring to the feasibility of a modern and regular maritime and passengers' transport, he founded the "Aegean Steamship Co",

7. E. Sifneos, "Olive- cultivation and innovation in 19th and 20th c. Lesbos", in Konnaris (ed.), *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, Courdgis Archive, pp. 51-59.

8. On the Galata Greek bankers, see Haris Exerdzoglou, *Greek Banking in Constantinople 1850-1881*, PhD diss., King's College, London University 1986; idem, "Investments and Investment Behaviour in the Ottoman Empire: the development of a Greek-Ottoman Bourgeoisie, 1850-1914", in Ch. Issawi, D. Gondicas (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy and Society in the nineteenth Century*, (Princeton: Darwin Press 1999), pp. 89-115.

9. On the merchant house of Zarifis and Zafiropoulos, see, Haris Exerdzoglou, *Προσαρμοστικότητα και Πολιτική Ομογενειακών Κεφαλαίων. Έλληνες Τραπεζίτες στην Κωνσταντινούπολη: το κατάστημα «Ζαρίφης Ζαφειρόπουλος», 1871-1881* (Adaptability and the Policy of the Greek Bankers in Constantinople: the 'Zarifis Zafeiropoulos' Branch, 1871-1881), (Athens: Foundation on Research and Education of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1991).

10. Memoirs of Panos Courdgis, 1914.

11. Memoirs of Pans Courdgis, 1914.

as a limited partnership in 1883. The company, owned by P. M. Courdgis and Co, had medium size steamships, up to 600 tons, and served five lines: Istanbul-Crete, via Smyrna and the Aegean islands, Istanbul-Danube via Varna, Istanbul-Trebizond, Istanbul-Volos via Salonica and Istanbul- Lesvos-Chios¹². There was also a line from Istanbul to Trieste inaugurated in the late nineteenth century. Courdgis' aspiration was to connect ports on both sides of the Aegean and create a line (in fact, two) that would facilitate passengers' and goods' transport between the Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the interruption of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the war of 1897 harmed his enterprise and the company suffered severe losses during that year¹³. He employed Greek-Ottoman crews and named his ships after the big Ottoman and Greek ports as well as the cosmopolitan port-cities of the Mediterranean: Panormos, Crete, Chios, City of Mytilini, Smyrna, Trabzon, Marseilles, Vraila, Odessa, Iraklea, Kardif, Naples.

The Trebizond line was inaugurated in the second semester of 1887. It served the ports of Istanbul-Ereğli (Heraclea)-Kozlu-İnebolu-Samsun (Amissos)-Trabzon,-Giresun -Ordu-Fatsa-Ünye-Samsun-Sinop-İnebolu-Kozlu and Istanbul. From his notebook we may replicate the voyages his steamships performed during the inaugural years 1887-1895 and delve into the difficulties of making a liner profitable when it poorly depended on state subsidies¹⁴. The only agreement with the Ottoman government was for transport of the mail service for free in exchange of lowering the port fees¹⁵. The statistical data on his annual gains or losses reinforces the belief that a ship-owner had to face a series of multifactorial circumstanc-

12. Evrydiki Sifneos, "P.M. Courdgis and the Birth of a Greek-Ottoman Liner Company: The Aegean Steamship Company", in Maria Christina Chatziioannou - Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Following the Nereids. Sea routes and maritime business, 16th-20th centuries*, (Athens: Kerkira, 2006), pp. 121-135.

13. Sifneos, "P.M. Courdgis and the birth of a Greek-Ottoman liner company", pp. 128-129.

14. Historical archives of the Aegean "Ergani", Courdgi family records, Panos Kourdgi's personal notebook, Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.

15. Memoirs of Panos Courdgis.

es in order to render his enterprise profitable¹⁶. Increasing receipts reached a peak in 1892 and decreased in the following years due to a multitude of factors (see, chart 1). External factors may be acknowledged as the obvious implications of the 1897 war between the Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire on his two lines that operated connecting the ports of the respective countries. Yet, internal causes regarding the company's decision-making are less visible in the archival material. Such factors that played a negative role on the performance of the liner may be due to erroneous administrative decisions, such as the selection of the ports of call and schedule of voyages, the appropriate number and tonnage of his fleet etc. Following Courdgis' interest in selecting internal accounting data, we observe that he was particularly interested in calculating his income and expenses per voyage.

His steamships' income derived from two basic categories: passengers and general cargo. These subsequently depended on the demand for mobility from the Black Sea and Aegean ports, the ticket price for passengers of the third class, who were numerous, the freight rate policy for the transport of merchandise, the frequency and stability of the service offered and the competition from other liners. It also depended on the lowering of the fixed costs which were required for each voyage. Regarding passengers' flow, the Trebizond line in 1891 transported 6,398 passengers of the third class, while the Cretan line 11,166, the Volos line 10, 774 and the Danube line 6,307¹⁷. The number of the Trabzon line corresponded to 180 passengers per voyage, a relatively small number which quickly reached a limit. His effort therefore was directed to increase the number of his voyages per year, possessing the adequate steamers to serve all his lines.


His initial strategy was to boost merchandise transport of general goods, which were not carried by tramp shipping, and among them coal. His income from merchandize was established initially at a rate of 4 to 1 compared to that from passengers. Yet, for unknown reasons this strategy did not work and the rate lowered up

16.V. Kardassis, "Greek Steam Liner Companies, 1858-1914", *International Journal of Maritime History* IX:2 (Dec. 1997), pp. 107-127.

17. Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895, pp. 33-67.

to 2.43 to 1 in 1894, which may suggest a difficulty in maintaining an advantage in the cheap prices for cargo transport due to harsh competition associated with an increase of the passengers.

Chart 1



Source: *Historical archives of the Aegean “Ergani”, Courdgi family records, Panos Courdgi’s personal notebook, Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.*

The distribution of expenses of the Aegean Steamship Co and his care to reduce the transport cost, led to the idea of extracting his own coal from the Zonguldak mines. This was a well-known pattern of investment for ship-owners worldwide, who invested, as he did, in collieries and shipbuilding premises. Courdgis built a dockyard in Istanbul for repairing his ships. According to his calculations, coal expenses rose to 24.3 % of the total expenses for operating the steamers which needed annually 301,000 tons of coal¹⁸. In 1887 the price of Turkish coal in the Istanbul market was cheaper than that of the British by 4-5 kuruş per ton¹⁹. Yet, we need a com-

18. Memoirs of Panos Courdgis.

19. In the *Bulletin Commerciale Hebdomadaire de Constantinople*, 1887 the price

plete series of prices of coal in Istanbul so as to be able to respond to the question of profitability. In 1882 the state had loosened its control on the trade of coal by allowing private extractors to sell to the open market 40% of their production.²⁰

Table 1. Expenses of the Aegean Steamship co, 1885-1893

	Total in kuruş	Wages in kuruş	%	Coal in kuruş	%	Insurance In kuruş	%	Port duties in kuruş	%
1885	3,029,314	664,866	21.9	811,825	26.8	314,004	10.4	317,491	10.5
1886	2,480,020	519,231	23.4	794,423	24.9	312,369	12.5	198,867	8.0
1887	3,777,517	998,485	26.4	958,744	25.4	425,185	11.3	413,941	10.9
1888	4,150,377	1,103,886	26.6	1,112,026	26.7	412,342	9.9	417,208	10.1
1889	4,504,784	1,120,385	24.9	1,102,476	24.5	377,135	8.4	432,620	9.6
1890	5,735,211	1,389,163	24.2	1,471,603	25.7	487,723	8.5	555,947	9.7
1891	6,212,865	1,532,802	24.7	1,551,968	25	511,685	8.2	651,380	10.5
1892	6,348,396	1,636,872	25.8	1,580,829	24.9	580,354	9.1	662,861	10.4
1893	6,574,887	1,751,750	26.6	1,609,859	24.5	652,558	9.9	657,096	10.0

Source: *Historical archives of the Aegean "Ergani", Kourdgi family records, Elaborated data from Panos Kourdgi's personal notebook, Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.*

The increasing needs of the Ottoman government for coal, for its military marine, railroads, developing industry and the demand for home heating, slowly opened the coal mine resources to the market and the state invited entrepreneurs by granting concessions for the extraction of coal. The Galata bankers were the first to take advantage of this policy and to obtain extra privileges from the state. As

of the Cardiff coal was fixed to 19-20 kuruş/ton, of Newcastle 17-18, of Liverpool and Ereğli, 14-15.

20. Donald Quataert, *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire. The Zonguldak Coalfield 1822-1890* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), pp. 16, 42.

local production grew, the English coal trade in Istanbul showed signs of falling-off²¹. The coal field of Ereğli was at a distance of 150 miles from Istanbul and it could easily furnish the capital if the adequate infrastructure (railroads, piers and ports) was quickly built.

In May 1891, P. Courdgis begun works in the mine no 1 of Ereğli (Heraclea), a well-known mine operated during the Crimean war by the Barkley Brothers²². Since that time, some ninety mines had been opened and in 1891 the French joint-stock company Société Ottomane des Mines d' Heraclée financed with French capital via the Ottoman Bank, won also a concession²³. The French company quickly occupied a dominant position in the coalfield, accounting, in 1902, 79% of the total output of coal²⁴. By contrast, Courdgis as a private operator could not achieve economies of scale that would reduce his cost of output and obtain more profitable terms of exploitation. Yet, both joint-stock and private ventures suffered from fluctuations in their profitability that depended on a host of factors, capital wealth being the most important, in order to invest in the relative infrastructure (port facilities, railroad network etc.). Another headache was the supply of labor, which during the first years was based on a mechanism of compulsory recruitment from the villages of the region. Compared to the French company, Panos Courdgis used a mediocre size of work force, calculated for 1891 to 176 unskilled workers, 68 hewers per month in his pits no 1, 4, 6, and 9²⁵. He imported workers from the Aegean islands and, in particular, from the island of Lesbos. His account book reveals that from 1893 onward exploitation of the pits became more intense and regular, while the distribution of his working force was allocated in the following works: cutting of trees, rolling of trunks, timbering, exhaustion-evacuation, mining timber, airing and warehousing. Above these, he also paid for general expenses, transport by railway to the port, and temettüat tax (tax on personal income from land).

21. FCOL, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Constantinople for the year 1887 and 1888, p. 13.

22. Memoirs of Panos Courdgis.

23. Quataert, *Miners and the State*, p.29.

24. Quataert, *Miners and the State*, p. 66.

25. Accounts of the Aegean Steamship Co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.

He extracted 20-22.4% of the production of the French joint-stock company for five years, and after the first years of running them as a private operator, he handed over the enterprise to the newly founded Bank of Mytilène, in which he was a partner. The mines together with the steamship company became part of the assets of the Bank²⁶. This decision was dictated by the difficulty to manage successfully large business ventures, with inherent high risk, by a single entrepreneur.

Table 2: Courdgis' coal production in tons, 1891-1895.

Mine no	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895
1	8,252	7,583	13,312	14,338	16,941
6	458	6,713[3-12]	7,886	4,253	3,188
4	4,345				
8			798 [3 months operation]	1881 [3 months operation]	5,100
9		295	2,617	2,000	7,680
Total	13,350	14,591	24,613	22,472	32,909

Source: *Elaborated data from Panos Courdgis personal notebook, Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.*

From the data furnished by his personal account book (see Table 2) we may notice that he made a moderate use of his right of extraction, and did not develop his colliery to its full capacity of output. His production did not cover his needs in coal. This was not due to the poor capacity of his colliery but to the unattractive conditions of the investment. As a matter of fact, his reluctance to invest in the coalfields was due to an aversion for long term investment without achieving immediate gains. It was a common practice, known at least from the Welsh collieries that some time had to elapse before a mine could develop sufficiently to gain profits²⁷.

26. See for instance the Balance Sheet of the Bank of Mytilène on the 31 December 1904, IT1844.

27. There has been a great discussion on the profits of the coal owners in

Many of the calculations we elaborated from his personal notebook attest to this hypothesis.

Courdgis did not master the details of the mining business which were of no little complexity. It resulted being of a very fluctuating character and the entrepreneurial risk was high. Fixed and working capital required a heavy expenditure for a single entrepreneur. Moreover he could not gradually proceed to the growth of his enterprise and control it closely, as he did with the Aegean steamship company, by purchasing carefully a new steamship every two or three years, according to his gains²⁸. In the mines he had to employ the maximum of capital in order to achieve an economy of scale and reduce his cost of production per ton. As Table 3 shows, little extraction inflated the cost of production to an exorbitant price.

Profitability was questionable in the mining business and was more risky when technology was poor and means of detection of the capacity of the pits inexistent. Even when a large investment had taken place it was impossible to foresee the fall of the output, in consequence of failure of the seams, faulty ground, accidents, or other contingencies. A very prosperous mine could work successfully for a season or a couple of years and afterwards the exploitation of the same vein could prove unprofitable. The British expertise in the field had already from the 1890s come to the conclusion that a return of somewhat higher than 5% on the colliery capital could be expected.²⁹ By contrast, in the business ventures of the Ottoman Empire there existed many opportunities in investing money and gaining much higher profits. Courdgis was demotivated by his mines' performance and soon passed it over to the management of the Bank in which he had invested substantial capital. He actually

Britain and Wales that appeared on the newspapers and magazines of the mid nineteenth century. In general, profits were estimated at 5 or 10 percent of the invested capital.

28. M.P. Thomas Richardson and John A. Walbank F.C.A., "Profits and Wages in the British Coal Trade, 1898-1910", Newcastle (The NACC, 1911).

29. G. P. Bidder, "The Profits of Coal Pits", *Nineteenth Century* 35:207 (May 1894), pp. 807-812, in *Coal in Victorian Britain*, v. 3, pp. 89-92; George Elliott, "Estimated Cost of Winning and Likely Profit of Working a Colliery in North Durham", 1845, Courtesy of the Library of the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers, in *Coal in Victorian Britain*, v. 2, pp. 129-134.

Table 3
Cost of Production of the Courdgis Mines, 1891-1895

Mines	1891 (May- fin Dec.) production/ tons	1891 cost/ton	1892 (Jan-Dec.) production/ tons	1892 cost/ton	1893 Production /tons	1893 cost/ ton	1894 (Jan-Sept)	1894 cost/ton	1895	1895 cost/ton
Ereğli 1	8,252	66.5	7,583	99 	13,312	65.64	14,338	54.30	16,941	53.49
Ereğli 6	458	242	6,713	88.6	7,886	77.29	4,253	84.41	3,188	110.8
Ereğli 4		42.26								
Ereğli 9	295 (Dec-Jan)	462,10		-	3,214	175.23	(Jan- August) 2,000	72.29	(Jan-fin Dec.) 7,660	71.45
Ereğli 8					(Jan.-April) 798	61,71	(June- Sept) 1,881	100,33	(April- Dec) 5,100	52,16
Total output	13,350		14,296		25,210		22,472		32,889	
Cost of production	66.86 kuruş/ ton		94 kuruş/ ton		83.13 kuruş /ton		65.45 kuruş/ ton		63 kuruş/ ton	

Source: *Elaborated data from Panos Kourdgi's personal notebook, Accounts of the Aegean Steamship co and the Pontoheracleia Mines, 1885-1895.*

contributed to the founding capital of the Bank of Mytilini, by registering the estimated value of his enterprises to its founding capital. The bank operated for twenty years until 1911 when the disturbances of the Italian-Turkish war and a crisis of financial management in the branch of Alexandria led the Bank to bankruptcy³⁰.

Courdgis' archive has preserved documents from the Minutes of the Bank's Administration from December 1902 to 1904. The Executive Board that undertook the management of the bank was based in Istanbul and consisted of L. Zarifis, B. Sgoutas, Th. M. Courdgis, P. Efstratiou and I. Hadzopoulos³¹. The Administrative board which was much broader was based in Mytilini and among its members were Panos Courdgis, M. Koumbas, M. Simonidis, and others. These two institutions which had their premises in different locations complicated the management of the bank's issues. From the documents emanates a fair impression that the bank wanted to advance its operations more in the merely financial sector, than in resolving the deficiencies of a steamship company that was growing old and an unprofitable coal mining company. The steamships and the mines were more of a headache to its administrators. Their problems recurred on the daily agenda of the Executive Board and solutions were difficult to elaborate or implement. The obstacles the Austrian Lloyd had risen against Courdgis' Trieste line obliged him to interrupt his expansion in the Adriatic Sea³².

In 1902 the Steamship Company suffered heavy losses that influenced the performance of the Bank as well. In only a year its deficit increased from 1,700 turkish liras to 7,500³³. The steamship company owed the Bank 12,000 Turkish Liras and its steamships needed continuous repairs. In 1904 the members of the administration decided to sell the company as quick as possible. Proposals

30. Haris Exertzoglou, "The Bank of Mytillini [in Greek], in K. Konnaris (ed.), *Historical Archive of the Aegean "Ergani"*, Courdgis Archive, Historical documentation, (Mytillini: 2007), pp. 33-49.

31. Historical archives of the Aegean "Ergani", Courdgi family records, Minutes of the Board of Administrators of the Bank of Mytillini, 1902-1904, IT0948, 25/8 July 1904.

32. Historical archives of the Aegean "Ergani", Letter of E. Stavrou concerning the antagonism with the Austrian Lloyd, document IT0248, 22 September 1902.

33. Decision of the Executive Board of the Bank, 1 October 1903.

were directed towards the Ministry of Navy, the Destouni brothers and other entrepreneurs based in Athens without being able to achieve a fair agreement. Another solution was to merge with Freitas Company³⁴, but finally the steamship company remained as the bank's asset until its liquidation.

The mining business had a better perspective. A study on the pits and the coalfield at Kozlu and Zonguldak done by French specialists on behalf of the bank in 1901 led to the following conclusions: there existed no exact plans of the Pontoheraclea coalfield. Exploitation in Kozlu had stopped in the most productive of the pits and works were necessary to go deeper. If full exploitation of the coal potential of the Bank was achieved, the cost per ton could be reduced to 48 kuruş/per ton. Additional infrastructure, new machinery and a new pier were necessary. The study concluded that the quality of coal was one of the best in the Ottoman Empire, and, therefore, the complaints of many of the clients of the mines were only due to inefficient quality tests, storage of coal in the open air etc. The Bank intensified its efforts to sell coal to foreign liners and to broaden its circle of clients. An agreement with the Lloyds was under discussion in 1908 for purchasing quantities of coal from the Zonguldak mines. In 1912, after the Bank's bankruptcy the mines were sold to the Société des Mines d' Heraclée.

We need to study the Courdgis exploitation in relation to other private operators, as the Armenian Artin Karamanyan and the Muslim Rağib Paşa or corporate institutions, as the Société Ottomane, in order to be able to answer the questions: were the Ereğli mines profitable? Was the exploitation of the Société des Mines more profitable than that of private businessmen? Did the ottoman government fulfill its obligations in creating the necessary infrastructure? These questions may be answered when the study will compare the findings in Ottoman, French and Greek archives.

34. Decision of the Executive Board of the Bank, 28 November 1903.

3.

The Transformation of the Mercantile Shipping in Eastern Anatolian Black Sea Ports between 1834 and 1914

*Ekin Mahmuzlu**

Introduction

During the long nineteenth century, aggregated commerce of Trabzon Province either in value or volume remained marginal comparing to other foreign Black Sea ports, especially Russian and Romanian, or big Mediterranean Ottoman ports like Izmir or Salonika. For that reason, it has been generally assumed that what had happened in maritime shipping in other ports should have happened to Trabzon Province's ports. However, contrary to widely assumed, because of political and geographical reasons¹, evolution of maritime shipping diverged in many ways; like absence of British and Greek

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1. From 1774 to roughly mid-1840s, the foreign ships were allowed to navigate from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea or vice versa, only within few days. Ottoman officers tried to control this traffic by registering every ships in books called *İzn-i sefine defterleri* (Books for shipping permits) (see, Ibid, p.289.). Although, foreign shipping companies started to settle to Ottoman Black Sea ports, by 1840s, officially, the Western powers and the Ottoman government reached an understanding on the opening of the Straits for all kind of merchant ships during the peace negotiations between Prussia and France, in London (1871). See, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, v. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.152. Especially the Crimean War was a turning point in economic and shipping terms. According to Issawi's calculations, Trabzon ports' exportation and importation was around 4,000,000 francs in 1840s, but it jumped to 10,000,000 francs after Crimean War. The economic breakdown happened after the opening of Suez Channel in 1869, when it fall to the levels of 4,000,000 for importation and 2,000,000 for exportation. See Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1: 1 (1970).

dominance or prevalence of Muslim partnerships in sailing ships. In this article, my aim is double; first, to make a detailed presentation of history of merchant shipping in Trabzon Province. For that purpose, I benefited from French and British consular reports and maritime certificates (*sened-i bahri*) from *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* (BOA) to compose statistics. Second, to elaborate these statistics. Elaboration of these statistics was fruitful. According to my findings, firstly, brigs, usually built in Anatolian Black Sea ports, was the main type of merchant sailing ship. Secondly, contrary to generally assumed, sailing-shipping had already been dominated by Muslims long before the Republic and even one of them managed to establish a successful local steam-shipping company survived until Republican Era. Thirdly, steam-ships gradually increased their share. However, although there had been no sign for innovative breakthrough in steam-shipping, share of steamship transportation had two take-offs, thanks to arrival of a series of steamship companies after Crimean War and in 1880s. Finally, a foreign steamship company could be an established company, if there was a prospect for exports to their state market. These shipping companies entered to ports in Trabzon Province, if there was something to export.

Primary Sources and Methodology

This study is mainly based on three different primary sources; maritime certificates, British² and French commercial reports. My first primary source is the maritime certificates. I randomly selected 513 certificates, which consisted roughly more than one third of whole collection.³ A maritime certificate contains almost always information

2. In addition to original copies of British reports, provided by Thales Black Sea Project to me, I also benefitted from Musa Şaşmaz's edition of British Commercial Reports for composing the statistics. See Musa Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914* [Trade Reports for the Trebizond Province Based on British Documents, 1830-1914] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014).

3. The files containing maritime certificates can contain either the original maritime certificate or petition for it. Moreover several petitions or certificates can be classified under one file as well. For example, all the maritime certificates from

on the ship's type, cargo capacity, length, port, where it was built and sometimes number of the masts along with the name and birth place of the captain and name(s) of the ship-owner(s) with their share(s). Although, these documents hold valuable information on merchant shipping, the collection stops in 1860. My second primary source is the British and French yearly commercial reports. These reports contain statistics on merchant ships entering to Trabzon, Samsun, Giresun and other small ports⁴. However, these commercial reports have some issues: there is no report for each year and information could change year by year, report by report⁵, especially before 1873⁶. For that reason, when there are two different set of numbers on shipping, I preferred British statistics over French before Crimean War⁷, when the French merchant shipping was marginal comparing

Danube that I found was in a single file; BOA A.DVN.121.76. Moreover, information of a single ship can also be divided into different files as well; A.DVN 85.38, A.DVN.79.86 and A.DVN.87.87 were about the same bombard built in Mürefte.

4. Both British and French commercial reports always give casually statistics on shipping for other ports than Trabzon, but only after 1873 the reports on Samsun became regular. Giresun, Ordu and other ports became main interest in 1890s.

5. In composing statistics consular agents profited from other consular agent's information. However, Austrian Lloyd and Deutsche Liner were the fewer sharers. For that reason, the information on steamships should have been accurate as much as could be with some marginal errors for Austria-Hungarian and German ships. However, the statistics on Ottoman wooden ships were elaborate estimations made by professionals on daily basis.

6. In addition to this, the numbers given by British and French consular agents are not always the same before 1873, but the divergence remained under 5%. However, after 1873 the numbers were practically the same because the calculations were provided by Mésagerie agents like Doucet or Henri de Contanze. See, *Annuaire Oriental (Ancien Trébizonde) Du Commerce De L'industrie, De L'administration Et De La Magistrature*, ed. R. Cesar Cervati (Istanbul: The Annuaire Oriental and Printing Company Limited, 1904). In some cases, these Mésagerie agents wrote an entire rapport for small ports, which were sent with annotations from British consular agents. For example, the British report of 1867 for Samsun was originally written by Mésagerie agent Doucet and commented by British consular agent Palgrave. (See Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti* (for 1867)).

7. While the British reports before Crimean War enlisted the name, physical features of all foreign ships with their captains entered to Trabzon, other reports give only aggregated numbers according to flag of the merchant ships with total number of entrance, volume of ships and value of their cargos.

to British; after Crimean War I used French *Méssagerie Maritime*⁸ agents' detailed reports over the British⁹.

Methodology

Because diversity and incompatibility among the sources, I processed the information provided by primary sources, including maritime certificates. The main challenge on composing series relies on spotting the ships, which actually entered to Trabzon ports among the entire list. To spot those ships, I constructed four different criteria¹⁰. My first criterion, which I call Entire List, is using all the ships listed in certificates. My second criterion (Criterion-2) is to accept all the ships built in Anatolian Black Sea in the east of today's İzmit area, because of being too close to Istanbul. My third criterion (criterion-3) is to select the ships whose at least one of their owners was from Trabzon Province, and in the cases when it is not possible to detect the homeland of the owners, to implement same criteria to captains. My final criterion (criterion 4) is to accept that the list given by British commercial report of 1831 represents

8. Now on *Méssagerie* regardless, it was called as *Méssagerie Maritime* or *Méssagerie Imperial* at the moment.

9. With one exception; I always accepted consular agents' calculations for their home country.

10. Since there were no statistics classifying features of the ships according to the types, I am proposing two different methods. First is simply to count only the ships definitely owned at least one agent from Trabzon Province. The problem with that method is to omit possibility that owner of ship dealing commerce in Trabzon Province could be an outsider or an economic agent could immigrate without involving in Trabzon trade. The second method is to accept all the ships built in Black Sea ports, except Istanbul, representing average cargo capacities and accepting that the numbers of different types indicated in commercial report of 1831 was still representative for 1830-1860. However, this method ignores the possibility that 1831 could not be an ordinary year and ignores the possibility of ships built outside of Black Sea ports. The final method is accepting the distribution of ships owned definitely by a market agent in Trabzon and reflect to the numbers taken from 1831 report. Definitely all three methods were estimations, not the real statistics. Therefore, I will make my comments accepting that all these methods have limits, but fortunately, all these three methods give estimations with variations within acceptable limit of errors.

the average at least for mid-nineteenth century. In other words, I took the percentages taken from 1831 and combined them with other three criteria to measure the weight in sailing-shipping.

Before discussing the results obtained by these four criteria, I have to make two comments. First, obviously, none of these estimations can represent the reality, but the proximity in obtained results statistically good sign, which is attained. However, before doing any estimation, I have to ask whether observation is statistically meaningful or not. Theory of large numbers dictates that any estimation made should have enough samples. For that reason, although I give the results with number of samples below to twenty, these results should not be considered statistically meaningful. In addition to this, in reasoning out, while, I interpreted the results of criterion-3 reflecting the actual case of North Anatolian ports better than criterion-2, the results acquired from Entire List consists of actually the entire case of Ottoman-flagged ships. However, when the results obtained from criteria-3 are not statistically meaningful, I use those from criteria-2 or in worse scenario, the Entire List is accepted as it represents the real situation.

Table 1: Number of observations
(numbers with * are not statistically meaningful)

Ship Type	Entire List	Criteria-1	Criteria-2	British 1831
Brig	164	94	41	69
Martigo	64	45	6*	5*
Bombard	22	5*	1*	17
Roared	67	45	0*	
Berkatine	9*	7*	3*	
Kırılç ¹	51			
Other	75	25	6*	5*
Total	452	221	57	96

¹ Kırılç was only seen in the ships built along the Danube River.

Last point to make is about categories of the types of ships. The ships registered in the certificates were described with more precision in typology; as *beşçifte brik* (cutter brig) or *şethiye brik*, including hybrids like *çekdirme brik* (roared brig). To be compatible with the commercial report of 1831, I narrowed down to seven major classes;

brig, martigo, roared, bombard, brigantine, *kırlaç* and others. In the hybrid roared ships with sails, since roars should have been an alternative to sails, I classified them under the sailing class, like in the case of roared brig, which is accepted as brig, not roared.

Sailing Ships

I use these four criteria to estimate average physical properties and weight in the commerce, to find out what were the main building sites and the nature of their ownership. My first inquiry is to determine average physical features of each different type of ship.

Long ships: Brigs and Brigatines

According to all criteria, the brig type ship, especially the *şethiye brik*, was the most common type of ship. This result is consistent with situation of coeval Mediterranean Greek shipping¹¹. As I am going to explain later, the prevalence of brigs might be resulted from Ottoman government's promotion for building of brigs after the Greek Revolution¹², while the construction of other kind of ships, such as martigo, was prohibited either in 1826 or 1827¹³. According to criterion "Entire List", an average Ottoman-flagged brig consisted roughly of 16.5 meters long with 100 tons cargo capacity and always two sails¹⁴. On the other hand, according to criterion-3,

11. Apostolos Delis, "From Lateen to Square Rig: The Evolution of the Greek-Owned Merchant Fleet and Its Ships in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *The Mariner's Mirror* 100: 1 (2014), p.52.

12. The reason behind this governmental support was the effective role played by the brigs during the Greek Revolution. For example, at the beginning of the Greek Revolution, the Greek navy was formed by 12 brigs anchored near to Preveza and 35 more in Samos Island. See Fevzi Kurtoglu et al., *Yunan İstiklal Harbi Ve Navarin Muharebesi (Çengeloglu Tahir Paşa)* [The Greek War of Independence and the Battle of Navarin (Çengeloglu Tahir Paşa)] ([Turkey]: Askeri Deniz Matbaası, 1944), pp.13-15.

13. "[...]bu misillü sefainin inşâsı bâferman-ı âli men' olunmazdan beş sene mukaddem inşâ olmuş olduğu merbud olan bir kıta' i'lâm-ı şer'iyeden[...]" BOA, C.İKT, 695, 10.

14.. The brigs are ships with two sails. See Robert Gardiner and Brian Lavery,

Table 2
Ship Types using different estimations^a (numbers with * are not statistically meaningful)

<i>Ship Type</i>	Average cargo capacity (tons)			Average Length (meter)			Difference in cargo		Difference in length	
	Entire List	Method 1	Method 2	Entire List	Method 1	Method 2	Method 1	Method 2	Method 1	Method 2
<i>Brig</i>	100.04	103.14	113.92	16.53	17.13	17.51	3.09%	13.87%	3.65%	5.95%
<i>Martigo</i>	49.16	52.81	49.52*	13.66	14.14	13.89*	7.44%	0.75%	3.52%	1.68%
<i>Bombard</i>	28.58	42.73*	35.37*	11.53	12.39*	12.50*	49.54%	23.79%	7.45%	8.44%
<i>Roared</i>	19.98	18.74		10.86	10.46		-6.20%		-3.69%	
<i>Berkatine</i>	187.56*	157.97*	174.51*	24.16*	24.03*	22.98*	-15.78%	-6.96%	-0.55%	-4.88%
<i>Kırlaç</i>	61.68			17.32						
<i>Others</i>	22.47	29.90	33.25*	10.74	11.34	12.00*	33.05%	47.99%	5.50%	11.66%
<i>Total</i>	62.03	67.79	100.46	14.32	14.62	16.75	9.28%	61.95%	2.09%	16.97%

a. All the measures were originally inscribed as *zira*’ for length, *kile* for cargo capacities. I transformed these measures into meter and kilogram accepting that all these measurement should have been inscribed according to Constantinopolitan, not that of Trabzon system, since all certificates were kept by central government. To convert numbers to metric system, I profited from the following article; Dr. Y.H.V. Lun, Dr. K.-H. Lai, and Prof. T.C.E. Cheng, *Shipping and Logistics Management* (London: Springer, 2010).

an average Trabzon brig could have been bigger up to roughly 17.5 meters and 114 tons of cargo capacity,¹⁵ but still shorter than military *şehitiyes*¹⁶. Considering the sizes and cargo capacity, these ships should have operated in longer distances.

Assuming that total number or total cargo capacity represents the share in transportation, then brigs' share in total transportation would be consisted to %70 (number) or %80 (cargo capacity). (See Graph 3). In other words, I am estimating that almost every four pieces/boxes/tons per five should have been transported from Trabzon to Istanbul by the brigs. Another long ship was brigantine (*navi*), whose physical appearances resembles to brigs¹⁷ and that is why it was also called as brig-schooner in some European countries¹⁸. However, comparing to Mediterranean Greek brigantines¹⁹, brigantines were extremely rare in the Black Sea. For that reason, it is impossible to give physical features of an average brigantine.

Round Ships: Martigo and Bombards

The main round ships were known as bombard (*Bumbarta/Gagalı*) and martigos. Most probably both ships should have been used for coastal trade²⁰. According to the Entire-List, bombards had smaller

The Line of Battle: The Sailing Warship, 1650-1840 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992), p.129. If the number of sails were not omitted, it would be registered as two sails in the certificates

15. According to method 2, brigs ranged from *Şethiye brik* with 49.52 tons to 12.88 meters built in Ünye (BOA A.MKT.85.77) to another *şethiye brik* built in Greece with 254.69 tons and 20.45 meters (BOA A.MKT.103.78). The shortest was still same *şethiye brik* built in Ünye and the longest was 21.21 meters built in Rize (BOA A.MKT.103.63).

16. The longitude of military *şehitiyes* ranged from 17.5 to 28 meters. See Idris Bostan, *Osmanlılar Ve Deniz : Deniz Politikaları, Teskilat, Gemiler* (İstanbul: 2010), p.170. Rasim Unlü, *İnce Donanma* (İstanbul: Deniz Basimevi, 2005), p. 230.

17. The brigantines, a foremast fully square rigged two-masted vessel, were the biggest ships. Like the brigs, the brigantines probably operated in the long-distance.

18. Gardiner and Lavery, *The Line of Battle : The Sailing Warship, 1650-1840*, p.196.

19. Delis, "From Lateen to Square Rig: The Evolution of the Greek-Owned Merchant Fleet and Its Ships in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," p.52.

20. Ahmet Güteryüz and Vakfi Türkiye Sualti Arkeolojisi, *Kadirgadan Kalyona Os-*

cargo capacity as 28.5 tons and their length was of 11.5 meters. *Martigo* was another important type of merchant ship. Thomas Gordon, a contemporary witness, described *martigo* as a *sort of square-rigged sloop*²¹. Unlike the brigs, the *martigos* did not compose a homogenous typology²² and there existed various kinds of mixture of *martigos* with different kind of ships. Consequently, the description on sails, *martigos* with no sails, one or two sailed or one-and-half-rigged, ship's length and or cargo capacity diverged greatly. For example, cargo capacity ranged from 12.74 to 135.97 tons (900-9.610 kiles). Therefore, although an average *martigo* consisted to around 50 tons with 14 meters, this statement is meaningless because of such diversity. Final coaster ships are roared ships (*çekdirme*) and Black Sea coaster, *alamna* (*İnebolu kayığı*). According to the Entire List, an average roared ships consisted roughly of 20 tons with 11 meters and an *alamna* was 8.93 tons with 10.77 meters. However, both ships were absent according to Criterion-2, because most probably, these coasters might have been so small and they operated in short distance that their owners had no interest to register in Istanbul. British consular agent's testimony supports this later argument, and he wrote that wooden ships ranged from 10 tons to 40 tons and were mainly used for smuggling between close ports; most of them should be operating illegally²³.

manlida Yelken : Mikyas-I Sefain [Ottoman Sailing Ships from Galleys to Galleons and Particulars of Ships and Their Equipment] (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2004), p.74.

21. Thomas Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution : And of the Wars and Campaigns Arising from the Struggles of the Greek Patriots in Emancipating Their Country from the Turkish Yoke* (Edinburgh; London: W. Blackwood ; T. Cadell, 1844), p.281.

22. According to method 2, while the standard deviation for brigs' cargo capacity was 3677.49 tons (standard variation/mean = 45.68%) and 5.98 meters for length (standard variation/mean = 25.90%), *martigo*'s cargo capacity was 3630.49 tons (standard variation/mean = 103.73%) and length was 5.92 meters (standard variation/mean = 32.27%).

23. See Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporlari, 1830-1914* (for 1860) In 1859, it was estimated that there were some 1.500-1.600 sandals with 6-35 tons Cargo capacity navigated in Trabzon. See Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping : The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Table 3: Estimation of physical features according to ship type²⁴ (bold numbers are not statistically meaningful)

	Ship Type		Average cargo capacity (tons)	Average lenght (m)	Percentage as number	Percentage as cargo capacity
	Number					
1st Method	Brig	94	103,14	17,13	42,53%	64,71%
	Martigo	45	52,81	14,14	20,36%	15,86%
	Bombard	5	42,73	12,39	2,26%	1,43%
	Roared	45	18,74	10,46	20,36%	5,63%
	Berkatine	7	157,97	24,03	3,17%	7,38%
	Others	25	29,90	11,34	11,31%	4,99%
	Total	221	67,79	14,62	100,00%	100,00%
2nd Method	Ship Type	Number	Average cargo capacity (tons)	Average lenght (m)	Percentage as number	Percentage as cargo capacity
	Brig	41	113,92	17,51	71,93%	81,57%
	Martigo	6	49,52	13,89	10,53%	5,19%
	Bombard	1	35,37	12,50	1,75%	0,62%
	Roared	0	0,00	0,00	0,00%	0,00%
	Berkatine	3	174,51	22,98	5,26%	9,14%
	Others	6	33,25	12,00	10,53%	3,48%
3rd Method	Ship Type	Number	Average cargo capacity (tons)	Average lenght (m)	Percentage as number	Percentage as cargo capacity
	Brig	69	103,14	17,13	71,88%	86,19%
	Martigo	5	52,81	14,14	5,21%	3,20%
	Bombard	17	42,73	12,39	17,71%	8,80%
	Roared		18,74	10,46	0,00%	0,00%
	Berkatine		157,97	24,03	0,00%	0,00%
	Others	5	29,90	11,34	5,21%	1,81%
4th Method	Ship Type	Number	Average cargo capacity (tons)	Average lenght (m)	Percentage as number	Percentage as cargo capacity
	Brig	69	113,92	17,51	71,88%	88,56%
	Martigo	5	49,52	13,89	5,21%	2,79%
	Bombard	17	35,37	12,50	17,71%	6,78%
	Roared		0,00	0,00	0,00%	0,00%
	Berkatine		174,51	22,98	0,00%	0,00%
	Others	5	33,25	12,00	5,21%	1,87%
Total List	Ship Type	Number	Average cargo capacity (tons)	Average lenght (m)	Percentage as number	Percentage as cargo capacity
	Brig	164	100,04	16,53	36,28%	58,52%
	Martigo	64	49,16	13,66	14,16%	11,22%
	Bombard	22	28,58	11,53	4,87%	2,24%
	Roared	67	19,98	10,86	14,82%	4,77%
	Berkatine	9	187,56	24,16	1,99%	6,02%
	Kirişac	51	61,68	17,32	11,28%	11,22%
Total List	Others	75	22,47	10,74	16,59%	6,01%
	Total	452	62,03	14,32	100,00%	100,00%

24. To measure the weight in shipping, I made two assumptions; first, I accepted the number of ships could represent the weight in the trade (fifth column) and second, I accepted total cargo capacities could represent the weight in trade (sixth column).

1st method is the results from Criteria-1

2nd method is the results from Criteria-2

3rd method is the combination of Criteria-1 and British commercial report of 1831. I took the number of ships entered in 1831 and multiplied with the cargo capacities from Criteria-1 to obtain weight in trade according to cargo capacity

4th method is the combination of Criteria-1 and British commercial report of 1831. I took the number of ships entered in 1831 and multiplied with the cargo capacities from Criteria-2 to obtain weight in trade according to cargo capacity

Total List is the results from Entire List

Building sites

According to the certificates, the majority of the Ottoman-flagged ships were built one of the Black Sea ports. However, this result does not represent all the ships owned by Ottoman subjects, because firstly, some of Ottoman subjects, especially from Aegean, registered their ships under a different flag. Secondly, possessing a foreign passport was extremely rare in Trabzon Province²⁵. Consequently, the percentage of ship-owners in the Black Sea ports registering to Ottoman Empire should have been more common than elsewhere. Thirdly most prominent ship-building sites as Syrian coast lines, Aegean Islands were totally missing. Therefore, it is better to argue that Black Sea ports were among the most important wooden ship-building sites in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and the great majority of the ships built in Anatolian Black Sea shore sailed under Ottoman-flag.

Among the Ottoman flagged ships, western Anatolia appeared to be the most important ship-construction site thanks to the existence of rich and dense woods providing suitable timber for ship-building.²⁶ Especially, the port of Bartın was the most important building port for merchant ships²⁷ and the woods and ships build in Bartın were very important for the Ottoman Navy as well²⁸. Tra-


25. During the rush of foreign merchants to Trabzon Province after Crimean War, there were 67 protégés in Trabzon Province. (see A. Üner Turgay, "Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Trabzon: Elements of Ethnic Conflict," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire : The Functioning of a Plural Society* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1982), pp.310-312. There were only 17 French citizens and 16 French protégé in 1893, (See "Rapport Commeciale De Trébizonde (1893)," (AMAE, CADN, 1893).)

26. While among the places that İdris Bostan listed as provider of timber for Ottoman Navy of mid-seventeenth century, Amasra Bartın, Ereğli, Çayağzı, Sinop and Gerze seems to be most important building sites for nineteenth century mercantile wooden ships. However, seventh century important other building sites, Samsun, Çanlı and Sahil were never mentioned in the maritime certificates. See İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teskilâtı : XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmiri* [The Organization of the Ottoman Naval Administration: The Imperial Shipyard] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1992), p.116.

27. 8.80%-10.85% (number-cargo capacity) in whole certificates, which is of 26.39%-42.44% in western Black Sea ports.

28. İdris Bostan, *Osmanlılar Ve Deniz : Deniz Organizasyonu, Teskilat, Gemiler*

Graph 1: Number of ships built in Each Region



bzon Province appears one of the major building sites at least in scale of the Ottoman Black Sea. In fact, Trabzon Province's ships were the longest and second vastest ships only after central Anatolian building site²⁹. However, considering the possibility that only the ships sailing to Istanbul were registered, a considerable number of small ships might have been missing as well.

In Trabzon Province, definitely Ünye was the most important building site- mainly for the construction of brigs, followed by Rize, Tirebolu and Giresun³⁰. Contemporary witnesses and statistics point out that while the ships within 50-200 tons were built in Ünye, Tirebolu and Giresun ports, the coasting boats were mainly constructed in Trabzon, Sürmene and Rize³¹. The question of how many ships


[The Ottomans and the Sea: Organization, Structure and Ships of the Navy] (Istanbul: Küre, 2007), pp.27 and 46.

29. See Appendix

30. Ünye 4.51%-7.56%, followed by Rize 1.77%-2.54%, Tirebolu 1.55%-1.80% and Giresun 0.66%-1.56%.

31. In 1860 British report, Palgrave enlisted most important ship-building ports. The list is the same with one major difference; he mentioned the name of Vona (today - Perşembe) instead of Ünye (Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (for the year of 1860)). However, I think that the British consular agent might confused Vona with Ünye because of the geographical proximity and the similarity in foreign spelling (Vona and Unia).

Graph 2: Building sites according to cargo capacity



in Trabzon Province were actually built in Trabzon Province could only be answered by Criterion-2, which suggests that more than half of the ships³² should be built in Trabzon Province and a quarter should be from other Anatolian Black Sea ports³³.

Ownership

The criterion-2 is composed according to the hometown of the ship-owners and that of the captain, if the former is absent. If the distribution of captain's hometown is unbiased, the criterion-2 should reflect perfectly the nature of ownership in Trabzon, but not nature of the Ottoman-flagged ships operating in Trabzon Province. For, there is always possibility that most ships entering to port could be owned by outsiders. Here, despite this, labelling Criteon-2 as representation of real picture makes more sense. For that reason, I will consider criterion-2 as the situation in Trabzon, and the Entire-List as situation in the Empire. Let me start with a general picture in the Empire. Considering the numbers from the entire list, the single ownership was dominant in Ottoman shipping. In fact, diffusion of ownership

32. As number 57.14% and as cargo capacity 55.75%.

33. See Appendix

is perfect like a stairway; while single ownership consisted roughly to half of the enlisted ships, ships with two owners were roughly to a quarter, three owners to 1/8 and the rest was another 1/8. These results substantiate Murat Çizakça's observations on the nature of partnerships in eighteenth century's Ottoman shipping³⁴. On the other hand, contrary to what was going on in the Empire, partnership was the most common practice in Trabzon Province; while the ships owned by two, three and four partners were 54%-56%, single ownership remained to 1/3. The reason behind this divergence could be the absence of coasters, which should have been dominated by single ownership. However, considering the fact that these coasters could not have so much effect on total cargo capacities, it does not explain while the numbers calculated using simple numbers and cargo capacities were close. Another explanation could be that since brigs that dominated the port were generally bigger than normal, thus more probably were more expensive. The factors of absence of capital or high risk in shipping would lead the economic agents to establish a partnership in order to cover the expenses and minimize the risk.

Table 4: Distribution of ownership according to Entire List³⁵

Number of Partners	Number of Ships	Percentage acc. Number	Percentage acc. Cargo Capacity
1	484	49,59%	48,09%
2	257	13,17%	22,24%
3	135	4,61%	17,16%
4	62	1,59%	7,19%
5	20	0,41%	2,47%
6	3	0,05%	0,45%
7	6	0,09%	1,30%
8	7	0,09%	1,06%
9	2	0,02%	0,04%
Captains	479	49,08%	43,25%

34. Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden - New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 90-91.

35. The column of captains presents the percentage of the captain was a partner or full-owner of the ship.

Table 5: Distribution of ownership according to Criterion-2

Number of Partners	Number of Ships	Percentage acc. Number	Percentage acc. Cargo Capacity
1	39	31,20%	32,13%
2	19	15,20%	12,38%
3	30	24,00%	28,12%
4	21	16,80%	13,53%
5	6	4,80%	4,63%
6	1	0,80%	0,89%
7	4	3,20%	4,27%
8	3	2,40%	3,85%
9	2	1,60%	0,19%
Captains	66	52,80%	57,04%

Second important point to make about ownership is that shipping sector was heavily dominated by Muslims. In fact, if only the names in the criteria-2 are taken into consideration, it is safe to say that sailing-shipping in Trabzon Province was totally a Muslim business, since there were only 5 non-Muslim³⁶ shareholders, and none of them possessed an entire ship. Total dominance of Muslims in Black Sea shores was an exception for nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The difference was made by governmental policies. The evidence suggest that there are signs for a vivid Muslim shipping before 1820s; for example in the eighteenth century, the majority of the ship-owners transporting cereals from Anatolian Black Sea shores to Istanbul was Muslim³⁷³⁸. However, the situation should have gone better in favor of the Muslim investors as the result of series of governmental policies favoring Muslims. What stimulated the Ottoman government most was the role of the Greek merchant ships during the Greek Revolution and the ongoing nationalization

36. BOA A.DVN.103.63, BOA A.DVN.93.4, BOA A.DVN.74.7, BOA A.DVN.73.31 and BOA A.DVN.73.54.

37. Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanları* [The Ports of Istanbul from Byzantium to the Ottomans] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2003), p.91.

38. Salih Aynural, *İstanbul Degirmenleri Ve Fırınları: Zahire Ticareti, 1740-1840* [The Mills and Bakeries of Istanbul. The Provisions' Trade, 1740-1840] (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2002), p.52.

of Greek shippers by Russia³⁹. First attempt to prevent these two developments; the *Kaptan-ı derya* decided to make an inventory of Ottoman-flagged merchant ships in 1822⁴⁰. As a part of this new control policy, maritime certificates were launched in 1823. A more drastically precaution came later; government issued a law preventing non-Muslims to acquire ownership of ship with cargo capacity bigger than 5 *kile* (0.07 tons) without a Muslim partner⁴¹. Moreover, for the ships already sailing under Ottoman flag without a Muslim partner, a share should be sold to a Muslim⁴². These policies had different outcomes;⁴³ needless to say, this policy should have marginal effect on Aegean maritime shipping⁴⁴. However, the existence of the Straits, a natural checking point for any ship, enabled the Ottoman authorities to prevent infiltration of non-Muslims in Anatolian Black Sea shores. This policy should create a window of

39. The Ottoman authorities declared this concern in the Aynalıkavak Convention for the first time and convinced the Russian delegation to forbid the illegal emigration of the Greeks to Russia. See Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, p.289.

40. İlhan Ekinci, “Osmanlı Denizciliğinde Sened-I Bahri Uygulaması,” 6: 28 (2013).

41. As expected, the primary criterion to obtain these certificates was that both the captain and the ship-owners had to be Muslims. However, eventually some non-Muslims from Istanbul acquired full-ownership, but the majority of ownerships remained under Muslim control until 1860s. For example, some captain from Rodos Misi (Kastellosso) appears in one certificate with his *şethiye brik* named *Aya Yorgi*. See BOA A.DVN 84.85. But in a more extreme case a Catholic pharmacist owned a certified big *şethiye brik* with a Catholic captain. See BOA A.DVN 103.70.


42. Ekinci, “Osmanlı Denizciliğinde Sened-I Bahri Uygulaması”.

43. Accepting a policy is one thing, implementing the same policy is another. The introduction of bureaucracy complicated things for the Muslims as well. For example, one Naili submitted a petition to the Sublime Porte for delayed certificates in 1854. As he described, many ship-owners had been unable to get certificates for their newly-built ships, even after they had already paid fully their fees. Moreover, these ships were sailing without certificates, which caused many legal difficulties for their owners. Since bureaucracy was so slow, those who wished to renew their certificates, did not even bother themselves. See BOA A}DVN. 98.54.

44. Edhem Eldem, “Kontrolü Kaybetmek: 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Doğu Akdenizde Osmanlı Varlığı” [Loosing Control: The Ottoman Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Second Half of the 18th Century], in Özlem Kumrular, ed., *Türkler Ve Deniz*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi 2007), pp.63-78.

opportunity for Muslim merchants to establish their supremacy⁴⁵. Subsequently, even in 1867, not only the ownership belonged to Muslims, but also apparently the crew of coasters were also *Laz*, in 1867⁴⁶, and it probably remained that way until the Republic.

Graph 3: Sailing ships by flag entered to Trabzon port



Tramp Shipping

Tramp shipping and the elastic supply was probably the most important advantage of the wooden ships in surviving against stiff competition from the steamships. The British reports from 1831⁴⁷ to 1842⁴⁸ and the French commercial reports from 1873 to 1882⁴⁹ indicate that wooden ships operated in Trabzon port according to seasonal changes. According to Graph 10, sailing ships in 1870s

45. *Hayriyye and Avrupa Tüccarları* was a similar policy supporting the Ottoman merchants in Ottoman Empire, See;

46. Bruce Masters, "The Sultan's Entrepreneurs: The Avrupa Tuccaris and the Hayriye Tuccaris in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24:4 (1992).

İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914. (For 1867 note B')

47. The permissions for sailing ships (*izn-i sefine*) indicate that the sailing ships were irregularly touching the ports long before 1831. Take for example A{DVNS. İZN.d.09.

48. For the years 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1837, 1840 and 1842.

49. The years of war (1877 and 1878) are excluded.

entered less frequently to Trabzon port during winter, especially in Januarys and February, while the most vivid period seems to be autumn⁵⁰. The reason behind this periodization seems to be the weather conditions and harvest season. Especially storms⁵¹ could be dangerous⁵². For example, in January 1858 some sailor tried to expand their range by fixing sails to their rowboats, but they ended up with their hands and feet frozen after a severe storm⁵³. In fact, these hurricanes cause danger even to bigger boats; for example, ships named as Sully in Trabzon and Henry IV in Amasra shipwrecked during the same hurricane⁵⁴. Hurricanes could be harmful even for steamers; for example Progresso owned by Austrian Lloyd was severely damaged in March 1858⁵⁵. On the other hand, what drove a sailing ship to enter the port was the harvest seasons. It was reported that most sailing ships travelled to Samsun in ballast in order to transport grains⁵⁶.

Forecasting Days of Future Past

The final inquiry for sailing ships is to combine the numbers acquired from certificates and the consular reports. As pointed out

50. This difference between the seasons was much more evident in the British reports of 1830s and 1840s, where January and February are totally dead season.

51. See the webpage for traditional storm calendar; Hugh Ragstale, *The Cambridge History of Russia: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven, v. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006).

52. The port of Trabzon does not protect the ships during the storms. The harbor of Samsun port was half-moon and very low; 8 meters to bottom and 2 miles of land. It was dangerously open to the winds from North-West and North. When the winds reigned, the water took down and the ships went to Sinop or Vona. Even the postal service and other kinds of communication became impossible. "Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1897)," (AMAE, CADN, 1897).


53. The news was dated 16 January 1858, but published in 23 January 1858. See "Trébizonde," *Journal de Constantinople, l'Echo de l'Orient*, 23 January 1858.

54. Micheal B. Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World: A Twentieth-Century History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

55. Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route."

56. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (For 1867)

Graph 4: Arrival of Sailing ships to Trabzon port (1873-1882)



earlier, certificates and consular reports are not compatible, since the maritime certificates ranged between 1850 and 1860 and consular reports between 1872 and 1883. Moreover, British consular agents classified Ottoman sailing ships between the intervals of 5 tons, 100 tons and bigger. For that reason, I converted statistics acquired from criterion-2 into this new classification. Comparison of two data indicates that the gap between bigger ships and small ships diverged by roughly 80%⁵⁷. However, this estimation could be biased as well⁵⁸, firstly because, as I mentioned before, the very small coastal ships could be missing in the certificates. However, even if that was case, it is safe to state that the size of the bigger ships increased in the 1870s and 1880s. Moreover, the differences in shape and sizes between wooden ships operating with long-distance with

57. While the ships bigger than 100 tons became 12.5% bigger and the ships smaller than 100 tons get smaller, shrunk roughly to %67.5.

58. Another weakness of this estimation is that while Method 2 counts every ship as if it were entered to port once in a year implicitly, the consular agents count every entry regardless the number of trips.

coasters operating in the short-distance should have become more apparent with increasing competition from steamship companies.

Steamships

Recapitulating the history of the steamships

Steamships came to Trabzon Province in 1830s; the first steamship company that established regular trips from Istanbul to Trabzon was the Austrian Danube Steam Navigation in 1835⁵⁹, which later was ceded by Austrian Lloyd in 1844. Starting their first trips in 1840⁶⁰, the Ottoman Steamship Company⁶¹ was the second. By 1841, it was reported that two Austrian -with 140 and 160 horsepower- and one Ottoman -with 120 horsepower- steamships had already been operating regularly⁶² between Istanbul and Trabzon⁶³⁶⁴. Another Ottoman steamship with 140 horsepower started its journeys in 1842⁶⁵. However, introduction of these steamers most probably had little effect since their cargo capacities were hardly bigger than 200 tons, the exact size of the biggest brigs, and double as cargo size of a mediocre brig. Although the first attempt to extend the line to Batumi was in 1846⁶⁶, Ottoman Steam Company started its

59. Sasmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents, 1830-1914* = *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporlari, 1830-1914*. (For the other numbers were from British consular reports Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporlari, 1830-1914*. (for 1882)

60. Ibid.

61. Since during the century the public steamship company changed its names, I call it simply Ottoman Steamship Company as the foreign consuls did.

62. Austrian steamers entered 52 times in 1842 and 34 times in 1844. See Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporlari, 1830-1914*. (For 1842 and 1844)

63. Kaya Tuncer Çağlayan, “İngiliz Konsolosluk Raporlarına Göre 1841 Yılında Samsun Ve Çevresinde Ticaret,” in Cevdet Yılmaz, ed., *Geçmisten Geleceğe Samsun* (Samsun: Samsun Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2006), p.284.

64. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporlari, 1830-1914*. (For 1841)

65. Ibid. (For 1842)

66. Ibid. (For 1849)

Table 6: Comparison between Ottoman sailing ships in 1850-1860 and 1872-1883¹

	<i>Certificates</i>	<i>Consular Reports</i>										
<i>Sailing ships</i>	<i>1850-1860</i>	<i>1872</i>	<i>1874</i>	<i>1875</i>	<i>1876</i>	<i>1877</i>	<i>1878</i>	<i>1879</i>	<i>1880</i>	<i>1881</i>	<i>1882</i>	<i>1883</i>
<i>5>100</i>	<i>56,50</i>	<i>19,17</i>	<i>17,84</i>	<i>17,62</i>	<i>13,98</i>	<i>15,01</i>	<i>26,39</i>	<i>23,32</i>	<i>19,82</i>	<i>24,39</i>	<i>21,38</i>	<i>23,14</i>
<i>>100</i>	<i>142,91</i>	<i>138,37</i>	<i>200,05</i>	<i>281,29</i>	<i>179,93</i>	<i>174,39</i>	<i>155,80</i>	<i>206,60</i>	<i>106,00</i>	<i>139,60</i>	<i>168,25</i>	<i>157,60</i>

1. The numbers in 1872 was calculated from French consular reports, other numbers were from British consular reports

regular trips to Batumi by mid-May 1849 and Austrian Lloyd by July 1849⁶⁷. In the same year, Russian Steamship Company started its trips from opposite direction from Ketch and Sukhumi⁶⁸.

Austrian Lloyd and Ottoman Steamship Company were the only two main steamship companies regularly operated before Crimean War, despite several attempts by Russian and British companies. The main issue for steam-shipping was the fact that the ships entering to Trabzon port usually returned not fully loaded or in total ballast. According to the British consular reports from 1831 to 1842⁶⁹, up to 43% of the foreign ships departed from Trabzon in ballast. The main problem is that although Trabzon was one of the main exit for Persian goods⁷⁰, its geographically narrow hinterland had almost nothing to offer to western merchants. For that reason, operating in Trabzon port was not lucrative comparing to its alternatives. The Ottoman Steam Company became an established company thanks to political support. On the other hand, the Austrian Lloyd success relied on the fact that they enabled to find commodities to export, not exactly in Trabzon, but in Samsun, a gateway of Anatolia. It was reported that Austrian Lloyd exported leeches, beans, cattle skin and especially tobacco⁷¹ from Samsun⁷², which should have increased the profitability.

The Crimean War was the main turning point. In the period of 1854-1860s, while total exportation passed from Trabzon 5,240,000 to 10,710,000 francs, importation augmented from 4,320,000 to 8,930,000 francs⁷³. The increasing demand for transportation encouraged new steamship companies to arrive to Trabzon Province. The third steamship company, French Mésagerie,

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. (For the years of 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1837, 1840 and 1842)

70. Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route".


71. Austrian steamships kept exporting mainly tobacco in 1880s. See «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1881),» (AMAE, CADN, 1881).

72. Çağlayan, «İngiliz Konsolosluk Raporlarına Göre 1841 Yılında Samsun Ve Çevresinde Ticaret,» pp.287-288.

73. See Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route".

arrived soon after in 1856⁷⁴. Already operating casually between Istanbul and Trabzon, Russian company followed the trend and finally started its regular trips in 1857.⁷⁵ With new companies new steamships came as well. For example, M  ssagerie’s steamships that came in late-1850s were brand new, built in 1854, and they remained in use even in 1870s. As a consequence, comparing to 1844, the average cargo capacities of steamers in 1860s doubled. It can be argued that the steam-shipping started to establish control over the market in 1860s, but it gripped off the merchant shipping market in the 1870s.

Graph 5: Average Cargo Capacity of Steamships (tons)⁷⁶




74. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (For 1882)

75. Ibid. (For 1882)

76. In fact, the liner trend with high R^2 of %89.85 indicates that the average cargo capacity increased steadily with %2.85 every year, The equation is “ $y = 16,441x + 226,54$ ”

Graph 6: Steamships versus sailing ships according to cargo capacity



Increase in demand after the Crimean War, alleviated sail-ship-
ping as well. Despite the astonishing increase of number and cargo
capacity, all the same, the share of steamships in merchant shipping
amplified against sailing ships in the following years. While total
tonnage was 6,495 in 1844, it passed to 105,908 tons in 1860. The
share of steamships in total shipping amplified gradually against
sailing ships from 1860 to 1913 by 1.85%. The domination of
steamships was established in the long-term and transformed the
shipping. Firstly, from 1860s, the steamship companies firmly aug-
mented their average cargo capacities by 2.85% every year, regard-
less the exogenous effects. Secondly, the steamships gained speed
in time⁷⁷. Thirdly, contrary to sailing ships, steamship companies
always dealt with liner shipping. Especially, Courdgi and French
companies were more loyal to time schedules⁷⁸. Even as early as

77. In the appendix, I enlisted steamships with technical properties. This list would not be statistically meaningful for all steam companies, but it can be argued that as the steamships became bigger, they became faster

78. By 1890s, the most regular service was provided by French steam companies and Courdgi, while Austrian Lloyd did not always follow its schedules. Ottoman Steam Company was reported to provide bad service for passengers and irregularities in their itinerary. However, the Ottoman Steamship Company had the advantage to be cheaper and enter more ports than others.

1840s, the Austrian steamship company travelled regularly between the ports. By 1867, major steamship companies arrived to Trabzon and Samsun almost every week⁷⁹. In 1874, *Méssagerie*, Austrian Lloyd, Ottoman and Russian Companies steamboats came from Istanbul to Trabzon via Samsun once a week and another Russian ship came to Trabzon from opposite direction every week.⁸⁰

In mid-1880s, the well-established order of four, Austrian, French, Russian and Ottoman, were challenged by the arrival of new shipping companies. Firstly, *Paquet*, another French steam company, entered to the market in 1879, targeting the line between Trabzon and Caucasian ports⁸¹, which had been dominated by Russian Steam Company. *Paquet* flourished in the eastern Black Sea ports under the umbrella of *Méssagerie*⁸². Accordingly, this company added Istanbul-Trabzon in the mid-1880s⁸³. *Paquet* was followed by *PanHellenic Steam Company* in 1885, but due to stiff price competition, *PanHellenic* remained a rayless company until 1898. Hardly travelling to Trabzon port before, *PanHellenic* launched fortnight trips in 1 July 1892 from Marseilles to Batumi⁸⁴ and by 1898, *PanHellenic* ships arrived every Wednesday to Trabzon and went back to Istanbul every Tuesday⁸⁵. In this sudden success, the arrival of Egyptian cigarette producers with Greek-origin to Samsun, should have played an important role⁸⁶. Second major factor might be the change of course of

79. French; *Méssagerie*, Austrian Lloyd and Russian Company of Navigation companies' steamers started to operate between Constantinople and Trabzon in a more regular base (French and Austrian ship companies seem to touch Trabzon once a week, the Russian twice). See, "Rapport Commerciale De Trébizonde (1874)," (AMAE, CADN, 1874).

80. Ibid.

81. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (For 1882)

82. These companies shared same agents in the Trabzon Province

83. "Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1887)," (AMAE, CADN, 1887).

84. «Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1892),» (AMAE, CADN, 1892).

85. «Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1898),» (AMAE, CADN, 1898).

86. For Greek cigarette production in Egypt, see Relli Shechter, *Smoking, Culture and Economy in the Middle East the Egyptian Tobacco Market 1850-2000* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006). Take Mavrides family for example. In addition to their interest on tobacco in Samsun, Mavrides Co was representing Ottoman Bank in Giresun, Ordu and Akçaabad, where any branch had opened

Table 7: The itinerary for the year of 1885^{1, 2, 3, 4}

	Depart (İstanbul)																Arrival (Trabzon)		Arrival (Terminus)	
	Hour		Ereğli	Bartın	Anaşa	İnebolu	Samsun	Ünye	Ordu	Giresun	Trabzon	Rize	Batumi	Pot			Hour			
Austrian Lloyd	Saturday	15:00																	Tuesday	11:00
Ottoman (Mahsuse)	Thursday																		Tuesday	
Méssagerie Maritim	Thursday	06:00													Saturday				Sunday	06:00
Russian Steam Co	Saturday	08:00													Friday		16:00		Friday	
	Depart (Batumi)																			
	Hour		Batumi	Rize	Trabzon	Giresun	Ordu	Ünye	Samsun	Sinop	İnebolu	Anaşa	Bartın	Ereğli						
Austrian Lloyd	Tuesday	11:00																		
Ottoman (Mahsuse)	Tuesday																			
Méssagerie Maritim	Sunday	06:00																		
Russian Steam Co	Friday																			

1. The Méssagerie Maritime's ships took off in every Wednesday at 10:00 o'clock in the year of 1884 Austrian Lloyd and Russian Steamship Company every Tuesdays from İstanbul (Lloyd at 15:00 o'clock). (see Harold 1 March 1884)

2. Lloyd (entered the port during the cholera) , Russian (cancelled after cholera), Ottoman, (Mahsuse, Kurci) PanHellenic (after 1 July 1892 passed to trips 2 weeks from Marseilles to Batumi) Paquet and Messagerie (causally entered to the port for 6 months) : weekly (AMAE, CADN, Samsoun, Rapport Commerciale de Samsoun 1894)

3. 1. Messagerie: 15 days, Marseilles-Batumi

2. PanHellenic: 15 days, Trieste-Trabzon

3. Russian: weekly Odessa-Batumi

4. Lloyd: weekly Constantinople-Batumi

5. Courtldgi and Mahsuse: weekly Constantinople- Trabzon

Lloyd Paquet and Messagerie had casual trips according to demand. Russian, Mahsuse and Courtdgi had regularly based trips. AMAE, CADN, Trébizonde, Rapport Commerciale de Kérasoude 1890

4. The itinerary is taken from Annuaire Orriental of 1885. See «Annuaire Oriental Du Commerce, De L'industrie, De L'administration Et De La Magistrature,» *Annuaire oriental du commerce, de l'industrie, de l'administration et de la magistrature* (1885).

British textiles, which were carried to Istanbul by the French and Austrian steamers,⁸⁷ and shifted to Piraeus port, which boosted Panhellenic's share⁸⁸. After 1908, another Greek company, Destuni, also entered to market and started its weekly trips along⁸⁹, which doubled Greek share. However, the Greek steam companies abandoned Trabzon ports for good with the beginning of Balkan Wars, like Italian Rubittino Florio⁹⁰ did after Italian-Ottoman War.

A second Ottoman shipping company, Courdgi or Aegean Steamship Company, was established in 1883⁹¹. This company started to operate in Istanbul-Trabzon line in 1887⁹². Courdgi had two distinctive features from other companies; first, provided better services to passengers⁹³. Second, the company was a conglomerate formed by the shipping company, Mytilini Bank and Pontoherakleia Mine Company for coal extraction in Ergani (Zonguldak). By 1890s, Courdgi became known for its best service on passengers specializing on passenger transportation⁹⁴. Thanks to one of its partners, Georges Zarifi, this company also profited from its good relations with both Greek and Ottoman governments. However, this company stopped its business in 1911 like Panhellenic and Rubittino Florio.

Danish DFDS entered to market in 1887 and operated between Russian Baltic ports to Odessa passing by Istanbul, Samsun and Trabzon⁹⁵. DFDS provided only cargo service mainly for Northern

yet. Mavrides Co was representing Courdgi Steamship Company in Akçaabad and Giresun. See *Annuaire Oriental (Ancientrébizonde) Du Commerce De L'industrie, De L'administration Et De La Magistrature*.

87. "Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1898)."

88. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (For 1898 and 1899)

89. "Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1908)," (AMAE, CADN, 1908).

90. This company made many attempts for entering to market, but their ships touched the ports causally.

91. Evridiki Sifneos, "P.M. Courtgi and the Birth of a Greek-Ottoman Liner Company," in Maria Christina Chatzeioannou and Gelina Harlaftis, eds., *Following the Nereids : Sea Routes and Maritime Business, 16th-20th Centuries* (Athens: Kerkyra Publications, 2006), p.123.

92. Ibid., p.127.

93. Ibid.

94. Samsoun, "Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1894)".

95. The line started with St. Petersburg or Riga or Reval in winters and touched

ports⁹⁶. DFDS entered Trabzon port irregularly once a month, but after 1896, only two ships came to Trabzon and the service for Russia was totally cancelled in 1898. The German company Orient Line arrived in the beginning of 1890s and established a monthly trip from St. Petersburg to Batumi by visiting Hamburg, Antwerp Istanbul, Samsun and Trabzon⁹⁷. Like DFDS, Orient Line had no passenger service, but unlike DFDS, the German Steam Company flourished under Austrian Lloyd regularly every year until the 1914. The introduction of new steamships heated competition⁹⁸. A price war sparked in the mid-1880s. For example, in the beginning of 1890s, the fees of transportation between Samsun and Istanbul were reduced to 6 francs from 10-15 francs per ton⁹⁹.

The commerce of Trabzon entered into a new period of growth in the middle of the first decade of 1900s. However, due to the Balkan Wars and the rise of Turkish nationalism the Ottoman steamers took all the benefits¹⁰⁰. However, this time, a descendant of a local “*hayriyye*” merchant¹⁰¹, Şükrü Yelkencizade from Samsun enabled to grasp increasing potential. Yelkencizade family had already been

Copenhagen, Antwerp, Piraeus, Samsun, Trabzon, Batumi and finally Odessa. This information is provided by DFDS Company’s (Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab) agent Gert Jakobsen.

96. Samsoun, «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1894).»

97. Ibid.; «Rapport Commerciale De Trébizonde (1897).» (AMAE, CADN, 1897).; «Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun », (AMAE, CADN, 1901).

98. Another change introduced by new comers was the established direct lines from ports outside of Black Sea. For example, until mid-1890s, while the Austrian Lloyd operated only between Istanbul to Batumi, only more than half of French steamboats had direct lines to Marseilles. However, in 1896, both French and Austrian companies served between western ports to Trabzon. (See «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1892).» (AMAE, CADN, 1892).; «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1894).»; «Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1896).» (AMAE, CADN, 1896).)

99. The fees for 12 francs for Marseilles, 20 francs for Nord of France, 30 francs for Germany, 10 francs to Greece 12 francs for Russia and 15 francs for Italy. See Samsoun, «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1894).»; «Rapport Commercial De Samsoun (1892).»

100. Although Greek steam companies profited first from this new expansion, eventually they abandoned the port during the Balkan Wars.

101. Yaşar Tolga Cora, “A Muslim Great Merchant [Tüccar] Family in the Late Ottoman Empire: A Case Study of the Nemlizades, 1860-1930 “ *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 19: 1/2 (2013), p.28.

involved in shipping; Yelkenci Hacı Mustafa joined his capital with Sürüroğlu Yakup Ağa from Rize and Nemlizade Mustafa Efendi from Trabzon for the construction of a 20.000-liter ship in 1860s¹⁰². However, the family abandoned the shipping sector and invested especially on cereals and tobacco in the 1880s. Nonetheless, Şükrü Yelkencizade, born in 1868, decided to revive his grandfather's profession and founded the firm known as Yelkencizade and Sons¹⁰³. This firm flourished during the second constitutional era¹⁰⁴, but it became one of the major steamship companies after 1914.

Ships and Cargos

The shipping history in Trabzon Province diverged also in steamship companies entering its ports. The Ottoman, French, Russian and Austrian steamship companies established domination as early as 1860s and preserved their position despite the challenges from Greek, German and Italian, while share of British and Scandinavian companies remained marginal. It is important to note that this composition did not reflect the general situation in other Black Sea or Ottoman Mediterranean ports. To understand how different it was, let me compare with Odessa. While percentage of British steamers was around %55-60 in 1897's Odessa¹⁰⁵, no British ship entered Trabzon port in 1897, 1898 nor 1899. Only some British steamers touched Samsun for transporting cereals to Britain¹⁰⁶. Moreover, some prominent shipping companies sieged in Istanbul were either totally absent, like Papayanni or Moss¹⁰⁷, or entered briefly to Trabzon market, like Ralli agency operated from 1858 to 1870's winter¹⁰⁸.

102. Ibid., p.8.

103. The Turkish name was *Yelkencizade ve Mahdumları*.

104. The firm acquired four steamships called as Vatan, Samsun, Anadolu and Yelkenci.

105. H.G. Mackie, "Report on the Trade, Commerce and Navigation of the Consular District of Odessa for the Year 1897," (Foreign Office, 1897).

106. «Rapport Commerciale De Samsoun (1899),» (AMAE, CADN, 1899).

107. Even though, Whittal family, the family representing Moss in Istanbul, was present in Samsun.

108. Sasmaz, *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Trabzon Vilayeti Ticari Raporları, 1830-1914*. (For 1870s).

Steamships (in tons)




Table 8: Ports Steamship Companies and Merchants

Nation	Main Port	Samsun		Ordu	Giresun	Rize	Trabzon	Entire Province	Entire Province
		Hq Tobacco	Cereals	Haricot	Hazelnut	Rice	Persian trade	Lq Tobacco	Maize
Austrian	Trieste	1840s/Lloyd	Never	Causually	1880ss/Lloyd	Never	1880ss/Lloyd	Never	Never
French	Marseilles	1850s/Méssagerie	Causually	Causually	1880ss/Paquet	Never	1880ss/Paquet	Never	Hardly
Russian	Tiflis-Poti	Causually	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian	1840s/Russian
Ottoman	İstanbul	Hardly	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman	1840s/Ottoman
Greek	Alexandria	1880s/Panhellenic	Hardly	Hardly	1880s/Panhellenic	Never	1880s/Panhellenic	Hardly	Never
German	Antwerp	1880s/Deutsche Linie	Never	Never	1880s/Deutsche Linie	Never	1880s/Deutsche Linie	Never	Never

I argue that the survival of a steamship company in Trabzon Province relied firstly on finding out something to export and the dominant nationality of exporters. In other words, I claim that Austrian or French steam companies became established companies, because there had been a vivid demand for oriental tobacco, but it was the Greek, not the Egyptian steamship companies, that profited from the increasing demand on tobacco, because most merchants were Greek not Egyptian. In fact, finding a major profitable commodity to export was so crucial that only Ottoman and Russian steamship companies entered regularly to Ordu and Rize, because only the above two transported local haricot and rice to their main ports. The Graph 13 summarizes my argument: while dark indicates exportation of a crop in great quantity, I also put the date of entry of steam company and its decade. In other words, the table should be read as for example: Deutsche Linie stated its trips to Giresun in 1880s, to export mainly hazelnuts for Antwerp, but it never entered to Rize.

The main object of attraction in Trabzon Province was the high quality tobacco. As pointed out above, the Austrian Lloyd touched Samsun for this agricultural crop even in 1840s. The French Tobacco Monopoly made three expeditions in 1844, 1845 and 1847¹⁰⁹. In 1847, although the French Tobacco Company in 1847 suggested to find a “French” ship to lower the costs, they could find such kind of ship in Russian ports in two months¹¹⁰. However, tobacco exportation to France became regular only in late-1850s with *Mésagerie*’s arrival. As pointed out, the Greek cigarette industry in Egypt was one of the main reasons for PanHellenic’s expansion in 1880s. In 1890s, thanks to decrease in prices of cereals, the exportation became again profitable. In addition to this, hazelnut became another important crop in 1890s because it was used as ingredient in chocolate and perfume industries’ usage¹¹¹.

109. See “Samsoun, Tabacs 1844-1847,” (AMAE CADN, 1844-1847).

110. See *ibid*.

111. “Rapport Commerciale De Kérésunde Et Ordou (1894),” (AMAE, CADN, 1894).

Conclusion

In the nineteenth century, contrary to what is expected, the sailing-shipping in Trabzon Province was dominated heavily by the Muslims, who sailed under Ottoman flag. Thanks to the natural barrier, the Straits, a series of governmental policies were launched to prevent the development of local Greek shipping or the infiltration of Mediterranean Greek shippers to Black Sea ports. As a result, in the mid-nineteenth century, the vast majority of the ship-owners and sailors were Muslims. Another interesting feature of ownership is the prevalence of the partnerships, which was an exception comparing to Murat Çizakça's observation for eighteenth century shipping and also for nineteenth century Ottoman shipping.

If the coasters are left aside, the brig type ships, especially the *şethiyye brik*, dominated the maritime trade in Trabzon Province. An average brig transported up to 115 tons in 1850s, but most probably, these ships' cargo capacities increased by 12.5% in 1870s. Most of these ships were built in West Anatolian Black Sea ports, especially around Bartın and Trabzon Province, namely Ünye, Tirebolu and Giresun. Since sailing ships were dealing with tramp trade, their main advantage against the steamships was their elasticity in schedules. The sailing ships usually avoided sailing in winter and they touched to the ports more frequently during summers and autumns.

First regular steamship expedition was started by Austrian Lloyd and Ottoman Steamship Company in 1840s, but only after the Crimean War, steamships became increasingly dominant in maritime trade with the addition of French Mésagerie and Russian Steamship Company. The introduction of the steamers regulated the commerce and the transportation in off-seasons became possible. A second wave happened in mid-1880s; this time, Panhellenic, Courdgi, German Linie and Rubittino Florio arrived in Trabzon Province. Their arrival sparked a price war and the transportation fees decreased. However, the most astonishing newcomer was probably Yelkencizade, one of the local sailing ship-owners, whose steamship company survived to Republican Era. The most important factor in commercial success for a steamship company was to find a local commodity to export to a country, where commercial network was

dominated by their fellow patriots. While Austrian Lloyd, French M  ssagerie, and Panhellenic became established companies thanks to tobacco exportation to France, Austria-Hungary and Egypt, Rubittino Florio's success relied on hazelnuts.

Primary Sources

AMAE, CADN: Les archives du Minist  re des affaires   trang  res, Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes

BOA: Ba  bakanlık Osmanlı Ar  ivi

4.

The Rising of a Muslim Merchant Family: The Nemlizade's

*Şahika Karatepe - Mustafa Batman**

Merchant families were very common in Ottoman history whose members were involved in all kinds of trade activity¹. Nemlizades, one of these well-known families, are an important example in order to understand the commercial activity of Muslim families in Ottoman history at the end of the nineteenth century. In this paper, we will focus on the trade actions of Nemlizade family to explain not only trade relations between family members and other merchant families, but also to analyze the relationship between a merchant family and the state officials².

Although new studies show the importance of Muslim merchant families in the Ottoman History, there are not enough studies that specifically refer to this subject. The classical view implies the lack of Muslim merchant bourgeoisie in the late Ottoman Historiography³. This view simply argues that non-Muslims commercial

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1. This paper is based on our presentation in the 3rd Black-Sea Conference in Bogazici University.

2. The late Professor Vangelis Kechriotis encouraged us to prepare a paper about this subject. Yaşar Tolga Cora sent many documents and his papers about Nemlizade Family. While writing this paper both of them helped us. We are very grateful to both of them.

3. For Black-Sea Studies, Yaşar Tolga Cora, who is a Ph. D candidate in Chicago University and researches on the merchant families of the eastern part of the Empire such as Nemlizade family and Pastırmacıyan family: see Yaşar Tolga Cora, 'A Muslim Great Merchant (Tüccar) Family in the Late Ottoman Empire: A Case Study of the Nemlizades, 1860-1930', *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 19:1-2 (2013). Hamdi Özdiş who wrote a thesis about the power struggle in the Trabzon Vilayet, Hamdi Özdiş, 'Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi'nde

elite realized the changes in the market system earlier than the Ottoman Muslims and created their commercial bourgeoisie, while the Muslims formed the bureaucratic elite of the empire⁴. This argumentation attributes clear-cut positions to the social groups of the Empire and provides some sociological explanations to draw an image about the late Ottoman Historiography.

However, new studies criticized this kind of sociological explanations and suggested alternative historiography for the late Ottoman period. Their arguments do not deny the early realization of the Ottoman non-muslim population of the changes in the economy, but they add the Muslim merchant families in the general framework as the rivals of the former in the local and international trade.

From that perspective, this paper will focus on how a Muslim merchant family developed in a port-city. When did they appear and what did they do to gain power? What was their relationship with their rivals and the state officials? This paper will directly focus on the Nemlizade family as an example of the Muslim merchant families in the Black-Sea region of the Empire.

Although we do not know much about the early history of the Nemlizade family, we can follow their story from Salih Ağa and his children. The first person we can find his voice in the archives is Salih Ağa. He donated 4,000 kuruş to the State during the Crimean War⁵. He was called ‘tüccar-ı muteberandan Salih Ağa’ which means respectable merchant Salih Ağa⁶.

Salih Ağa had three children and after him, his children took

Trabzon Vilayeti’nde Eşraf, Siyaset ve Devlet (1876-1909), Unpublished Dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2008. Kudret Emiroğlu who transliterated Ottoman statistical yearbooks of Trabzon province (1869-1904), see *Trabzon Vilayeti Salnamesi*, Trabzon İli ve İlçeleri Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı, 1993. v. 1 H. 1286 (1869)- v. 22. H. 1322 (1904).

4. Fatma Müge Göçek’s influential study is a clear example of this kind of historiography. Although her study was very important to understand the nineteenth century of the Empire, she did not give importance at the crucial role of the Muslim merchant families in the Empire. Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

5. BOA, İ.DH.18184

6. BOA, İ.DH. 18184

important places in the local trade. Mustafa Efendi, the older son of Salih Ağa, was accepted as Hayriye Tüccar in 1856, September 26th, shortly after Crimean War, and, thus, he received the rights to trade in Europe, Persia and India by sea and land⁷. According to Yasar Tolga Cora, who published a detailed article about Nemlizade Family, Mustafa Efendi is one of the best examples of successful Hayriye Tüccarı. He was active in caravan trade with Persia and maritime trade in the Black-Sea. After the construction of Trans-Caucasia railroad that connected Persia with Poti, he supported the re-construction of the Trabzon-Erzurum road as an alternative way to trade with Persia⁸. He also owned a ship and he formed a partnership with Yelkencizade Mustafa and Suruoğlu Yakup who were other important Muslim merchants of the vilayet. We do not find enough data to explain what he carried with caravan and maritime trade, but it is clear that he was one of the important merchants of his time. After his attempt in the reconstruction of the Trabzon-Tabriz route, he was rewarded with the fifth degree of the high order of Mecidiye in 1859.

Shortly, we can say that the prize of the Salih Ağa's donation was given to Mustafa Efendi. The Nemlizade family increased their trading capacity after Mustafa Efendi gained power in Trabzon. When Mustafa Efendi died in 1867, he left substantial network of economic relations to his brothers Mahmud and Ahmed⁹. After him, firstly Ahmed Efendi and then Mahmud Efendi who were the other sons of Salih Ağa, worked to increase their trade capacity day by day.

Nemlizade Ahmed and Mahmud Efendi

Soon after the death of Mustafa Efendi, Ahmed Efendi took his title and became a Hayriye Tüccar¹⁰. With this title Ahmed Efendi became one of the prominent notable of Trabzon. He firstly estab-

7. BOA, A.DVN. 116/92 21 M 1273

8. For further discussion on Trabzon-Erzurum road see: Fulya Ozkan, "Winding Road To Modernization: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road In The Late Ottoman World", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 34 (2014), pp. 191-205.

9. Cora, "A Muslim Great Merchant Family", p.8.

10. Cora, "A Muslim Great Merchant Family", p.8.

lished in 1869 a company, which was called ‘kollektif nevinden şirket’¹¹. Its capital was 17,000 piasters (8,500 mecrediye) divided into 500 shares.¹² Ahmed Efendi was the head of the company and his partner was Yelkencizade Mustafa Ağa. He also opened a commission house in Erzurum directed by one of his sons, Sabri Bey. Like his older brothers he joined trade activities with Persia and Maritime trade.

It is important to note that he was also famous in banking. He loaned cash to many farmers and other merchants with an interest and created a hierarchy over them. From the death of Mustafa Efendi in 1867 to the death of Ahmed and Mahmud Efendis in 1891, Nemlizades controlled many bureaucratic positions in the vilayet via this hierarchy. It was also the time when local elite gained power in bureaucracy. Ahmed Efendi was the member of municipal council in 1870s and after a short time he was a member of ‘meclis-i idare-i vilayet’ (provincial council) in 1880’s. In addition to the above, due to the banking system, they confiscated the property of people from almost all classes who did not achieve to pay their debt. One important example of this situation shows us the power of the Nemlizade: Ahmed in the province of Trabzon. The text reveals the ideas of Lamec Saad (doctor quarantine) in which Tolga Cora wrote in his article about the family¹³. According to Sadd, Ahmed Efendi;

.... was the greatest merchant of the place [Trabzon] and a millionaire although he was very stingy and he lived in his house in the simplest fashion... He should have acquired his wealth through either profiteering or smuggling. The smuggler in Surmene – eight hours from Trebizond- is under his protection and works for him, he [Ahmed Efendi] uses him, to collect his usury from the peasants. If he had to get an interest [of money] from a farmer– he never loaned under 20%- who would not pay, he sends him one of those rascals on his neck, who simply says: “Nemlizade has money to get from you, give it or I shoot

11. Cora, “From Hayriye Tüccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic: International Trade Accumulation of Capital and the Big Muslim Merchant Families: A Case Study of the Nemlizade Family of Trebizond”, p.20, unpublished paper.

12. Cora, “From Hayriye Tüccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic”.

13. Cora, “From Hayriye Tuccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic”, p.26.

you down". Every poor villager, to whom there was such a message, knew that this was not for fun. Everyone in Trebizond was in his hands, the general inspector lives in one of his houses, the first secretary of the governor general, the customs director, many small officials as well, all had a house from him, of course free or at will. This is the common talk. One bends down in all bureaus, when the Nemlizade comes in. Later he also offered me one of his houses, I thanked politely.

According to Sadd's observations, there are two important points in this story. One is the Ahmed Efendi's illegal way to collect his debt from peasant. All peasants who Ahmed Efendi loaned, know that if they did not pay their debts in time, they would face a huge problem. In addition to this, the more vital point in this text is about smuggling; although we do not know the year of this event(s), we know that, the nephew of Ahmed Efendi, who was Osman Efendi, was Regie tax farmer in 1895. One of the main problems in Trabzon was smuggling. The Laz Smugglers, who were especially from Akçaabad and Surmene, were well organized, armed groups who travelled around Anatolian cities and sold their tobacco without the permission of the Regie company. The Laz smugglers of Trabzon generally caused security problems in the provinces and in many provinces, the power of provincial governors were not enough to stop their trade and arrest them. The above mentioned text was only one of the documents about Laz smugglers, who were identified in Nigde, a small city of Anatolia¹⁴. Regie company always criticized the unwillingness of the state officials to stop illicit tobacco trade in the provinces, but we can see that, while Ahmed Efendi was controlling the smugglers of Surmene, his nephew, Osman, tried to stop illicit trade and collect taxes from tobacco. This shows us the binary position of the family according to their profit from the structure.

As a dilemma of merchants; the more they earned, the more they had to donate¹⁵. As Emiroğlu stated, Ahmed Efendi built a konak, mosque and a school in Trabzon. After him, other people of

14. Mustafa Batman, *Tobacco Smuggling in the Black Sea Region of the Ottoman Empire 1883-1914*, unpublished MA Thesis Istanbul Şehir University, 2013, p.62.

15. Cora, "From Hayriye Tuccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic", p.27.

the family continued to donate money for charity. This is important to show us the vital position of Muslim merchant family to the society. We can say that the donations transformed their wealth to social capital.

After the death of Ahmed and his brother Mahmud Efendi in 1891, their children took their job. While, Cemal, Tahsin and Osman Efendis who were the sons of Mahmud Efendi stayed in Trabzon, Şükrü, Hamdi, Zihni (karesi) and Sabri (Erzurum) Efendi moved to other cities and improved their businesses in that cities. Also most of these people moved to other cities and were provided by the power of their father, while Ahmed Efendi was alive. Firstly, Hamdi Efendi moved to Istanbul, Sükrü Efendi went to Samsun, Erzurum for Sabri and Karesi for Zihni Efendi. The cities which they chose were about their specialization in the market. After a short time, Hamdi, replaced with Şükrü Efendi, became one of the important merchants of Samsun between 1897-1903. In our paper, we will focus on the Black-Sea region, but it is crucial to say that all of these family members who were active in trade in different cities became important merchants in the cities where they lived. While Sabri Bey who traded with Persia, was an influential merchant in Erzurum, Zihni Bey was one of the well-known merchant of Karesi vilayet. The latter was kidnapped by Rum bandits of Gonen in 1909¹⁶. The bandits demanded 3,000 Ottoman Liras to release him. Although the Nemlizades paid the money, they did not release Zihni Bey. However, the bandits were arrested in other cities, Düzce and Kastamonu-. In this event, the important point is that many people from bureaucratic elite, including the Ministry of Navy, worked to save him. This situation also shows us the rising power of Nemlizade family in the State.

Back to Trabzon: Nemlizade Hacı Osman Efendi

Hacı Osman Efendi was the son of Mahmud Efendi and he was the representative of Nemlizade's trade network in Trabzon after the

16. For the documents about the problem between Nemlizade Zihni and Rum bandits, see; BOA, BEO. 3615/271088; BOA, DH.MUİ. 1/29; BOA, DH.MUİ,68/51.

death of his father Mahmud Efendi and his uncle Ahmed Efendi. According to 1894 Annual of Vilayet (Salname) his name appeared as the member of the council. He was firstly accused to use his political power to confiscate the properties of Aznodorian brothers, who were one of the well-known Armenian merchants of the city. This is not studied well, but we can say that, after a long court-process, Aznodorians got acquitted in the court of appeal but they did not manage to reorganize their business¹⁷.

In 1897 as a head of the Nemlizade family, Hacı Osman Efendi was honored with the Mecidi of second rank and with the Nişan-i Ali Osmani of the same rank in 1899¹⁸.

What provided more effectiveness to Hacı Osman Efendi was the partnership with the Régie Company and the fact that he became a tax-farmer of the latter. The Régie Company controlled the tobacco revenues of the Empire from 1883 to 1925. Although the Régie Administration was formally established in 27 May 1883, it went into action in 14 April 1884. The company had the right to buy, produce and sell tobacco, and to collect the taxes due on tobacco production in places where the Band-roll system was enforced, except in the eastern parts of Rumelia.

Osman Efendi was the tax-farmer of Regie Company. It was the first time that we can follow petitions from ordinary people of Trabzon who criticize the power of Osman Efendi. This is so probably because there was a negative attitude against the Régie Company as a monopolistic company over one of the most important products of the Empire. Moreover, the local elite of the city raised their voice against Nemlizade Osman Efendi and claimed that Nemlizade Osman Efendi used not only his bureaucratic position but also kolcus of Regie Company to suppress their effectiveness in the city.

During his job as a Régie tax-farmer from 1895 to 1900 Osman Efendi never appeared in the provincial council¹⁹. However, Nemlizades' power in the province never decreased. Instead, they raised their power also in other cities especially in Istanbul, Samsun and Erzurum. Tahsin Paşa is the best example of this.

17. Cora, "From Hayriye Tuccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic", p. 35.

18. Ibid.

19. Cora, "From Hayriye Tuccars to the Entrepreneurs of the Republic", p.40.

The Golden Age: Nemlizade Tahsin Paşa

Although there had always been at least a member of the Nemlizade family in İstanbul in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, their story changed in time with Nemlizade Tahsin Efendi (later Paşa). Tahsin Efendi arrived in İstanbul in 1893. According to Cora, there are two crucial points in his story: his marriage to Şeref-Nur Hanım who was the daughter of a palace physician, and his involvement in charity, more specifically in fund-raising for the children of the martyrs and the veteran warriors of the Empire (Evlad-ı Şüheda ve Malulin-i Güzzat Şahane İanesi). To this charity Nemlizes and Tantavizes donated two and a half million piaster in cash. Again Cora adds that they also paid 5,000 Ottoman liras, distributed as prizes in a lottery following the charity exhibition. After this charity, when Nemlizade Tahsin Paşa was honored with the honorary title of Paşa of Rumeli Beylerbeyi, his brother Cemal was given a honorary second degree of mütemayiz class and their cousin Nemlizade Zihni, who was a timber merchant in Balıkesir, Gönan and he was the Nemlizade who has built Nemlizade Han in Sirkeci across the train station in 1902, was honored with a Nişan-ı Ali-i Osmani of the fourth degree.

Nevertheless, although had had successful business activity in İstanbul,, his first concession of the petrol fields in Bagdad and Basra provinces proved to be an the unsuccessful attempt. According to this concession, making a survey on these lands for three years would be possible and the concession would continue for 99 years. However, thse Sultan Abdühamid II decided to incorporate the lands with oil fields into his Hazine-i Hassa (private purse) by September 1898. But while Tahsin Paşa was waiting for the result of the concession, he decided to proceed with other investments in other regions of the Empire such as in the vilayet of Aydın, where in 1900 he applied for a concession with his partner M.Cardiopoulos, (advocate in Smyra), to construct and operate a horse and a steam power-street car from Basmahane (printed cotton) district of Nif (today Kemalpaşa). In order not to change the direction of the traffic in Aydın-Kasaba railway, Nafia Nezareti declared their unwillingness and even though some part of route was accepted in 1903, the project could not be realized. After hav-

ing mentioned unsuccessful attempts of Tahsin Paşa, we would like to give some examples from his successful attempts such as the operating six chrome mines in different locations in Aydın with his partner kapıkethüdası of Manastır and Hüdavendigar provinces, Ahmed Efendi. While his concessions were continuing, he did not cease his charity and commercial activities. In 1905 he donated to the Hamidiye Sanayi Mektebi of Bursa. He was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Istanbul by 1900 and a member of executive board of the chamber for the years between 1901 and 1908. It is not possible to mention his other successful attempts throughout the Empire in the limited time. We tried, however, to show that Tahsin Paşa was the one of the most important examples of the Muslim entrepreneurs in the final period of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

The Ottoman State was poor not because it lacked resources, but because of their mismanagement. Nemlizade Family showed us how a Muslim merchant family could manage its resources and relationships to raise its effectiveness in trade.

With the beginning of the Crimean War, the family raised its power not only in local trade but also in bureaucracy and became one of the well-known merchant families of the late Ottoman Empire. Although we do not know the source of the Salih Ağa's trade network, we know that after him, his sons developed trade relations in the region and distributed their trade system to different cities. The family continued their trade issues in the first years of the Republic of Turkey via their relationship with the new state elites. They were one of the first Muslim bourgeoisie of the Republic.

Table 1.1 List of Tobacco Smugglers Identified in Niğde

City	District	Neighborhood	Name	Arrested Or Fled	# of People	
Trabzon		Boztepe	Ali, son of Bekircan	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon		Argaliya	Mithat, son of Huseyin	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Rankariye	Ahmed, son of Kara Huseyin	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Yomra	Vakıf	Karabet	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Dimitri, son of Haralampos	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	İmamkızıoğlu Ali	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Kemal, brother of Ali	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Tütüncüoğlu Ali	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Ali, son of Kara Hasan	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Gümüşhane	Kelkit	Hozbirik	Dursun or Tosun	Arrested in Niğde	1	
Trabzon		Boztepe	Osman, brother of Ali	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Kavak	Mehmet Ali	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Kavak	Hüseyin and fellow fighters	Fled	6	
Trabzon		Mariya	İsmail	Fled	1	
Trabzon	Yomra	Vakıf	Melkun, son of Menal	Fled	1	
Trabzon	Çakırlı	Horah	Cobanoğlu Süleyman	Fled	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Maltul, neighbor of Dimitri	Fled	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Seradere	Hüseyin, son of Malber	Fled	1	
Trabzon	Pulathane	Huzhoron ?	Sergeant Mehmed	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Divranos	Mehmed, son of Hazval	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Divranos	Osman	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Divranos	Kalleman ?	Fled	1	
Trabzon		Divranos	Somel	Fled	1	
Gümüşhane		Haşoza	Süleyman	Fled	1	Total
People who were unidentified					25	55

Source: BOA. DH.MKT 1567/78 Leaf 1.

5.

Samsun (Amisos). Aspects of financial development and cosmopolitanism in the late 19th century

Stavros Th. Anestidis*

Some information on geography and history

Built as an amphitheatre on the slopes of a hillock that stretches to the beach, on a short distance from Mert Irmak (Lykastos), Samsun is situated on the cove of a gulf that was formed by the silts of two big rivers, Kızıl Irmak to the west and Yeşil Irmak to the east¹. Administratively it was the seat of a *mutasarrıf*; until 1913 the *mutasarrıflık* was part of the *valılık* of Trebizond. After 1913 it became an independent *mutasarrıflık*, answerable directly only to Constantinople².

A very brief historical overview takes us first to Strabon, who refers to Hecataeus of Miletos, according to whom the Enetians, a Paphlagonian race, were the first inhabitants of Amisos³. The Greek city however, was founded in 562 B.C., by the Ionians of Phocaea. In the end of the twelfth century, Amisos fell to the Selcuks by Emir Kılıç Arslan II. In 1393 Sultan Yıldırım Beyazıt conquers Amisos and makes it the capital of the *sancak* of Canik.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, Samsun appears as an Ottoman city, without any Christian population and with not much

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1. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Oral Tradition Archive, Pontus, folder 220 (Samsun), pp. 55, 71-80; P. Amédée Jaubert, *Voyage en Arménie et en Perse. Fait dans les années 1805 et 1806*, (Paris: Pélicier, 1821), p. 384; Παντελής Μ. Κοντογιάννης, *Γεωγραφία της Μικράς Ασίας* [Geography of Asia Minor], (Athens: Petrakos P.A., 1921), p. 77.

2. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Σ. Ιωαννίδης, *Ιστορία και στατιστική Τραπεζούντος και της περί ταύτην χώρας. Ως και τα περί της ενταύθα ελληνικής γλώσσης* [History and Statistics of Trebizond and its Wider Region. Also of the Greek language therein], (Constantinople: Vretos I.A., 1870), pp. 180-183.

3. See Strabon, *Geographica*, XII, 3, pp. 12-15.

worth of notice. Tournefort, who passes through in 1717, dedicates only two lines to it: “We left behind us, on the edge of the sea, a village built on the ruins of ancient Amisos, an Athenian colony”⁴.

From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, Samsun shows some signs of development, which, however, did not last long. This at least is what is hinted by the French traveller Jaubert, who passes from the Black Sea in 1805 and 1806. He writes: “To-day, as in the years of Strabo, there are a few interesting cities in Canik. The main one is called Bafra... Samsun, Terme, Ünye, Fatsa are only slightly commercial”⁵.

Samsun became the seat of an ecclesiastical metropolis in 1855, during Patriarch Sophronios. The transfer of the seat from Amaseia was due to the density and affluence of the Greek Orthodox populations in the district of Samsun, compared with Amaseia. However, the title of the Metropolitan remained as “of Amaseia, his Eminence Exarch of All the Black Sea”⁶. The ecclesiastical province of the Amaseia Metropolis included Amaseia, Samsun, Merzifon, Vezir-Köprü, Kavza, Ladik, Erbağa, Bafra and Çarşamba, together with the Greek Orthodox villages that belonged to the districts of the aforementioned cities⁷.

The demographical expansion

A reliable source for the number of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the city during the reconstruction period is considered to be that of Periklis Triantafyllidis, in his work *Pontika*, which was published in 1866. The Greek neighborhood, he writes, that was created “for the most part, by people who moved there from Kaisareia (Kayseri)” numbers a hundred houses⁸. Allow us to cross-check this piece of

4. See Pitton de Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant*, (Lyon: chez Anisson et Posuel, 1717), v. III, Letter XVII, p. 56.

5. See P. Amédée Jaubert, *Voyage en Arménie et en Perse*, pp. 102-103.

6.6 See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., p. 13.

7.⁷ See Ιερόθεος Χριστοδουλίδης, «Μελέτη και στατιστική της Επαρχίας Αμασειάς [Study and statistics of the Province of Amaseia]», *Ξενοφάνης [Xenophanis]* IV (1906), pp. 333-343.

8. See Περικλής Τριανταφυλίδης, *Η εν Πόντω Ελληνική Φυλή, ήτοι Τα Ποντι-*

information with the testimony of refugee Iakovos Hatzisavvas from Samsun, as recorded in the Samsun folder of the Oral Tradition Archive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies: “My grandfather, Kyriakos Hatzisavvas, went to Samsun from Zincidere of Kaisareia in 1875-1880. When he arrived, there were not many houses or hotels”⁹.

Triantafyllidis writes in the year during which a big fire burned to ashes almost all the wooden houses of the city. Three years after the fire, the population of the city did not exceed 3,000 inhabitants, whereas the Greek Orthodox families were about a hundred and fifty¹⁰. The Greek element would progressively thicken. Next to the Cappadocians (mainly from Kaisareia) who settled there early “due to the commerce” as Savvas Ioannidis informs us¹¹, other Rum populations also moved there, mainly from the Black Sea, from Oinoe (Ünye) and the other towns and villages of the *mutasarrıflık* of Samsun and even from Greece¹².

According to the sources of the time the statistical data about the population were as follows: Starting from Vital Cuinet, who in 1892 mentions 16,000 inhabitants, 5,000 of whom are Muslims, 6,000 are Greek Orthodox, 3,000 Armenians and 2,000 are of various beliefs and national identities¹³, we arrive at P. Kontogiannis, who gives us the following numbers for 1921: Inhabitants: 25,000 out of whom 11,000 are Greeks, 12,000 Turks, 1,000 Armenians and a few Tatars¹⁴. Refugee Iakovos Hatzisavvas recites by memory: “Samsun in the last year before the Exodus had the following inhabitants: 7,000 Greeks, 7,000 Turks, 1,000 Armenians, and 500 Levantines. In elder times Samsun had more Greeks, but from 1900

νά [The Greek Race in Pontus, namely Pontika], (Athens: Lazaros Villaras, 1866), p. 144.

9. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., p. 34.

10. See S. I. Βουτυράς - Ι. Α. Βρεττός - Γ. Βαφιάδης, *Λεξικόν Ιστορίας και Γεωγραφίας* [Dictionary of History and Geography], (Constantinople: Vretos I.A., 1869), v. I, pp. 446-447; Χρ. Σαμουηλίδης, *Αμισός (Σαμφούντα) και η περιφέρειά της* [*Amisos (Samsun) and its district*], (Athens: Kyriakidis, 2004), p. 25.

11. See Σ. Ιωαννίδης, *Ιστορία και στατιστική Τραπεζούντος*, p. 183.

12. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 18-30.

13. See Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, v. I, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1892), p. 104.

14. See Π. Κοντογιάννης, *Γεωγραφία της Μικράς Ασίας*, p. 77.

onwards they started emigrating to Constantinople and Europe”¹⁵.

The language spoken in the settlements of the district is divided in three categories. The first and largest included the Greek-speaking villages that spoke the Argypopolis idiom of the pontic dialect. The second category, also quite large, spoke the Turkish language. One sole village, Kadıköy (Ano Amisos) consists a separate, third category, which spoke another idiom of the pontic dialect. Finally, in the Kavak section, Turkish was the dominant language. Out of 28 of its villages, only 3 spoke Greek, 17 were turkophone and 4 spoke a mixture of languages. In total, in the Samsun district we located 133 Greek-speaking, 88 Turkish-speaking and 9 mixed-speaking settlements¹⁶.

Financial growth

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Samsun was mainly a small port without commercial interest. In fact, the existing marshes made mooring difficult for the ships that sailed in the Black Sea¹⁷. In 1813-1814 the marshes stretched up to four kilometers. However, in 1866, the big fire burned not only the wooden houses of the city but its poverty-ridden past as well.

Through the ashes a new city with laid-out streets and squares emerged. An active commerce of cereals began, transported from the inland by cars, mules, horses, camels and other goods-carrying animals. Tobacco, the local product, was also transported from the villages to the market of Samsun. Both these products were exported from the port in considerable quantities. Next to them, untreated hides are also exported, as well as legumes, hemp and flax¹⁸. Thus, Samsun began to take its place as Asia Minor’s seaport, after Trebi-

15. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., p. 27.

16. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 39-49; Χρ. Σαμουηλίδης, *Αμισός*, pp. 89-93.

17. See Charles Texier, *Asie Mineure. Description géographique, historique et archéologique des provinces et des villes de la Chersonèse d’Asie*, (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1862), p. 620.

18. See Π. Τριανταφυλλίδης, *Η εν Πόντω Ελληνική Φυλή*, p. 144.

zond¹⁹. Already from 1897, the port of Amisos became an important Black Sea harbor, as the following coastal-lines laid there: *Compagnie Panhellenique* (Greek), *Messageries Maritimes* (French), *Compagnie N. Paguet* (French), *Lloyd Autrichien* (Austrian), *Compagnie Russe de Navigation à Vapeur* (Russian), *Compagnie Ottomane “Mahsoussé”*, (Ottoman), *Compagnie Ottomane* (Ottoman), *Compagnie Italienne Flario-Rubattino* (Italian) and *Papayanni ve Ortağı* (Greek). The ships carried water, coal, all the marketable kinds of iron rations, baggage, post and of course, passengers²⁰.

In the end of the century there is also industrial production, limited of course to tile making, pottery, and forest industry, whereas other professions such as coppersmith, saddle-maker, shoe-maker etc. are recorded. Cuinet, on the other hand, sums up the resources of the region as follows: The forests, tobacco, agriculture, stock-raising, commerce and of course, shipping²¹.

The financial and commercial transactions of the city took place daily at the Bezesten, the Yeni Çarşı, the Bon Marché, where the big shops were and at the Tütün Merkezi, where the tobacco-merchants had their storehouses and offices and where each farmer had his own merchant to whom he sold his tobacco and from whom he could also possibly borrow money. Besides, at the Saathane Meydanı, the big bazaar took place every Friday²².

Let us now look at some data of the export trade on the eve of the twentieth century:

6,989,000 kilos of tobacco,
31,881,600 kilos of cereals,
10,478,800 kilos of flour,
324,200 kilos of wool,
1,552,000 kilos of opium,
2,200,200 kilos of flaxseed, hempseed and opium-seed,
555,000 kilos of dry fruit,
1,339,800 kilos of eggs,

19. See Σ. Ιωαννίδης, *Ιστορία και στατιστική Τραπεζούντος*, p. 182; Π. Κοντογιάννης, *Γεωγραφία της Μικράς Ασίας*, p. 77.

20. See Θ. Αλεξιάδης, *Η Αμισός των Ελλήνων του Πόντου [Amisos of the Greeks of Pontus]*, (Athens: Kyriakidis, 2009, pp. 106-107.

21. See V. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, pp. 89-98.

22. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

108,900 kilos of local textiles.

This mass was distributed as such:

26,284,300 kilos to the interior of the Empire,

6,981,100 to England,

6,339,500 to France,

5,825,600 to Austria,

4,528,200 to Egypt,

2,244,700 to Italy,

1,845,800 to Germany,

1,640,300 to Greece,

690,300 to the Netherlands,

632,500 to Russia,

258,300 to Romania.

A total of 57,264,600 kilos²³.

“Samsun was a big commercial center and station for the export trade of the entire mainland. It was the seaport of the whole region of Sevasteia (Sivas) and Ankara. Wheat, walnuts, millet, *mahlep*, walnut wood etc. were exported from there. Samsun had direct dealings with Germany to which it sent tobacco, hemp, opium and walnuts. To France it transported eggs, untreated hides and live chickens. It sent the same things also to Spain”. The description and the wording are by refugee-informant of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Iakovos Hatzisavvas²⁴.

The number of consular authorities that appear in the city from the mid-nineteenth century onwards demonstrates the international aspect of this financial growth. The first consulate that was founded in Amisos was the English one. This happened in 1860. In 1863 the French consulate was established and in 1867 the Austrian-Hungarian consulate, followed by the Russian three years later. The Greek consulate was established in 1879, the same year as the Belgian one, while in 1880 the Swedish-Norwegian consulate opened, which was represented by the Italian consulate until 1895, established in that

23. See V. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, pp. 95-99; K. Παπαμιχαλόπουλος, *Περίηγησις εις τον Πόντον* [Journey in Pontus], (Athens: Typ. Kratos, 1903), pp. 319-320.

24. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., p. 52.

same year. Finally, in 1883, the American consulate was established, represented by the Italian consul, as well as the German consulate represented by the Austro-Hungarian consul²⁵.

The share of the tobacco-merchants in the market until 1920 is apparent in the statistical books of the Régie: Greeks 60%, Régie Monopoly 10%, foreign companies 15%, Armenians 10%, Turks 5%²⁶. According to the refugee Stelios Karahisarlis, "Samsun was the biggest tobacco-manufacturing center of all Turkey"²⁷.

The professions of the Greek Orthodox often agreed with the main occupation in their place of origin: For example, the people from Kaisareia were merchants (of tobacco, manufacturing, exporting eggs, grocers etc.) but also money-changers and bankers. Mytilini people were oil-merchants or wine-sellers, the people from Oinoe in the Black Sea were grocers, shoemakers, cabinet-makers, artisans, builders, carpenters, black-smiths (like most Pontians), the people from Ordu were black-smiths, the ones from Niğde were porters, the people who came from the villages in the same district of Samsun had manufacture shops and they were also tobacco-dealers, whereas the Levantines were money-lenders, managers and employees in the banks and the Régie, as well as in the maritime agencies. As for the people from the Peloponnese, they dealt with oil-trade and the commerce of groceries²⁸.

To sum up: shipping agents, traders of pharmaceuticals, merchants and retailers of tobacco, experts and processors of tobacco, bankers, hotel-owners, cinema and theatre-owners, oil-press owners, representatives of European houses, typographers, photographers, electricians, engineers, metal and iron-workers, tailors, confectioners could all regularly be found among the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the city. The Turks, as a rule, worked as state employees, saddle-makers, car-makers, farriers, black-smiths, bakers, cart-drivers, porters, postmen, cobblers, gardeners, workers, wholesale dealers of cereals and bargees. The Armenians were usually merchants of textiles, tobacco and cereals²⁹.

25. See Θ. Αλεξιάδης, *Η Αμισός*, pp. 114-115.

26. See Χρ. Σαμουηλίδης, *Αμισός*, p. 30.

27. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., p. 210.

28. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

29. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 224-227; cf. Αντ. Γαβριηλίδης,

The gradual prosperity promoted Samsun to the seat of the Canik *sancak* (*mutasarrıflık* with Kavak as a *nahiye*), composed of 5 *kazas* (*kaymakamlıks*): 1. Bafra (with Alaçam as *nahiye*), 2. Çarsamba, 3. Ünye (Oinoe, with Karauç as *nahiye*), 4. Fatsa and 5. Terme³⁰.

When it came to administrative affairs, the participation of the Rums was established in their financial, demographic and social development. Already in 1904, Metropolitan Anthimos took part in the *sancak*'s Board. Rums also participated in the public works' Council, the Court of the first instance and the Commercial Tribunal, in the Chamber of Commerce, the Agriculture Council as well as in the Régie³¹. Iakovos Hatzisavvas remembers accordingly: "My father served 34 years as a judge. He even took a medal. The Turks respected him because he was unprejudiced. The Greeks too loved and respected him. People would come from the villages to his office and ask for justice. My father solved all their disagreements. He did not ask for payment"³².

Education and intellectual activity

In the year of the great fire the Greek community commanded a primary school of mutual teaching³³. In 1870 the building was rebuilt "from the foundations", but the teaching system remained mutual³⁴. In 1906 Samsun had two boys' schools (urban school - half-secondary) with 11 rooms and 12 teachers and a girls' school with 9 rooms and 8 teachers³⁵. Before 1920 the education levels

Σελίδες εκ της Μαύρης Εθνικής Συμφοράς του Πόντου [Pages on the dark national disaster of Pontus], (Athens: 1924), pp. 204-218; Chr. Samouilidis, *Αμισός*, pp. 96-98; Th. Alexiadis, *Η Αμισός*, pp. 106-114.

30. See I. Χριστοδουλίδης, «Μελέτη και στατιστική της Επαρχίας Αμασειάς», p. 333.

31. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 8-12; Χρ. Σαμουηλίδης, *Αμισός*, pp. 103-107.

32. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

33. See Π. Τριανταφυλλίδης, *Η εν Πόντω Ελληνική Φυλή*, p. 144.

34. See Σ. Ιωαννίδης, *Ιστορία και στατιστική Τραπεζούντος*, pp. 182-183.

35. See I. Χριστοδουλίδης, «Μελέτη και στατιστική της Επαρχίας Αμασειάς», pp. 336-337.

were: nursery, primary (boys' and girls') of 5 classes, *scholarcheio* of 3 classes and high-school of 4 classes³⁶.

In general, the intellectual life of the Greek Orthodox provides us with strong evidence in order to consider it outstanding and in any case, above the level of a provincial cultural mentality. Already from 1880 an educational society was in function, in which libraries with books and leaflets in Greek and other languages were housed. There was also the musical club "Orpheus", the Greek club of the Black Sea "The Renaissance" and the cultural society "Pericles". The presence of a 24-member philharmonic orchestra was also very important. Two cinemas and a theatre were also in operation³⁷.

The epilogue

The remarkable development of the city was brutally interrupted during the First World War. From the summer of 1915 the exiles and displacements of the Rum and Armenian populations began³⁸.

After the Asia Minor Catastrophe the local authorities of Samsun allowed the exodus of the population from Turkish soil. The Samsun people, for their most part women and children, embarked on ships and came to Greece. The biggest wave departed in the last months of 1922 and in the first months of 1923. The flight continued for the whole of 1923 and 1924, when they were included in the broader regulation of the Population Exchange. Moreover, the men who were in the army and the Labor Battalions (*Amele Taburu*), the ones that survived, went from Erzurum to Trebizond in 1923-1924 and from there returned to Samsun only to leave immediately for Greece³⁹.

The refugees from Samsun settled in the big urban centers of

36. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 114-130; cf. K. N. Παπαμιχαλόπουλος, *Περίηγησις εις τον Πόντον*, pp. 324-325.

37. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 50-70; Θ. Αλεξιάδης, *Η Αμισός*, pp. 115-125.

38. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 245-247.

39. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 250-253; cf. Ιακ. Χατζησάββας, *Απομνημονεύματα [Memoirs]*, (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1961), p. 6 sq.

Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki and mainly in the cities of the tobacco-producing areas of Drama, Kavala, Kilkis, Xanthi and Preveza. A few new villages, with a strong presence of Samsun refugees, wished to preserve the memory of their origin by renaming themselves. So a New Amisos in Drama was founded, as well as Amisiana in Kavala, New Amisos in Preveza and New Amisos in Xanthi⁴⁰.

This last chapter in the history of the Greek Orthodox population in Samsun is eloquently summed up in refugee Anastasios Kyriakidis' testimony⁴¹:

“Until 1914, we got along well with the Turks. But when the war started in 1914 they closed all the Greek schools and gathered the Greeks to the army.

The biggest ordeal began after 1918, when the war ended. Then the guerrilla army was formed in the district of Samsun.

In 1922, before Smyrna had even fallen, we were up on the mountains. Then the Exchange agreement took place. We found out about it but we didn't believe it. One by one we went down to our villages. First they sent the women and the men slowly followed suit. But we didn't stay in the villages. We came to Samsun. What were we to do in our burned-out villages?

I lost all of my family during that time. Out of seven people I was the only one that survived.

On the mountain I had a gun. When I went down to Samsun I handed it over to the Turks. As I was on my own, I entered the Orphanage. It was foreigners that gathered the orphan children in Samsun. They gave us food and clothes and we stayed in Samsun.

We stayed in the Orphanage many months: From Christmas until Easter. I remember that it was April when I arrived in Piraeus.

From our village every one came on their own, as they found themselves in those troubled times. As far as relatives, I had an aunt in Ioannina. She was my mother's sister. I came to live with her and

40. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, op. cit., pp. 254-255; Μ. Μαραβελάκης - Απ. Βακαλόπουλος, *Αι προσφυγικά εγκαταστάσεις εν τη περιοχή Θεσσαλονίκης* [The refugee settlements in the region of Thessaloniki], (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1955), pp. 136, 339.

41. See Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Oral Tradition Archive, Pontus folder (Exodus), Testimony of the refugee Anastasios Kyriakidis from Anatoli (Ioannina).

so I found myself in *Anatoli*, the village that the refugees founded. My other compatriots were scattered elsewhere. I don't even know where they are. Here where I live there is nobody else from Antonoglou village. Neither from the other villages of Söğüt oymağı”.

APPENDIX



Κ.Μ.Σ. Χαρτογραφική Υπηρεσία

23 Μαΐου 1975

Περιφ. Σαμψούντας

Χαρτογράφοι: Σταύρος Θίκορόπουλος

Συνεργάτης Κ.Μ.Σ.: Ελένη Γαβή

ΣΑΜΨΟΥΝΤΑ

Πόλη παραλιακή στην Εύξεινο Πόντου. Συνδέεται
βιαιοδρομικά με τή Σεβάστεια, τήν Καϊσάρια,
τήν Άμφυρα, τήν Κωνσταντινούπολη και τή Βαρδάρη.

283 χλμ. Δ-ΒΔ από τήν Τραπεζούιντα

178 χλμ. Δ-ΒΔ από τήν Κερασούιντα

127 χλμ. Α από τή Σινώπη

178 χλμ. ΒΔ από τή Σεβάστεια

110 χλμ. Β-ΒΔ από τήν Τσιούρτη

82 χλμ. Β.Α. από τήν Άμασία

Στις Χάρτες:

Γερμανικό 1941: Samsun. Τούρκικο 1951: Samsun. Κίπερτ: Samsun

Σε απόστασιν 2 χλμ. Β-ΒΔ από τήν κέντρο τής Σαμψούνταςόκιντης
ερείκης ενδύζι αρχαίων ερειπίων με τήν ονομασίαν: Kaza Samsun
AMISUS

(3)







6.

Refugees in the Basin of the Canik Mines: Greek Orthodox from Mining to Agriculture (1790-1884)

*Mehmet Yavuz Erler & Mucize Ünlü**

The aim of this work is to explore the social, economic and structural changes during the international enterprise era in the Ottoman Black Sea region. The Ottoman reforms known as “Tanzimat” between 1825 and 1839¹ or the “hatt-i hümayun” of 1856 (known as Islahat)² obviously influenced and twisted the fate of the Ottoman minorities as much as the external impact gradually established and controlled the local welfare via enterprise activities. This study aims to shed light on the changing social and economic conditions in the area as a result of the international trade. Canik³ district is chosen as a study field because of the Christian tenants who worked as diggers in the region. Thus, the Christians’ status in the aftermath

* Prof. Dr., Ondokuz Mayıs University, History Department, Samsun; Mucize Ünlü, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Ondokuz Mayıs University, History Department, Samsun. We wish to thank the head of municipality of Tekkeköy Hasan Togar, for supporting us on the field search of Maden Kabı and charging his staff Ahmet Biltekin and Şeref Aydın to take the photos of the area under study.

1. Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey], v.II (İstanbul: e-yayınları, 1983), p.88.

2. Shaw and Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, p.122.

3. Trabzon Vilayet Salnamesi, 1321 R., Samsun, pp.266-277. Canik was a sub-province of the Black Sea coastal line with the town of Samsun as its center. The Canik was an Ottoman administrable division unit consisted of mainly coastal towns such as Samsun and Çarşamba, Terme, Ünye, Fatsa throughout the eastern coasts, and Bafra, Alaçam throughout the western coastal lines of the Canik sub province. The Canik had also some internal towns at the rear of the coastal towns as may depict at the rear side of the eastern coastal towns Ayvacık, Niksar and at the rear of the central coastal town Samsun Kavakh. Canik covers the territory between and around the Green River and Red River.

of the constitutional reforms of 1839 and 1856 can be examined concerning their living conditionw within the Ottoman society. The international trade capacity increased and with the new technological innovations such as steam shipping, more commodities were transported between the coastal towns. As a result of the railways, knitting the rural lands and connecting them with the town-ports, and steaming companies, there was no place left eventually safe from the market demands. The Ottoman state had to adjust itself into the new entrepreneurial environment. The commercial treaty of Balta Limanı, signed between the Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1838, declared that the Ottomans were eager to take part in this trade world market and benefit from the technological advances within the Tanzimat framework⁴. This new era fastened the advancements of the coastal towns towards entrepreneurial growth; if the coastal towns and their hinterland offered some commodities at lower prices and higher quality, their economies survived only in the framework of the local market, but vanished from the old market and were replaced with outside equivalence. Our key subject, the mining enterprise, was severely damaged by the rules of this marketing new world. European countries were simply good in mining and had abundant sources thanks to their colonies. The entrepreneurial mines producing iron, copper, lidjesy, silver with their high qualities and new production techniques easily slammed down the Ottoman local mining from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the first British and Russian steam ships appeared in the Black-sea coastal horizon⁵.

4. İbrahim Duran, "1838 Tarihli Osmanlı-İngiliz Ticaret Sözleşmesi ve Sonuçları" [The 1838 Ottoman-British Treaty and its Consequences], A.Ü.E.H.F.D. VI:1-2 (2002), pp.80-81.

5. "Foreign vessels, to which the Black Sea was opened by the Treaty of Kınardjik, being allowed to enter only Russian ports, the goods were transported from and to Constantinople and Trebizond in Turkish vessels only. It is revival dates from the treaty of Adrianople, which opened also the Turkish ports of the Black Sea to European shipping... British Shipping "Crescent", which was represented in 1830 by a single vessel entered into Turkish coastal towns for trade. At the end of 1835 Danubian Steam Navigation Company also established a line, which was opened by the "Ferdinando Primo". The French and Russian started in 1857 and 1858, and all received large subsidies from their respective governments."

1. Mine Works and Royal mines

At the end of the eighteenth century mining production remained to some extent as it was inherited from the backward techniques along with the old regulations⁶. The rulers of the Ottoman mines were appointed by the royal treasury until the first decade of the eighteenth century. In 1736 the Royal mint house (Darphane-i Amire) assumed the responsibility of the administration of the Ottoman mines. The royal mint house performed its duty in the name of the Sultan's royal pocket treasure (Ceb-i Humayun Hazinesi)⁷. In the Black-sea region the iron, silver, copper, lead, golden and etc. mines were administrated by the Gümüşhane Royal Mine. Some of these mines, such as those of lead, copper, and iron, were regarded as state owned resources and used in producing the weaponry and building materials, while they fulfilled local demands: some fine copper was spent for the state mint house, as well as gold and silver resources were registered as the Sultan's private revenue. In 1790 the Ottoman mining headquarters were rearranged and Royal Mine Administration took the charge of operating the wealthy sources with the power of Sultan. According to this rearrangement Keban and Maden became independent headquarter to produce mainly copper more effectively⁸. On the other hand it could be realized that

M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents (1830-1914)*, v. II, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014) pp. 592, 594.

6. According to H. İnalcık, during the establishment of the Empire, Mehmed The Conqueror needed the cash from this mines and concentrated his efforts during the first years of his reign, from 1454 to 1464, on controlling those regions. Once they were in his possession, he tried to expand production levels of the mines, with the assistance of Serbian and Greek financiers“(H. İnalcık, *Economic and Social history of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1600*, v. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994), pp. 58-59). İnalcık also emphasizes the fact that the Ottomans did not make any basic changes in the production methods or technology in the mines in the Balkans which came under their control. (Ibid). İnalcık also states that the regulations on mines were simply a translation of the pre-Ottoman legislation, in which the original German (Saxon) terminology was preserved. (Ibid).

7. F. Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik (1775-1850)* [The Mining in the Area of Keban-Ergani in the Ottoman Period], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), p. 10.

8. F. Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik*, p. 15.

Gümüşhane Royal Mining carried out its performance throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a main headquarter of the middle and northern Black-sea region along with its hinterland Sivas province. The other royal mines of Anatolia namely Bozkır (Sivas), Gümüşhacıköy (Amasia) and Kure (Kastamonu) also operated according to its old divisions⁹. Especially silver and lead from Bozkır and Gümüşhacıköy mining were consumed for centuries. The copper of Kure (Kastamonu) even much earlier was benefited as a share of the state use¹⁰. Thus, It could be maintained that some mining headquarters continued to function for the Sultans' treasure and others such as Keban-Maden for the state needs. Some Ottoman manuscripts could also be evaluated as a proof to exclusive links between Gümüşhane Royal mining and the Porte. For instance in 18 January 1790, one member of the Royal Musketeers unit, Hafız Mehmet Efendi was appointed to charge of Gümüşhane Royal Mining instead of thrust worthy (emin) administrator, allegedly corrupted the business of the mentioned mining organization¹¹. However, the corruption on the matter of ruling the diggings was inevitable old habit so that of new rulers from the Porte were carried on being appointed in the following years. Therefore, inevitable destiny also seized Hafız Mehmet, found incapable was replaced no later than his immediate appointment with another member of Royal musketeers' unit named Ismail Agha in 1818¹².

It is obvious that new mine sources were discovered in time within the territory of Gümüşhane Royal Mining. For instance abundant copper sources were found in Milas (Şarki Karahisar-Trabzon) at the second half of the eighteenth century¹³. The copper mine was operated via The Gümüşhane Royal Mining for some time but later it was either rented for as a maktu to those

9. F. Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik*, p. 19.

10. S. Faroqhi, *Osmanlıda Kentler ve Kentliler* [The Ottoman Towns and its Inhabitants], (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), pp.211-231.

11. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 49, Gömlek No. 2434, 02 C. 1204 (H.) (18 January 1790)

12. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 1, Gömlek No. 14, 02 Ra 1233 (H.) (9 February 1818)

13. İlhan Ekinçi, "Milas (Mesudiye) Bakır Madeni (1750-1816)" [The Copper Mine of Milas (Mesudiye) (1750-1816)], *Turkish Studies* 8:5 (spring 2013), pp.243-259.

who were interested and dare to benefit from the mining or it was operated by the local official rulers of the state. However the mining in Milas decreased and the miners' settlement conditions worsened. The miners, both Muslims and Non-Muslims (especially Greeks and Armenians), were regarded as Sultans' subjects who performed their duty as labor for the Sultan. Not worse than a slavery but not much different than the slavery. Mining laborers or diggers could not move to other mine-towns, different from those they were placed at first, and they were paid with very small amount of cash for their burden or with tax exemptions. Undoubtedly, there were some gains such as the food stock provided by the Porte and even their shelter along with the permission of having their worshipping places, while their security was guarded by the highest local administrators. However the mine was rented and the miners' burdens remained, while the Sultannic donations vanished because of the local Ağas. In the case of Milas, it can be maintained that the local rulers or renters could not manage the profitable yields from the copper mine and they harassed the mine-town settlers whose labor belonged to Sultan. The state regulations functioned in such conditions as the above and the mine that once operated on itself was tied directly to the main administrative head quarter in the region. For example the worsened condition of the Milas copper mining in 1793 forced the administration to postpone the confirmation of the "right to digging" contract of the renter and tied the Milas copper mining directly to Gümüşhane Royal Mining¹⁴. Nonetheless, the bad operation and the harassment over the mine towns occurred even under the royal administration. Last but not least one of the cases indicates that Gümüşhane Royal Mining was badly managed and the local Ağas abused the mine-town settlers' rights in 1790. Hence the settlers of mine-towns ruled by the Gümüşhane Royal Mining left their posts and tried to find out convenient mining places within or even outside of the Gümüşhane¹⁵.

So far we tried to explain that the administration of the Ottoman mines was a quite difficult issue to understand, especially as far as

14. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 34, Gömlek No. 1698, 29 Ca. 1207 (H.) (11 February 1793)

15. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 46, Gömlek No. 2286, 26 C. 1208 (30 December 1790)

the question of who was really in charge is concerned. Nevertheless it can be stated out that there were two types of mining regulations: those that they had direct connection with the Sublime Porte and those that functioned for the fulfilment of the state demands. The first one -called royal mining (ceb-i hümayun) - remained intact with its old regulations inherited from the hay day of the Ottoman Empire but the record of the labors and amount of the mining were not kept properly because of its status as Sultans' personal property. These royal mines were directly ruled by someone who was chosen among the royal dynasty or trustworthy labour of the the Palace. Therefore the trifle matter of the administration of the royal mines such as the correspondence and the amount of the product, was solely based upon information exchanged between the Sultan and his chosen subject who was in charge of the royal mining.

There was an iron ore in the Canik district, re-explored and operated during the eighteenth century, and it was still working in the beginning of the nineteenth until British sailors provided the local market with cheap iron pick¹⁶. It is understood from the documents that the workers were settled in this region by the state and the mine had been run with the help of officials who acted rather independently from the Gümüşhane Royal Mining administration. These iron miners and smiths were migrants from Kürtün in Gümüşhane vicinity and a tribe called Karayaka, that is, a nomadic tribe which travels between Bafra in Canik and Karagöl pasture in Giresun.

State inspector and representative of Royal mining assembly, Kol Ağası Hüseyin Efendi conducted a land survey in 1863 to detect the richest mine in Canik region. Hüseyin Efendi examined 13 different kind of mines in the region and found out that 9 could to operate. He did not give more explanation about the other mines except of the iron ore in Karagöl pasture. He stated that the migrants from Kürtün and the tribe of Karayaka used the mine ore and they benefited from it, smuggling for centuries the iron ore into the local market . According to his estimation, each of air producer tool named *körük*¹⁷ had the capacity of producing 30 *kıyye* of iron ore each

16. "British articles, iron to Samsun represented 32.000 pounds in 1872", M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province*, pp. 598.

17. *Korukh*: A pair of bellows (a leather tool pressing and bellowing the air

day. Hüseyin Efendi asserted that each körük belonged to the state and miners could operate the ore for 78 days and they produced in a year a surplus of 2,340 (roughly between 2,340 and 2,808) okka iron ore. He also estimated that each kıyye of iron ore was sold in the market for 2 Ottoman piasters (kuruş) and each körük produced iron at the cost of 936 piaster. He offered the authorities 900 piaster per each körük to the right of using these körüks and offered this money as a newly invented tax burden as taxation for use craft. He also mentioned in his survey that the outcome of all the körük used in the mine would possibly grant the state more than 100.000 piaster. It could be roughly calculated that more than 101 air producers (körük) were used by the nomadic miners. Based on the above mentioned data, it could be concluded that 303,000 okkas of iron ore was produced in the region each year to feed the local black smiths¹⁸. It is obvious that Canik mines had got a special administration status and sometimes were ruled by the officials of Gümüşhane royal mining; or usually the mining in Canik was run by local administrator or someone who directly had connection with the Porte. The map depicting the iron ore in Canik can be also used to determine the separate mining area within the realm of Gümüşhane royal mining¹⁹. One of the documents lists exactly the mining area and the sources in the Canik region so as to define the borders of exact exclusive ruling administration. According to this document, dated on 26 November 1857, a mining schedule in Canik has been comeout as depicted at Table I²⁰. According to this table I (dated in 1857), Canik sub-province contained largely silver (red silver), copper, iron ore, lead and, even to some extend, coal. One of the river maps precisely confirms the copper yield of Canik

into the melting pot or bellowing air into the underground mine tunnels). Sir James W. Redhouse, *Turkish and English Lexicon* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1987), p. 1586.

18. BOA., M.VL. Dosya No. 648, Gömlek No. 71, 14 Z. 1279 H.

19. BOA., HRT. H., Nr. 01865.00001, "The iron ore map in the villages Fas and Arpalık, belong to Ünye town of Canik. Arakin Siragan exported the iron ore to international consumers."

20. BOA., HR. MKT., Dosya No. 213, Gömlek No. 10, 1274 Ra. 8 H. (26 November 1857)

(Kapukaya mountain between Bafra and Vezirköprü) ²¹. However there is no information about the gold resources of Samsun in 1857. This can be possibly explained on the basis that the gold or silver mining were cancelled or the surface sources in Samsun vanished until 1857 . Hence it can be asserted that the Canik region offered some mining from time to time but the operation had not lasted long due to the backward mining techniques or bad administration.

2. Exploring the old mine, changing the administration structure

A traveler wrote that in 1817-1818 a new red silver and golden mine was discovered 3 miles far away from Samsun town center (Canik sub-province, part of the Sivas province) and depended to Gümüşhane Royal Mining. It had also remained as a rumor that the mine operated during the existence of a Genoese colony in the region until 1430²². It remains to be answered whether the Ottomans explored the old mine after all those years being left abandoned. The answer has not been clear since the historical sources are not sufficiently searched on the subject. Meanwhile the report from Samsun on a bandit case might have contained some plausible clues for the mine work in Canik district. Küçük Ali from Niksar, one of the towns of Canik district was investigated as a bandit who harassed the tenants and also kept busy the authorities; finally, state security forces destroyed Küçük Ali's tower between Erzurum-Sivas and Canik in 1762²³. None of the inhabitants of the provinces of Erzurum and Sivas complained about the bandit leader Küçük Ali, who had 800 armed men, except of the inhabitants of Samsun²⁴. Samsun tenants wrote a petition to the Porte asking help claiming

21. BOA, HRT. h., Nr. 00144-00002, "There is abandoned copper mine in Kapukaya (Between Bafra and Vizirkopru) operated by the state."

22. P. Minas Bijishkyan (from Trabzon), *Karadeniz Kıyıları Tarih ve Coğrafyası (1817-1819)* [The History and Geography of the Black Sea Coast], translated by Hrand D. Andreasyan, (İstanbul: İstanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1969), p.33.

23. BOA., C.DH., Dosya No. 124, Gömlek No. 6184, 7 R. 1176 (H.) -(26 September 1762)

24. BOA., C.DH., Dosya No. 300, Gömlek No. 14972, 29 Ra. 1176 H. (17 November 1762)

that Küçük Ali harmed their peaceful working and minted gold coins, resembling the Sultans' coins, and accused Küçük Ali that he transferred these golden coins to Crimea, small amounts each time. The gold mine of Tomak was mentioned by the tenants hinting out that the bandit leader seized the gold raw materials²⁵. There are no more documents to tell us, if the bandit leader Küçük Ali really found the raw gold sources to mint the gold coins of Ottomans and where was precisely this Tomak gold mine located. It can only be presumed that Samsun tenants were close or acquainted with this gold mine. It can be also interpreted from the tenants' petition that they must have been mine workers or inhabitants of mine town located near Samsun. If this was the case, then Küçük Alis' activity against the tenants of Samsun could be excusable. Nevertheless it could not be possible to get further information to prove the gold mining in Samsun.

Many years after this bandit case in 1792 a new settlement place was found in the judicial court registers as "Kabı" (Door or entrance) village, three miles far away from the town of Samsun²⁶. This must be the new mine town established by the new migrants as mine workers. However it is obvious from the documents that as the investigation conducted by the Porte proved the existence of gold and red silver mine in 1799, the Ottoman Porte eagerly passed the authority to examine the silver or gold sources and to operate it to one person who had close connection with the Sultan. The governor of Trabzon, Battal Hüseyin Paşa was assigned to Canik for three months in order examine the newly discovered mines. He was also charged of taking care of the brick production in the kilns of mining area. He stated in his report that the mining in Canik during his fathers' rule was manipulated by the tax collector (mu-hassıl) sent by the Porte. He then excused his administration in Trabzon and declared to the Porte that he would send his tax collector, Seyyid Ali Ağa, to run the mining in Canik after his examination in

25. BOA., C.DH., Dosya No. 227, Gömlek No. 11342, 25 Safer 1176 H. (15 September 1762)

26. M. Beshirli, *XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Samsun Şehri (1755 numaralı Samsun Şer'iye Siciline Göre -H.1200-1255; M. 1785-1839)* [The City of Samsun in the Beginning of the 19th Century], Yüksek Lisans tezi, Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Samsun 1993, p.658.

the region²⁷. Though Canik was under the administration of Sivas province in those years, the mining affairs were given to the governors of Trabzon due to the trust of the Porte. It can be assumed that the governors of Trabzon were more trusted by the Palace on the matter of treasury comparing the governors in the vicinity. The administrator found out that the mine in Canik was promising so it should be operated by the expert craftsmen and labourers needed from other mining region.

Digging of gold and silver in the Canik sancak might have caused the reorganization of the Ottoman administration in the region. Canik was ruled by Sivas (Rum) province till 1847²⁸ but digging areas were controlled by Trabzon governors or their relatives. When the digging area gathered under the name of Maden Kabı, as newly reformed administrable unit, it was tied to the head quarter of Canik sub-province, named as Samsun. However this administrative unit Maden Kabı had not lasted long, since it dissolved in 1853, and the digging area was directly ruled by the governors of Samsun. The ex-manager (müdür) of Maden Kabı, Halil Agha was assigned to Fatsa where new emerging silver depots had been explored.²⁹ However, a few years later in 1855 it was reported that connecting Maden Kabı with Samsun town was a bad experience and caused sharp decrease in the revenue of the region. Hence a new manager Hacı Galip Ağaa had been offered Maden Kabı with 500 silver coins of salary, state officials investigating if this amount could be paid by the inhabitants of the town. The result has not came out so far in any official records and it thus can be presumed that the re-separation of Maden Kabı from Samsun town had never happened³⁰.

3. Miners clash in Maden and their immigration to Black sea region

There are insufficient historical sources that directly define the back-

27. BOA., HAT., Dosya No. 40, Gömlek No. 2021, 03 Ra. 1214 H. (4 September 1799)

28. Devlet Salnamesi (State Annual) (Hijra 1263), 1847, p.86.

29. BOA., A.MKT.MVL., Dosya No. 62, Vesika No. 2, 1269 C. 15

30. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., Dosya No. 139, Vesika No. 37, 1271 13 6 H. (1855)

ground of miners in Canik. Despite no precise data available for gold diggers, there are sources that refer to iron mining in relation to a nomadic tribe (Karayaka) and a group from Kürtün (mainly Turcoman) in Gümüşhane³¹. Another issue concerned Armenian and Greeks performed as iron miner and black-smith in Ünye, one of the coastal towns of Canik administration³².

However it is confusing to find out plausible historical data, proving the background of the labourers in the diggings of Samsun. It is obvious that we need extra methods to discover the mine workers' background. So far there was no precise document available to mention the whole story of miners in Canik. We have at least some issues regarding the gold and silver mine, explored in Canik region presumably around the second half of the eighteenth century and fully operated around 1792's. We also know that the miners who performed digging in Samsun should have been under the Sultans' possession, since the newly explored gold and silver quarries refer the information that the diggings of Samsun in the region were directly spared as Sultans' fair share. It is also known that the royal mining in the Gümüşhane region compulsorily kept the regular mine workers who inherited their post from the early ages and passed their duty to their offspring under the Sultans' caring. They were not allowed to migrate or escape and were forced to do the compulsory work, working in the royal mining for the Sultan. In return, they received the so called privileges such as exemption from the poll tax (cizye) and protection provided by the Sultan's security forces. At the time of discovering the new diggings in the Canik region Gümüşhane royal mining had the authority and run the business along with copper, gold mining at Maden in Elazığ. Most probably the Sultans' mine workers (Orthodox Greeks and Armenians) in Sultans royal mines were officially sent to new diggings to establish miners'- towns and to perform the work as it was the case in Milas copper mining, tied directly to Gümüşhane due to the decrease of yields in 1793. In 1790 Keban-Maden copper mining changed its administration and turned out one of the state mining company and separated administratively from the

31. BOA., M.VL. Dosya No. 648, Gömlek No. 71, 14 Z. 1279 H.

32. M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province*, pp. 78-79.

Gümüşhane royal mining due to the vanishing gold sources; only copper remained. This change in the administration of the copper mine in the region left a question unanswered of what happened with the mine labourers and experts who worked only for the Sultan. Though there is not available historical data to prove that the diggers of Sultans' royal estate had been charged on mining in different field, it can be assumed that the royal labourers were settled in another mining area where a newly found mine belonging to the the royal treasury would eventually operate.

The local clash between Kurds and Orthodox Greeks in the copper mining of Maden around the eighteenth century might have contained a clue to the plausible background of those mine labourers apparently having been charged with laboring Sultans' royal mine in Canik region. Muslims and Orthodox Greeks were peacefully working in the royal mining of Keban-Maden cutting the timbers, by Orthodox Greeks for the melting furnaces and carrying those prepared lugs to the melting pots operating area, by Kurdish Muslims as a part of their obligatory duty on the Sultans' private estates. Muslims and Orthodox Greeks, from Kemah, Gercanis and Kuruçay towns of Erzurum province were performing their royal duty and provided the summoned char-coals and lugs to Gümüşhane Royal mining in the year of 1744³³. Keban-Ergani and Kemah inhabitants of mining towns in 1761 borrowed some amount from the mining treasury chamber. In the following year these obligors refused to pay their debts³⁴. We assume that this was the initial reason of clash between the settlers and the mining authorities. A year later, in 1761 the debtors must have been moved to newly found digging fields to compensate their debts with heavy burden of mining. One of the Ottoman investigation reports suggests that the newly copper operating area, Milas (Karahisar-ı Şarki town tied to Trabzon province) needed expert miners along with labors and Gümüşhane Royal Mining administration moved the experts and labors from surrounding miner towns within its realm in 1762³⁵.

33. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 39, Gömlek No. 1932, 29 M. 1157 H. (14 March 1744)

34. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 3, Gömlek No. 115, 15 R 1175 H. (1761)

35. BOA., HAT., Dosya No. 8, Gömlek No. 280, 23 M. 1176 H. (14 August 1762)

Perhaps exactly in the same year, 1762, some of those miners were also forced to settle down as pioneers in the gold and silver undiscovered mining in Canik when bandit leader Küçük Ali harassed and fraud the forgery in the region. Otherwise the bandit herd could not mint the Sultans' gold and silver coins without having skilful artisans under their captivity³⁶. Another manuscripts related to the issue informs about the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of miner towns of Kemah, Eğin, Kuruçay and Gercanis as that of referring their 6.000 lugs, from the Mount Kandil were stolen by the local miserable Kurdish merchants in 1769³⁷. Local authorities, having been responsible with guarding the mine towns were warned with the command, pointing out that lugs were necessary to run the pits and tunnels and ordered to take precautions to hinder the assault³⁸. However it can be investigate that the Ottoman officers strengthened the condition and caused the death of notable person among the Kurdish tribe Şeyh Hasanlı in 1778. This event inflamed the wrath over the Orthodox Greeks who were regarded as Sultans' beloved subject as for that reason of laboring in the royal mining towns. Kurdish tribe seized the forestry mountain from where timbers cut for the furnaces and kilns. The state ordered the officials to ease the anger, but the local tribes and Sultans' loyal subject were turned to be each others' rival in the region³⁹. Whatever the methods of the Ottoman officials were applied in the region, they could not succeed to stop the harassment of the lugs' transfer for the mining pits. Miner town inhabitants, both Muslim and Orthodox Greeks carried on complaining about the local tribes and local authorities unfair assaults over the lugs, prepared for the Gümüşhane Mining realm in 1786⁴⁰. We presume that this issue has got a connection with our explored digging area in where diggers urgently needed.

36. BOA., C.DH., Dosya No. 227, Gömlek No. 11342, 25 Safer 1176 H. (15 September 1762)

37. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 52, Gömlek No. 2597, 02 Za. 1182 H. (1769)

38. BOA., AE.SMST.III, Dosya No. 3, Gömlek No. 140, 29 Z. 1182 H. (6 April 1769)

39. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 15, Gömlek No. 747, 17 Z. 1192 H. (7 December 1778)

40. BOA., C.DRB., Dosya No. 7, Gömlek No. 308, 13 M. 1201 H. (5 November 1786)

When the Samsun digging was explored and tied with Gümüşhane Royal mining around 1790-1817 the new rulers (mu-hassıl-tax collector) might have transferred the expert miners into the region from Gümüşhane Mining realm. We assumed that the inhabitants of miner town were moved to Samsun around 1790's not only to labor the diggings of newly explored red silver and gold mine but also to seized the local clash between the Sultans' royal subject and inhabitants, occurred in Keban-Kemah⁴¹. The census records contain some footnotes justifying our guests about the miners' roots in Samsun. One of these censuses indicates clearly that diggers settled on the mine villagers in Samsun moved from Kemah (copper and gold mining in Maden/Erzurum)⁴² and continues with extra information on miners stating that there were diggers who migrated from other quarries as well such as; Akdağ (silver mining in Sivas), Gümüş (silver mining in Gümüşhacıköy-Amasia-Çorum) and Taşabad (silver mining in Erbaa/Tokhat) within the Gümüşhane Royal Mine's realm⁴³.

4. The emergence of a new settlement, migrant villagers as mine workers

According to the Ottoman administrative structure, when a productive mine was discovered, an "emin" (was appointed from the Porte as in the case of Keban-Ergani mining. As soon as an official administrator (emin) had been assigned by the Porte, mine workers and labourers were settled in the region where a new mine sources were found. Firstly, a big house (usually called konak with two stores) was built for the official administrator and his household , and it would become the centre of the newly settlement in the mining region. The labourers and mine operators' houses were

41. M. Yavuz Erler, "Osmanlı Nüfus Kayıtlarına Dair Alternatif Bir Kaynak: Defter-i Liva-i Canik (1837)" [A Different from the Ottoman Population Records Source: the Register of the Province of Canik (1837)], *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi/ The Journal of International Social Research*, 2:8 (Summer 2009), p. 175. See also: BOA, Nfs. Dft. Nr. 979-993.

42. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21510, 1258 H. (1842-1843)

43. BOA., NFS.d., No: 981, 1254 H. (1838-1839), p. 61, 85, 95, 144, 166.

built surrounding the administrator's big house. New shops from where the pioneers of the mine town fulfilled their needs were built such as bakeries, butchers' shops, smithies etc. The state did also build the religious edifices according to the miners' beliefs such as churches and mosques or pious foundation as "tekke". The transfer from the mine pitches was made by animals, especially oxen, mules, donkeys, horses and for that reason stables were also built in the mine-towns⁴⁴. Another example of mine towns is well described by Suraiya Faroqhi in Kure, referring to the slaves that worked in the shadowy tunnels with inadequate air supply, under terrible conditions. It might be presumed that decrease of the numbers of slaves or subjects, condemned at forced labor in the Sultans' royal properties, lowered the duration of mining and sharply decreased the yields. Losing the slaves or royal servants on the royal mines must have caused the abandonment of the mining around 1840s', as it happened in Küre⁴⁵. It is also necessary to bear in mind that Samsun has got a castle, used as prison for those who were exiled there and sentenced to heavy labor⁴⁶. Nevertheless, we do not have any historical evidence if women prisoners or children were sentenced to the digging area of Samsun as a part of their punishment⁴⁷.

Samsun, as an initial town of Canik administrative structure, was a small town surrounded with muddy marshes on the land and shallow coast on the sea side. Samsun pear was one of the outward gates on the coastal shore of Black-sea from where, for centuries, raw or manufactured materials from the hinterlands were transferred to Istanbul. Grain and some mining raw materials, such as initially copper, lead, tin and silver from Maden (Elazığ) and Gümüş (Çorum), from Sivas and after their processing in the To-

44. F. Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik*, pp. 96-97.

45. S. Faroqhi, *Osmanlıda Kentler ve Kentliler*, p. 222.

46. M. Yavuz Erler, XIX. *Yüzyıl Osmanlı Karadeniz Sahil Kalelerinin Yöre Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapısına Olan Katkıları* [The Socio-Economic Structure in the Suburbs of the Coast Toward the Black Sea in the 19th Century], CIEPO, Trabzon 2006, p.785.

47. M. Karabacak, *Meclis Zabıtlarına Göre II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Kadınlarla İlgili Düzenlemeler* [Regulations Concerning the Women according to the Court Officers in the Second Constitutional Era], Ph. D. Submission paper to Ondokuz Mayıs University Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Samsun 2011, p. 18.

kat's copper workshops, found their way to the Ottoman capital via Samsun's piers. Camel caravans (3,000-4,000 camels and a donkey ahead), horse carts (there were 400 carts operated between Amasya to Kavak station and then to Samsun) did their best to lift the heavy burdens of the state's livestock from hinterlands to Samsun. Thus, it is assumed that carriers, farmers and also diggers of mines were all somehow acquainted with the Samsun piers. It is possible to assert that daily workers' migration occurred in this small coastal town of the Black-sea, as early as the mid of the 15th century on a small scale. Some historical sources also indicate that Greek Orthodox fishermen traveled around the eastern Black-sea coast and stayed for a while in Samsun during the fishing season⁴⁸. Even more, it is possible to mention some nomadic Orthodox Greeks who traveled inland to the pastures with their herds. The villages surrounding Samsun, initially Kadıköy contained Greek Orthodox farmers who cultivated olive trees and grinded the olive oil in order to provide the market with olive oil, largely used as candle light rather than food for centuries⁴⁹.

There are some Ottoman documents proving the existence of diggers around the Samsun town and its surrounding settlements. However the official correspondence and investigation documents fails to depict precise information where actually miners were settled and how many villages were infiltrated into mine work. One of the sultanic orders to the royal musketeer, referred to the diggings of Canik. It exclusively informs us where mining for the Sultans' private estates took place in 1824. It states that the miners were located in Fatsa, including its surrounding settlements, Ökse (today known as Ayvacık) and Samsun (most probably Maden Kabı). The decree also mentions that people of Arım (later known as Çarşamba) levied with a burden of labor in the digging areas⁵⁰.

One of the applications submitted to the state for the permission of digging in 1910 gives us the real picture of predicted digging fields that possessed the gold or silver depots in the Canik. The pri-

48. M. Yavuz Erler, "Osmanlı Nüfus Kayıtlarına Dair Alternatif Bir Kaynak", pp. 171, 188.

49. Photo I: Olive grind machine.

50. BOA., HAT., Dosya No. 1041, Gömlek No. 43066-K, 30 M. 1240 H. (24 September 1824)

vate miner businessman asked permission from the state in order to examine the field of Çamalan village, tied to Çarşamba district of Samsun so as to find gold, silver and copper. He also depicted the exact searching zone such as: at the eastern side of Samsun town: Çinili Meryem Ana church within Samsun and the stream where was the Yurika's mill, who was the son of Ekred, which run next to Lazari's field who was the son of Hacı Anastas and Yanko's field who was the son of Hacı Yuri. At the western side: Dimetler stream within Samsun and the mills and fields of Haghi Panayod. At the southern side: Oluklu Pınar village, tied to Çarşamba town and Yurika's field of Fudika who was the son of Baba Pavli. At the northern side: Gökçe Pınar village, tied to Samsun and Bağ Yeri (vineyard) stream and Kiraki's field who was the son of Kasab (butcher). Mehmet Usta who was the one who applied for mining permission informs us that all searching field contained 13.000 acres and he intended to find some silver, lead, gold, iron and alum depots in the region⁵¹. It can be asserted that he did not arbitrarily choose this field to examine for mining. He certainly had been informed by locals about the mining in the aforementioned borders. Whatever the reason, his field research for mining supports other historical sources about the digging and mine towns regarding their exact location.

In 1823 Osman Ağa son of Süleyman was assigned as a tax collector to Canik in order to administer the silver and etc. mining in the region, Maden Kabı (within the Samsun town), Fatsa and Keşh dere (within the Ünye town). It could be referred from the decree that the royal mining administration named as Fatsa and Bayramlı royal mining already existed in Canik due to the iron ore, extracted since 1485. The decree issued the order stating that newly found diggings could be administered with the Bayramlı and Fatsa royal mining. Nevertheless, it must have been a bad choice, including the gold and silver mining business into melting iron business. Perhaps that was the reason why later, after Osman Bey, the royal musketeer Ahmet Ağa was appointed to the region to deal privately with the silver and gold mining along with other state matters. However the decree also accused the tax collector, sent by the Porte, because

51. BOA., BEO., Dosya No. 3789, Gömlek No. 284104, 14 Temmuz 1339 (27 July 1910)

he had failed to run successfully the digging business. The digger's petition explained the failure of yield within a few years. The diggers from Maden Kabı (Mine Pot) district (within the Samsun town) went to the Porte and had an interview with the head of the Royal Mint House claiming that there were abundant gold and silver depots in the region and complained for bad administration and pressure. It can be also inferred from the digger's petition that the officers from the Porte levied them with extra taxes and burdens. The diggers did obviously find spare time apart from mining to earn their living with other activities such as hemp production, robe, lugs for the royal navy and linen production, sails and lifting the heavy loads to the ships, embarked to the Samsun quay. The diggers blamed the tax collector, to whom the mining business was rented by *maktu* (lump sum) and Osman Bey who was the son of Süleyman, that taxed the diggers with 12,000 silver coins for what they earned apart from mining. The verdict came soon by the Porte commanding the Ahmet Ağa, from the royal musketeer unit in 1825 to gather 800 migrants Orthodox Greek diggers to run properly the mining business. We also learn from the decree that some Orthodox Greeks who were involved in the coffee grind business backed their neighbors' claims and complained about the tax collector Osman Bey in the region. It is also possible to learn from the decree that the diggers used the techniques of melting the silver on bricks⁵². However Ahmet Ağa's son in 1853 applied to the Porte stating that his father administered the digging area of Samsun, Maden Kabı and Fatsa between 1819 and 1825 by the virtue of the Sultans' decree. He claimed that his father could not gather the local taxes for 1824, demanded by the state as a payment for his fathers' duty in the digging area. Ahmet Ağa's son asked the Porte to give him 153,051 silver coins that would be collected from the locals of the digging zone, who owed the money to his father as for delayed tax payment for the year 1824⁵³.

In of 1825 the diggings of Canik, Fatsa and Ordu were run by the

52. BOA., HAT., Dosya No. 564, Gömlek No. 27650, 29 Z. 1240 H. (15 July 1825)

53. BOA., MVL., Dosya No. 137, Gömlek No. 99, 1269 Ş 20 H. (1853), taxes enlisted as *sal-ı mukata*, *imdad-ı hazıriyye*, *kalyoncu bedeliyesi*, *mürettebat-ı saire*.

governor of Trabzon Hasan Paşa who was appointed by the Porte. In the sultanic decree it is stated that Hasan Paşa was appointed as the tax collector, pointing out the auction of the mining permission at Fatsa and its vicinity. He suggested to the Porte that he would personally visit the digging area of Kabı (the word “kabı” might have been driven from the word “Şap” which means alum) Mountains, in order to get the expert diggers to examine the surface where plenty of gold or silver depots must have been, by the virtue of God almighty. It is a kind of synergic leaving the possibility of finding reach silver depots at the hand of God. It is also a kind of confirmation on inadequate technique to explore the surface mine depots leaving it to God will⁵⁴. What is the obvious result from this religious approach to the diggings was the failure of prompt yield of silver as a consequence of an once more change of the administrator of the mining territory. However, it can be inferred from the decree of Hassan Paşa that some more expert diggers were transferred to the mine towns. The result was the population growth of the mine town (Kab-ı Maden) and the villages under the administration of different rulers.

In 1839 we came across another administrator in the digging area. Another tax collector identified as Abdullah Bey whose brother was the governor of Trabzon, Osman Paşa, gained the revenue of the digging zone at auction held by the Porte in Istanbul . However, the final destiny occurred once more and Abdullah Bey forced the diggers to do his own business along with the digging. He made an agreement with some of the local merchants to build 10-15 trade galleons in the quay of Fatsa. He forced the diggers to cut down enough timber from Canik forests and prepare these timbers as lugs, to be used for the galleons. It can be understood from the decree that the diggers were also good lumbers just as they were in Keban and Maden royal mining. Though the diggers of Canik complained about this unfair burden, stolen lugs prepared for the mine pits and tunnels, and they asked for a fair trial from the Porte, none dared to touch Osman Paşa’s brother and ruin the ruling hierarchy in the region⁵⁵.

54. BOA, HAT., Dosya No. 1063, Gömlek No. 43654, 15 C. 1240 H. (5 January 1825)

55. BOA., HAT., Dosya No. 1622, Gömlek No. 2, 3 C. 1255 H. (15 July 1839)

As the time goes by, Abdullah Paşa in 1844 was appointed as the governor of Trabzon and charged to take care of mining business in Canik, dependent to Sivas province. What happened to the Sultans' loyal subjects, once upon a time privileged in return of doing the royal service in the royal estates of valuable digging areas? The changing status of miners can be strongly emphasized upon the emergence of the Greek Kingdom in 1829. The sultan must have been disappointed with the Greek rebellion and there was suspicion all over the state against Orthodox Greeks, not exempting the royal subject as well. If we consider this as a fact, it might be clear to understand the ruin of digger's heyday as Sultans' royal subject. On one hand Greek Orthodox miners' loyalty to the Sublime Porte diminished throughout the miner towns of Canik. On the other hand, the diggers of mine villages had been spoiled and had the courage to complain even on the highest authorities in the region. Though Abdullah Paşa mistreated the mine town inhabitants and villages in Canik region, he succeeded to confirm his position in Samsun and even after he was appointed as the governor of Trabzon. Abdullah Paşa was asked to increase the silver, copper and gold yield in Karahisar (in Giresun), Canik, Kabı Mountain and Armutili royal mining. He reported to the Porte that the yield of copper decreased to 8,777.5 "vukiyye" and silver to 1,294 "dirhem" between the years 1842-1843 because of the heavy winter which worsened the mining conditions. He also estimated the price of expenditure gold, silver and copper mining in the region stating that per "dirhem" gold cost 41.5 kurush, silver (per dirhem) 102 paras and copper (per kıyye) 252 paras. He was also charged to multiply the brick production in the mine pits⁵⁶. A few years after the appointment of Abdullah Paşa, Canik region was extracted from Sivas province and tied to Trabzon province as an administrative sanjak (sub-province) in 1847⁵⁷. This change helps us to find out more properly organized census of the mine towns. When we compared this census records with other documents, the overall picture of the territory became more clear.

Above all, the Muslim miners, royal subjects of Sultan, had

56. BOA., CDRB., Dosya No. 40, Gömlek No. 1966, 29 Ca. 1260 H. (16 July 1844)

57. Devlet Salnamesi (Hijra 1263), 1847, p.86.

their “tekke” (today known as Tekkeköy and indeed there is a pious foundation) in the region, called as Maden Kabı (Mine Pot). We also found out that each Greek Orthodox mine village had its own church, still intact because of the churches’ conversion into mosque by the Lozan migrants from Greece (after 1923). It can be suggested that the Muslim mine village had its own “tekke” by the end of 1790’s; the graveyard and carved tomb stones in the “tekke” proves this estimation⁵⁸. The Greek Orthodox diggers built their mine villages with the support of the Porte and had the privilege to establish their Orthodox churches⁵⁹.

It is evident that the iron ore mining existed in the region since of 1485 onwards, but there are no any available data on the digging areas of gold or silver. Mining in Ünye and Fatsa must have been an important earning activity ever since the first historical evidence dated back to 1485. However, it must be considered that iron works could be inherited from the earliest civilization of the pre-Ottoman era. In fact, Chalybians (ancient natives of the region) were credited with the invention of ironworking and gave their fame to steel in Medieval Greeks⁶⁰. In 1839 iron ore of Ünye was still in abundance to be used as domestic commercial good. In the town of Ünye, one of the coastal towns of Canik, iron was manufactured into nails, used both for ship and house building. The British Consul R. W. Stevens reports provide some valuable information on iron mining of Canik: “The ore was found in small nodules embedded in clay. A number of people employ themselves exclusively in collecting and smelting the ore, and for the privilege they were obliged to furnish the government 80 tons”⁶¹. However, the iron manufacture of Ünye must have ended when a proper quay of Samsun allowed the European trade cargos both to embark and disembark heavy loads at a lower price around 1872’s.

58. Photo II: Pious foundation of Tekke

59. Photo III: Depicts the Orthodox Church, some converted into Mosque. And some spared intact.

60. Mehmet Öz, *Population, Taxation and Regional Economy in the District of Canik (According to Ottoman Tahrir Defters, 1455-1576)*, PH.d. Dissertation submitted to Girton College, Cambridge, November 1990, p. 148-149.

61. M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents*, pp. 78-79.

Though the iron smiths were around the region where gold and silver sources were detected in eighteenth century, there are no available sources about the silver or gold diggings. However we could not come across any historical evidence to prove gold or silver mining in the region of Ottomans, until eighteenth century. This lack of evidence for the existence of gold and silver resources within long laps in time may be attributed to the fact that precious materials were driven from inland via streams and floods, scattering the gold and silver tiny particulates on surface of the towns of Ünye, Fatsa and Kabı region in Samsun till its amount became abundant enough to glitter the natives interests throughout the eighteenth century. Another possibility is that that gold and silver resources remained below the ground till when it burst up because of an earth-quake, taken place in XVIII th century.

The settlers' issue from the social point of view attracted our interest more than the existence of gold or silver in the region. The relative sources prove that diggers who understood about gold or silver mining were imported in the territory from other mining locations. These new comers were settled where gold and silver yields were promising. However, this region was also inhabited by native Orthodox even before the new diggers' arrival to the territory. The census records prove that diggers either settled down in private miners' villages or next to the old Christian villages as a part of new social structure. The imperial decree, dated in 1824, refers to the diggers in the region such as Fatsa, Ökse (today Ayvacık) and Maden Kabı (tied to Samsun)⁶². However, there is not enough information on their demographic dense in the document but only information concerning their taxes. After the westernization policy in administration, the first census applied in the mining zone of Samsun and recorded under the office of royal mining (rikab-ı humayun) service was made in 1842⁶³. However, we cannot obtain this source from the Ottoman archive in Istanbul due to its restoration. Nevertheless, it became possible to reach consecutive census records of the region. The census record Nr. 981 held after 1842 contains the information

62. BOA., HAT, Dosya No. 1041, Gömlek No. 43066, 30 M. 1240 H. (24 September 1824)

63. BOA., MAD.d. Nr. 21510, 1258 H. (1842)

dated back to 1838. In this census some native Christian villages included some migrant diggers, introduced as Shab Christians or sometimes migrants, referring their home miner town as “tabir-i maden Akdağ” (so called Akdağ mine). For instance Ali Bey village, one of the surrounding villages of Maden Kabı town, in 1838 included 35 out-comers of Shab Christians within 11 houses⁶⁴. In another village of Maden Kabı town registered under the name of Karye-ı Kışlak 67 out-comers from Akdagh mine (probably in Sivas province) within 23 households were also included⁶⁵. Perhaps the most important village comparing with others on the matter of red silver and gold diggings is Devgiriş (Giant Entrance); it also registered some out-comers called Şab (alumn) Shab Christians: 58 men within 17 households⁶⁶. However the native Devgiriş village also contains some small amount of out comers (diyar-ı aherden) both from Akdağ mine and Çarşamba mine⁶⁷. It can be pointed out that the pioneers of diggers, from Akdağ and also Çarşamba mines were settled down in Devgirish village to do mining then after bulk of diggers; Şab Christians were settled down next to Devgiriş village establishing a miner village. One of the records proves that Şab Christians were also settled down in Maden village⁶⁸. The other village in where Şab Christians were settled was named Çınarlu⁶⁹. It is also possible to detect some diggers who came in Maden Kabı town of Samsun from other mining zones such as Gümüş (Amasia) and Taşabad (Amasia)⁷⁰. The closest village of Maden Kabı to Samsun is named Çiftlik had also some out-comers from Akdağ mines⁷¹.

64. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 55 (for Ali Bey village).

65. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 61 (for Kışla village)

66. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 83-84 (for Devgirish village, miners village)

67. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 85 (for genuine Devgirish village, 220 men within 54 households)

68. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 118.

69. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 121.

70. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 144, 166.

71. BOA., Nüfus Defteri (Census Record), Nr. 981, 1254 H. (1838-39), p. 95.

Though this census records were too confusing, it helps to figure out from where the diggers came to Samsun mining zones. One of the relevant sources to the issue of mining reveals another migration of the Greek migrants from Kale village of Gümüşhane to Samsun in 1840. It is also remarkable information that the Greek miners from Gümüşhane were transferred to other mining zones. For example 185 households of Greek miners in 1826 moved from Gümüşhane to Hamit mines in Nighde⁷². Though there are not enough clues to prove, it can be asserted that Samsun must have received some Greek miners even after 1826. Nevertheless it is obvious that migrant diggers appeared in the region as a result of the exploration of the red silver digging region in the Canik territory. So far it is evident that the royal Gümüşhane mining realm lost some digging areas due to the decrease of the yield of valuable mines, some domestic clashes between minor groups in society, and bad administration or state regulations; in the case of Kemah it converted the royal mine in to the state owned one. The miners who worked for the Sultans' royal mines as loyal and also capable subjects to run the diggings were settled to other newly operated digging areas within the Gümüşhane Royal Mining realm. Sometimes the diggers directly moved to Samsun from Gümüşhane, while sometimes they first passed to other mining zones from Gümüşhane or Kemah-Maden to some neighboring mines such as Akdağ silver mine in Sivas (Rum)⁷³, Taşabad silver mine in Erbaa (tied to Sivas), Milan copper mine (in Ordu/Trabzon), Gümüş Hacıköy village (in Amasya), but when the resources were exhausted, they migrated to Samsun. The main group of diggers called Christian Shab (Alum mine) diggers in the Canik region must have been moved from Shebin Karahisar in Giresun to Samsun as a result of loosing of some royal mining sources⁷⁴. Last but not least, we found out that

72. K. Saylan, *Gümüşhane Sancağı (1850-1918)* [The Province of Gümüşhane (1850-1918)], Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of KATU, Trabzon 2012, p. 172.

73. BOA., TS. MA.d. , Nr. 5622, "It declares that the silver mine (Akdağ) in Sivas (Rum) was Sultan's private property."

74. "The Alum mines of Karahisar, a district of Trabzon province, which formerly supplied all Turkey, have been neglected of late years (araound 1858)." M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents (1830-1914)*, v. I, p. 266.

nearly the entire Christians miners passed over their pickaxe (digging) to their family members in Maden Kabı (in where digging area stood)⁷⁵. It can be presumed that the diggers were provided with state mining tools except the pickaxe. If this is true, we can explain why in only Christian digging areas the miners passed their personal pickaxe to their family. It also can be concluded that the digging area must contain surface raw materials so that only a pickaxe sufficed to do mining.

The town established as a unit and administration center of miners' villages along with the locals in Samsun was named Maden Kabı (Mine Pot or Alum Mine). The census record of Maden Kabı, dated in 1849-50, depicts all 47 villages in the digging area⁷⁶. Andrea village, out of 47 villages, was registered as a district as well. It must have been a kind of developing village that later turned to be a suburb of a town, Tekkeköy as a center of Maden Kabı⁷⁷. Andrea village (district) included 112 men combined altogether in 46 household. Muslim diggers, from surrounding areas such as Fatsa, Charshamba and Okse (Ayvacık) might move next to Andrea village and as a result the central town of Maden Kabı received the name Tekke Köy because of the establishment of pious foundation. Nevertheless, Okse village next to Andrea village resembled the name of Okse town (Ayvacık), which included 94 men in 48 households, and was a place in where the Christians live⁷⁸. It thus can be maintained that some of these Christian miners might be converted into Islam by the pious foundation named Tekke. Whatever the case, it is clear enough that there is a creation of a new town center combining a few villages together and turning the villages into a suburb of a new established town. Some of the villages in Maden Kabı town received a title as "çiftlik" (farm). In Ottoman terminology çiftlik (farm) does not only indicate a simple agricul-

75. "They have also passed their axes to the heirs", see : O. Keskiner, *Kadı Sicillerinde Samsun* [Samsun according to the Court Registers], v. I, (Samsun: Samsun Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2013), pp. 64, 68-69, 70, 75, 128-129, 156-160, 165-166, 171-173, 189-190, 200, 205-207, 210, 212, 247-248, 273-274, 296-298, 305, 306-309.

76. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850)

77. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 11-13.

78. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 13-14.

tural farm, but also refers to a place where a digging or another economic production has being performed. It hence can be claimed that the villages bearing the mark of “ma’ çiftlik” (with farm) had digging fields at their surroundings. Besides it can also be seen that the hilly and rocky topography of the region was too hostile for any kind of cultivation. According to 1849 census, these villages with the farm were those shown in the table I⁷⁹.

Table I

**The miner villages contains digging farms in their vicinity
(1849-1850)**

Name of the village	Men Population	Household
Çan Deresi (Bell stream)	65	27
Ali Bey	159	44
Ali Bey (Alum, miners)	26	10
Dev Giriş (Giant Entrance)	164	64
Dev Giriş (Alum, miners)	49	12
Asarağaç	63	27
Sarı Bıyık (Yellow Mustache)	137	67
Avdon	101	37
Şahruh (Alum, miners)	40	19
Bayramlı Batak	85	33
Zıdar (Haydar ?)	58	38

The census record also offers some Christian nomadic tribes under the name of “oymak” (tribe). These groups travelled around the Maden Kabı and settled wherever they preferred or they were allocated by the authority. One of these local migrating “oymak” bears the note as “They were seen in Taşabad” (Sivas = Rum province)⁸⁰. This nomadic Christians and their names are enlisted in the Table II⁸¹:

79. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p.1, 3, 4-6, 7, 7-8, 18-20, 23-25, 25, 26-27, 27-28,

80. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 48-49 (for Kirazh (chery) deresi (stream) tribe “oymakh”)

81. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 38-39, 39-41, 41-42, 43, 43-44, 44-45, 45-47, 47-48, 48-49,

Table II

**Christian Nomads in the digging area of Samsun
(1849-1850)**

Name of the Nomadic tribe	Men population	Household
Arucan Tribe	148	49
Yayla Kiriş Tribe	138	55
Sarıyurt Tribe	111	41
Yurdam oğlu Tribe	43	28
Gökçe Tribe	62	26
Pelid oğlu Tribe	81	30
Frıncı oğlu Tribe	101	43
Cakız Tribe	87	43
Kiraz Deresi Tribe	80	25
Total	841	340

These Christian nomads, near the digging area dealing with animal husbandry, were also master artisans such as tinners, miners “madenci”, carpenters, grinders, bakers, bear tamers, fishermen, jewelers, camel owners, stone carvers etc. One of the nicknames of the inhabitants of nomads bears the title of “yörük” which means traveler exactly as how Turkish nomads identify themselves⁸². Another nickname recorded as Karagöllu Lefter proves that Christian shepherds used the same pasture, Karagöl (Black Lake) in Giresun that the Turkish nomads Karayaka (located in Erbaa) tribe used⁸³.

The census records of Orthodox Greeks in the digging area enlisted the villages' name in Turkish. However the register of 1837 proves that there were only 26 settlements around Maden Kabı, whereas the census records of 1849/50 refers 47 settlements⁸⁴. It could be inferred as if all Orthodox miner villages have Turkish roots by looking into the villages' Turkish names, but it is rather suspiciously predictable. However there is another explanation: all those villages in the digging area were designed by the state authority and

82. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 39-41 (for Yayla Kiriş tribe)

83. BOA., MAD.d., Nr. 21731, 1266 H. (1849-1850), p. 47-48 (for Cakız tribe)

84. M. Yavuz Erler, “Osmanlı Nüfus Kayıtlarına Dair Alternatif Bir Kaynak”, p.182.

the rulers decided that the name of the miner villages should be in Turkish. This can be an evident case that all the miner villages were based upon state organized migration of the diggers or the Christian nomads. If this was the reason for the Turkish names of the Christian villages, it can be stated that all of these diggers' villages were newly established by the State-forced migration, due to the recently explored silver and gold digging resources in the end of eighteenth century or perhaps because of the existence of Russia in the northern frontlines. The pure Turkish names of the villages perhaps bear the "nationalized" marks of the state policy caused by the shifting of power between Orthodox Russia and the Ottomans over the Orthodox population in the Eastern lands after 1774. Therefore, it can also make plausible to excuse the Eastern Christians state controlled migration in to digging areas far away from the Russian borders. Nevertheless, it is early to assert the state national agenda over the names of the settlements without exclusive research over the matter.

It is remarkable to identify the private companies' eagerness in the digging areas of Canik at the first half of the 19th century. European interest (British, France and Austria-Hungaria) to reach India (over Persia) brought foreign companies to the coastal towns of Black-sea, including Canik, until 1869, when Süveyş Canal project offered an alternative, shorter and safer access to the East,. The Black Sea port- towns expanded because of the foreign trade and offered local products such as silk, from Amasia and Trabzon, different kinds of textile like cotton manufacture "bogasi" from Tokat or mohair from Angora and also fine leathers "softiyan", from Tokat. There were also other tradable goods as grain, manufactured rice and wheat of Samsun's hinterland and also natural dying herbs. On the one hand the sea enterprise accelerated to some degree the trade activities on textile and also on food stocks in the port-towns, but meanwhile it caused the decline of mining and the productions of old –fashioned tools and equipment. Cheap copper, tin, iron and even gold and silver decreased the local production and supplied the market with British, Russian, French and Austrian goods. The raw domestic sources of mining, badly operated, attracted foreign investments with modern techniques that offered more production. Kigork, son of Basman from Tokat found a way to introduce himself as miner businessman in 1847. He demanded from the Porte to

run the silver diggings, possessed by the Sultan in Ünye and Samsun. He also conducted a survey to gauge the fertility of the silver digging areas and reached to the conclusion that the silver mines of Samsun were worthwhile to operate⁸⁵.

Kigork, as private investor in mining requested from the Porte to appoint him administrator of the mining in Samsun, but his request was refused in 1855 and the digging area once more was submitted to Gümüşhane Royal Mine administration. Meanwhile Kigork extracted during his survey in the region 10.000 kıyye of soil that contained silver by spending 322.000 silver coins. The Porte was also keen to demand these raw mine soils from Kigork. The Porte later on seized it and attached it to Gümüşhane Royal Mine⁸⁶. However, Kigork kept demanding the rights of digging in the region, Ünye, Fatsa towns of Samsun and renewed his petition to the Porte, in order to operate the digging for 20 years in 1856⁸⁷. He did not obtain the royal permission for digging in Samsun. A year later, in 1857, his son applied to the court demanding justice for his father, introducing him as a European merchant, and asked for a reimbursement because of his father expenditures during his 6 years survey in the region⁸⁸. Whatever the verdict of the court, it is obvious that the royal Porte was eager to accept any kind of interference of European merchants in digging business in Samsun.

Nevertheless, the state annuals (salname) contain some trace of mining in Canik between 1879 and 1894. It can be asserted that the private investment largely took place in mining after the re-establishment of the coastal town of Samsun. Samsun area contained cement in the villages of Kabaklı and Bilmece. Apart from the cement extraction between the years of 1879 and 1894 there were other kind of mines, exploited by private investors. The mining areas of Samsun with their type and location⁸⁹, shown in Table III.

85. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., Dosya No. 87, Vesika No. 2, 1263 11. 16. (1847)

86. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., Dosya No. 128, Vesika No. 56, 1271 R. 29 (1855)

87. BOA., A.MKT. NZD., Dosya No. 226, Vesika No. 17, 1273 L 24 (1857)

88. BOA., HR.MKT., Dosya No. 213, Gömlek No. 10, 1274 Ra. 8 H. (26 November 1857)

89. K. Emiroghlu, Trabzon Vilayet Salnamesi) [The Salname of the Province of Trabzon], v. XI (1879, pp.303-305; v XII (1881),p.335; v. XIII (1888), pp. 331-333; v XIV (1892), p.339; v. XV (1894), p. 345.

Table III

Mine Type	Çarşamba	Fatsa	Ünye
Lead mixed with silver	Alaçak and Kantarlı villages	Ordu village	Kurt, Çaçula and Gana villages
Coal		Efraz village	Muradeldin vilage
Iron		On the coast, Ordu village	On the coast
Manganese		Çaçula, Çeçale, Mirşabükü village, Ordu village	Fardil, Köçet, Könehar, Gün Ali and Demirci villages
Copper	Karaköy and Olumca (oyumca) village		

5. Unprofitable digging resources. Searching new fields of living as caravan inn keepers, row boat lifting, hemp production, mills

It is evident from the above that the digging areas were not properly regulated and that caused the failure of silver and gold production around 1855's. However, it is also known that the state central policy towards Ottoman subjects radically changed in 1839 and also 1856, easing the pressure over the Christian subjects and providing more human and civilized rights as stated in the *Gülhane* and *Hatt-i Hümayun*. It therefore can be claimed that diggers, as sultans' royal subject, received the choice for their own destiny to remain loyal or keep living on their own gesture. It might be hard to live without Sultans' royal protection but anyway better than the hard work in mines and yoke of burden of extra taxes, imposed by the state. The diggings were also not profitable and challenging to operate because of the rainy climate of the region, resulting in filling the tunnels with flood of water hard to pump out without high techniques. Leather air pumps were also inadequate to reach properly deep corners of the tunnels. It can also be asserted that

the gold nodules on the surface were wiped out by the diggers in time and surface depots removed from the digging area. There are some remarks on the field that the diggers attended to open some tunnels into the rocky hills, hard to operate and expensive to melt out the gold or silver from the rocks. Perhaps these obstacles hindered the digging business or Sultans' private property remained solely abandoned⁹⁰.

The introduction of the tobacco cultivation in the humid soils of Samsun and especially rocky hills, between Maden Kabı (Tekkeköy) and up to the Mert River, by British sailors or perhaps the Ottoman state itself gave another choice to the farmers for agricultural production throughout the end of the eighteenth century⁹¹. The new product, driven from Kuba had been growing in the Caniks farming areas, first just in the suburb of the Samsun town, along with its vicinity, and secondly in Bafra. What is relevant to our subject, the diggers chose their living mainly as tobacco cultivators along with other life earning activities, thus abandoning the mining and acting more independently from the state. Some also found for themselves easy access to the sea fare, working as porters or oarsmen. These Christian hard workers mixed with Muslims and participated into seasonal worker migration. They remained in Samsun quay as long as the season allowed the embarking of cargoes; after that they moved to Istanbul acting also as porters for the other half of the year.

The change of the Samsun economic conditions, caused by the maritime trade, offered more opportunities for carriage. Therefore some of the diggers preferred to take their share in the land transportation as inn keepers on the way from the Samsun through the mining zone. They developed their inns by offering extra services to the passengers or caravan owners with bakery (oven), hay store, grinding yoke mills, safe shelter for their trade goods against the rainy climate of the region etc. During the Crimean War the trade and transport hastened between Samsun quay and its hinterland, Ama-

90. Photo IV: The entrance of mine tunnel

91. Mehmet Yavuz Erler & Kerim Edinsel, "Samsun'da Tütün Üretimi (1788-1919)" [The Tobacco Production in Samsun (1788-1919)], *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi/ The Journal of International Social Research*, 4:18 (Summer 2011), pp. 230-247.

sia, Tokat, Sivas, Kayseri, Çorum and even Ankara, based mainly on food stocks of the allied troops, who were wandering miles away from their home in Crimea. Some French sailors passed their habit of potato consumption to Samsun where they remained along with their British fellows. However the British consuls reported this event as Ottoman state precaution against the draught of 1855 in Samsun region⁹². Locals -especially those surrounding Christian villages of Samsun- along with Caucasian migrants seized this new vegetable and started cultivating it in large amounts in order to profit from its sale⁹³. Migration of Tatars from Crimea, from 1853 and onwards and Circassians from Caucasus since 1864, into the Canik province increased the Samsun's population in rural areas and also in the suburbs of the town . The instant rise of human power created cheap and abundant labor in Samsun, which accelerated the commerce and lured the foreign investments. The overall of the hard soils of Samsun covered with tobacco fields were depicted in an Ottoman map, made in 1867⁹⁴. The road allowing heavy loads and carts was financed by the British investors in order to create a better link between the quays of Samsun and its hinterland where tobacco, rice, grains and any kind of tradable goods were cultivated⁹⁵. Migrants from Caucasia were charged with the responsibility of the hard road working with a low salary⁹⁶. The city of Samsun was just get on the wheel to develop since 1853. However some Christians in Samsun sought their destiny abroad as merchants or they massivel moved to Russia having lured by the newly occupied lands⁹⁷.

92. For patato cultivation; M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents*, v. I, p. 245.

93. For corn cultivation see: M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents* v. II, pp. 780-781.

94. BOA, Harita Katalogu, Tobacco farms and bridges, having drawn in 16 December 1863.

95. BOA., HR.TO., Dosya No. 449, Gömlek No. 68, 1867 3.7. "Investigation report of Mr. Pavel"

96. M. Şaşmaz, *Trade Reports of the Trebizond Province on British Documents*, vl. II, pp. 780-781.

97. Christian migrants from Samsun to Georgia (Russian territory) taught the Georgians how to cultivate tobacco and hazel-nuts. Mehmet Yavuz Erler, "XIX. Yüzyıl Boyunca Osmanlı Karadenizinde Ekonomi" [The Economy of the Ottoman Black Sea during the 19th Century], *The Journal of International Social Research*, 2:7

However there was a a turning point concerning the development of Samsun due to a calamity, occurred in 1869. The city, with an old Turkish down-town, was rebuilt according to a city plan. The quays were renewed, the buildings (public, religious, private), street roads, pavements, squares, sewage etc. were all rechecked and designed. As a matter of fact the city was reborn with the help of foreign and state investment after 1870's. Meanwhile the construction carried out the creation of a new planned city center; Christians, from suburbs of the down-town and also from surrounding towns flooded into new emerging estates, devised by the authorities. As Samsun developed as a merchant-town, Christian traders from the inner part of Anatolia as far as to Kayseri wished to take advantage of it by locating their international logistic base in this coastal sea-town. The wealth of the inhabitants, both Muslims and Christians, reasonably changed their daily lives, allowing them to have their own luxuries. Religious edifices were erected in the town, churches and mosques, as well as trade ware houses, inns, markets, custom houses, trade agencies, embassies, a tobacco factory and a branch of international banks etc.; all the above demonstrate the great success of the maritime trade in collaboration with the local financiers. The diggers of the Sultan proved that they can be successful in other earnings without the Sultans' favors. In the end they became rich and were accepted in the Ottoman society on their own.

Table IV
The Mines Occurred in Canik (1857)

Number	Towns	Locations	Type of Mining
1	FATSA	SÜRMENE MOUNTAIN	SILVER
2		ABBAS MOUNTAIN	SILVER
3		ARPALUK MOUNTAIN	SILVER
4	ÜNYE	CURAKI MOUNTAIN	LEAD
5		CÖZ STREAM, YOKUŞ MOUNTAIN	SILVER

(Spring 2009), pp. 121, 122; "600 Armenian hemp producers migrated to Russian Georgia from Canik in 1860", BOA., İrade-i Şura-yı Devlet, Nr. 104, 16 Muharrem 1285; "Greeks who migrated to Russian Georgia were either tobacco farmer or hazel-nut producers", BOA., İrade-i Dahiliye, Nr. 13998, 27 Şevval 1285.

6	ELMALI MOUNTAIN IN KUŞLU, HISARCIK	COPPER
7	MOUNTAIN	COPPER
8	HASUR MOUNTAIN	SILVER
9	HASUR MOUNTAIN	IRON ORE
10	MURADIYE MOUNTAIN	COAL
11	KURNA MOUNTAIN	SILVER
12	CIKLANCIK MOUNTAIN	COPPER
13	EFRAZ MOUNTAIN, KINAR SPRING	COPPER
14	IN EFRAZ, ALEXI'S SON MOUNTAIN	SILVER
15	KİRAZ HILL MOUNTAIN	SILVER


Iron ore map in Ünye town of Canik sub-province
(BOA., HRT. H. , Nr. 01865.00001)




Copper Mine in Kapukaya, lines between Bafra town of Canik and Ve-zirköprü town of Sivas province (BOA, HRT. h., Nr. 00144-00002)



Tobacco farms and bridges, drawn in 16 December 1863 (5 Recep 1280 H.), BOA, Harita Katalogu



MAP I: The digging area in 1915.



Charter III

Politics, Administration and the Ottoman Greek Communities of the Black Sea

1.

The Interaction of the State with the Communities in Trabzon based on the *Salnames*, the Official Year-Books (1869-1904)

*Kudret Emiroğlu**

Introduction

‘Modernism’ cannot explain in this post-modern era what had happened in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and can be even a more confusing term if we want to understand what happened in the provinces and more particularly in Trabzon. In Ottoman historiography Tanzimat embraces real, or at least symbolic, ‘changes’ realized in the Empire in the name of modernism. The standard of living of the people in the provinces is evaluated before and after the Tanzimat Act, in order to identify especially what had changed. At the end of the day, this was simply the struggle between the central, ‘reformist’ state and those social layers which had the power or the will to turn against the state, for or against the will of the local community.

It is a common knowledge that the political authority and the continuously self-reorganizing state was a reflection of the on-going struggle within the provinces due to geographic, technological and other reasons. To understand what happened one has to see the reflections from the “mirrors” of the sThe aim of this chapter is to look into the provincial life of Trabzon, to “hear” the voices of the provincial leaders on the one hand, and on the other hand the common people, the basis of the society, the household, those who cannot speak for themselves and are not heard. Common people did not read or write in the 19th century. They social classes, the various social organizations and the state. ang but memorized only love songs; but the passion of love does not change political or

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economic lives. Still, the active and, most importantly, the passive behaviour of the people, rendered possible the provincial lords or the local governments and even Grand Viziers to act in the political scene; after all, their actions can be deciphered and interpreted in various ways, as each written word can have a different meaning.

Our sources are the *salnames*, the Official Year-Books which were published between 1869 and 1904. The *salnames* give us the opportunity to examine all walks of life and through its evidence to bring to life the society of Trabzon composed from various ethno-religious communities, and investigate their interaction to each other and the state. Nearly half of the books printed in Trabzon during the period under examination were *salnames*. The other books were text books or religious books and all of them were written or translated by Ottoman officials, by governors, governor secretaries or teachers at schools but who also had some posts at the administration offices of the time that do not tell us much about the society.

The Trabzon vilayet *salnames* consist of 22 volumes, published in 36 years and reveal us official evaluation about the situation in the vilayet. The volumes include the names of the bureaucracy, beginning with the governor of the vilayet to all (at least, nearly all) the other officials, whatever their rank. Other names of employees of important social institutions as representatives of the communities, consuls, shipping agents, professional lawyers and doctors are also present. After the administrators and the professionals, chapters on geography, history, demography, economy, education, health, mining, historical buildings, etc. follow; statistics on the previous subjects along with the imports and exports of the *vilayet* ports, the budget of the *vilayet*, the number of vaccinated population, passports issued, cases trialed, and so on, maps and photographs are also included. Every volume of the *salnames* is not equally rich but there is a steady improvement with time as the number of the pages show; from 112 pages in the first volume it comes up to 457 pages in the last 22nd volume.

The publication of *salnames* by the Ottoman government started in 1847 by the *devlet salnamesi* (yearbook of the state). Up to 1918, in 71 years 68 volumes of the *devlet salnames* were published.¹ The publica-

1. See the bibliography and statistical information in Hasan Duman, *Osmanlı*

tion of *vilayet salnames* became an obligation for the vilayets by the Act of 1864. During the Tanzimat era under the administration of Âli and Fuat paşas, the central government aimed to improve the quality of the bureaucracy in the country, trying to have officials educated in modern schools, provide for their salaries from the central budget and be aware of the new law and order mentality. In 1859, the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, School of Civil Administration, today Faculty of Political Sciences, was set up to produce educated governors for the country.

Under the Act of 1864 and the amendment of 1867 not only did the administrators of the *vilayet* have the obligation to publish *salnames* and newspapers but the *kaza* (district), *sancak* and *vilayet* councils were to be assembled, and their members had to be appointed by a sort of quasi elections, namely from the officials of the high bureaucracy and the local lords or their representatives. By 1880s the new ministries had their provincial branches set up and due to the economic and social developments, the mentality of the bureaucracy and the people began changing. So the local members at the *kaza* and *vilayet* councils began to be more active while getting accustomed to the state regulations. The power struggle between them and the government officials started to be more civilized and in the big prosperous cities their relations altered towards collaboration.

Salnames are the best sources to examine the history of Trabzon from 1869 to 1904, not only because every volume published reveals the accomplishments of the government and other occurrences year to year, but because there is no other similar material either in the Ottoman archives or in the European sources. Moreover, the books published in Trabzon are not more revealing in this sense.² To try to understand the social life in Trabzon from the *salnames*, we will base our analysis on the first volume (1869), volume 13

Salnameleri ve Nevsalleri Bibliyografyası ve Toplu Kataloğu [The Bibliography and the Collective Catalogue of the Ottoman Salnames and Nevvals], (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 2000), pp. I-II.

2. Stefanos Yerasimos said “the present knowledge we have about the Trabzon Turkish community being very poor according to the knowledge of the Greek community...”, Stefanos Yerasimos, “XIX. Yüzyılda Trabzon Rum Cemaati” [The Rum Community in the 19th Century Trabzon], in İ. G. Kayaoğlu, Ö. Ciravoglu, C. Akalın (eds.), *Bir Tutkudur Trabzon* [Trabzon is a Passion], (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997), pp. 281-303.

(1888) and the last, 22nd volume 1904 covering in this way a 36 years time span.³

This paper will then start with an important change that marked the new era of modernization: the establishment of printing houses and the production of books, magazines, newspapers and of course the *salnames*. Using the information from the latter source, we will deal first with the administration, the hierarchies, the social elites. Secondly, the economy of Trabzon will be examined through its artisans, merchants and entrepreneurs, its shopkeepers, its European factors and the agricultural sector. And lastly, the cultural aspect will be analysed through the education and the ideology that developed in the national state.

Books and publishers in Trabzon as a proxy to modernization

Apart from the folk songs and the tales of the common people and the archival documents of the state, an important source of evidence since the 1870s is derived from books, magazines and newspapers. The press and the publishing market that flourished in the last third of the 19th century brought to life a new and independent strand of literature that generated a new generation of readers. This development, however, that mainly happened in Istanbul, took a long time to reach the provinces and even the big cities of the empire, like Trabzon.

Although generally, press and printing have been means to promote the civil rights of people promoted by private initiative, the first printing machines in the vilayets (provinces), to publish books and newspapers in the Ottoman Empire started by the state. As an introduction to a new and more modern way of life, even if this was driven by an idealistic nebula, was started in the country by the state. After the Act of Provinces (*Nizamname-i Vilayat*) in 1864, supplemented in 1867 all vilayet governors (*vali*) were to establish a printing house and to publish *vilayet salname* (year-book) and a

3. The 22 volumes are published again (together with the Ottoman original and Latin script, ed. Kudret Emiroğlu) by Trabzon İli ve İlçeleri Eğitim Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı, Ankara, 1993-2009.

vilayet gazetesi (newspaper). Appropriate valis were appointed by the state with a term of office of two years. Not every vilayet was able to fulfill this task. In Trabzon, however, the valis were very successful: they were able to publish 22 volumes of vilayet *salname* (during the period 1869-1904) and the official vilayet newspaper for 51 years (1865-1916).

This was during the Abdülaziz reign (1861-1876). In 1876 he was de-throned by the Yeni Osmanlılar (New Ottomans) movement and Sultan Murat V (30 May to 31 August 1876) was enthroned to proclaim the constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) and assemble the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan). But Sultan Murat V was proclaimed mentally ill and Abdülhamit II (1876 - 1909) who promised to put into effect the constitutional monarchy was enthroned. Just after a couple of years the authoritarian regime of Sultan Abdulhamit II changed the fate of the Yeni Osmanlılar, who had to flee in order not to be imprisoned or exiled. The press and publishers who had just started to flourish, suffered both from strict censorship and auto-censor, due to the fear of the cruel persecutions that marked the Abdulhamit era. The press and the market continued to grow, just with a difference in subjects.

So what did the governors (*valis*) publish during Abdulhamid's long reign of 33 years? In Trabzon where in 1839 the Tanzimat regulations could not be applied due to the resistance of the local lords up to 1847, the vilayet newspaper started to get published from 1865 and the first *salname* (year-book) was published in April 1869.⁴ After the printer's was set up, in the first seven years only *salnames* were printed. The first book that was printed, other than the *salnames* was the *Divân-ı Hilmi ve Münşeat* by Hüseyin Alem-darzade Emin Hilmi in 1876. Emin Hilmi (1831-1884) was the secretary of the vilayet and very important to the vali because he was also a man with local linkages. He was elected deputy of Trabzon in the Parliament in 1876. He served his office well and he was the first author to publish his book in Trabzon. His poems were collected in his *Divan*, as traditional poets did, and his book *Münşeat* consisted of the collection of his official writings at office, as tradi-

4. Mehmet Bilgin, "Trabzon Basın Tarihi'ne Katkı", *Müteferrika*, 4 / Kış (1994), pp. 19-33.

tionally done, was considered as an example of “good writing” by the new scribe apprentices.⁵ The second book published in Trabzon (1876), other than salname, is the long poem of Şakir Şevket, praising the grandeur of the Ottoman reign, *Şevketnâme-i Osmanî*. Şakir Şevket (1847-1878) was the author of *Trabzon Tarihi* (*History of Trabzon*, published in Istanbul⁶) and the Council of the Vilayet’s second secretary (*Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet*). The third book was by Hafız Zühdü (1854-1914), *Nevbave* (“fresh gift”). Hafız Zühdü was from the *ilmiye* class but he worked not only in schools and administration of justice but was also the director of the vilayet printing house for some time and the author of the vilayet newspaper.

5. Emin Hilmi (1831-1884) stayed in Istanbul after the parliament was closed and became the accountant of the İdare-i Mahsusa Vapurları (Ottoman Navigation Company) and after some time director of the scribes’ office at the Admiralty and the director of its printing house. His poem against Ali Suavi who attacked the Çırağan Palace to enthrone Murat V again and killed (20 May), was published in *Basiret* newspaper (No: 2447, 22 May 1878), showing his consistent with the regime attitude. In Emin Hilmi Efendi’s *Divan* we find collective poems with then famous poets of Trabzon, Mehmet Behçet, Ziver, Alaybeyizade Mustafa Hulusi, Zühdü, Tıfî, Talip, Fehmi, Şakir Şevket, Hamamizade Fevzi and Bayburtlu Zihni. Emin Hilmi Efendi was from the elite (eşraf) of Trabzon, son of a pilgrim (hacı) father who had built a fountain in the city as a charity. His paternal and maternal uncles had died in Istanbul, from the *ilmiye* class, showing the family orientated not only in Trabzon but in Istanbul as well. He had traditional religious education at home (Kudret Emiroğlu, “Trabzon Mebusu Hilmi Efendi ve Divan ve Münşeâtı” [The Collection of Poems and Works of Mebusu Hilmi Efendi from Trabzon], *Kıyı* 150/ Eylül, (1998), pp. 18-24; Ahmet Hilmi İmamoğlu (ed.), *Şâir-i Mâhir Trabzonî Emin Hilmi Efendi, Hayatı, Edebi, Kişiliği, Eserleri ve Divanı* [The Skilled Poet Emin Hilmi Efendi from Trabzon. Life, Education, Personality, Works, Collection of Poems], (Trabzon: Serander Y, 2009). (The sources of the biographies are not cited here; they can be seen in Kudret Emiroğlu, *Trabzon Vilayet Salmeleri Yer ve Kişi Adları Dizini* [Series of Geographical and Personal Names from the Salmes of the Province of Trabzon] (Ankara: Trabzon İli ve İlçeleri Eğitim Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı, 2012), with the references in the salname volumes.)

6. Şakir Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi* [History of Trabzon], (Istanbul: Ümran Matbaası, 1294 [1877]), Latin transcription ed. İsmail Hacıfettahoğlu, (Trabzon: Trabzon Belediyesi, 2001). Books on Trabzon written by Muslims and mostly by Greeks of Trabzon were published outside of Trabzon; in a way showing the economic, social and of course the political atmosphere. See f.n. 12.

All these three books were published in 1876 which is the year the first parliament of the Ottoman Empire assembled. The fourth and fifth were classical education books edited and translated again by Hafız Zühtü. The sixth book was *Âsâr-ı Hame-i Sırrı Paşa* by Giridî Sırrı Paşa (from Girit = Crete), published in 1884 and Sırrı Paşa was the governor of the Trabzon vilayet. His book is in the same genre with Emin Hilmi's *münşaat* but the difference is that Sırrı Paşa was a skilled and experienced governor, a poet and polemical writer. He served in Trabzon for five years but in two separate terms of office (1879-1881; 1882-1884) and the local elites finally won the power struggle against him, as corruption and banditry prevailed in Trabzon.⁷ Sırrı Paşa was a model Tanzimat governor and in the 1880s it seemed that Trabzon was in the new modern era, started in Istanbul twenty years ago. In the 1880s, the new publications and new literature flourished enough to have their own entrepreneurs, admired novelists and reader-customers, though a strict censorship prevailed. Abdulhamit's modernist face together with the rise of the efficiency and income from agriculture and trade, triggered new middle-class consumer tastes. The European influence meant in effect imitation of culture and habits, something universal. The same happened in the middle-classes around the World and for the first time a universal fashion expanded in the Old and New Worlds. Reading books and magazines and playing the piano was part of the universal European fashion.

In Trabzon the first private printing house was set up in 1881 by Mücellit ("bookbinder") İsmail Hakkı Efendi and the second in 1888 by Serasi Dimitraki Efendi followed by Mihailidi Efendi.⁸ The

7. "According to the Paşa, everything in the province was in an absolute mess. Neither the administrative and financial arrangements of the province nor the works in general depended on rules and regulations. ... Major problems that the governor dealt with were the banditry of the Laz, Georgians and other groups, corruption of officials in the province, refugees and resettlement issues, the Georgian-Turkish conflict, and of course, power struggles among the local elite. ... Hamdi Özdiş, "Some Observations on the Structure of Power Relations and Ottoman Administration in the Late Nineteenth-Century Trabzon Vilayet", in the present volume.

8. Ali Birinci, "Trabzon'da Matbuat ve Neşriyat Hayatı (1865-1928)" [Press and Editing Activities in Trabzon], *Trabzon Kültür ve Sanat Yıllığı* [Annual Report of the Cultural and Artistic Life of Trabzon], (İstanbul: 1989), p. 175.

profits of the three printing houses, however, did not derive from the sale of books, newspapers and magazines, published after 1880s in Trabzon, but from the growing bureaucracy and their allegedly large volume of new law regulations. This meant an expenditure on stationary and the printing houses printed what the governmental offices needed, stationary with letterhead, receipts, etc. But still, slow and tacit changes did occur. In 1891 *Gavo Minar ve Şürekası* ("Gavo Minar and Partners") was published, a book translated by another governor of Trabzon, Direktör Âli Bey. This was the first literature book, to be published in Trabzon and translated from a European language; it was a French book. Âli Bey was a keen theatrical writer and also translated many plays from French, most of which had been performed in Istanbul. He was also a comedy writer and his works were published in *Diyojen*, an eminent newspaper of the time, where Namık Kemal, one of the ideological leaders of the Yeni Osmanlılar generation, had also written. Âli Bey was courageous enough to put up one of his translated plays in Trabzon, making the acrobats and other workers of a visiting circus to take up the roles. And he was courageous enough to fall in love with one of the circus girls and elope with her, leaving the governorship and the city behind.⁹

So the city witnessed some novelties and also with the effect of the newly opened modern schools in the city, the first bookstore and publishing house was set up in 1885 by Kitabi Hamdi Efendi.¹⁰ He

9. Mehmet Âli Beyefendi [Direktör] (1836–1899), son of Halab and Damascus chamberlain Yusuf Cemal Efendi. He started working at the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office), and later became Varna mutasarrıf. In 1885 he was the inspector of the Düyun-u Umumiye (see f.n. 45), visited the eastern vilayets and went to India. After Mamüretü'l-Aziz he served as governor of Trabzon between 12 March 1890 and 20 April 1892. Sponsor of theatre in Trabzon, he was removed from office ("Yusuf aleyhisselamın kıssasının tiyatrodah sahneye konduğu, Trabzon Valisi Âli Bey'in yerine Maliye Nezareti müsteşarı Kadri Bey'in tayin edilmesi", BOA. Y.PRK.BŞK.25.108: 20/N/1309 (18 April 1892)) and his book was asked to be prohibited ("Eski Trabzon Valisi Âli Beyefendi'nin yazdığı tiyatro eserinin yayınlanmasının uygun bulunmadığı", BOA.MF.MKT.141.11: 27/L/1309 (25 May 1892)). He again started working in the Düyun-u Umumiye and became a director (so his nickname was 'Direktör').

10. Kitabi Hamdi Efendi (1862–1948), not only opened book-store, dealing with stationary, publishing, then photography, he had the royalty of cigarette roll-

was a *medrese* graduate, his father had a tobacco shop in the bazaar and, thus, Hamdi Efendi was accustomed to trade. He begun selling books and stationary first in his father's shop and than in his own, after he had gone to Istanbul to bring books to sell. The new imported cheap paper, - the cheaper books from such paper were called "yeni eserler" (new works)- was another factor for the new growing demand for books. Besides Kitabi Hamdi, İbrahim Cudi Efendi should be mentioned as a writer of 19 books.¹¹ The Trabzon youth was now able to read the same books as in Istanbul. But not much was changed of the books published in Trabzon; they were either text books or religious books. And the market in Trabzon did not or could not grow enough to satisfy its new customers who were to consume what had been published in Istanbul.

In July 1908 the Constitutional Monarchy was proclaimed for the second time due to the pressure of the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress) in the Balkans. This was the end of the censorship and the beginning of the so-called "freedom". In Trabzon the number of books increased, the newspapers by their number, diversity and contents had an unprecedented success in the provincial city. Nevertheless, when we look at the whole period starting with Abdülaziz (1869, the set up of the first state owned printing house) and going up to 1908 we see that in Trabzon, including all subjects, only 46 books were published, out of which 22 were salnames, official state books, that is 47,82 % of the total production.

When we look at the total numbers of the printed Ottoman books, their number in Trabzon up to the acceptance of the new Latin Alphabet in 1928 were 113. In the whole Ottoman period

ing paper and set up an artificial manure factory in 1906 (*Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi* (newspaper), Nu: 1708, 30 Mart 1322 (12 April 1906)).

11. İbrahim Cudi Efendi (1864-1926), graduated from medrese, worked as a teacher in the Trabzon Idadi and other schools, became one of the writers of the official vilayet newspaper. During the Russian invasion of Trabzon he went to Ünye and then to Ankara being a teacher at the Idadi there and preached sermons to support the Independence War. After his return to Trabzon he was part of the society Trabzon Muhafaza-i Hukuk Cemiyeti founded to support the Independence War. He became the mufti of Trabzon but never stopped teaching. Two of his books are published again in the new Turkish alphabet, one being a dictionary.

from 1869 to 1919 the number was 93. In the ten years period from 1908-1918 (the Russian invasion in Trabzon 1915-1916 included) the number was 47. In the War of Independence and the Republican era together, during 1919-1928 (the war of 1919-1923 included) the number was 20. We see how the “freedom” of 1908 as it was called by the Young Turks, effected the number of books that were published in Trabzon.

The official newspaper, *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi*, included the praises of the sultan and governors, official declarations and announcements. The court verdicts and announcements form valuable testimonies for the legal, economic and social life of the time, but they can not be used just by themselves and they have to be completed by other sources.

There was no Turkish newspaper before 1908, but in 1870 *Efx-einos* (Black sea) was published in Greek. It included some ethnographic articles, poems and short stories and its total circulation was 500 issues. After a short life it was closed in 1881. The second Greek newspaper was named *Astir Tou Pontou* (Star of Pontos), its total circulation was 250 issues; it was published from 1886 and closed in 1891. Then, no other Greek newspaper had been published up to 1908. The Greek community in Trabzon could consume hundreds of books but it was hard to find readers/customers to finance the daily or weekly newspapers; people would buy a book on Trabzon but wouldn't buy a censored newspaper everyday or week. The Greeks of Trabzon wrote the history of Trabzon¹² before the Muslims.¹³ Books published in the Ottoman time by the Greek Trabzonites on Trabzon add up to 20, most of them published out of Trabzon, Istanbul, Athens, Odessa, etc.¹⁴

12. S. Ioannides, *Ιστορία και Στατιστική Τραπεζούντος και τής περί ταύτην χώρας* [History and Statistics of Trabzon and its Environments], (Istanbul: 1870); Şakir Şevket, in his book *Trabzon Tarihi* (see f.n. 6) made use of Ioannides'.

13. Europeans did write before them both: Jakop Philipp Fallmerayer, *Geschichte des Kaiserthums von Trapezunt*, 1827 and George Finlay, *The History of Greece from its Conquest by the Turks and of the Empire of Trebizond*, 1851.

14. We do not have a satisfactory bibliography of the books published in Trabzon in Greek and Turkish in Greek alphabet, Armenian and Turkish in Armenian alphabet. We know of two Karamandlika religious books published in 1900 [(İlyas Minyatis, *Kerniki Ve Kalavrita Episkoposu İlyas Minyatis'in Büyük Perhiz Kiryakilerine*

1. Administration and Hierarchies

In 1869 the borders of the Trabzon *vilayet* included Trabzon *Sancağı* (sub-province), Gümüşhane *Sancağı*, Lazistan *Sancağı*, *Canik Sancağı*. Trabzon *Sancağı* was made up of Trabzon *kazası* (district), Giresun *kazası*, Ordu *kazası*, Rize *kazası*, Tirebolu *kazası* and Of *kazası*. Trabzon *kazası* included the *nahiyes* (sub-districts) Akçaabat, Maa Yomra Vakfısagır, Maçka and Maa Tonya Vakfikebir. Although in 1878 Batum was lost to Russia after the 1876-78 war, the border lines of the Trabzon *kazası* in 1904 did not change much. In the Trabzon *kazası* the *vali* stood in the Trabzon *kaza*; the Trabzon *kaza* and the Trabzon *Sancak* did not have their *kaymakam* (governor of *kaza*) and *mutasarrıf* (governor of *sancak*) as the other *kazas* and *sancaks* of the *vilayet* did, because in the presence of the *vali*, they wouldn't be able to have any authority. Though for some years there was a *mutasarrıf* appointed at the Trabzon *Sancak* the co-existence didn't work, the *vali* of the whole *vilayet* was the *kaymakam* and *mutasarrıf* of his own seat, so the bureaucrats of the three administrative units in the Trabzon *kaza* mostly coincided.

In 1869, in the first *salname* there are 170 people working in the Trabzon *kazası* settled in the Trabzon city itself. The number was higher than normal because the personnel working for the construction of the Trabzon-Erzurum highway and the personnel working for the demographic register of the *kazas* and *nahiyes* were situated in the Trabzon city that year. Moreover, there was the *merkez liva*

Mahsus Bazı Nutuklarının Tercümesi [Translation of Several Speeches of the Bishop of Kerniki and Kalavryta Ilyas Minyatıs Concerning the Great Fast of Sundays], trans. By İkonomos Leondios, (Trabzon: Serasi Printing House, 1900) and *Mevaiz-ı Mesihîye Yani Kıryaki Günlerinde Eklisyada Okunan Şerif Evangelion Fıkralarının İzah ve Mütalaatını Lisanı Türkçe olan Hiereas ve familyalarının istimaline mahsus eserdir* [Explanation in Turkish and Study of the Stories of the Holy Gospel Read in the Church on Sunday for Use by the Priest and the Families], (Trabzon: Serasi Printing House, 1900). The Armenian Hunchak and Dashnak books on socialism were -of course- published after 1908: Sunik, *Down with the Social Democrats*, (Trabzon: 1910); *Fredrich Engels, His Life and Work*, trans. Sunik, (Trabzon: Meşveret Printing House, 1910); *May 1st*, (Trabzon: Meşveret Printing House, 1909); Malkhas, *Current Starvation and Its Causes*, (Trabzon: Meşveret Printing House, 1909). It is compatible with our knowledge that up to 1914 the Dashnaks were in good relation with the Unionists so that their books were printed in their printing house Meşveret.

mutasarrıfı, the *mutasarrıf* of the Trabzon *sancak*; the post was abolished a year after. The military personel working in the Trabzon city is also included in the number, while the military personel of other sancaks and the corps are not.

In 1888, according to the 13th volume of the *salname*, the administration numbered 432 people. The growing number shows how the administrative branches and serving units were established during that time. The consuls, maritime agents, *Düyun-u Umumiye* (the Ottoman Public Debt Administration)¹⁵ and *Reji* (the Régie Company)¹⁶ workers settled in Trabzon and responsible for the Trabzon *kaza* are included. In 1904 the personel indicated by their names is 601. The growth of the personel from 1869 to 1888 is 270 %, from 1888 to 1904 is 71 % and from 1869 to 1904 is 353 %.¹⁷

From 1867 to 1906 there were 22 valis appointed but five of them were appointed twice (as Sırrı Paşa mentioned above); 17 valis served in Trabzon in 35 years. The number would have been 18 if the two years of office term had been applied. But we know that some of the *valis* served longer, like Kadri Bey then Paşa whose term of office was the longest, from 1892 to 1903. Kadri Bey was the son of Hacı Ethem Paşa, the *Evkaf Nazırı* (Ministry of Pious Foundaitons). Six *salnames* were published during his term of service and his brother Ali Paşa was also the *mutasarrıf* of the *Canik*. Kadri Bey died in Trabzon and a monumental grave was built for him by the sultan Abdülhamit himself. Today we know that Kadri Bey had been one of the sultan's informants.¹⁸ During 1869-1904 years some powerful (Kadri Bey), some able (Sırrı Paşa, and Esat Muhlis Paşa - June 1867-October 1871), some cruel (Ali Sururi Efendi, 1886-1888), some poor (Mehmet Reşad Bey, 1903-1906) *valis* served and all of them were sons of Ottoman officials and trained in traditional ways (modern education will be focused on below).

The most important administrative unit of the province was

15. Fn. 45.

16. Fn. 46.

17. Trabzon city population was about 15,000 around 1810's, 20,000 around 1830's, said to be between 50,000 to 70,000 during the Crimean War, 35,000 around 1890's and 50,000 in 1912.

18. For his son Hüseyin Kazım see fn. 122, 124.

the *Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet* (the vilayet council), the president being the *vali*, consisting of the high bureaucrats (*Erkan-ı Vilayet*) of the vilayet and those elected members (*Aza-yı Muntehabe*). In 1869 these bureaucrats are *Defterdar* (treasurer), *Müfettiş-i hükkam* (inspector of adjudicators; then *Naib* (surrogate) as in 1888 and after), *Mektubi* (corresponding secretary), *Vali muavini* (deputy governor) and *Başkatip* (chief secretary). The representatives of the communities have become the permanent members of the *vilayet* council. Thus, we have in 1888 and in 1904 Greek, Armenian and Armenian Catholic representatives along with the *mufti* of the vilayet as members. Each religious community had the membership right whatever its share in the population of the vilayet had been.

Table 1- Members of the Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet (Council)

1869	1888	1904
Permanent members		
<i>Vali</i>	<i>Vali</i>	<i>Vali</i>
<i>Defterdar</i>	<i>Naib Efendi</i>	<i>Naib</i>
<i>Müfettiş-i hükkam</i>	Mufti Seyit Efendi	<i>Vali muavini</i>
<i>Mektubi</i>	<i>Defterdar</i>	<i>Defterdar</i>
<i>Vali muavini</i>	<i>Mektubi</i>	<i>Mektupçu</i>
	Greek Archbishop Gregoryus Efendi	Mufti and Nakib'ül-eşraf Kaymakamı Es-Seyid Mahmud İmadeddin Efendi ²
	Armenian delegate Karakin Efendi	Greek Metropolitan Kostandinos Efendi
	Armenian Catholic delegate Marmaryan Bogos Efendi ³	Armenian Catholic delegate İstevan İpekyan Efendi
		Armenian delegate missing
Elected members		
Hacı Derviş Ağa	Eyüpzade Ali Galip Efendi ⁴	Subaşızade Pertev Paşa ⁵
Hacı Ömer Bey	Nemlizade Hacı Ahmet Efendi ⁶	Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi ⁷
Panayot Dominos Ağa	Filibyoz Efendi	Mısıryan Bogos Efendi ⁸
Ağaser Ağa	Totos Efendi	Kunkalidi Petraki Efendi

Sources: *Salnames* 1869, 1888, 1904.

There were commissions and boards whose chairmans, mem-

bers and secretaries consisted of the permanent and elected members of the Vilayet Council and its secretaries. In 1904 the *vali* was the chairman of the *Nafia* (public works) and *Ferağ* (primary conveyance) commissions. The *mufti* Mahmut İmadeddin Efendi was the chairman of the *Heyet-i İthamiye* (board of allegation). *Mektubi* Efendi was the chairman of the *Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet Müstantikliği* (prosecutor of the vilayet council) and the *Muhacirîn Komisyonu* (commission of the immigrants) and also the minister of the Vilayet Printing House. The *Naib* was the chairman of the *Adliye Encümeni* (committee of justice), *İstinaf Mahkemesi Hukuk Dairesi* (court of appeal civil tribunal). The *Defterdar* was the chairman of *Tahsilat Komisyonu* (collection agency). The (s)elected members of the vilayet council were members of these commissions.

One of the four elected members of the Council Subaşızade Pertev Paşa was the second chairman in the Public Works Commission and member in the Board of Allegation. The other member of the Council Mısıryan Bogos Efendi was also the member of the Public Works Commission, the Board of Allegation, the Collection Agency and the Council of Education. The member of the Council Kunkalidi Petraki Efendi was also the second chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture. Only Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi had no other official post in any of the commissions or boards - possibly because he was living in Istanbul- and he was just a member of the Vilayet Council.

Apart from the above administrative commissions and boards, the *Nizamiye* Courts set up after the Tanzimat had their own elected members. While the chairman was the *Naib* in the Trabzon *Mahkeme-i İstinaf-i Vilayet Hukuk Dairesi* (court of appeal civil tribunal), the members were Nemlizade Osman Efendi, Hacı Derviş Ağazade Eşref Efendi, Fondopolus Todos Efendi and Nuryan Alako Efendi. In the *Ceza Dairesi* (criminal tribunal) the chairman was Reşit Bey, the members Semercizade Mehmet Efendi, Rıza Bey, Handanyan Kaspar Efendi, Petro Petropolu Efendi. The members of the *Bidayet Mahkemesi Hukuk Dairesi* (country court civil tribunal) were Zühtü Efendizade Hafız Mesut Efendi and Gramanikopulo Aristomuno Efendi; the members of the *Ceza Dairesi* (criminal tribunal) were Hacı Pir Efendizade Mehmet Pir Efendi and Elmasyan Haçik Efendi. The elected members of the *Ticaret Mahkemesi* (commercial court) were Fehmi Efendi and Kalpakcidi Yorgi Efendi.

Yorgi Efendi was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the same time. It is evident that Muslims, Orthodox Greeks, Armenians and Catholic Armenians were all members of the administrative institutions.

The president of the *Şeriye Mahkemesi* (Court of Islamic law), *Fetvahane* (fatwa – religious decree office) and the *Evkaf Komisyonu* (pious foundations commission) was the *mufti* as these organizations were committed traditionally to the *ilmiye* class. The members of the Pious Foundations Commission were Hacı Derviş Ağazade Eşraf Efendi who was also a member of the Appeal Court; Semercizade Hacı Mehmet Efendi a member of the Criminal Tribunal; one of the prominent religious scholars Tayyip Efendizade Hafız Zühtü Efendi and Kırzade Hacı İsmail Efendi.

The administration of the modern schools belonged to the Council of Education. Its members were the chief secretary of the *Vilayet* Council Arif Hikmet Efendi; Eyüpzade Ali Galip Efendi, *müderris* of the *Hatuniye Medrese*; Hafız Ahmet Mahir Efendi, member of the municipal assembly and also chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Hacı Hamdi Efendizade Hacı Hami Efendi¹⁹, member of the *Vilayet* Council; Mısıryan Bogos Efendi, member of the municipal assembly and the branch council of the Ziraat Bank and also member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Karagözyan Mıgırdıç Efendi and trial lawyer Orfanidi Nikolaki Efendi. Though Nikolaki Efendi didn't have any official work and rank, he was a member.

The members of the Vilayet Council, courts, council of education also worked at the Public Works Commission and Collection Agency. The member of the Vilayet Council Mısıryan Bogos Efendi and the member of the Municipal Assembly Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi²⁰

19. Fn. 37. He was one of the partners of the Trabzon Electricity Corporation in 1924, the others being all from the families we know of: Mayor Kazazzade Hüseyin Bey, Nemlizade Sabri, Barutçuzade Hacı Ahmet, Hacı Ali Hafizzade Mehmet Salih, Çulhazade Hacı Kadri, Bekir Efendizade Hacı Rüştü Hafız Efendi, Serdarzade Münir Bey; Murat Küçükugurlu, "Visera (Işıklar) Santrali ve Trabzon Elektrik Türk Anonim Şirketi'nin Faaliyetleri" [The Central Visera and the Activities of the Turkish Electric Anonymous Company of Trabzon], *Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi* [Journal for the Black Sea Studies], 10 (2011), p. 103.

20. Fn. 41, 140.

were members of the both. Second chairman of the Public Works Commission is another member of the Vilayet Council Subaşızade Pertev Paşa. Among the six members of the commission we also see one of the members of the Chamber of Commerce Nemlizade Hakkı Efendi and branch official of the Ziraat Bank Şükrü Efendi.

Ziraat Bank is thought to be an agricultural credit organization with very important social impact, so a branch council was set up. The chairman of this council was Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi. The members of the branch council were the branch official Mehmet Şükrü Efendi, the member of the Municipal Assembly Çulhazade Şükrü Efendi and the members of the Chamber of Commerce Hacı Hattatzade Mustafa Efendi and Karagözyan Mıgırdıç Efendi.

The municipalities in the Ottoman Empire were set up by the state so they were not and could not be representatives of the local people and the local authorities. Though this was true up to the Republican era and in fact up to 1960s, still, the municipal assemblies were an important institution where the local lords, entrepreneurs and elites could come together. In Trabzon, the members of the municipal assembly were the ones that manned the various commissions and boards of the Administrative hierarchies. However, half of the members in Trabzon, came either from the Chamber of Commerce or Agriculture. The mayor himself Hanzade Ziya Bey was a member of the Chamber of Agriculture. Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi and Hacı Hamdi Efendizade Hacı Hami Efendi were the chairman and the member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Marmıyan Bogos Efendi was the second consultant of the Chamber and a member of the Chamber of Agriculture. The other members were Alaybeyizade Tahsin Efendi, Nemlizade Kaşif Efendi, Çulhazade Şükrü Efendi, Seyid Yazıcızade Hafız Hakkı Efendi, İkrîdi Yorgi Efendi, Terziyanoğlu Vasilaki Efendi. Among the ten members of the Municipal Assembly, three were members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry including the chairman, two were members of the Chamber of Agriculture. There were seven Muslims, two Armenians and one Greek member constituting the municipal assembly, and only one Armenian was a member of both chambers while the others were Muslims.

The first chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was Hacı Hamdi Efendizade Hacı Hami Efendi, the second

chairman was Çulhazade Hacı Kadri Efendi. The first consultant was Velisaridi Dimistokli Efendi, the second consultant Marmıyan Bogos Efendi, while members were Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi, Nemlizade Hakkı Efendi, Kalpakcidi Yorgi Efendi, Hacı Hattatzade Mustafa Efendi, Midaksa Hristo Efendi, Karagözyan Mıgırdıç Efendi, Gramanikopulo Parişko Efendi, Arabyan Kabzak Efendi. Seven of the members were Christians while six were Muslims.

The first chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture was Eyüpzade Ali Galip Efendi, second chairman Funkalidi Petraki Efendi. The members were Hanzade Ziya Bey, Hacı Hamdi Efendizade Hacı Tevfik Efendi and Hacı Derviş Ağazade Eşref Efendi, also a member of the Court of Appeal Civil Tribunal and Pious Foundations Commission, Kozinzade Fehmi Efendi, Hacı Mollazade Hacı Mahmut Efendi, Karagözyan Mıgırdıç Efendi, Marmıyan Bogos Efendi, Fetvacıyan Yevrant Efendi, Papadopulo İspro Efendi and Brisiti Yorgi Efendi. There were six Muslim and six Christian members.

The members of the official commissions, the municipal assembly and the chambers were either the same people or members of the same families. In 1904 Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi was a member of the *Vilayet* Council; Nemlizade Hakkı Efendi was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and a member of the Vilayet Public Works Commission; Nemlizade Osman Efendi was a member of the Court of Appeal Civil Tribunal; and Nemlizade Kaşif Efendi was a member of the Municipal Assembly. While there were four Nemlizades, there were two Çulhazade at the high ranks of the vilayet; Çulhazade Hacı Kadri Efendi was the second chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry while Çulhazade Şükrü Efendi was a member of the Municipal Assembly and the member of the Ziraat Bank branch council at the same time.

The Notables of the Town

The *eşraf* (notable) families were officially recognized during the Abdülhamit reign. The ancestors of the *eşraf* were called the *ayan*, and those dynasties acquired administrative and financial functions in their hands making use of the tax farming system. These families had their own militia and fought with each other to get the

bigger share of the taxes or extortions and the nomination from the central state. With time grew also their autonomy and they kept their own “order” in the region; their power had to be recognized by the central government as it was in need of the money they sent and the soldiers they recruited. Mahmud II waged war against these local dynasties and tried to centralize the military, financial and administrative institutions and Tanzimat was the proclamation of the struggle for law and order, centralization of the state meant modernization at the same time.

Trabzon was one of the provinces where these local lords had fierce fights. The central government had to support one of the families to guarantee its share and the family needed the government to be legitimized. Thus the Canik family, with a history since 1720s, spread its power to the whole of the Blacksea coast up to Amasya in the West and to Erzurum and Batum in the East, fighting with the Çapanoğlu family in the South. Though they rose in rebellion and were found guilty many a time, each time they were fleeing to Crimea, and each time were granted pardon; for fifty years (1758-1808) the family hold the governorship of the province in its hands. After the *Canik* family's turn, the order was accomplished by supporting another family in the region because the central government had had no other agents. This time the most appropriate nominee was the treasurer (*haznedar*) of the *Canik*, Hacı Ali Paşa. Behram Bey was the ancestor of the Haznedaroğulları family which for thirty years (1811-1845) hold the governorship of the province.²¹

In Trabzon the end of the *ayan* era is marked by the first *vali* of the Haznedar family, Osman Paşa. Osman Paşa supported and was supported by the sultan Mahmud II. In order to help the sultan's war against the local lords, he became famous by burning down their *konaks* (palaces). In 1820s, the *vali* Osman Paşa lived and worked in his own *konak*, while it was long ago that in İstanbul the high bureaucrats had separated office from home. The Haznedar family, in the traditional way, built mosques, *medreses*, fountains, bridges in Samsun, Çarşamba, Ordu and Trabzon. But in 1840s,

21. And during the Second Constitutional Period in 1908, Haznedarzade Mahmut was elected Trabzon deputy, a development that showed that little changed in the relations between the state and the ordinary people.

they did something new, they set up libraries. The Fetvahane Library of Osman Paşa was put into service for the public after his death in 1845; the Hatuniye Library of his brother Abdullah Paşa in 1844; the Ortahisar Library of the other brother Muhtar Bey in 1845; and the Nazifiye *Medrese* and Library of the governor Rüstem Paşa in 1848. In Trabzon where Tanzimat could be put into action in ten years' time, these were to be the symbols of the new age.

The local *ayans* and *valis* followed the model of the İstanbul *saray* (sultan's palace) in the structure of their administration. In 1840s in the *divan* of the Haznedarzade Osman Paşa worked Mehmet Teymur Fenni, his son Ali Kemali Paşa (Söylemezoğlu), the other son İbrahim Ethem Pertev Paşa, Bayburtlu Zihni, Hüseyin Revnak Efendi, Tıfli, Mehmet Ziver; all known personalities in Ottoman history, either national or local. The daughter of Haznedar Abdullah Paşa, Fıtnat Hanım (1842-1909) was a famous woman poet of her time and the grand son of Osman Paşa, Mazhar Bey, was a close friend of Namık Kemal, one of the leaders of the *Yeni Osmanlılar*. In the 1890s the literate youth in the city was not limited in the entourage of the *vali* any more, and this was the first generation who had the taste to own personal libraries at home.

From the beginning of the 1830s, the trade of the city was flourishing as it became the transit port of the European-Iran and European-East Anatolian trade. While the branches of ministries and administrative offices in the country began to serve the people and the bureaucracy grew larger as reflected in the *salnames*, the mentality started to change; the Empire was not the sultan's *mülk* (property) but their *vatan* (motherland). In Trabzon the *eşraf*, or their heirs, would embrace the new way and made profits from the growing trade, but did not disentangle from the agricultural relations which they, the local people and the state was accustomed to.

The totalitarian regime of Abdülhamit tried to strengthen the *mülk* concept, now called the riches of the province *eşraf* (notables) by giving them posts in the local administration. This meant the collaboration of the central government and local lords, because even if they earned profits from the trade, still these families guaranteed revenues from agriculture and continued to be called the lords, *ağas*. By owning large confiscated villages and gathering taxes in the name of the state, they exploited the villagers. So they acted

towards the villagers and country people in a traditional way, and in a modernist way towards the central government, the agents of the international trade and the institutions in the province. The *eşraf* of the 1900s were either the grandsons of the old *ayan* or *derebey* families or traders that had gotten rich and were acknowledged among the notables. The children of the notables got much more involved into the bureaucracy as the new trade era made it necessary get used to the new procedures as well as to have a foothold in the more efficient administration.

In the 1880s, the new built *konaks* were praised by the government as the symbols of development, and modernization of the city. It is not known when the rich merchant family Nemlizade began to build their *konak*, but the harem part was built the same year with the Tavanlı Mosque (1874), and the *selamlık* (the part reserved for men – out of family and official relations) was built in 1892, just after the year they had the Değirmendere Bridge built (1891).²² Their traditional way of keeping the balance between commercial gains and charity was important to understand their mentality, both feudal and bourgeois, but at the same time trusted lords for the sultanate.

The Ottoman Empire never tolerated aristocracy in the European sense but had to compromise with the local lords, feudalists or bandits, thus ottomanising them. Recognizing the local lords as the *eşraf* during the Abdülhamit reign is just the modern way of the same classical altitude. For the first time we can see the list of the *eşraf* in the 15th volume of the *salname* of 1893, which includes 43 names officially recognized as notable.²³ In the longer list which includes 133 people published in the 21st volume of *salname* of 1903, 43 are not government officials; there were also 25 people written separately, which belong to the *ilmiye* class. The 1903 list is

22. Haşim Karpuz, *Trabzon*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), pp. 31, 46; Haşim Karpuz, “Trabzon’daki Nemlizade Konağı’nda Yer Alan Kütahya Çinileri” [Kütahya Tiles in the Mansion of Nemlizade in Trabzon], *Trabzon*, 6 (Aralık 1992), pp. 62-67.

23. In the *eşraf* list published in the 15th *Salname* the dates they received their ranks and decorations are registered; *Trabzon Vilayeti Salnamesi*, 1311/1893, 15/202-4 (the pages referred will be shown after the number of the volume with a slash (/)).

arranged according to the state protocol, rank and decoration order but the important thing is that each registered individual belongs to a notable family.

Table 2. Prominent members of the three main notable families in the Trabzon vilayet, 1901

Nemlizedes	Nemlizade Hacı Osman Efendi Hazretleri ⁹ Dersaadet'te mukim (settled in İstanbul) Nemlizade Tahsin Paşa Hazretleri Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi ¹⁰ Nemlizade Cemal Efendi ¹¹ Nemlizade Hamdi Efendi Nemlizade Mehmet Salih Efendi Nemlizade Sabri Efendi ¹² Nemlizade Hakkı Efendi
Şatırzade	Kaymakam of Hopa kaza Şatırzade Mehmet Bey Şatırzade Refet Bey Şatırzade Mikdad Bey
Eyüpzades	Kaymakam of Tirebolu kaza Eyüpzade İzzet Efendi ¹³ Member of the Court of Appeal Eyüpzade Ali Galip Efendi ¹⁴ Eyüpzade Merani (?) Efendi Eyüpzade Osman Efendi

Source: Trabzon vilayet *Salname*, vol. , 1901.

There were eight Nemlizedes included in the eşraf list. Only four of them had official ranks as mentioned above, the other four had no offices. There were three Şatırzade in the list only one with an official rank. The same was true for the Eyüpzades. Out of the whole list, 35 people were relatives. This meant that 35 out of 133, namely 26%, one out of four were relatives to each other. And it is not possible to determine the relation by marriage.²⁴ It

24. For example we know that Saadet Hanım, the daughter of Subaşızade Pertev Paşa, married Hacı Hamdi Efendizade Hacı Hami Efendi, member of the municipal assembly, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, member of the Education Council. He was active in the Independence War and worked at the municipality up to 1924. Hami Efendi is included in the eşraf list together with his

is known that the girls and boys of the *eşraf* families married each other, sometimes first cousins. The Kalcızade, Şatırzade, Eyüpzade, Abanozzade, Hanzade, Gümrükçüzade, Sakazade families were included in the list of the 1901 salname with many names. Also we see that members of these families had been mutasarrıfs and kaymakams in various towns, part of the ruling class:

Table 3. The main *eşraf* families in the administraiton ranks, 1901

Yenipazar Sancağı mutasarrıf	İsmail Fevzi Paşa
Süleymaniye Sancağı mutasarrıf	İlyas Sami Efendi
Ordu kazası kaymakam Gümrükçüzade	Mehmet Ziya Paşa
Ünye kazası kaymakam	İbrahim Halil Paşa
Tirebolu kazası kaymakam	Eyüpzade İzzet Efendi
Hopa kazası kaymakam	Şatırzade Mehmet Bey
Sürmene kazası kaymakam	Abanozzade Hüseyin Avni Efendi
Cide kazası kaymakam	Kalcızade Ragıp Bey

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, vol. , 1901.

The high bureaucracy in the country not only in Trabzon but in other towns consisted of the members of notable families. The new generation of these families had either traditional education or largely begun to have the modern education in the new schools. For higher education they had to go beyond Trabzon, to İstanbul in 1880s and mostly to Paris in 1900s. While they had their residential properties in the city and large estates in the country, they participated in the commissions and boards in the vilayet and became a part of the ruler class in all over the Ottoman geography.

The Subaşızade family is one of the examples who had been a bridge between the old and new styles. Subaşızade Pertev Paşa was one of the four elected members of the Vilayet Council and was the second chairman in the Public Works Commission and a member of the Board of Allegation in 1904. His grandfather Mehmet Teymur Fenni (d. 1844) had been the treasurer of the Kığı bey (lord) and when he had some problems with the Erzurum vali he fled to Sivas

three relatives, Vehbi Efendi, Tayyip Efendi, Hacı Tevfik Efendi, the last two had several posts also.

and then affiliated to Haznedarzade Osman Paşa, vali of Trabzon in 1828. He worked in Lazistan, Şebinkarahisar, Gümüşhane as *mütesellim* (gubernatorial title abolished in 1842). His son Ali Kemali Paşa (1819-1898) was the secretary of Osman Paşa beginning from 1833 up to 1846 and was affiliated with Halil Rifat Paşa²⁵ (1827-1901), vali of many important vilayets, Minister of Internal Affairs and *sadrızam* (grand vizier) in 1895-1901. So his secretary Ali Kemali became a paşa and vali in some vilayets and he died when he was the governor in Konya. The other son of Mehmet Teymur, İbrahim Pertev Paşa (1824-1872) worked in Gümüşhane and Samsun and became a vali and paşa and after serving in Berlin consulate died when he was the governor in Kastamonu. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu (1873-1960) was a diplomat in the last Ottoman and early Republic era. Subaşızade Pertev Paşa (1824-1907) member of the Trabzon Vilayet Council was the son of İbrahim Pertev Paşa. In the *eşraf* list, there are another two members of the Subaşızade family, one is Mustafa Efendi and the other is Hafız Kazım Efendi who was the director of the Central Telegraph and Post Office.

Social Status

The *eşraf* list consisted mostly of Muslims. The Ruling class (*miri* or *askeri* in the classical age) consisted only of officials and this class that could only get involved in politics consisted only of Muslims (there were always exceptions but these were only tacitly tolerated). While the new bureaucratic class *kalemiyye* got into the circle, the local lords/ağas under the title *eşraf*, in the last quarter of the 19th century, had to be acknowledged in the ruler class also. The Christian subjects had been proclaimed equal to the Muslims (by *Güllhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* [Noble Edict of Rosegarden], known as Tanzimat Fermanı of 1839 and Islahat Fermanı [Reform Edict] of 1856,) were given posts in the high bureaucracy (for example ministers

25. He was one of the graduates of the Mekteb-i Mülkiye (School of Civil Administration) and famous for his word “any place you can’t go is not yours”, so he started a road building programme which was quite avant-garde and efficient in his time.

in the cabinet) in the central government and began to work as officials in the country. Though it took time to accept and implement this, some Christians in some vilayets had access to official works and *eşraf* lists.

In the Trabzon *kaza* the non-Muslim names in the 1904 *salname* number 120, approximately 20% of the total. They were 54 in the 1888 *salname*, 12,5 % of the total names. However as the names of the lower hierarcal levels were not included in the salnames, the real percentage was probably smaller. For example, while *Düyun-u Umumiye* and *Reji* post were exclusively Christian, the minor posts which necessiated Turkish literacy, scribes and clerks, were almost exclusively Muslim.

In 1895, in the 15th *salname* volume, there were seven Christians in the *eşraf* list: the vilayet intrepeter Andon Efendi²⁶ also member of the municipal assembly; the secretary of the Russian consulate Muratyan Karabet Efendi, Fetvacıyan Hâcı Simyon Efendi who was member of the Collection Agency in 1888; the first intrepeter of the French consulate Mısıryan Ohannes Efendi, member of the education council, and the second intrepeter of the French consulate Mısıryan Mıgırdıc Efendi, Vasilaki Efendi and Magavrrıyan Bedros Efendi. So three out of seven were working at the consulates. In 1903 the same Andon Efendi, Muradyan Karabet Efendi, member of the vilayet council Mısıryan Bogos Efendi, member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and member of the Commercial Court Kalpakcidi Yorgi Efendi and Hâcı Panayoti Mito Efendi formed the Christian *eşraf*, 5 people.

An empire had to have the grandeur, and the palace or its representative, the bureaucracy, (or *vice versa*, in the last quarter of the century) had to impose the official titles, medals, decorations; the hierarchy was very important. Accompanying the *eşraf* list we have the list of the donors to the Hedjaz water canals; in this list it is understood that the amount of the donation had to be according to the rank. The vali Reşat Bey had given 1,625 kuruş; then came his wife with 545 kuruş; Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi, Nemlizade Hacı Osman Efendi, Nemlizade Cemal Efendi and Çulhazade Hacı Kadri Efendi

26. Andon Efendi, appointed intrepeter in 1884, died with his seven relatives when his house was bombed by the Russians in the First World War.

all had given 545 kuruş. Naib Mehmet Bahattin Bey had given 238 kuruş, Şeyh Yusuf Efendizade Abdullah Efendi 216 kuruş with six other people. Then comes fifteen people who had donated 108 kuruş each. The scribes had donated between 20 to 60 kuruş.²⁷ This hierarchy indicates clearly who were the rulers in the vilayet.

The denomination of a person by the state or by the people in civil life reflected the status of the person in the traditional status quo society. *Efendi*, *bey* and *ağa* were used somewhat differently than the older years and than today. The word *efendi* is today nearly out of use though it means gentleman as an adjective. As a noun *efendi* is used for someone un-educated and of lower class. But during the *salname* years it was used as “Mister”. *Bey* meant the leader of the tribe in the old days and a ruler of an administrative unit in classical times and it was still an honorable address. Today it is used as “Mister”. *Ağa* (an officier with his own team in the old days) meant the landlord who became the illegal owner of the land which had belonged to the state, making himself the intermediary between the state and the common folk for the tax-collection and army recruitment. In the *salnames* the word began to lose its status (though it is still today used to describe a landlord), it meant someone working with his hands or an artisan. *Beyefendi* was used only for high rank bureaucrats, *mutasarrıfs* and *valis* namely. In every *salname* from the first volume till to the last, there was a special chapter dedicated to the official titles used for the *askeriye* (military) and *ilmiye* and the class *kalemiyye* (scribers) which was formed after the Tanzimat and

27. The list of the donors in Trabzon vilayet was published in *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi* (official newspaper) in 1906 and is transcribed by Hikmet Öksüz, “Hicaz Su Yollarının (Mekke-i Mükerrreme; Ayn Zebide) Tamiri İçin Trabzon ve Havalisinden Toplanan Yardımlar” [Assistance from Trabzon and its Area for the Repair of the Water Canals of Hicaz], *Trabzon Tarihi Sempozyumu Bildiriler 6-8 Kasım 1998*, (Trabzon: Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 1999), pp. 443-460. It is curious that Terziyan Vasilaki Efendi and Haçık Efendi had donated 216 kuruş each for the Hedjaz water canals. Again this time for the Hedjaz Railway donations, only the vali and the staff of the Education Council and the Idadi had been the donors and among them is present the French teacher Panayot Efendi, published in the 1904 Salname. While the non-Muslims could not enter the sacred places of Mecca and Medina (Hedjaz water canals – Mekke-i Mükerrreme Ayn Zebide) and the Abdülhamit regime made the propaganda of the Muslim-built railways, it seems that the regime had not wished to make discrimination.

their ranks and titles were arranged accordingly to the military ones.

In the 1869 *salname* there are 15 beys and 17 ağas while in 1888 there are 28 beys and 10 ağas and in 1904 the number of beys did not change, and there were 16 ağas. It is understood that there were more ağas in the bureaucracy and it was used in the traditional way. Traditionally you could become an ağa but not a bey if your father was not. But education would promote someone to the bey status after the Tanzimat; but we can't be sure how much this was applicable when the *salnames* were being published. For example in 1869 in the *Evrak Odası* (Records Office), *evrak müdürü muavini* (assistant of the director) is *efendi* and his third rank colleague (*refik-i salis*) is called bey. In the printing house of the vilayet while the lithographia official is an *efendi*, his colleague (*refiki*) is an ağa and the *destgah ustası* (master of the bar) is an *efendi*. In the *Tahrir Dairesi* (Register Office) *başkatip* (chief scribe) is an *efendi* and *vukuat katibi* (keeper of daily accounts) is a bey. So being called an *efendi* or bey did not depend on the post in the bureaucracy but the family origin (or education) of the person.

More important, the elected members of the vilayet council are Hacı Derviş Ağa, Hacı Ömer Bey, Panayot Dominos Ağa and Ağaser Ağa in 1869; all of the elite people were ağas. In 1888 all four are *efendis* and in 1904 one is *paşa* the other three are *efendis*. These titles make it clear that the more traditional and village based mentality in 1869 had changed into a more educated and clerk type society in 1904. Instead of the landlord type ağas, in 1904 there were artisans and hand-working ağas and the grandsons of the ağas that belonged to big families became *efendis*.

The title *bey* was not used for the Christians though ağa and *efendi* was used. The reason for that is that the aristocratic-feudal title of *bey* was to be only for the Muslims as they could become rulers; bey was a title used for the head of the emirates (*beylik* in Turkish) and Christians could not have such a title. But after 1890's, a few Christian beys can be found in the *salnames*. For the Europeans (engineers or workers of the consulates or agents of navigation companies) *mösyö* (Monsieur) is preferred. For the Christian Ottoman citizens working in those posts *efendi* is the normal appellation.

Being a *hacı* (pilgrim) is something social and officially the pilgrims were named and registered. In 1869 there were 6 hacıs, in

1888, 22 and in 1904, 36. The rate of increase in the *hacı* number during 1869-1888 is 366% and in 1888-1904 is 257%. The increase in the rates of *hacıs* is more than the rate of increase in the number of names included into the *salnames* for the first period (71% for 1869-1888) and nearly the same for the second (270% for 1888-1905). We could say that going to Mecca became easier after 1870s and more possible and honorable for the rich people in Trabzon.

There were *hacıs* among the clerks and this means these people didn't make their living from their salaries, they had some other income. And this means that working for the government was not a thing to be ashamed of (to work for money was a shame for the simple villager up to the end of the 1950s and of course they couldn't get into the official ranks) and they worked to be sociable. Also the number of *hafız* (reciter of the Koran) among the cadres and employees shows us the people who had a rank in traditional education. There are 4 *hafizes* in 1869, 7 in 1888 and 26 in 1904 (in fact 27, as one of the *hafize*, was a woman reciter, Hafize Asiye Hanim, teacher at the secondary girls school). Again, the rate of increase in the number of *hafizes* in the first period was 175% and 371% in the second period of the total names included in the *salnames*. This would mean that religious affiliation and education became much more important in Trabzon during these years.

Being *hacı* or *hafız* is not something related to your private life, it is a part of your personality and status in society. When we add *hacı* and *hafız* together we find out that their ratio in the total number of people included in the *salname* is 5,88 % in 1869, 6,25 % in 1888 and 10 % in 1904. In 1869 all the four members of the Vilayet Council were *ağas* and the two Muslims were *hacıs*. In 1888 there is no *hacı* and in 1904 again there is no *hacı*. In the 1893 list of the *eşraf* there are 3 *hafizes* and 2 *hacıs* and in the 1903 list 14 *hacıs* and 7 *hafizes*. In the 1903 list the *ilmiye* class is written in a separate table and there are 4 *hacıs* and 6 *hafizes* among the *ilmiye*. It could be said that while the society became more religious, among the ruling elite traditional education was declining.

Still, we learn that in 1906, when the publishment of the *salnames* stopped, the member of the municipal assembly, chairman of the Ziraat Bank branch council, member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and member of Collection Agency and Pub-

lic Works Commissison, Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi²⁸ had gone to Mecca to be a *hacı*. The news was published in the official vilayet newspaper.²⁹ The Christian pilgrims are written as *hâci* to make a difference. There is only one *hâci* in 1869 in Trabzon city itself, Hâci İlya Ağa member of the Sancak Council. In 1888 there is only one, Fetvacıyan Hâci Simyon Ağa, member of the Collection Agency, and in 1904 there are no *hâcis* in the city. In the whole vilayet there are 19 *hâcis* in 1888 and 26 in 1904.

The Abdülhamit II reign is also a time of decorations and medals. Though first Mahmut II started the practice, Abdülhamit II made much use of it that a special chapter was devoted to the Ottoman decorations and medals starting from volume 14 of the 1892 *salname*. Especially the decorations as they were given to announce the personal merit, were the instrument to tighten the relations between the central government and the “common” people. The *Mecidî* and *Osmanî* decorations started in 1852 and 1862 respectively, but in the 1869 *salname* there is no person with such decorations. In 1888 there were 13 people with *Osmanî* and 34 people with *Mecidî* decorations. The numbers increased in 1904 and the number of people that had *Osmanî* decoration were 33, while those that had *Mecidî* were 63. In 1888 only three people had both the decorations. These were the *alay beyi* (commander of the regiment) Nazım Beyefendi, the notable Subaşızade Pertev Paşa and the consul of Belgium Mösyö Altiyos Sasi.³⁰ In 1904 there were 29 people who had both decorations. Seven of those were consul agents and two of them were agents of the navigation companies. Among the others we see Nemlizade Osman Efendi, Nemlizade Şükrü Efendi, Muf-ti and Nakib’ül-eşraf kaymakamı Es-Seyid Mahmud İmadeddin

28. Barutçuzade Hacı Ahmet Efendi (1871-1939), son of the mayor Arif Efendi, had many posts in the administration and became the mayor in 1912-1916 and 1918-1919. Businessman and politician at the Committee of Union and Progress, he entered to the Special Organization of the party. One of the leaders of the Muhafaza-i Hukuk Cemiyeti worked for the Independence War, published the newspaper *İstikbal* with his son Faik Ahmet during that time. His son was one of the important names and deputy of Trabzon at the CHP one party rule.

29. *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi* (newspaper), Nu: 1705, 9 Mart 1322 (22 March 1906).

30. See below p. 33, 35 and f.n. 58.

Efendi, Metropolitan bishop of the Greek community Konstandinos Efendi, members of the vilayet council, the mayor, the quarantine doctor, the minister of Düyun-u Umumiye Kirkor Efendi, police chief Safvet Efendi, etc. Christians had a high rate of decorations (15 Osmanî out of 33 and 22 Mecidî out of 63) but most of them were given to consuls or consulate employees, Düyun-u Umumiye and Reji ministers, doctors and engineers, Europeans or people related to European institutions.

The directors, chairmen and high bureaucrats were mostly outsiders and would be appointed to some other vilayet in two years. The Ottoman officials worked in a vast area from the Balkans to Hedjaz. For the natives of Trabzon the area was limited to the Trabzon vilayet, but they would be also appointed to the other sancaks like Canik, Lazistan, Gümüşhane. For lower ranks the area was even smaller; they would be appointed from one district of the Trabzon Sanjak to another, like Ordu, Rize, Of, etc. And the lowest rank workers were not appointed to any other place.

In this men's world only five women were included in the salnames. These were in 1904 four teachers (the headmistress Fatma Zühre Hanım, associate Hafize Asiye Hanım, Turkish teacher Nezihe Hanım and needlework teacher Agnes Hanım) of the İnas Rüşdiyesi (secondary girls school) and the municipal midwife (Havva Hanım).

2. Economy

As the main income of the city came from international transit trade, a vibrant economy of small-scale manufacture, services and agriculture developed in the city. The professional population of the city consisted of artisans, manufacturers, shop-keepers, small-scale merchants, large state companies employees, large, Europe-oriented merchants, the local landlords and the peasants.

Artisans and Tradesmen

There was a large number of shops in the city of Trabzon as it appears in the 2nd Salname volume in 1870 and in the 12th volume

in 1881. We see that the general word *dekakin* (pl. of *dükkan*) “shop” and *mağaza* “multiple store” were written separately in 1870 and together in 1881; it is not easy to say the difference. The total number of these stores is 1673 in the year 1870 and 1675 in 1881. Those present in 1870 did not appear in 1881 and *vice versa*. Perhaps dyers, tanneries, fabric printing, slaughterhouses are counted as *fabrika* (factory) and number 55 in 1881, although it is not easy to recognise. Still, the use of the word *fabrika* (factory) is interesting and we know that macaroni and brick factories were to be seen as amazing development for the city in a few years. The numbers of *hans* and *fırms* (bakery) have not changed but there are 68 *oda* (rental room) in 1881 not mentioned in 1870. *Oda* must be a room rented to single men, who came to the city for a relatively long time to stay. But it is interesting that in the city no “hotels” are mentioned. In Maçka, a small *nahiye* of Trabzon with only 25 *hanes*, 5 hotels are registered and this is emphasised in the 1904 salname; so it is interesting that the hotels that we know that existed in Trabzon, as contemporary postcards and memoirs reveal, are not mentioned in the Official Yearbooks, although the traditional *hans* are all mentioned.

Table 4. Shops in Trabzon city, in 1870 and 1881

Years	Dekakin	Mağaza	Han	Bazaar	Mill	Dyer	Tannery	Fabric printing	Slaughter house	Room (Oda)	Factory	Stable	Strawhouse	Boathouse	Storeroom
1870	1232	441	33	1	21	3	17	9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1881	1675	33	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	68	51	21	5	1	3

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1870, 1881.

We can categorize a number of shops in the services sector, like *fırın* (bakery), *hamam* (bath), *kahvehane* (coffeehouse), *meyhane* (tavern) and *gazino* (“casino”, a new word in Ottoman, hard to understand its real function at the time, making it harder as they

were merged with *meyhane* in 1881) that belong to the service sector along with hans and odas. So numbers of shops included in the services sector indicate that not only visitors but also the inhabitants of the town developed leisure habits, a fact that also shows the scale of monetization.

Table 5. Services in Trabzon city

Years	Bakery	Bath	Coffeehouse	Tavern	Casino
1870	86	12	131	51	-
1881	86	12	131	55	

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1870, 1881.

In 1916, there were 36 *mahalles* (neighbourhoods/districts) in the city so this makes 3,63 kahvehane for each. We can suppose at least one in each mahalle, but the remaining 95 may be a bit too much for the centre of the city which was made up of two streets and a *meydan* (square). To what scale the production in the city had its periphery as a target-customer we can not know; a part of it must have been sold to the villages any way.

We know the best admired artisans in the Trabzon vilayet: In 1903 an exhibition called “industry exposition” was held in Trabzon by the order of the government. Eyüpzade Ali Galip Efendi was given the task as the head of a commission to set up the exhibition and it was inaugurated in 1903, on the birthday of the sultan Abdülhamit, 7 November. At the end of the exhibition the “successful” participants were rewarded by decorations and money. The photographs of the most admired products were taken and processed in Vienna to be printed in the 1904 *salname*. Thus, we have the names of these people, men and women, and it is interesting to see the material rewarded in the industry exhibition in Trabzon:

Table 6. Industrial exhibition in Trabzon, 1903

1. Calligraphic panel	In Samsun Veliyüddin Efendi
2. Carpet pillowcase	In Trabzon Ballaryan Efendi daughter Aşhin
3. Carved decoration of the Sultanate	Hakkı Usta
4. Horse driving bridle	In Trabzon harness makers Zühtü Efendi and Abdullah Efendi
5. Hungarian saddle	In Trabzon harness makers Zühtü Efendi and Abdullah Efendi
6. Lacework cipher of the Sultan	In Trabzon Armenian Catholic nun Ancela
7. Lacework silk pillowcase	In Trabzon nun Ancela
8. Model ship	Mapavri ¹⁵ product
9. Prayer rug	In Trabzon İrfan Hanım
10. Prayer rug	In Trabzon Hatice Hanım
11. Prayer rug	Gotoğlu daughter Nergis
12. Rug	In Ordu Abisomiyadi daughter Afridi
13. Rug	In Gireson Güllioğlu wife Eleniko
14. Rug	In Ünye Avikoğlu daughter Arbir
15. Rug	In Gireson Güllioğlu wife Eleniko
16. Silk embroidered satin prayer rug	In Gireson Sea-Captani Liyonis wife Afrodidı Hanım
17. Silk embroidered velvet prayer rug	Şateste Hanım
18. Silk woven Arm of the Ottoman Dynasty	In Trabzon grocer Yusuf Efendi wife Müzeyyen Hanım
19. Silk woven horse	In Trabzon Santurciyan Nigar
20. Silk woven turret ship of his majesty the Mesudiye frigate	In Trabzon priest Koconi Efendi
21. Stone mosque model	Stonecutter Haralambo
22. Suitcase	Harness makers Zühtü and Abdullah Efendi
23. Velvet arras	Santurciyan Nigar
24. Silk embroidered bird	In Gireson Sea-Captain Liyonis wife Afrodidı Hanım
25. Carpet pillowcase	In Trabzon Ballaryan Efendi daughter Aşhin
26. 'Karakulak' knife	In Şarlı Beşiroğlu Yusuf

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1903.

And the names of those rewarded by a sanayi medal were:

Tanner in Trabzon, Serdarzade Abdülsübhan Efendi
From Catholic “millet”, priest Koconi Efendi
From Yenicuma neighbourhood, Gotoğlu Ardaşir daughter Nergis Hanım
Tanner Hacı Dervişağazade Ruhi Efendi
Samsun teacher of girls’ school, Hatice Rana Hanım
Same school student Ali Osman Efendi daughter Ayşe Hanım
In Gireson Sea-Captain Liyonis wife Afrodidi Hanım

Most of the material exhibited was not produced to be sold in the market, but they were produced by housewives to be used at home. There are 5 prayer rugs and pillowcases, 4 rugs, 2 velvet prayer rugs, 7 silk embroideries, making 19 out of the total 26. So 17 of the works photographed were produced by women. Of course, they could be sold if brought to the market. We can see the works of carpenters, engravers, harness makers, tanners and a cutler’s work among the most admired. We have only one *usta* (master), two *saraçs* (harness makers) among the creators of the exhibited works list and two *debbağs* (tanners) in the medal awarded list. It is understood that being a Muslim or a Christian did not matter in the exhibition, but it is interesting that the Armenian Catholic nun Ancela had her lacework *tuğra-yı hümmâyûn* (cipher of the sultan) exhibited ,and more interesting, priest Koconi Efendi had his picture of the “*zırhlı Mesudiye fırkateyn-i hümmâyûnu*” (turret ship of his majesty the Mesudiye frigate) woven of silk also exhibited.

In sum, it is understood that Trabzon people had a sophisticated way of decorating their houses and had its traditional artisans that worked for the city and its hinterland. The modern state made the housewives and daughters written by name (though after the names of fathers and husbands) on a printed paper, in a society that you could not mention them in public. This is important ideologically. As the ‘industry’ revealed, it does not seem that wholesale trade was present in the market; the real income came from the international transit trade.

The European Factor

The Europeans in the Trabzon city were government employed engineers, employees of both the European based Ottoman institutions and the agents of European firms and consulates.

By European based institutions we mean *Düyun-u Umumiye*³¹, *Reji*³² and the Ottoman Bank.³³ The employees of these institutions were either Europeans or native Christians; only some clerks and laborers were native Muslims. But the sons of the Muslim *eşraf* families got jobs at those institutions (preferably at *Düyun-u Umumiye*); as everyone accepted the working milieu and terms were good, and the salaries were high. It was also a way to be promoted and become part of the upper crust. The top officials of these institutions had an important role in the social and economic life of the city, intervened directly in the government affairs addressing the *vali*-governor (and they were decorated with medals and other official etiquettes). The top officials and the employees of the *Düyun-u Umumiye*, *Reji*, navigation agencies and the consulates were usually relatives.

31. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*), a European-controlled organization that was established in 1881 to collect the payments the Ottoman Empire owed to European companies. *Düyun-u Umumiye* became an independent bureaucracy within the Empire, run by the creditors and its governing council was packed with European government officials. It employed 5,000 officials and had 9,000 employees, more than the Empire's finance ministry.

32. The Régie Company, formed by the *Düyun-u Umumiye*, had a monopoly over tobacco production. Also having the salt monopoly and some privileges in fishery, revenue from the Regie Company was supposed to help pay the Empire's debts. It was the largest foreign investment in the Empire and its monopoly prices caused smuggling which became a big problem, especially for Black Sea where tobacco was largely produced.

33. *Imperial Ottoman Bank*, founded in 1856 in İstanbul, as a joint venture between British interests, the French capital and the Ottoman government. It operated from 1863 to 1924, privileged as a state bank, it carried out the functions of a central bank. See Edhem Eldem, *Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi* [The History of the Ottoman Bank], (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi, 1999) and Christopher Clay, *Gold for The Sultan*, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

Table 7. Top officials of main state institutions -1904

Trabzon Düyûn-u Umûmiyye Ministry	Trabzon Reji Ministry	Trabzon Bank-i Osmanî Şubesi
<i>Minister:</i> Kirkor Efendi <i>Inspector:</i> Oskiban Perto Efendi <i>Inspector assistant:</i> Fernan Kunin Efendi	<i>Minister:</i> Ladislas de Dorobleski Efendi <i>Assistant:</i> Gotofski Efendi <i>Accountant:</i> Kortelli Efendi <i>Sandık emini:</i> Mareşal Efendi	<i>Director:</i> Mösyö Con Kronberk M 3 <i>Second director:</i> Mösyö Hristodulidi <i>Sandık emini:</i> Mösyö Agop Zarif <i>Accountant:</i> Mösyö Kamil Poriyir <i>Correspondance scriber:</i> Mösyö Abraham Kavrukciyan <i>Assistant accountant:</i> Mösyö Kostantin Artladis

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1904 (M 3: 3rd rank mecidî).

• *Düyun-u Umumiye and Reji*

One of the powerful men in the city, Nemlizade Hacı Osman Efendi, was subject to a complaint that he should not be a member of the Vilayet Council and do business with the *Reji* at the same time. The complaint did not lead to anything, as Osman Efendi was backed by the *vali* himself, Kadri Paşa.³⁴ And Osman Efendi was elected in 1909 and 1912, two terms deputy of Trabzon (the totalitarian Abdülhamit reign or the Second Constitutional Period proclaimed by the 1908 Revolution had no effect to the local rulers!).

Direktör Âli Bey, governor of Trabzon, had the title “Direktör” because he was a director of the *Düyun-u Umumiye*. Hacı Polatzade Raif Efendi was a member of the municipal assembly, included in the *eşraf* list and he worked at the *Düyun-u Umumiye*. Alaybeyzade Ahmet Faik Efendi³⁵ worked at several posts and vilayets at the

34. See supra p. 10.

35. Alaybeyzade Ahmet Faik Efendi [Aybay] (1865–1930), after his education at traditional elementary school and Trabzon rüşdiye in 1877 started to work at the Council of Appeal Court auditeursly, became maker of fair copies, in 1880 Trabzon Country Court criminal tribunal scribe and then chief scribe, in 1893 Lazistan public prosecutor assistant. After working in many vilayets up to 1916, he came to Samsun and retired in 1921. For a while became the Reji lawyer.

courts of appeal. He was elected deputy of Trabzon in 1920 but preferred the work at the court. He retired in 1921 and became a *Reji* lawyer.

The Trabzon people were proud of Alaybeyizade Hasan Naci Efendi,³⁶ who was from the older generation, and Halil Nihat Boztepe,³⁷ who was from the younger one, because of their literature works; they both worked at *Düyun-u Umumiye*.

The relations of these institutions with the villagers and the state are well understood through two examples: Sarı Alizade Ömer Lütfi Efendi, both mayor of the district Of and an employee at the *Reji*, and Kethüdazade Mehmet Esat Bey, who after several official posts became the acting *mutasarrıf* and also preferred to be a *Düyun-u Umumiye* employee.

The income of the *Düyun-u Umumiye* Trabzon ministry is mentioned in the 14th *salname* of 1892 and when calculated for the Trabzon *Sancak* amounted to 3,415,238 kuruş. This formed 18,45 % of the total income of the Trabzon *Sancak* (18,502,303 kuruş).

• *The Imperial Ottoman Bank*

The Trabzon branch was established in November 1891 and was active in the financial operations together with the native Greek bankers (Kabayanidis and Fostiropoulos; see below), Bank of Athens and the afore mentioned state owned Ziraat Bank, but each had its

36. Alaybeyizade Hasan Naci Efendi (1854–1920), son of the merchant Hacı Hasan Efendi. Graduated from Trabzon rüşdiye, had private lessons. In 1878 in Istanbul started working at Ministry of Finance Düyun-u Umumiye Office of Balance Sheets. Returned to Trabzon in 1880 benig member in several commissions, again in Istanbul became Ministry of War Adjudication Office chief scribe. Included in the list of Trabzon eşraf in 1901. For long years he was the teacher at Galatasaray and Darüşşafaka high schools, author of many articles, poems in Trabzon and Istanbul newspapers and some books.

37. Halil Nihat Efendi [Boztepe] (1882–1949), son of a maritime merchant. Graduated from military rüşdiye and Trabzon idadi. He worked at Trabzon Düyun-u Umumiye (1900–1902). He learned french at French Catholic school in Trabzon. Moved to Istanbul. For 25 years worked at the Düyun-u Umumiye. Elected deputy of Gümüşhane in 1927, deputy of Trabzon in 4-7. terms up to 1947. Author of many articles and poems both at Trabzon and Istanbul newspapers and some books and translations.

own channels. So the Ottoman Bank preferred to employ and do business with Europeans instead of native Christians and recruited its employees from the ranks of the consulates and the European navigation companies. Radliya Atilyo and Leonar Vitalis are to be mentioned (Salname volumes 16-22) as will also be seen below.

- *The Consulates and Navigation Companies*

Beginning from 1803 and the French consul Dupré, parallel to the improving international transit trade and the increasing role of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in the world economy and politics, the consulates in Trabzon rose to 9 in 1904.³⁸ Being a consul in Trabzon was a much sought post, much more than that of a *vali*. First of all, the term of office of the *vali* was normally two years, while that of the consul depended on the conditions. For example the English consul H. Z. Longworth served in Trabzon from 1886 to 1911. In these 25 years eight *valis* worked in Trabzon (and one had been Kadri Bey whose term was unseemly long covering the period 1892-1903). The consuls had the right to give passports to Ottoman citizens who gained the privileges of a European.

The consuls preferred to employ relatives of the agents of the steam navigation companies in Trabzon, as these companies were very important for the development of the international transit trade. The Greeks and the Armenians of Trabzon, who had extensive commercial networks in the sea and land transport of the area, succeeded in getting the agencies at their hands when the transit trade started to grow. After the first phase, the Europeans realized that it was to their advantage to work with the native Christians. In a short time the Greeks and Armenians traders of Trabzon connected with their entrepreneurial diaspora networks in Batum, Odessa, Marseilles, Trieste, Manchester, etc. Having the privileges of special licenses (*berathı tüccar*) from the Ottoman Empire and the protection (*himaye*) of the European countries, the Christian subjects of the Empire integrated with the European companies and then

38. In Trabzon there were 94 Protestants and 1443 Catholics in 1904, but those not subjects of the Empire aren't specified in the statistics. Subject Catholic Armenians were represented in the Vilayet Council by their delegate.

with the consulates that protected the interests of these companies and their own subjects. So to work with certain families was the easiest way. These families worked in all Trabzon vilayet (Samsun, Rize, Giresun, etc.), where there were consulates and agents of the companies (also at the *Düyun-u Umumiye* and *Reji* branches).

From the Armenian community of Trabzon, the Mısıryan family³⁹ is one of the examples we trace in the *salnames*. We have seen Mısıryan Bogos Efendi as member of the most important councils, commissions and boards in Trabzon. His relative, Mısıryan Ohannes Efendi was the first dragoman at the French consulate; Mısıryan Mıgırdıç Efendi was the second dragoman and he was also the agent of the French Paquet company. The secretary of the company was Mısıryan Oseb Efendi. Relative in law from the Marmıyan Family, Marmıyan Bogos Efendi was a member of the municipal assembly, consultant of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, member of the Chamber of Agriculture and his relative Marmıyan Mıgırdıç Efendi was the agent of French Messageries company.⁴⁰

39. The French Catholic school was built in Mısıryan Mıgırdıç's garden. Mısıryan Bogos Efendi was suspected by the central government in 1905, because of his relations with the Armenian illegal committees. The family was deported in 1915 but asked to be found the whereabouts, as it was understood that the Ayan (Senate) member Aram Efendi's sister Mısıryan Annik was wife of one of the Mısıryan family member ("Trabzon'dan çıkarılan Meclis-i Ayan Azası Aram Efendi'nin hemşiresi Mısıryan Annik'in nerede olduğu, çocuklarından kimlerin yanında bulunduğu ve diğer aile fertlerinin hayatta olup olmadıklarının bildirilmesine dair Mamuretü'l-Aziz Vilayeti'ne çekilen telgraf", BOA.DH.ŞFR.77.52. 16 ş 1335/7 June 1917). Also member of the Country Court and merchant dealing with lumber in Russia Marmıyan Ohannes was the son-in-law of Mısıryan Ohannes (see f.n. 108 for the Marmıyans).

40. For the Maranko family see fn. 109.

Table 8. Consuls and Employees in Trabzon in 1904

Country	Consuls and employees
Greece	Consul: Mösyö Vitalis M 4 Dragoman: missing
Belgium	Consul: Mösyö Atilyo Sasi O 3 M 2 ¹⁶ Also acting consul of Danmark Dragoman: Mösyö Ferdin Koma O 4 M 5
Iran	Chief consul: Zülfikar Bey O 2 M 2 Chancellor: Hasan Bey Dragoman: Mösyö Emil Vital
İtalia	Consul: Mösyö Macinta M 4 Dragoman: Mösyö Alfons Gulilmi
Empire of Austria-Hungary	General consul: Mösyö Lö Baron di Meske O 4 M 3 Chancellor and dragoman: Mösyö Ferdin Koma O 4 M 5
France	Consul: Mösyö Kolomb First dragoman: Mısıryan Ohannes Efendi O 4 M 5 Acting consul and chancellor: Mösyö Moro Second dragoman: Mısıryan Mıgırdıç Efendi M 4
Rusia	Consul: Mösyö Jorj Brand O 3 M 4 Scriber: Karabet Melik Muradyan Efendi M 5 Chancellor: Mösyö Sakroni Rif O 4 Dragoman: Nurihanyan Ohannes Efendi
The United Kingdom	Consul: Mösyö Lonfurt Dragoman: Hekimyan Hekimyan Komidas Efendi M 5
The United States of America	Consul: Mösyö J. Sullivan Acting consul and dragoman: Mösyö Vital Ojaldo Scriber: Mösyö Martin

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1904.

The Levantine families were also active at the same posts in the Black Sea coast. For example, Alfred Vital (as written in Turkish in the *salnames*), a member of the famous Whittall family of Smyrna,⁴¹ worked as *Reji* minister in Samsun (during 1898-1904

41. Charlton Arthur Whittall was born in Smyrna in 1816 and the English Whittalls both in this city and in Istanbul were bussinessmen and a part of the social life.

as it is found in the *salnames*).⁴² Leonar Vital was the director of the Ottoman Bank and consul of Greece, while Emil Vital was the dragoman of the Iran consulate. From another Levantine family, Atilyo Sassi, the consul of Belgium and agent of the Austrian Loyd Company, was also acting as consul of Denmark and Austria-Hungary at some time.⁴³ His relative Silviyo Sassi was inspector at Trabzon *Reji* accounting office. From the Radliya family, Radliya Atilyo Efendi was a citizen of Austria, agent of the Austrian Lloyd navigation company in Trabzon, first scribe at the correspondence office at the Trabzon *Reji*, second scribe of the Italian company and vice-accountant of the Ottoman Bank. Radliya Viktor Efendi was also a citizen of Austria, a scribe at the Trabzon *Reji* correspondence office and vice-accountant of the *Reji*; he became the director in 1904 and afterwards director of all the vilayet.⁴⁴ Radliya Ojen Efendi was secondary accountant at the Trabzon *Reji* and Radliya Matyo was Trabzon *Reji* foreign language correspondence secretary. To mention more Levantine families, Gulilmi Aleksandr Efendi was the third secretary at the Trabzon *Reji* accounting office. Gulilmi Alfons was the Italian consul secretary and dragoman and agent of the Italian company. Gulilmi Amda was agency clerk of the Italian company. Gulilmi Nikola Efendi was Ordu *Reji* director and a certain Gulilmi Efendi was Akçaabat *Reji* warehouse clerk associate.

From the Greek community of Trabzon, there was Kostantinof Sava Efendi, the Trabzon *Reji* agriculture office clerk. Mösyö (Mister) Kostantinof Nikola and Kostantinof Mösyö Panayot were the agent and clerk respectively of the Trabzon Panhellenic steam navigation company; while Sava was an “efendi”, most probably an Ottoman

42. *Reji* inspector Louis Rambert says that Vitol (as the spelling is in the translation) had been from an English family of Smyrna and as a *Reji* inspector had travelled all around Asia Minor when he was young; Lui Ramber, *Gizli Notlar* [Secret Notes], ed. Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu, (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser).

43. Atilyo Sasi was also the father-in-law of Habib Melhame, Trabzon *Reji* minister. Habib and Necip Melhame were ominous brothers of the Abdülhamit reign, serving the sultan in every way. Necip became the minister in the cabinet (1893-1908) and Habib Bulgaria commissary (1898-1902).

44. Both Atilyo and Viktor Radliya were asked to leave the country in December 1918 by the authorities (BOA.DH.EUM.5. Şb.22.76. 29 s 1337/4 December 1918 and BOA.DH.ŞFR.54.604, 2 December 1334/1918).

subject, the other two relatives were addressed as “mösyö”. The Swiss oriented Hochstrasser company was partner with the native Fostiropulo, agent of navigation companies, merchant and insurance agent. This company continued working with the Black Sea coastal cities up to recent years, as Switzerland is one of the main producers of chocolate and in need of the large production of hazelnuts in the area.

Table 9. Navigation Companies in Trabzon in 1904

British - Loyd Nemçe Kumpanyası (Austrian Lloyd)	Chief agent: Mösyö Atılyo Sasi O 3 M 2 Chief clerk: Mösyö Ferdin Koma O 4 M 5 Clerk: Kapudanyan Bedros Efendi Clerk: Nuryan Françesko Efendi
French - Fransız Mesajeri Kumpanyası (Messageries Maritimes)	Agent and postman: Boyacidi Kosta Efendi Clerk and post clerk: Marmıyan Mıgırdıç Efendi
French - Fransız Pake Kumpanyası (Paquet Company)	Agent: Mısıryan Mıgırdıç Efendi M 3 Clerk: Mısıryan Osib Efendi
German - Almanya Doşt Levand Kumpanyası (Deutsche Levant Linie)	Agent: Mösyö Huştraser (Hochstrasser) Clerk: Mösyö Petro Other clerk: Mösyö Akulet
Greek - Yunan Kumpanyası (Pan-Hellenic Company)	Agent: Yuvanidi Yusif Efendi Clerk: Kukinidi Efendi
Italian - İtalya Kumpanyası (General Italian Navigation)	Agent: Mahohyan Onnik Efendi Clerk: Mösyö Amida Gulilmi
Ottoman - Gürcü Osmanlı Kumpanyası (Georgian Ottoman Company)	Agent: Fostiropulo Yorgi Efendi First clerk: Lefteraki Efendi Second clerk: Diyomidi Efendi
Ottoman - Hâci David Kumpanyası	Agent: Evanidi Efendi Clerk: Persopulo Efendi
Ottoman - İdare-i Mahsûsa (State Navigation)	Agent: Hacı Mahmud Efendi Clerk: Emin Efendi
Ottoman - Trabzon Kumpanyası	Agent and clerk: Yanko Hiyotidis
Russian - Rus Kumpanyası (Russian Naivigation Co.)	Agent: Mösyö Emanuyel Sarafimof Chief clerk and postman: Mösyö Etyen Omid Second clerk: Babikyan Kirkor Efendi
Russian - Rus Prens Kakarin Kumpanyası (Gagarine)	Agent: Fostiropulo Yorgi Efendi Clerk: Kostantin Bapadopulo Efendi

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1904.

One of the leaders of the Greek community, Fostiropulo Yorgi Efendi, was agent of both the Georgian Ottoman Company and Russian Prens Kakarin Company. This relation explains why Matheo Kofidis Efendi⁴⁵, accountant of Trabzon *Reji* in 1888, became Akçaabat *Reji* director in 1900, and after the proclamation of the constitution was elected Trabzon deputy in 1908. For the Trabzon businessmen (who belonged to the educated bourgeoisie, the elite, high bureaucracy, etc.) to work for the consulates, navigation companies and *Düyun-u Umumiye* or *Reji* was a way to get promotion and form their social capital in order to become entrepreneurs. But for the common people, businessmen - and particularly those who worked for the *Reji* - were dictators who manipulated the prices according to their interest, cheated at the weighing and destroyed the petty tobacco smuggling that added to the people's income. In 1908, when "liberty" came to the country, the tobacco workers of the *Reji* went on strike and staged demonstrations against it.⁴⁶

Agriculture - The tip of the iceberg

The hidden side of the iceberg in the *salnames* is the agricultural sector. By the same mentality that does not mention the traditional schools and teachers, state officials for the agricultural sector and landowners are not mentioned the *salnames*. We know that there were *ağnam* (smallcattle tax) and *aşar* (tithe) officials, *ruhsatiye*

45. Matthaïos Kofidis (1855-1921), born in Kromni, graduated from Frontistiron in 1872. He worked in the *Reji*. Elected three terms Trabzon deputy (1908-1912, 1912-1914, 1914-1918), he was in good terms with the Unionists, after the suspension of the parliament because of the First World War, he was elected to the inspection commission. In 1919 he replaced for a period the bishop Chrysanthus in his non-religious duties. He refused the guerilla struggle in Pontus. In 1921 he was hanged by the Independence Court (of Ankara).

46. For the blood-shed tobacco producer villagers-*Reji* conflict see Kudret Emiroğlu, "Trabzon'da II. Meşrutiyet'te Tütün Rejisiyle Mücadele" [The Conflict in Trabzon with the Tobacco Regie in the Constitutional Period], *Trabzon*, (Trabzon: Trabzon İli ve İlçeleri Eğitim Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı, 1993), pp. 34-46. It was also objected that a worker of *Reji* could not and should not be a deputy at the same time (Kofidis meant).

memurluğu (licensing officials for certain agricultural products), *aşar ihale memurluğu* (tithe tender authority) but these are not mentioned in the *salnames*, despite the fact that they affected the lives of thousands of people; they were not thought to be as important as doctors or lawyers. Though agricultural taxes depended on the *iltizam* system, no word of this system can be found in the *salnames* (while there were chapters on modern agriculture and hazelnut and corn agriculture to be taught to the villagers; and floriculture to be taught to the amateurs in the 1904 *salname*).

It is not difficult to guess that the people named in the *eşraf* lists, members of the vilayet councils and other commissions and boards, were also the *mültezims* or worked at offices related to the *iltizam* system. The *aşar* income of the vilayet was 15,910,302 kuruş and when the animal and forest taxes are added, the agricultural income amounted to 19,646,993 kuruş, that is 73,42 % of the total vilayet income. Still in the 1900s, taxes were collected in kind in some areas and *mültezims* were mostly the sons of *ayan*; it was nearly impossible for anyone to bid for the *iltizam*, if he was not connected with the appropriate families. All these gave way to coercive illegal methods. British Consul Palgrave in Trabzon and other consuls in other regions of the Ottoman Empire, stated that the most desperate people were the Muslim villagers and their situation was one of the reasons for the low levels of fertility and production.

During the modernization process, the central government had to compromise with the local elite; hence by Abdülhamit's reign they were working in the state commissions. Having this semi-official status, the local elite became more educated, came to grasp a wider understanding of the world and could better integrate in the new European businesses and staff. This integration was stronger for the ruler class of the native Christians. As in the past, they could not integrate with the local land ruling class because they could not be *ayans* (as semi-civil semi-military posts, in Anatolia especially). Thus, they had become more urban and were able to benefit when the European capital penetrated the Black Sea shores.

While the *ayan* class was differentiated from the military as the modern army was set up, they still retained the privilege of retaining armed men of their own to collect the taxes (the *başıbozuk* system which meant subsidiary forces of the army gathered and ruled by

the *ağas*, which lasted till the end of the Empire, and contributed to the *ağas* legacy). Those that had access to the market and ports got more integrated with the new civil officialdom and the urban life. Despite the modernity appearing between *ağas*/*mültezims*/*müdürs* and the local government, the *Reji* and the *Düyun-u Umumiye*, the old relations between the *ağas* and the villagers remained the same.

The possibility of the same man being the mayor and a worker of the *Reji* at the same time and the possibility of the same man to be an *aşar* official, an acting *kaymakam* leading soldiers and also chasing bandits at the same time, depended on the power balance between the state and the old ruling class. Sarı Alizade Ömer Lütfi Efendi⁴⁷ in Of is an example. He was the son of an *ayan* family⁴⁸ and in the *eşraf* list, member of the Education Council. He became the mayor of the *kaza* and he was also a *Reji* employee. We can guess that he was the head of the *kaza*, a mayor and an employee of the *Reji* at the same time, acting in a way that satisfied both the state and the *Reji*, a modern institution of European standards that had to function in Of. So in every corner of the triangle Ömer Lütfi gained power from all sides, making himself necessary to the state, the institution and the people at the same time, playing, sometimes, one against the other.

The traditional *ağa* class earned their living as *mültezims* and by usurious trade; they also had large real-estate in the towns or in the city of Trabzon itself and they were trustees of the pious foundations founded and operated by the family members. Tanzimat regulations were introduced to Trabzon after the development of the transit trade; so for those who were able to adapt to the skills demanded, it was a peaceful transition from the status of illegal *ayan* to the legitimate high-rank employees of the state in the new founded offices. By getting involved in the international trade, they were put in charge of the local offices/people, and became partners of the state.

47. Sarı Alizade Ömer Lütfü Efendi (d. 1915), son of Mikdat Ağa. Member of the Special Organization of the Unionists during the First World War and died at the Sarıkamış front.

48. Mehmet Bilgin, *Doğu Karadeniz’de Bir Derebeyi Ailesi Sarıalizadeler (Sarallar)* [The Sarıalizadeler (Sarallar), a derebey family in the Eastern Black Sea], (Trabzon Serander Y, 2006).

Art Nouveau of the Entrepreneurs

The private sector is not included in the *salnames* though the professional trades are. As it became obvious from the “industry exhibition” mentioned above, we can not talk about industry in Trabzon⁴⁹ but only of traditional manufacture; and it was said that it was deteriorating due to the imports from Europe. But the new *bourgeois* upper class is present in the *salnames* though without any mention of their firms-trades but as members of the counsels, boards, etc. The Nemlizade family that got rich and took part in all semi-official organizations is the only family without any *ayan* origin.

Outside the world of the *salnames*, we find the people and firms working in Trabzon from other sources like the *Annuaire Oriental* volumes. In the 1891 volume, there are the names of the grocers, bakers, carpenters, haberdashers, black- and goldsmiths, etc. And, of course, the same consulate staff, navigation agents, lawyers and doctors we know of. There were also the insurance agents (written in French spelling, Mahokian, Sassi, Hochstrasser, Enepekoglou, etc), money dealers (Capayanides, Caragheussian, Karalambidis, etc), and merchants (Caculidi, Capayanides, Carvonidi, Hochstrasser, Triandafilides, etc). Once more we encounter the families dealing with international trade. We can get information about these families from the memoirs and historical researches.⁵⁰ We learn that other families we can speak of are Teofilaktos and Fostiropulos, the leaders of the Greek community.

49. In the *salnames* it is written that Terziyanoğlu Vasilika Efendi was the owner of a macaroni factory “working with steam generator and moulding the paste with machine”, “producing 60-80 thousand okkas (measure of mass, equal to 1.2829 grams) macaroni annually” (Salname 19/200). Vasilaki Efendi was included in the eşraf list in 1892, he was a member of the Municipal Assembly and Chamber of Commerce. He had been the Tersane-i Amire (State Shipyard) chief architect, contractor of mining biddings, farming the tobacco customs. He was elected to the Vilayet Council in 1906, still dealing with mines in 1911 and contractor of the building, the vilayet prison. He had donated to the Hedjaz water canals (see Öksüz, *op.cit.*).

50. Yaşar Tolga Cora, “A Muslim Great Merchant [Tüccar] Family in the Late Ottoman Empire: A Case Study of the Nemlizades, 1860-1930”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 19:1/2 (2013); Şahika Karatepe, Mustafa Batman, “The Rising of A Muslim Merchant Family: The Nemlizade’s”, in the present volume, pp. 221-232.

Epameinondas T. Kyriakidis helps us with his book on biographies.⁵¹ Beginning from the 17th century the history of the Greek community is displayed by way of biographies. In Trabzon the struggle to get organized and the clashes to support or divide this organization is focused on the community's education institutions. In 1682 the Greek school *Frontistirion* was set up by Sevastos Kiminitis (1630-1702), when he heard that the French missionaries had come to Trabzon to preach Catholicism. This early exertion did not last long and the school had to be closed in 1784. When it opened again in 1816 the community was divided into two; there were those for the continuation of the religious school and those against it. This also meant how and where the money collected from the community was to be spent. Thus, the decision about the school became the principle struggle between the clerics and the laymen, the traditional old generation and the new businessmen.

The history of the school shows us how the Greeks of Trabzon looked up to Russia and Greece. When a prosperous community of Greek entrepreneurs started to rise in South Russia, monks from Trabzon travelled to Russia to collect donations and the same was done from Greece. After the 1830s, to improve the quality of education, teachers were brought from Russia. Pericles, son of the school teacher Savvas Triantafilides, and perhaps the first person to be baptized "Pericles" in Trabzon, and another old student of the school, Konstantin Xanthopoulos, were sent to Athens for pedagogical education.⁵² In 1850 a teacher was hired from Athens and the education in the school followed the Greek one, so the graduates could go to high school there. In 1902 the school moved to a lovely

51. Epameinonda Kyriakidou, *Βιογραφίαι Των Εκ Τραπεζούντος Και Της Περί Αυτήν Χώρας Από Της Αλώσεως Μέχρις Ημών Αχμασάντων Λογίων Μετά Σχεδιάσματος Ιστορικού Περί Του Ελληνικού Φροντιστηρίου Των Τραπεζουντίων* [Biographies of the Scholars of Trabzon and its Surrounding Area from the Conquest until our Era with a Historical Essay of the Hellenic Phrontistirion of Trabzon], Athens, 1897.

52. Perikles Triantafilides taught the children modern Greek and he wrote on the Pontus dialect (Η εν Πόντω Ελληνική Φυλή, ήτοι τα Ποντικά [The Greek Race in Pontos, the Pontika] Athens, 1866). Also the writer of the Trebizond history Savvas Ionnides found out the manuscript of *Diegenes Akritas* in Trabzon and published it (first in Paris (1875) then in Istanbul (1887)).

new building.⁵³ It is said that engineer Kakulidis and three other merchants paid the 2,000 golden liras and another 18,000 golden liras were raised from the people to build it.

Yorgi and Yanika from the Kakulidi family are found in the *salnames* and the *Annuaire Oriental* and seem to be prime members of the Greek community. The deputy of Trabzon in 1876, in the parliament of First Constitutional Period, was Yorgi Karvonidi⁵⁴ and his election must be related to the fact that he was the son-in-law of Kakulidi.⁵⁵ After 1897, the intra-communal conflict was dissolved by the new generation and the formation of new elites in the Greek community of Trabzon. Leading families of the community were the Teofilaktos and Fostiropulos. Kostaki Teofilaktos (Konstantinos Teofilaktov in Russia) was one of the pioneering bankers of Trabzon. After the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, his family immigrated to Trabzon from the area between Crimea and Soçi with more Greeks living there. His business reached out to Erzurum, Batum and Istanbul. He donated great sums to the *Frontistirion* and *Metropolis* Church in Trabzon. A kindergarden was set up by him where his wife was the assistant director. In 1883 Teofilaktos also donated money for the newspaper of the Patriarchate *Eklisistiki Dliteis* in Istanbul and in 1907 he sent G. Fostiropulos and Chrysanthus to Lausanne and Leipzig for education; the latter was to become the archbishop of Trabzon.⁵⁶ During the Russian invasion

53. In September 1902 there were 358 students in the elementary, 298 in the middle and 126 in the high school, the total was 782, some boarding and some free form any fee.

54. Not found in the 22. Salname, he is the member of the Commerce Court and Collection Agency in 1888 in 13. Salname.

55. Kakulidi Yanika together with Hanzade Ziya Bey and Handanyan Kasbar was given Nişan-ı Osmani (decoration) in 11 March 1894 (BOA 4 N 1311, Dosya No: 214, Gömlek No: 70, Fon Kodu: DH.MKT); certain Captain Konstantin Kakulidi was arrested for importing salt that was included in the monopoly of Düyun-u Umumiye in 27 August 1891 (21 M 1309, Dosya No: 2555, Gömlek No: 40, Fon Kodu: ŞD) and Telmak Kakulidi was appointed honorary consul to Russian port Maryopol (Mariupol in Ukraine) in 2 May 1911 (3 Ca 1329, Dosya No: 3888, Gömlek No: 291579, Fon Kodu: BEO). We know of a certain N. Kakoulidis, attended the Pan-Pontian Congress in Athens in August 1921.

56. "Archbishop Chrysanthus (1881–1949), born Charilaos Filippidis, in 1903 he became a deacon and began his service in the Metropolis of Trabzon as a teach-

Fostiropoulos was regarded as the mayor of the autonomous Trabzon. He died before the population exchange and his wife and son moved to Istanbul.⁵⁷

In 1820s Kethüdazade Emin Ağa burnt down the mansions as a part of the war waged against the local derebeys.⁵⁸ In 1890-1900's the new mansion of the new riches were set up. The Nemlizade mansion⁵⁹, the Kostaki mansion⁶⁰, the Kabayanidi mansion⁶¹ are today three examples of the living standards of these families, the first being a school, the second the Trabzon Museum and the third

er at the Secondary School of the city, where he taught religious classes. He studied theology at the school of Halki then transferred to Lausanne and then to Leipzig. In 1913 he became the archbishop of Trabzon. He led a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in the region and was therefore condemned to death by the Turkish forces in 1920. He became archbishop of Athens and all Greece in 1938 and held the post until he resigned in 1941 in the aftermath of the German invasion of Greece, after refusing to swear-in the collaborationist government of Georgios Tso-lakoglou", quoted from *The Encyclopedia of Pontian Hellenism. He was the author of The Euxine Pontus Question, Memorandum Submitted to the Peace Conference, His Eminence Mgr. Chrysanthos, Archbishop of Trebizonde, May 2, 1919, Paris, s. 1-7 and Η Εκκλησία Τραπεζούντος [The Church of Trebizond], Αρχαίον Πόντου 4-5 (1933).*

57. The father of Fostiropoulos, Hacı Ioannis from Imera, minning region north of Gümüşhane, settled in Trabzon in 1880. Together with his five sons, he established his bank and in nearly ten years' time they had their place among the Trabzon elites.

58. An ayan acted together with the Trabzon governor. Grandson Mehmet Esat became kaymakam and Düyun-u Umumiye worker at the same time; Feridun Emecen, "Doğu Karadeniz'de Âyânlık: Tirebolulu Kethudazâde Mehmet Emin Ağa" [The Ayans of the Eastern Black Sea: the Kethudazâde Mehmet Emin Ağa from Tirebolu], *Belleten*, LXV: 242 (2001), pp. 190-207 and *Salname* 13, 1888; 15, 1894.

59. Candan Nemlioğlu, *Trabzon'un Abidevi Eserlerinden Kostaki Köşkü* [The Monuments of Trabzon, the kiosk of Kostaki], (İstanbul: Nöbetçi Y., 2008), see fn. 28.

60. The mansion was built at the beginning of the 1900's, between 1898-1913.

61. Konstantin Kabayanidis (1868-1915) also built the mansion on the Soğuksu hillside where all the riches of Trabzon had their summer pavilions as if having a competition of building the most charming one. Kabayanidis also had Russian passport and the family business reached out to Erzurum and Bayburt. With his father and brother they had their own bank. He married in 1904 Anna Triantafilidis. The mansion reveals the European Renaissance architecture and the building must have started in 1906.

the Atatürk Köşkü, a museum in his name; today the last two are the most visited touristic places in Trabzon after the churches.

3. Culture

Political Economy and Education

In 1901/1902 (h. 1319), the total value of the imports and exports (Persian transit trade included) from the Trabzon port was 270,226,700 kuruş. Assuming the rate of profit as 20%, the money earned from the port amounted to 54,045,340 kuruş. The population of the Trabzon kaza was 51,016, so the per capita income from the international trade was 1,059 kuruş. Since the per capita taxed income was 318 kuruş in 1898, these numbers reveal the richness of the new Trabzon bourgeoisie (and the daily income of the people serving them, as British Consul Palgrave informs us).⁶²

To be written in a *salname* volume by name depended on your real estate or education. To be elected to the Vilayet Council, a person had to pay 500 kuruş tax annually; it was lower for the *sancak* council, 150 kuruş, and for the *kaza* council 100 kuruş. The requirements for election in these posts were to for someone be literate and to belong to the notables of the vilayet. There are no statistics on income distribution, but the education statistics were published in the *salnames*.

To make a hypothesis on per capita income, we have to know the total income. In some of the *salnames*, the income of the government (*varidat*) is published. If we suppose that the total income is ten times the income of the government due to the rate of the taxes, we can find the per capita income roughly by dividing this figure with the population. In the 17th volume of the *salname* of 1898, the income of the Trabzon *sancak* was 18,502,303 kuruş. If the tax rates were 10 %, the total income in the sancak should have

62. The tax *bedel-i askeri*, collected from the non-Muslims for exemption from military service, was 17.5 % of the vilayet total income. Another factor not to be forgotten is that Trabzon people had gone to foreign lands to work, so we can't calculate the money sent in, contributing to family budgets and the city's standards.

been 185,023,030. The population of the *sancak* was 581,476, so the average per capita income should have been 318 kuruş, annually. In the expenditure table of the *vilayet*, the sum of the salaries for the Trabzon *Sancak* were 273,390 kuruş. Approximatley one thousand were working for the *sancak* administration, so the average per capita salary should be 273 kuruş, annually. Of course there was a big difference between the salaries of high rank bureaucrats and those of the minor officials. In 1878, the salaries of the *kaymakams* of *kazas*: Ordu was 2,350, Aybastı 6,420, Tirebolu 1,550, Of 1,550, Rize 2,100 and Sürmene 1,000, etc. The salaries of the directors of the *nahiyes*: Perşembe was 650, Yomra 800, Maçka 900, Tonya 450, Akçaabat 800, etc.⁶³

The income gap, however, between the people and the high-ranking bureaucrats and also between the minor officials and high-ranking bureaucrats was very big. The governor Sırrı Paşa when appointed to Diyar-ı bekr had a rise of 3,000 kuruş, so his salary reached to 20,000 kuruş in total. Besides he was given 500 liras for transport expences.⁶⁴ In *Kanun-i Esasi* (The Ottoman Constitution of 1876) article 63 stated that the monthly salary of the *Ayan* (Senate) members was to be 1,000 kuruş and article 76 stated the monthly salary of the deputies was to be 5,000 kuruş.⁶⁵ While then, the average per capita income was annually 318 kuruş, (monthly 26.5 kuruş), the per capita income of the *vilayet* employee was annually 273 kuruş, (monthly 22.75) kuruş; a vali got 20,000 and a clerk 80 kuruş monthly. The comparison to the working class was even worse. In the Ottoman Archives, for example, a document

63. Salname 10, 1878.

64. "Diyarbakır Valisi Sırrı Paşa'nın maaş-ı valalarının üçbin kuruş zammıyla yirmibin kuruşa iblağı ve beşyüz lira harcırah itasıyla Diyarbakır'a avdetleri", (Dersaadet; 46906), BEO, Dosya no: 627, Gömlek no: 46957, Date: 27/Za/1312 (22 May 1895).

65. "Altmış üçüncü madde- Heyet-i Âyân'ın azalık maaşı şehriye onbin guruştur. Başka bir nam ile Hazineden muvazzaf olan azanın maaş ve tayini eğer onbin guruştan dün ise ol miktara iblâğ olunur ve eğer onbin guruş veya ziyade ise ibka olunur."; "Yetmiş altıncı madde- Mebuslardan herbirine beher sene içtimai için Hazineden yirmi bin guruş verilecek ve şehriye beş bin guruş maaş itibarile memurîn-i mülkiye nizamına tevfiқан azimet ve avdet harcırahı ita kılınacaktır."; Salname 10, 1878.

indicates a charity decision of putting some needies on salary, in Eğribucak district (Macedonia); a mother who had three children working got 15 kuruş salary for each and a boy in Trabzon was luckier to get 30.⁶⁶

The English Consul in Trabzon W. Gifford Palgrave during 1867-1873 provided important numbers on daily wages.⁶⁷ Daily wages for the carpenter was 10 kuruş, for furnisher 15, stoneworker 8, skilled stoneworker 12, painter 12, boatman 15, mason 20, manual worker 5 or 6, apprentice 2. Palgrave, in a realistic way, gives us the daily expenditure of nourishment for different types of workers. A single wage earner spent 3 kuruş, while a married one spent 5, a skilled worker spent 8, a boatman spent 6, and the goldsmith spent 11 kuruş on his diet. What he indicates is that wages seem somewhat higher according to our calculation. According to our calculation daily per capita income was 0.88 kuruş and for the vilayet employee 0.75 kuruş. This would mean that the share of the state was smaller in the total production in the vilayet. Though it was true that there was a great gap between income brackets and a very small portion of the population got a very big share, the production in the vilayet/city was much more “civil” than the numbers provided by the salnames. And we know that many statesmen of the time praised Trabzon for its richness and activities in economics.

Education always had been a gate to climb up the social hierarchy. The Ottoman Empire had been, as every traditional state, a *status quo* society, but after the 15th century the central government could not rule the country without the cooperation of the newly emerging land lords. In the 17th century the classical *ümera/askeri* (in charge of the state/politics ruling) class (formed by the *seyfiye* (military) and *ilmiye* (educated)) had to be widened to include the landlords. By the 19th century, the centralization of the state was completed in a large scale. By promoting the *kalemiye*, the central

66. “Eğribucak kazasında bir batında doğan üç çocukla validesine on beşer kuruş maaş tahsisine ve Trabzon’da bulunan bir erkek çocuğuna da otuz kuruş aylık tahsisine dair.” BOA İ.DH. Dosya no: 405, Gömlek no: 26762, Date: 09/L/1274 (23 May 1858).

67. Ergun Türkcan (ed. and trans.), “İngiliz Konsolosu W. Gifford Palgrave’in Raporlarına Göre 1870’te Trabzon” [Trabzon in 1870 according to the Report of British Consul W. Gifford Palgrave], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 31 (Temmuz 1986), pp. 34-46.

government and the local notables were cooperating in the established councils, commissions and boards and got the biggest share. Again, education was the gate to climb higher in the social hierarchy because the mode of production had not changed. The society was composed by villagers, while the new uprising bourgeoisie did not have the strength to demand the power, while the central role of the government had not changed. This is one of the reasons of the high salaries of the top bureaucrats and the importance of education for those who could have access to it.

But it was almost a rule that traditional education institutions were not included in the *salnames*. Muslim or Christian, the traditional education was ecclesiastical, and starting from 18th century modernist trends, secular schools were founded; by the 19th century they appealed more to the society and were supported by the government. This, however, applied more to the Greek and the Armenian communities, because they had become more secular in their institutions and so in their education. Moreover, their priesthood did not have the power of the *ilmiye* class, since the latter retained some hegemony on some of the state institutions and on the richness of the *vakıfs* (pious foundations).

Some of the *salnames* include information about the *sıbyan mektepleri* (traditional religious primary schools) and the *medrese*. Thus, the first *rüşdiyes* (modern secondary schools) were inaugurated in the *vilayet*, then the *idadi* (the high school). The latter were very important for they opened the way to university education and strengthened the importance of the city as the centre of the people living in the hinterland. In Trabzon the first *modern ibtidai* (primary school) was opened in 1852, and the *rüşdiye* (secondary school) in 1863. A private school supported by the municipality in 1879, changed into military *rüşdiye* in 1879; a private school supported by the notables was formed in 1880⁶⁸, the *idadi* (high school) in 1887,

68. By Nemlizade Hikmet Efendi's leadership twelve people opened the Mekteb-i Hamidiye (Hamidiye School, most probably in the name of the despot sultan Abdülhamit). The modern education at the school, including foreign language, music, gym class and also accounting, law and literature, was financed by the merchants of Trabzon. Cudi Efendi and Kitabi Hamdi, two prominent men of the city, supported the school by donating their book and cigaret rolling paper royalties. Still it was more expensive (280 liras annually) than the other fee charging

the *dariümuallimin* (teacher training college) in 1889, the *rüşdiye* for girls in 1891.

In the *salnames* education is always an important subject. The names of the teachers and the names of the lessons, class by class, are included. In 1888 there were 55 students, in 1892 49, in 1896 134, and in 1904 323 students at the *İdadi*. In 1888 it is stated that because the school was newly opened and the students were only from the town, not from the *vilayet*, the number of the students was low. In 1896 we have the information that among the 134 students, 30 were boarding students charged with tuition, and 21 boarding students were free of charge, while 33 were morning class students. While the population of the city was 55,000, only 323 students were attending the high school. The girls were not accepted to the high school and only a few Greeks preferred the *idadi*, because there was a school of the Greek community, enough satisfactory.⁶⁹ Nikolaki Efendi, a trial lawyer in the city that had no other office, was the only Christian member of the the Education Council. But at the *idadi* where it was supposed to be the school of all the Ottoman subjects, there was only one Christian teacher, teaching French, Panayot Efendi, and only 14 Christian students.⁷⁰

school in Trabzon, Hayriye Mektebi (150 liras). Hamidiye school got merged into the *idadi* (high school) when it was opened; Musa Şaşmaz, "İngiliz Konsolosu Alfred Biliotti'nin 1885'teki Raporuna Göre Trabzon Vilayetinde Eğitimin Durumu" [The Conditions of the Education in 1885 in the Province of Trabzon according to the Report of the British Consul Alfred Biliotti], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 163 (Temmuz 1997), pp. 41-53; Hüseyin Albayrak, *Kuruluşunun 100. Yılında Cudibey İlkokulu* [The Cudibey Primary School in its 100th years from its Foundation], (Trabzon: n.p., 1988), pp. 22-24.

69. Sırrı Paşa (*Mektubat-ı Sırrı Paşa*, İstanbul, 1303) tells the story how the Greek eşraf objected to the *Idadi*, they already had had high school education at The Greek College (Phrontistirion).

70. We have the numbers for 1318-19/1900-1902, *Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-i Umumiye*, İstanbul, 1321.

Table 10. Rate of students in 1898 in the sancaks of the Trabzon Vilayet

	Muslim %		Christian %	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Trabzon	12	5	17	3
Gümüşhane	11	3	29	22
Lazistan	16	8	12	4
Canik	13	5	13	6

Source: Trabzon vilayet Salname, 1898.

In the Trabzon Sancak, 12% of the boys and 5% of the girls were attending the schools.⁷¹ It is hard to interpret the Gümüşhane numbers for the Christians, but generally we can say that Christians were relatively more conservative towards the girls. In Lazistan where making a living was very hard, people chose the way of education and in this *sancak* the families were more liberal about the girls' education. The same hardship was true for Gümüşhane but they could not find enough schools and were more traditional in their ways. Canik was more modern and richer. On Christian higher rates we can say that the ruling class of the Muslims were land owners, so they were more conservative towards new ways of earning a life and a modern life, while the ruling class of the Christians were entrepreneurs, so the community was more open to modernity.

Universities and Biographies

From the last quarter of the 19th century towards the 20th, social capital shaping the social status begun to include education, even if one belonged to the traditional wealthy class. For the new generations of the state employees there was no other choice. So for someone to have his name included in the *salnames*, he had to be educated. And to have a known biography that historians and com-

71. But in 1892/93, in the Trabzon sancak, the number of old style primary schools (sibyan mektepleri) were still too many (2390) as to the modern ones (229); *Salname-i Maarif*, 1316 (1898), p. 1275.

mon people could have access to, one had to have a *medrese*/university education.⁷² In the *salnames* we find the *medrese*, *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (School of Civil Administration), *Tıbbiye* (Faculty of Medicine), *Eczacı bölümü* (department of Pharmacy), *Mekteb-i Hukuk* (Faculty of Law) and *Harbiye* (Military Academy) graduates.

- *Medrese*

Medreses are not universities but the *ilmiye* class exercised some of its power in the education system (to become a *medrese* teacher (*müderris*)) and the judiciary system (*şeriye* courts). The graduates originated from the common people, their biographies were written and are a source of research and publications.⁷³ In the city there were 9 *medreses* and 174 *medrese* students (*talebe-i ulum*) in 1869, while there were 8 *medreses* and 491 students in 1888, and 7 *medreses* 480 students in 1903-4⁷⁴ (compare the number of *idadi* students being 55 in 1888 and 323 in 1903). The increase at the rate of the *medrese* students from 1869 to 1888 is 282%, while the increase of the names included in the *salnames* was 270 %. So it can be said that the attraction of the *medreses* was not only for those that wanted to become part of the bureaucracy. While the population of the city was 35,000, the *medrese* students were 491; when the population rose to 55,000, the number of the students was 480. So it can be said that the *medreses* were not that attractive; some old *ulema* families who were originally the sons or cousins of the local lords of the

72. Ömer Akbulut, *Trabzon Meşhurları Bibliyografyası* [Bibliography of the Famous of Trabzon], (Ankara: n.p., 1970); Hüseyin Albayrak, *Trabzonlu Meşhurlar Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of the Famous of Trabzon], (Ankara: Vadi Y., 2008); Sadık Albayrak, *Son Devir Osmanlı Uleması* [The Ottoman Ulema of the Last Period], (İstanbul: Medrese Y., 1980); Mehmet Akif Bal, *Trabzonlu Ünlü Simalar ve Trabzon'un Ünlü Aileleri* [Famous Persons and Families of Trabzon], (İstanbul: n.p., 2007).

73. Also as every classical official was a poet see İbnü'l-emin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri* [Turkish Poets of the Last Period], v. 1, 1999, ed. Müjgân Cunbur, v. 2, 2000, ed. M. Kayahan Özgül, v. 3, 2000, ed. Hidayet Özcan, v. 4, 2000, ed. İbrahim Baştuğ, Y., (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı 1999-2000).

74. Trabzon Salname 1, 1869 and 13, 1888; *Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-i Umumiye*, 1321.

15th and 16th centuries, now preferred the modern schools. But *medreses* were cheaper for the ordinary people.

We also have some examples like Mehmet Şükrü⁷⁵ who had left the *rüşdiye* at the third year to go to the *medrese*, and Kitabi Hamdi Efendi⁷⁶ who although graduated from the *medrese*, preferred trade and became one of the first to introduce modern industry to the city (so Kitabi Hamdi Efendi was not included in the *salnames*). In the *salnames* there were 50 people mentioned to be *medrese* graduates. 36 of them were from Trabzon by origin and 22 of them were *müderris* at the *medreses*. They worked in the government offices, in the courts and as teachers at the modern schools as well; especially some who were teachers at the Trabzon Idadi are remembered with great respect.⁷⁷

To graduate from a university meant to go outside the city, namely to İstanbul, and it was not as guaranteed as the *medrese* education that one would have a work back in his native town Trabzon after the graduation.

• *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (School of Civil Administration⁷⁸)

In the *salnames* there are the names of the Mülkiye graduates. *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* was founded in 1859 and later supported by Abdülhamit. Not the *valis* but the *nahiye müdürs*, *kaymakams* and *mutasarrıfs* were to be all graduates from that school and in time it was aimed to include the *valis*. The new graduates were appointed as *maiyet memuru* to have an inservice training in the *vilayet* centres. In Trabzon in 1904 there were three *maiyet memurus* and one in Canik. We know their biographies as the graduates of Mekteb-i Mülkiye are researched and published.⁷⁹

75. Altıparmakzade Mehmet Şükrü Efendi (1863-1916) was appointed in 1903 as a scribe to the Fetvahane (Religious Decree Office) and became a member of the Country Court civil tribunal. So we can find his name in the *salname* (22, 1904) and also in Sadık Albayrak, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

76. Fn. 10, 83 and 138.

77. The first director of the Idadi Saraçzade Ali Naki (1836-1923) was elected Trabzon deputy during the Second Constitution Period, in 1908.

78. Today Faculty of Political Sciences, moved from İstanbul to Ankara in 1933.

79. Mücellitoğlu Ali Çankaya; *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler* [The History of the New Mülkiye and its Students], (Ankara: n.p., 1968-69).

Two out of three were natives of Trabzon. Ahmet Nuri Efendi (1877-1918) was the son of the telegraph official Arif Efendi. He graduated from Mülkiye in 1901. Mehmet Rahmi Efendi (1878-1936) was the son of the trail lawyer Eyüpzade Hamdi Efendi. He graduated from Mülkiye in 1903. After some administrative duties and serving as *kaymakam* in various districts, he was elected deputy of Trabzon after the Republic in the 2nd and 3rd terms of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM).⁸⁰ Yani Kuvanidis was the son of Todor Efendi, who was the steward of Rauf Paşa, the field marshal. He was born in Şarkî Karahisar and after his education at Phanar Greek Orthodox College, he graduated from Mülkiye in 1902. After his service in Trabzon he was appointed as *kaymakam* to several districts and elected as deputy of Kayseri during the Second Constitution Period. Due to the 1890's reform decisions a Christian could be appointed as *vali* assistant governor and in the *salnames* we see Ligoraki Vagleri Efendi appointed at this post. Vagleri (1861-1949) was born in İstanbul and he graduated from Mekteb-i Mülkiye in 1884. For long years he worked at *Şura-yı Devlet Muhâkemat Dairesi* (Council of State Adjudication Section). In 1896 he was appointed as *Dişar-ı bekr vali* assistant governor and came to Trabzon in 1899. In 1908 he left Trabzon and was appointed to Monastır, a city that was very active in riots and Young Turk movement, again as *vali* assistant governor. He was promoted and appointed as *mutasarrıf* to Çamlık and Mersin. In 1911 he was appointed as *Sisam Beyi* (general governor of the Samos island), an autonomous district in this period, and after that he was elected to the Senate (*Ayan*).

There are 46 Mülkiye graduates who worked in the Trabzon vilayet: 8 of them were natives of the *vilayet* (one from Tonya) and 3 of them of the Trabzon city itself (14 of them natives of İstanbul). In addition to the two *maiyet memurs*, İbrahim Halil Paşa (Tarhan, 1879-1945) was born in Trabzon. He graduated from the French school in Trabzon. He was appointed as Trabzon *maiyet memuru*, then served in Of, Ünye, Giresun and Ordu. In 1901 he was promoted as paşa. İsmail Fevzi Paşa (1863-1917), originally⁸¹

80. Çankaya, *op. cit.*, p 499. He was the father of Sabahattin and Bedri Rahmi Eyüpoğlu nation wide important entelektual and artist and poet respectively, of the Republican era.

81. He was included in the Trabzon eşraf list as Batum was no more an Ottoman soil, as his father Süleyman Faik Paşa (f.n. 100).

from Batum, and Mamoyzade Memiş Rüştü Efendi (1830-1903) and Mamoyzade Tefvîk Efendi (1864-1917) from Hopa, graduated from *Mülkiye* but they did not work in Trabzon vilayet.⁸² *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* was planned to train modern administrators, but we see that 14 of the graduates that served in the Trabzon vilayet preferred the education sector and became teachers, directors of the Trabzon *İdadi* and Trabzon superintendent of schools (*Maarif müdürü*).

Being a graduate of *Mülkiye* meant a lot in the last quarter of the 19th century and the last quarter of the Empire. So after working in the country as high administrators, they were elected deputies either at the places where they worked or at their hometowns. The two *maiyet memurs* Yani Efendi and Eyüpzade Mehmet Rahmi Efendi became deputies of Kayseri and Trabzon respectively, as mentioned. İsmail Fahri Bey (1872-1954) from Çamaş, affiliated to Ordu district, was a Trabzon deputy in the Ottoman parliament (4 terms) and Ordu deputy in the Republican parliament (2-7. terms). Again a native of the Trabzon vilayet, from Torul, Gümüşhane, İbrahim Ethem [Tuncel] Efendi (1874-1938), after teaching at the Trabzon *İdadi*, served as *kaymakam* and was elected Samsun deputy in 1927; he served (3-5 terms) until his death.

There are two ministers, one senator (*Ayan*), two *Meclis-i Mebusan* deputy and six TBMM deputies among the 46 *Mülkiye* graduates that served in Trabzon, which makes a rate 23.9 %, approximately one out of four to have been raised in high positions.

- *Harbiye* (Military Academy)

It is known that the military class had played great role in the history of the empire but to find the biographies or even the lists of graduates of the military school (*Harbiye*) is not easy.⁸³ As we have concentrated only on the Trabzon *kaza* and on those that settled/

82. Faruk Benli, *Mamoylar Aile Tarihi* [The History of the Mamoya Family], (Ankara: n.p., 2005).

83. The history book of the Harbiye (Kara Harp Okulu) by Muharrem Mazlum Iskora (*Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi* [A Short History of the Military Academies], Ankara, 1966) is the only source we have but what it does include aren't biographies in fact but very incomplete list of the graduates; only the famous ones' biographies are available.

worked in the city, the tables showing the military cadres in the vilayet are not taken into account. But 23 soldiers of every rank that were included in the *salnames* were important in the city life in some way.

Seven of them died and were buried in Trabzon and poems written by famous poets of the city were engraved on their grave. Nusret Paşa (1824-1896) was the bridge between the old and modern times; he had been appointed as vali to Trabzon.⁸⁴ Süleyman Faik Paşa was the commander of the Trabzon regiment. He was assaulted by the Armenian militants, while walking with Ahmet Hamdi Paşa in Uzun Sokak on 2 October 1895.⁸⁵ Mehmet Salih Paşa (d. 1897) was a commander in Trabzon and became the head of the military court after the Armenian riot in 1895.⁸⁶ Trabzon was the only city where a Young Turk assault took place before 1908, the proclamation of the Constitution. Ömer Naci, a captain who killed Ahmet Hamdi Paşa on 15 March 1907 and was trialed and hanged on 19 June 1907. It was said by the government that Ömer Naci had some psychological problems; he was recognized as a revolutionary martyr by the Committee of Union and Progress.⁸⁷

There were 459 students at the military *rüşdiye* in 1888, 313 students in 1894 and 260 in 1896. This number is much more than the number of the officers from Trabzon. It is easily understood that children could not continue with their education at the military high school and then to *Harbiye* to become officers; they had

84. Nusret Paşa was one of the Circassian slaves of Mahmud II. He was educated at the Palace school Enderun and then sent to Harbiye. And he was sent to Europe for education. After serving in some vilayets he was appointed to Military Council. After serving at Council of State he became the Trabzon vali in January-July 1875. Commander in Bosnia and Shkoder and vali in Adana and Selanik, he was the commander of the 4th then 6th armies.

85. Süleyman Faik Paşa was originally from Batum but as Batum was not Ottoman territory any more he was included in the Trabzon eşraf list as his son İsmail Fevzi Paşa (f.n. 96). He was appointed to Bursa after he had got mixed in an iltizam prosecution in Of.

86. Mehmet Salih Paşa was born in Karaferye and after he graduated from Harbiye and serving in several vilayets he was appointed to Trabzon. He died in the Greece War of 1898.

87. We know that the officers were active in the illegal Unionist organization in Trabzon, see p. 58 below.

to quit somewhere in between. So, it can be said that children of poor families preferred a military career as it was cheaper, and being a boarding student would save the family from much expenditure. The rich did not prefer a military career for their children. The children of the poor were not included in the *eşraf* lists and it is understood that none of them could become a paşa during the time the *salnames* were published (but one exception, Abdullah Paşa who was not a native of Trabzon and became a paşa in 1904). The Harbiye graduates of Trabzon children, unlike the administrative officials, served beyond Trabzon and it seems that the military class was not as active in the social life of the city as the others.

- *Tıbbiye* (Faculty of Medicine)

In the Trabzon *Vilayet Salnames* it is reported that there was a doctor employed by the municipality, and the doctor was made a natural/regular member (“tabii aza”) of the *Meclis-i Daire-i Belediye* (Municipal Assambly). All doctors, the municipal (‘*beledi*’) or country (‘*memleket*’), registered from the first volume of the *salnames* (of the year 1869) to 1888 (in the 13th volume), were Christians.⁸⁸ A special department was set up for health services, under the title “officials of health” (‘*memurîn-i sıhhiye*’) headed by a doctor ‘inspector’(müfettiş)⁸⁹. There was a quarantine doctor in 1869 and a vaccination official, and also some military doctors in the Trabzon barracks. And in Trabzon, the first hospital in the Ottoman era had been a military hospital, called after Abdülhamid II, ‘Hamidiye Hospital’. It opened with the financial and physical help of the people in 1883.

88. The list of the municipality doctors is found in Veysel Usta, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Trabzon’da Sağlık [Health in Trabzon from the Tanzimat to the Republican Era]”, *Anadolu’nun İlk Tıp Gazetelerinden Hekim*, (Trabzon: Serander/Trabzon Tabip Odası Y., 2007), pp. xix-xxxiv.

89. Abdülkerim Efendi in the *salnames*, must be Abdülkerim Sebati of Trabzon, he had attended to the second founding meeting of the illegal İttihad-i Osmanî (vanguard of İttihat ve Terakki (Committee of Union and Progress)) when he had been a student at the Faculty of Medicine. He was appointed as inspector on 7 December 1893 and served in Trabzon up to at least 1911 as far as we know. In 1908, after the proclamation of the Constitution, he was a deputy nominee but wasn’t elected.

The hospital served both the soldiers and the destitutes ('*gureba*').

For the first time in 1898, in the 17th volume of the Trabzon *Salnames*, we find the names of the pharmacists working in their own stores. These self-employed pharmacists and pharmacies are important, as doctors working privately practised their trade in these stores up to the 1920s. These doctors and pharmacists were qualified as 'diploma holders' in the *salnames*, suggesting that still popular medicine was not regarded as illegal.

Around 1900, a certain Akritu Efendi founded a private hospital in his name; the director was Dr. Jozef Yorgiyadi.⁹⁰ It is only known that this hospital was very modern. It was long evacuated and it burned down in 1970. Trabzon also boasts of being the second city (other than İstanbul) to have published a medicine journal, *Hekim*.⁹¹

In 1904 Malezyan Efendi (retired of the quarantine), Yorokli Efendi, Minasyan Efendi, Elguyadi Efendi, Madaksa Efendi, İspetaro Efendi, Melityadi Efendi, İlya Haritidi Efendi, Ceynaro Efendi, Eframidi Efendi were listed in the *salname* as working self-employed doctors in the city. Çırakyan Karabet Efendi⁹², Sürmeliyan Karabet Efendi, Sürmeliyan İstapan Efendi⁹³, Bogos Zahiko Efendi, Timote Marango Efendi⁹⁴, Nikola Papadopulo Efendi⁹⁵, Yani Efendi, Yanko

90. The archive document on the construction authorization for a hospital on the building cite half belonging to Panayotaki Afridi, half to the government (BOA. BEO. 2560.191981: 24/S/1323 (27 April 1905)) may be related to that hospital, as it is quite possible to read 'Akritu' as 'Afridi' in Ottoman Turkish.

91. The journal *Hekim* ("Doctor") was published by the doctors in the city; 48 issues released beginning from 14 January 1910 up to 28 December 1911. Mustafa Çulfaz, *Anadolu'nun İlk Tıp Gazetelerinden Hekim* [The 'Doctor', the First Medical Journals of Anatolia], (Trabzon: Serander/Trabzon Tabip Odası Y., 2007).

92. While his shop was on Uzun Sokak, there was another pharmacist in the Meydan-ı Şarki in 1898-1900 belonging to Nişan Çırakyan, most probably a relative.

93. Karabet and İstapan were brothers. There was an advertisement in Nu: 20, 28 October 1911 issue of *Hekim* announcing that doctor with a European diploma Marmaryan started to treat patients in Sürmeliyan's shop. Dr Marmaryan must be a relative of Marmaryan Bogos and Marmaryan Ohannes and from Trabzon (p. 11, 33).

94. He was decorated with sanayi medal; probably from Akçaabat originally and from the Marango family; Emil Maranko had been working in the Akçaabat Reji accounting office and a certain Maranko, most probably Emil himself had been Reji correspondence secretariat vice-chairman in Trabzon.

95. May be a relative of İspero Papadopulo, member of the Chamber of Agri-

Efendi were the pharmacists. The lists show us that still there were not self-employed Muslim doctors or pharmacists in the city.

• *Mekteb-i Hukuk* (Faculty of Law)

There were Court lawyers working at the governor's office or for example at the banks, *Reji* and *Düyun-u Umumiye* in Trabzon; but still the self-employed lawyers were a subject of pride for the city just as the doctors and pharmacists. So the list in 1904 was the following:

Beşirzade Mehmet Mithat Efendi⁹⁶

Eyüpzade Hamdi Efendi⁹⁷

Gedikoğlu Lazar Efendi

Orfanidi Nikolaki Efendi⁹⁸

Mumcidi Sokrati Efendi

In 1903 there was also Kantarcı Yorgi Efendi in the list. From the *salnames* we know of Mehmet Arif Efendi⁹⁹ and Hafız Mehmet Server Efendi,¹⁰⁰ who were born in Trabzon and were graduates of the Faculty of Law. Mehmet Arif's father was tradesman, Mehmet Server's father was a captain of a boat. We know some other people graduated from the Faculty of Law and worked in Trabzon, but they were not from Trabzon and were not self-employed. The presence of self-employed lawyers in a city meant the variety of the occupations, transactions, different origins of the people working, so they were able to sue each other in a modern way, seeking advice from a lawyer.

culture and Kostantin Papadopulo, clerk of the Russian navigation agency Kakarin and Yani Papadopulo, member of the municipal assembly and also member of the Tax Levying Commission and Board of Tax Assessment in Giresun; so Papadopulos must be of Giresun origin.

96. His father was from Sürmene and ilmiye class, a member of the Sürmene Country Court. Mehmet Midhat was also included in the eşraf list and was for some time aşar office trial lawyer.

97. His son is Mehmet Rahmi graduate of Mülkiye (see pp. 47-48 and fn. 95).

98. Though he had no official post he was a member of the Education Council.

99. Son of Basmazzade Tahir Efendi, after medrese and Mekteb-i Nüvvab (surrogateship school) he graduated from Faculty of Law and worked as naib (surrogate) in several districts.

100. Son of Ahmet Reis from Görele, Mehmet Server (1873-1945) after graduating from the Faculty of Law became a teacher of hüsn-i hat (calligraphy) at Görele rüşdiye, then he became a trial lawyer in Trabzon.

• *Engineers, Architects*

In the *salnames* of the first years the engineers that are mentioned are Europeans and they must have graduated in their own countries; these engineers worked in the construction of the Trabzon-Erzurum road and they were employed temporarily.¹⁰¹ In the first years military engineers worked in Trabzon and whenever needed they were called from Istanbul afterwards. In the Trabzon province, chief engineer from 1892 up to 1904 was İsidor Efendi. He was also a member of the Public Works Commission and at the municipality. In 1909, when the publication of the *salnames* had finished, he had worked at the project to improve the Tabakhane and Zağnos streams after the flood disaster.¹⁰²

Engineers were not seen as a part of the modernizing daily life; they were regarded as ordinary officials, so no special list was arranged for them. As to the architects, they were very rare, called in by the government only for special buildings. Everyone built his own house, and the architects were not necessary for the ordinary people. Still there is an architect mentioned in the *salnames* in 1904, the architect of the Samsun municipal hospital, Valori¹⁰³. Kabilizade Necip Efendi (d. 1916) was the mayor then and when he became mayor for the second time in 1913, he had an Italian architect, a certain Dana, to build the city hall.

After 1880s Trabzon city started to boast of its new buildings; something present in the *salnames* also. But no architects are mentioned other than Valori and this was because he worked for the municipality. When the building was a private property neither the civil engineer nor the architect were mentioned, since they were not

101. Briot, Trabzon province engineer in 1869 is the author of the article "Identification of Mount Théchés of Xenophon", *Journal of Royal Geographic Society of London*, 40 (1870).

102. Rahmi Çiçek, *İstikbal Gazetesine Göre Trabzon'da Belediye ve Belediyecilik (1919-1925)* [The Municipality of Trabzon according to the Istikbal Paper (1919-1925)], (Trabzon: Serander Y., 2011).

103. May be Alexandre Vallauray (1850-1921), graduated from Paris faculty of architecture, became one of the founders and professors of the Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi (school of fine arts) in Istanbul. He was the architect of many official buildings and kiosks in Istanbul and other big cities of the Empire.

officials. For example we know that Kakulidis Efendi was the architect of Trabzon Greek College built in 1889, but this is not mentioned in the *salnames*.¹⁰⁴ He must be the same Kakulidi who appears as the municipal engineer in Samsun in 1904. And the Kakulidi family, perhaps originating from Aybastı, a district of Ordu, must have settled in Trabzon. While Kakulidi Yorgi Efendi was a member of the Aybastı municipal assembly, he became a member of the Ordu *kaza* council and an agent of the Greek navigation company Pesani in Ordu, and also a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Kakulidi Yorgi, a member of the Trabzon Collection Agency, must have been relative, if not the same person working in the two cities. Yanika of the Kakulidi family was a member of Trabzon Court of Appeal and he was decorated with *nişan-ı Osmani* in 1894.¹⁰⁵

The Authorized Discourse

In the *salnames* we can see how the perception of economic development penetrated into the educated class and bureaucracy. The decline of the Ottoman craft industries because of the imported European goods did find its expression in the *salname* volumes. Not only complaints were written in the *salnames*, but it was also recommended to set up firms as the only remedy to the economic and social deterioration. The *salname* writer (mostly unknown but always an official near to the *vali*) showed the way to the Trabzon people that, even if there was not enough capital to set up big firms, there was not any obstacle to set up collective small firms and start doing business. And there was an appeal to the consumers to buy inland local products.¹⁰⁶

The *salnames'* language is not that of Trabzon but of the central government. The Trabzon people were defined by their accent, customs, toilet, folk dance and music and were harshly criticised. Believing that nature determines not only the agricultural production

104. He is also said to be the architect of the Kabayanidis mansion in Trabzon, see p. 40 and fn. 76.

105. See fn. 70.

106. Especially *salnames* 14/154-56; 22/209-10, 217.

but also the character of the people, Trabzon people were described as swift, furious, aggressive.¹⁰⁷

Let us give a linguistic example. According to the *salnames*, Trabzon people did speak Turkish, but it was a rather “kaba ve karışık” (abrupt and impure). It was hoped that with the help of the schools, there would be no trace of that accent in the near future.¹⁰⁸ It is interesting to find a Turkish nationalist tone in the *salnames*: “The Laz people do have their own language, but because it is an unwritten one, they have already started speaking Turkish and in due time it will be their only language. Along with the Laz, the Muslim Georgian, Circassian and Tatar people are also mentioned to abandon their native languages and become assimilated.” The assimilation of Muslims is something, for example, Namık Kemal thought of. The latter was the most known leader of the Young Ottomans movement, who was exiled by Abdülhamit and his works were banned and read secretly by way of smuggling into the country from abroad by illegal societies. In the Trabzon *salnames* instead of the Ottomanist perspective of the state we can see a Turkish nationalist anticipation.¹⁰⁹

It is also interesting to note the use of the Greek language of the Of people in the *medreses* in religious education; this was defended in the *salnames*. It was mentioned that as Turkish was not the language of religion (it is Arabic) but used it in religious education, there is no difference in using the Greek language for Muslim religious education; using Greek was as legitimate as using Turkish.¹¹⁰ It was also mentioned that the Krom people are the descendants of

107. The vulgar materialism and positivist tone in the salname discourse must have belonged to Hüseyin Kazım (1870-1934), the son of the vali Kadri Bey/Paşa. He had been with his father in the city and his contribution to the salname texts, especially on the agriculture part is written openly in the salnames (17/200; 18/93). He was the board member of the İttihad ve Terakki Committee, vali, deputy but gone to opposition after 1912 and been vali, deputy and minister after 1918; author of many books; Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Hatıralarım* [My Memoirs], ed. İsmail Kara, (İstanbul: İletişim Y., 1991).

108. *Salname* 17, p. 177.

109. Hüseyin Kazım was an expert on agriculture and also studied the Turkish language and had written and published a dictionary, four volumes, 1927-1945.

110. *Salname* 13, pp. 314-16.

the ancient Xenophon, so their Greek is different from that in the other villages, districts and the city. The city people found the Krom accent difficult to understand.¹¹¹

In the traditional Ottoman society, the people were not seen as equal citizens but were defined by their sub-identities. Since centuries, geographical lines determined the economy and the state tax farming areas. The tax collectors/*mültezims/ağas* were to be the only medium for the state to have a function in that region and the same was true for the villagers; the only intermediaries to the outside world and the state were these *ağas*. The market economy was the only way to break this chain, so the government in the Abdülhamit era also was modernist because it had to be centralist. But in the Trabzon *salnames* we have still the names Sürmene, Akçaabat, Yomra to define people. It is written, “the Sera and Aya Gorgor rivers people who earned their living by tobacco smuggling, today with the help of the government of the sultan understood that this was a bad behaviour towards the friends and outsiders and gave up this way of living.”¹¹² Or in another book, “speaking of Sürmene it would be unfair not to state and praise their courage, temerity, use of arms, along with their extraordinary abilities at seamanship, fishing and diving. As the Sürmene people began to get out of their old abrupt ways, the Bayburt people today can live in peace, and do not have to fear of the Sürmene assaults and plunderings. The dictum about the courage of the Sürmene people should be heard from the lethargic, tyrannized Bayburt people.”¹¹³

About the Georgian people who migrated from Russia to settle in the districts of the Trabzon vilayet, the *salname* reports that they were very courageous and men-at-arms, so did inappropriate things; but now understanding the benefit of peace and order and respecting the rights of their neighbours, they have become efficacious.”¹¹⁴ The Of people are described as having their own strange customs and behaviour, so the *salname* says “though it would be useful to give some information on that subject, we

111. *Salname* 17, p. 178.

112. *Salname* 21, p. 255.

113. *Salname* 21, p. 260.

114. *Salname* 22, p. 70.

think it is not suitable to describe their strangeness in an official publication.”¹¹⁵ The Gümüşhane people are called “Halt” in Trabzon and this is one of the two words the *salnames* use as the reflection of the Trabzon dialect (the other being “lazut” meaning Indian corn). The Gümüşhane region was very poor up to the end of the 1950’s that they went to work to Trabzon, as street porter, manual workers, etc. In the *salname* it is mentioned that “in this *sancak* nothing could be seen but wretched villages, sordid people, pathetic plateaus, glooming and depressing streams.”¹¹⁶ In the environment of Şiran, “one can not have any reflection, notion or meaning sticking out from the black earth and intimidating rock cliffs.”¹¹⁷

The writer of the *salname* had the point of view of an Istanbul official towards the Trabzon people. It is also the case that the elite families, native of the Trabzon city itself, got assimilated gradually to the Istanbul culture; they tried to behave, write, even speak and think like them. Istanbul was the centre of the state and reflected what was going on to the rest of the world. Education meant that one should look at the world from Istanbul not from Trabzon, just a *vilayet* in some corner of the Empire.

Faith, Nation and State

In the Ottoman Empire different identities had a different official status, the *millets*. After the Tanzimat, national counsels of these *millet* were founded and the modernist policy was to diminish the role of the Churches in their communities, in order to help the new generation to share the administration of their communities along with the clergy. This was the milieu for both the new economic activities together with the new intellectual pursuits.

The Greeks of Trabzon saw Russia as their protector and for the economic, social and religious relations their face was turned towards Russia. In 1854-1856 Crimean War, when Trabzon was full of European allies, it was not a secret that the Greeks of the Empire

115. *Salname* 21, p. 256.

116. *Salname* 21, p. 226; *Salname* 22, p. 103.

117. *Salname* 22, p. 106.

supported Russia against the Ottomans. It was, thus, after the Russian defeat and the Crete revolt of 1866, that the Trabzon Greeks got interested in Greece and Hellenism. Their religious identity now blended with their national one and became more militant. This nationalist atmosphere made the folklor characteristics of the local people more important and books on Trabzon culture and history were written; so the nationalistic trend built on ancient history and continuity made the Trabzon Greeks (*Rum-Romeika*), Greek (*Helen*) and Trabzonite at the same time.

This was true for the new bourgeoisie, dealing with European companies not only in Trabzon but in Russia, France, England, etc.; they were the intellectual leaders as well as the employers of the Trabzonite Greek villagers. The simple villagers who spoke *Romeika* were devoted to religion and there was no social organization or free press. It was mainly through the schools of the community that they would have a chance to go and learn the language and history of modern and ancient Greece. So the struggle for the leadership of the community became the same with the struggle for the administration of the schools. In time, those who had the money convinced the community in their way and the city ruled the villages (as much as they were involved in the market).

The educated class of the Muslim community seems to begin to raise their Trabzonite identity beginning from 1840s. We have the *hamsi* (anchovy) poems of Hafız Mehmet Zühdi, and poems with this subject attracted many poets of Trabzon and gave away a unified sentiment for Trabzon, as *hamsi* depicts.¹¹⁸ It was the usual way for the Ottoman intellectual to articulate himself by way of poems. Hafız Mehmet Zühdi (1808-1875), Bayburtlu Zihni (1795-1859), Mehmet Ziver (1821-1879), Çizmecizade Hoca Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi (1840-

118. "Hamsi" was the nickname given to Trabzon people outside the vilayet and -of course -in Istanbul, where they mostly migrated or went to work or study. The Persian teacher of the favourite Mekteb-i Sultani and Mekteb-i Mülkiye, so a Trabzonite living in İstanbul, Çizmecizade Hoca Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi, in his *hamsi* poem says that, "do not think that İstanbul people doesn't like *hamsi*, they just do not want the product of some other vilayet surpass everything" (*Hamsiyi, zannetme, İstanbullu ez-can istemez/ Belki, başka belde mahsulünde rüchan istemez*). In those years only Istanbul and the Black Sea coast were the vilayets where *hamsi* was consumed.

1909), Kayserili Mehmet İzzet Paşa (1843-1914), Hasan Tahsin Tiffî Efendi (1849-1908), Ahmet Sarım Doğru (1884-1966), Hamami-zade İhsan (1885-1948)¹¹⁹, Baba Salim Ögütçen (1888-1956), Esat Ömer Eyyubî (1893-1921), Mustafa Sıdkı Cansızoglu (1895-1975), Süleyman Mahir Durukan (1898-1953) are those we know by name to have written hamsi poems of the last Ottoman generation. The practice went on to the Republican era and still today the primary school students in Trabzon memorize the *hamsi* poems of the modern writer and journalist Ömer Turan Eyüboğlu (1927-1960).¹²⁰

The first history book of a provincial city was written and published in Trabzon. Şakir Şevket was criticised in the Republican era for getting help and believing the Greek author S. Ioannides while writing his book. His text was quoted in the *salnames* and those passages about the role of the Greeks in the ancient history of Trabzon had not disturbed the Ottoman officials as did the historians in the Republican era. But this was the first and last book on Trabzon published in Trabzon, as stated above. But reading books and forming one's own library became widespread among the young Trabzon generation after the Greco-Turkish War of 1898. So much so that the *medrese* graduate Kitabi Hamdi Efendi did not prefer to have a career in the *ilmiye* class, but opened a bookstore.¹²¹

Bookstores had always been the meeting place of writers and readers of a town. But where ordinary people gathered were the coffeehouses.¹²² We know that coffeehouses had been the places where politics started in the Ottoman Empire and coffee and coffeehouses were banned in the 17th century as they promoted a civic culture found dangerous then by the government. In the *salnames*

119. Who published a hamsi book, *Hamsiname* in 1928.

120. The others who wrote hamsi poems could be seen in Murat Yüksel, *Türk Edebiyatında Hamsi* [Hamsi in Turkish Literature], (Trabzon: Trabzon Kültür ve Turizm Derneği, 1989).

121. Not only had a book store but he was a real businessman, see fn. 10 and 83.

122. Kudret Emiroğlu, "Trabzon'da XIX. Yüzyıldan XX. Yüzyıla Kahvehane ve Kitabevi Bağlamında Toplumsal Tabakalanma, Kültür ve Siyaset" [Social Strata in the 19th and 20th Century Trabzon in Relation to the Coffeshops and the Reading Houses, Culture and Politics], *Kebikeç İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 10 (2000), pp. 187-222.

we see the government trying to turn the coffeehouses (*kahvehane*) into reading houses (*kıraathane*), a name still used. Officials were appointed to the *kıraathanes* opened in Trabzon, Samsun and Rize in 1870, and the names are present in the 1871 volume. The attempt of the government to control the coffeehouses was not successful.¹²³

In 1905 in Trabzon there was one of the rare branches of the Committee of Union and Progress active in Anatolia. The illegal newspapers and books were smuggled in and the branch was active through the coffeehouses, mosques, places where people gathered. We know that the branch members were caught and punished, but the activities of the Unionists did not stop in Trabzon; a new branch opened in Of and one in exile in Batum and then in Oçamçire.¹²⁴ After the 1908 Revolution, though from time to time nationalist feelings were expressed and organizations were created, the political and economic behaviour of the communities within themselves and with each other differed according to actual benefits. The Armenians had their *Hunchak* and *Tashnak* organizations in Trabzon as well as generally in the Empire; the *Hunchaks* acted together with the old generation and the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* (Freedom and Accord Party), while the *Tashnaks* acted together with the Committee of Union and Progress.

It is understood that as the Unionists were ambitious to set their hands on politics, the young Unionist generation of Muslim businessmen in Trabzon were very ambitious and set their goals on the profits of the Christian businessmen. This means that the old, the traditional, conservative, more devoted to religion generation was at ease with their Christian neighbours and accustomed to do business with them. The same difference was true for the Greek generations. Being an Ottoman meant obeying your fate piously, and the modernists being individualists, rationalists, libertarians, nationalists found themselves in new clashes.¹²⁵

123. It is told that Kitabi Hamdi Efendi was to set up a “kıraathane” in the city, *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi* (newspaper), Nu: 1318, 6 Ağustos 1314 (18 August 1898).

124. *Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti Paris Merkezi Yazışmaları Kopya Defterleri 1906-1908* [A Copy Register of the Correspondence of the Ottoman Association of Unity and Progress with Paris], transcribed by Çiğdem Önal Emiroğlu, Kudret Emiroğlu, to appear by Tarih Vakfı.

125. While to boycott the Greek commodities was discussed in 1913, Nemli-

In Trabzon the last *salname* was published in 1904. In 1904 only four vilayets, one of them Trabzon, published *salnames*.¹²⁶ During the turmoil years of 1905-1907 in Anatolia, the publishment of vilayet *salnames* was interrupted and after the Second Constitutional Period was proclaimed in 1908, in 1909 the *salname* publications virtually ended. This was the end of an Empire with all its expressed or unexpressed conflicts; closing the rift between the state and the Muslim community, exploiting it physically and financially to strenghten the Empire's capacities and preserve its legitimacy, keeping non-Muslim population sufficiently content to foreclose the interference by European powers.

The Unionist regime was confronted with the same problems and in many ways it resembled to that of Abdülhamit they fought against. So the discourse altered a little in essence, but the fate of the Empire did not change and the people did not have the chance to speak of themselves. Those who spoke in their names, took the decisions and wrote the history. The people had to cope with conflicts with the state, with each other and with the intra-communal conflicts; they had to deal with three lives, being Trabzonite, Muslim/Christian, Turk/Ottoman or Greek/Hellen/Rum Ottoman. Analyses often are reduced to nationalistic narratives.¹²⁷ The new generation of historians, both Turkish and Greek, try to understand the history and interaction of the communities with each other but also with the state, the Turkish side realizing that the absolutism of the "Turkish so Ottoman" equation and the Greek side "Greek not so Ottoman" is wrong. But also what Ottomanism and modernism meant for the Trabzon villagers (if they had to be the carriers of the local-national? culture) is an enigma.

zade Osman Efendi opposed and Barutçuzade Ahmet Efendi supported the idea. The Unionist partisans like Barutçuzade Ahmet and (the owner and author of the *Trabzon'da Meşveret* newspaper, voice of the party) Meşveretçi Naci were also modern entrepreneurs (investing on unprecedented fields in the vilayet) and severe adversaries of the non-Muslims.

126. Hasan Duman, *op.cit.*

127. Vangelis Kechriotis, "Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or Just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Revolution", *Académie des Science de Bulgarie Institut d'Etudes Balkaniques*, 2005, No 1, pp. 51-71.

2.

Some Observations on the Structure of Power Relations and Ottoman Administration in the Late Nineteenth- Century Trabzon Vilayet

*Hamdi Özdiş**

This paper is about the power relations in the late nineteenth-century Trabzon vilayet and refers to mechanisms and patterns of local administration¹. Along with the process that greatly empowered the centrally-appointed governors in the reorganization of the administrative and fiscal matters, local notables, prominent merchant families, and the bandits appear as the major actors of the local dynamics that played a significant role in the patterns of power relations in the region. Thus, the question whether the imperial administration's primary concern of establishing the central authority in provinces found reasonable echoes at local level in the Trabzon vilayet is of crucial importance.

The main argument of the essay is that the patterns of power relations in the province during the period in question changed constantly and each time were rebuilt in a different combination with the involvement of the above mentioned local power-holders. I will question to what extent the major governors of the period after the 1880s, who tried to exert their powers in highly personal ways, actually managed to establish control in the province. Based primarily on the British and Ottoman archival material, I shall argue that a modern administrative system desired by the imperial administration was never established and institutionalised in the province throughout the nineteenth century. As the primary reasons for this failure, the paper points towards the local actors and their direct involvement and influence as the main stake-holders in

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1. Conference of the Black Sea Project, "The Economic and Social Development of the Port-Cities of the Southern Black Sea Coast, Late 18th-Beginning of the 20th century", İstanbul, 23-26 October 2014, Boğaziçi University.

politics and administration in the vilayet in ever-changing combinations, rather than pointing to the incompetence of the governors.

The Hamidian period is often considered as the culmination of the Tanzimat reforms initiated in the 1840s. Perhaps the most important of the arrangements with respect to the Tanzimat reforms in the administrative field was the implementation of the Vilayet Law of 1864. The central government wanted to ensure its authority by redesigning the provinces with this ordinance and establish fiscal discipline. Even though the Vilayet Law outlined an administrative structure with certain logic, its implementation on daily life did not meet expectations. Thus, it would be wrong to assume that neither the stipulations of the Vilayet Law were fully implemented nor the orderly picture of vilayet administration as reflected in the imperial and provincial yearbooks (*salnames*) absolutely represents the realities at local level². This is because such an approach to normative and formal frameworks would lead to miss and underestimate both the local dynamics as well as the political, economic and social practices of everyday life. Therefore, one needs to ask to what extent the legal and conceptual frameworks are compatible with the administrative practices in provinces. Therefore, it is imperative to focus on the functioning of the administrative structure and apparatus of the governors, who served in the province of Trabzon in the reign of Abdulhamid II (1879-1909). To demonstrate the provincial realities to a certain extent, we have selected four prominent governors and some other figures, who left their marks on the local politics, characterising the Hamidian era. The gover-

2. Such evaluations are prevalent in the literature. See İlber Ortaylı *Yerel Yönetim Geleneği* (The Tradition of Local Administration), Hil Yay. 1985. For some examples of recent revisionist studies however, see Suavi Aydın, “19. Yüzyılda ve 20. Yüzyılın Başında Aşiret ve Devlet: İmparatorluğun Kendi Şarkında Taşrayla İmtihanı” (Tribe and State in the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century. The Examination of the Empire’s Eastern Provinces), *Diyarbakır ve Çevresi Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Tarihi Konferansı*, (İstanbul: Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), pp.159-174; Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.15; Hamdi Özdiş, “Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Trabzon Vilayeti’nde Eşraf, Siyaset ve Devlet (1876-1909)” (“Power Struggle in the Province of Trabzon under Abdulhamid II: Notables, Politics and State (1876-1909)”, unpublished PhD Dissertation, Hacettepe University, Ankara, 2008.

nors in question are (in chronological order) Sırrı Paşa the Cretan, Sururi Efendi, Ali Bey, the Director, and Kadri Bey.

Let us start with the Governor Sırrı Paşa. Born in Crete, he was a skilled and experienced governor. He was also a poet and polemical writer³. Throughout his governorship, the impacts of his authorship would be seen in press, namely *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi*⁴. In an assessment that he made when he came to the province of Trabzon in 1879, Sırrı Paşa used sharp and striking expressions in order to describe the atmosphere in the province. According to the Paşa, everything in the province was in an absolute mess. Neither the administrative and financial arrangements of the province nor the works in general depended on rules and regulations. In his words “an administration, which is incompatible with every administrative agent, dominated the province and was in need of reorganisation”⁵. Other contemporary observers also present similar picture stating that during the era of the former governor Yusuf Ziya Paşa, banditry and corruption had increased and the lack of a central authority became noticeable⁶.

Inheriting such a legacy, Sırrı Paşa was the governor of Trabzon for approximately five years in two separate terms of office (1879-1881; 1882-1884). Major problems that the governor dealt with were the banditry of the Laz, Georgians and other groups, corruption of officials in the province, refugees and resettlement issues, the Georgian-Turkish conflict, and of course, power struggles among the local elite. The power vacuum emerged in the province of Trabzon after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 and the waves of migration⁷ gave rise to settlement and land problems between the local people and Laz gangs in the region and violent conflicts were experienced. On the other

3. See, Sırrı Paşa, *Mektubat-ı Sırrı Paşa*, İstanbul, 1303.

4. Throughout his governorship, Sırrı Paşa wrote some articles in *Trabzon Vilayet Gazetesi*. Besides, he wrote some books about the period and its problems. See *Mektubat-ı Sırrı Paşa*, İstanbul, 1303 and *Mektubât, Nutuk ve Makalât* (Manuscript) 06. MK. Yz. A 6884 National Library of Turkey, no date.

5. *Mektubat-ı Sırrı Paşa*, p. 72-73 ; *Mektubât, Nutuk ve Makalât* (Manuscript) 06. MK. Yz. A 6884 National Library of Turkey, no date.

6. The British National Archives/Public Record Office, Foreign Office (Hereafter FO), 195/1457, Alfred Biliotti 10 May, 1883.

7. According to consular reports 150 Armenians and Greek families migrated to Russia. See FO 195/1457 A.Biliotti, 1883.

hand, Sirri Paşa found himself in a power struggle⁸ with Ali Paşa of Çürüksu, who was the natural leader of the Georgians, who settled in the coastal line of Ordu-Perşembe-Fatsa, coming from the Batum-Çürüksu region lost to Russia after the war. The Georgians settled in the region formed the social base of Ali Paşa. At the end of this struggle, Çürüksulu Ali Paşa, who led the local elites and established good relations with the Palace (Yıldız) as well as the Sublime Porte, managed to make Sirri Paşa lose his office twice in the periods 1879-1882 and 1882-1885. However, Ali Paşa could not achieve his own personal objective either, i.e. taking over the governorate of the province⁹.

In 1886, the governor was Sururi (Ali) Efendi, also known as Sururi Paşa. Sururi Efendi was one of the favourite governors of Sultan Abdulhamid and one of the former judges of the “Yıldız Court”, in which Midhat Paşa was tried for his alleged involvement in the death of the previous Sultan, Abdülaziz, in 1876. His period as Governor of Trabzon was also quite striking. Not long after Paşa’s arrival in the province, the general situation deteriorated in the administration of the province. The case of Sururi Efendi fits well in the framework of “patronage and corruption”, as described by Peter Burke. His situation either in his relations with his employees or in his corrupt behaviour in government can be seen as “deviant attitudes in official duties of a public role”¹⁰. According to a series of accounts found in the British and Ottoman archival documents, the two year period of Sururi Efendi (1886-88) was not pleasant either for the locals¹¹. The governor

8. Oktay Özel, “Çürüksulu Ali Paşa ve Ailesi Üzerine Biyografik Notlar”, *Ke-bikeç* 16 (2003), p. 106.

9. For Ali Paşa the simple solution to all these problems would be the appointment of himself as the Governor to Trabzon. See Oktay Özel, “Muhacirler, Yerliler ve Gayrimüslimler. Osmanlı’nın Son Devrinde Orta Karadeniz’de Toplumsal Uyumun Sınırları Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler” (Refugees, Locals and non-Muslims. Some Observations on the Social Harmony in the middle Black Sea Area during the Late Ottoman Period) *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, 5 (2007), p. 100; idem, “Migration and Power Politics: The Settlement of Georgian Immigrants in Turkey (1878–1908)”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 46/4 (2010), p. 477–496.

10. Peter Burke, *Tarih ve Toplumsal Kuram*, Turkish transl., (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), p. 70-73.

11. For a brief account of the events during Sururi Efendi’s term of office as Governor of Trabzon, see, Prime-ministerial Ottoman Archive/ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Şura-yı Devlet ŞD.316/26.

was accused of being the person who was at the centre of a network of organised corruption which included officials as well as local elites, stretching from accountants to military commanders (*alaybey*), from court judges to prosecutors. Many complaints and telegrams about his corrupt government were sent to the palace and the ministry of internal affairs. In addition, his cooperation both with the infamous bandits of the region and the elites such as Hazinedarzade's were not approved by the local people. Similarly, his methods of manipulation of such groups, his intrigues against a number of elites in the region, and, finally, the degree of violence that he exerted toward the people of the region were also reflected in the documents. Moreover, Sururi Paşa also became involved in a struggle for power and authority with the governor of Canik district, Tefvik Paşa, and Çürüksulu Ali Paşa. However, this appeared to be a game with no winner. Finally, after two years, he was discharged from duty by being elevated to the rank "Paşa"¹². Ali Paşa, who could not be restrained, was also sent into exile¹³. Regarding Sururi Paşa, unlike other governors, he was identified exceedingly with local elites (such as the Hazinedarzadeler family) and while trying to exert his personal authority, he did not hesitate to engage with bandits in order to intimidate his opponents.

It can be stated that the period of Arif Paşa, who was appointed as a governor for a short period of time (one year) to the Trabzon province after Sururi Efendi, appeared in the documentation to be rather fair and quiet¹⁴. The governor Director¹⁵ Ali Bey who suc-

12. Further information for Sururi Efendi's case see: Hamdi Özdiş, "When the Fish Stinks From the Head!": Violence, Banditry and Corruption in the Province of Trabzon in the 1880s." paper presented at the 13th International Congress of Ottoman Social and Economic History (ICOSEH), 1-5 October 2013 , Alcala, Spain.

13. FO 195/1584, No.19, 19 July 1887, H.Z.Longworth; BOA, İ.DH. 1073/84210.

14. FO 195/1696, No.14, 7 April, 1890, H.Z.Longworth. An Ottoman archival document (*jurnal*) sent by an "informer" of immigrant origin named Aydınoğlu Ahmed, however, portrays a different picture: Arif Paşa in fact behaved harshly to the native locals as well as the immigrants, and misruled the province. Given the fact that the immigrants of the province have always written such letters of complaints about the governors, this document should be read with a necessary dose of caution. Bkz. BAO Y.PRK. AZJ, 16/71.

15. Ali Bey was known as such since he had reviously worked in the Administration of Public Dept (*Duyun-ı Umumiye Müdürlüğü*). See "Ali Bey", *Aylık Ansiklopedi*, 1945, p.294

ceeded Arif Paşa, would establish an administration in the province in his own style, justifying, in a sense, his personal title as “Director”. Ali Bey, who was an intelligent and experienced Governor, had modern approach of government, with a good command of French. He had previously worked as a journalist, author, consul, diplomat, inspector (director) and finally worked as a governor in Harput. During his term, Ali Bey, fought against banditry, theft, corruption, while he significantly reduced many other criminal activities in his province. In order to speed up work in the Governor’s Office in terms of daily bureaucracy, new rules were introduced, fines were imposed on officers. These were proved to be successful. The officers who acted in a heedless fashion with respect to the bell system that was beginning to be used at the mansion were disciplined, and the work became rather organised and began to be processed quickly¹⁶. However, initial responses towards the rules he imposed towards the bureaucracy, along with his modern approach to government, which did not tolerate the conventional behaviour of the local subjects/elements, appear from the sides of the district governors of Sürmene and Of. Not surprisingly perhaps, the administrative success of Ali Bey, who received praises from the British consul, did not last long. Apart from the theatre and cultural activities that he initiated in the city, the fact that he drank alcohol, played cards, and danced were all successfully manipulated against him in the province. Moreover, he was married with an Istanbulin lady of Greek origin and their behaviour on their moonlight boat rides would be regarded as ‘contrary to public morality’ and this would also help his opponents to react fiercely. The fact that the local elites¹⁷ were directed against him, staged intrigues and exaggerated Ali Bey’s personal style and way of life in the telegrams sent to the

16. As enforced by the prevalent law, Ali Bey tried to establish a modern administration in the vilayet by appointing a müfti and a piskopos (Prelate) to the Provincial Council (Vilayet İdare Meclisi) along with the Greek and Armenian representatives. FO 524/25, H.Z.Longworth, 15 January, 1891.

17. “One of his more malignant foes went so far as to threaten to spend £ 5000 for his removal. He was however somewhat disconcerted by the Vali suggesting to him personally, as a cheaper, quicker, safer and surer means, his pruchasing from him direct the resignation of the Governor Generalship.” FO 195/1769, No. 4, H.Z. Longworth, 1 February 1892.

Palace. The above brought an end to his governorate in Trabzon¹⁸. The alliance consisting of the Muslim judge, the Greek Archbishop, and the wealthy merchant Lemlizade (Nemlizâde) Osman Efendi emerged victorious in this struggle of power with the intrigues that they successfully played. In Consul Longworth's words:

"The Cadi, the Greek Archbishop and the wealthy merchant Osman Efendi Lemlizade lent themselves to this. They exerted themselves to the utmost with success to the great disgust perhaps of all right minded people. The one accused Aali Bey of having attended the Circus not only during Ramazan, but during the performance "Pharaoh's Dream" representing the sale of 'Joseph' by his brothers, their prophet 'Yusuf'. The second charged him with having unduly hastened the conversion of a Greek to Mohametanism. The third complained of his seat as member of the administrative council, to which he thought himself a duly elected, having been disposed of to another candidate"¹⁹.

Finally; perhaps the most powerful governors of Trabzon, Kadri Bey. Kadri Bey was a son of a vizier with impressive credentials and was welcomed by the British consul Longworth with praise. According to the observations of the consul in 1895, from the time he came, he was referred to as a talented governor. The documents in the Ottoman Archives confirm such a portrayal. Kadri Bey, who served as the governor of Trabzon, weakened the power of feudal lords by re-establishing the balances in the province; suppressed banditry and, thus, ensured peace and tranquillity in the region by showing more respect for individual rights²⁰. Indeed, Kadri Bey became successful by oppressing many cases of public disorder including tobacco smuggling, despite the fact that he had stepped outside of his authority and the legal framework. In order to achieve this, he had conflicts with strong tobacco producers and by using the other local elites of the region (such as Nemlizadeler and Eyübzadeler families), he tried to suppress them and was able to establish his own authority substantially.²¹ However, tobacco smug-

18. Further information for vali Ali Bey and For the complaints of local notables to the palace see, hakkında saraya yapılan şikayet için bkz. (BOA) İ.DH. 99042.

19. FO 195 / 1769, No.7, 4 May 1892, Longworth,

20. FO, 195/1902, No: 107, Longworth to Sir P. Currie, August 31, 1895.

21. See. Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Mesrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Hatıralarım* (Memo-

gling continued despite all the efforts. It should be stated that the difficult and punitive methods that Kadri Bey used in his conflict with the tobacco smugglers became a subject of jokes. The governor, who was known for his distinctive methods, was also known for his coffee offers with “little” or “medium” sugar²². Despite numerous complaints to the palace regarding his use of fear and violence in administration, Kadri Bey was protected by Abdulhamid and he was not dismissed from the office. The complaints against him were mostly about nepotism, corruption, and unfair management²³. At this point, the information that the British consul gave is worth noting. According to him, the governor Kadri Bey was involved in corruption and his actions were faulty in the Armenian events in 1895-1896. Some information comes from Consul Longworth: “A large stain however remains on his record, namely the massacre of the Armenians, which he could not or would not prevent, to his subsequent great remorse.”²⁴. The order of fear and violence that Kadri Bey established and maintained for ten years would disappear with his death in 1903. During the term of his successor Reşad Bey (1903-1906), who was an extremely weak, passive and untalented governor after such a powerful governor as Kadri Bey, soon created a power vacuum in the province. There was a visible increase in criminal cases including all kinds of unrest varying from banditry, tobacco smuggling to car robberies, from murder to theft; once more it became a period of disorder. Again, fear and anxiety dominated the province instead of the sense of distrust²⁵.

irs from the Constitution to the Republic Era), İsmail Kara, ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p.54-55.

22. See Lui Ramber, *Gizli Notlar* (Secret Notes), Niyazi Ahmet Banoglu, ed., (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, no date), p. 132.

23. For the complaints of tobacco producers, see. BOA, ŞD.1848.26. For a complaint written by a local notable, see. ŞD.1847/9. For a letter of complaint collectively signed by twenty notables, see. Y.PRK.UM.28/76.

24. See, FO 195/2136, H.Z.Longworth 17 February 1903.

25. FO 524/25, 18 January 1904, H.Z.Longworth.

Conclusion

As seen in the overall picture presented above, on the one hand we have the profile of governors (such as Sururi Paşa and Kadri Bey) who were in good terms with the local elites in their own way and subjected to some complaints of corruption, and on the other hand there is the profile of governors (such as Sirri Paşa and Ali Bey), who tried to exhibit a fair administration with a distance from corruption and showed a visible care for the common interest of the local people. In that sense, it was this second profile of governors that were exposed to more intrigues than the others; they were in the “losers’ club”.

As for the local elites, they managed to protect themselves and their interests even in the most difficult periods. They could put up resistance and achieved this through the network of interests that they established both at the local scale and in the Sublime Porte and the palace. It was not possible for even the most talented and shrewd governors to reduce or remove the impact of this regional network of mutual interests formed by the local elites. Even though there were exceptions, the governors who were appointed to the region from outside were often involved in the vortex of intrigues, injustice, and corruption together with the local power-holders of the region. There is a number of evidence that show that the system worked almost the same from Thessaloniki²⁶ to Yemen²⁷ in the geography of the empire.

The administrative, economic, social and cultural issues experienced at local level were not properly understood or conceived by the central government or the Palace. Either incompetent governors were appointed or, even worse, the complaints coming from the

26. See Mark Mazower, *Selanik: Hayaletler Şehri* (Thessaloniki: the City of Ghosts), transl. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yay. 2007), p.164-166. R. Davison had also developed a similar evaluation much earlier. See Roderic H. Davison, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Reform* (Reforms in the Ottoman Empire), transl., (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2005), p. 145, 175.

27. During the establishment of Ottoman rule in Yemen, the imperial center had to win the hearts of local tribal chiefs. See, Ceasar E. Farah, *The Sultan's Yemen, Nineteenth Century Chalnges to Ottoman Rule*, London-New York: I.B Tauris, 2002, p. 60-62, and passim.

provinces were not taken into account and even small suggestions of reform that had been demanded from Istanbul were refused or resisted by the local power-holding elites in a very discouraging way. On the one hand, the power of the Yıldız Palace seemed absolute in appearance but, on the other, perhaps paradoxically, it was the local powers that largely shaped the ground for administrative, economic and social relations and practices in the province. According to the British consul, the centralisation was actually accomplished: "The system of centralization so prevalent in Turkey naturally retards any innovations initiated by an active and intelligent Governor. More than this, the little encouragement given by Constantinople to suggestions of reform, coming from the provinces, is to say the least most disheartening, and as a consequence though progress was made, the transition was but gradual"²⁸.

However, it was a centralisation in the sense that the officers were appointed and those who governed were under the direct scrutiny of the centre. Otherwise, the alliances and intrigues formed by the regional elites, could seriously weaken the governors that were sent by the centre; similarly, it was not that difficult for them to remove the governors they were not happy with. At this point, the political preferences of the sultan had a direct impact. As seen above, Sultan Abdulhamid did not see any harm in "strengthening and protecting the local elites instead of looking after the governors or officers that he himself appointed"²⁹. This is because he needed them at the local level more than the governors. With the impact of the preference of the Sultan, the modern administration was never fully established, as the centre seemingly wished for in the province of Trabzon, and it never became reasonably institutionalised.

In this sense, it can only be discussed that rather than a central authority that dominated the province, there were local elites who constantly made demands and made their own agenda be accepted by the centre. Not only was this valid for Trabzon, but was also true for regions where the tribal structure was strong, such as

28. FO/524/25, 15 January 1891, H.Z. Longworth. For much later periods of the 1900's, see FO/524/25 19 January 1904 and 1 July 1904, H.Z. Longworth.

29. See *Ottoman Administration of Iraq...* p. 150.

Diyarbakır,³⁰ Mardin³¹, Iraq (Baghdad³², Mosul³³, Aleppo), and Yemen.³⁴ Thus, the issues were not easily solved by simply appointing strong governors to the provinces. It was perhaps possible to solve such chronic issues of governance only by understanding on the part of the central government the nature of the problems of the province and trying to establish a different kind of relationship with different interest networks at every locality with a logic other than simply “managing the situation”. It seems that the Ottoman imperial administration under Sultan Abdülhamid II was satisfied with such a management instead of a modern central rule as actually was required by the Tanzimat project. In this particular regard, it seems that the Hamidian rule represents a fundamental break with the central principles of Tanzimat reforms, if not a serious deviation from them.

30. See Suavi Aydın, “19. Yüzyılda ve 20. Yüzyılın Başında Aşiret ve Devlet”, p.159-174.


31. See, Suavi Aydın-Kudret Emiroğlu-Oktay Özel-Süha Ünsal, *Mardin. Aşiret-Cemaat-Devlet* (Mardin. Tribe, Society, State), (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), p. 233-234.

32. See, Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq*, p.150.

33. Dina Rizk Khoury, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Taşra Toplumu* (State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire), transl, (İstanbul:Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999).

34. See, Ceaser E. Farah, *The Sultan' s Yemen, Nineteenth Century*.

Map of Trabzon Vilayet, FO 195/1488, No.21, 29 July 1884



3.

Greek-Orthodox in politics and the economy of the Black Sea port cities at the end of the Empire

†Vangelis Kechriotis*

Stefan Yerasimos, in one of the few articles on the Greek-Orthodox communities in the Black Sea region published in the context of Ottoman studies¹, claims that there is a significant demographic difference between the populations on the Western coasts of Asia Minor and those of the Black Sea. As the former are to a large extent the result of migration from the islands as well as the interior, in the Black Sea - and primarily at the Vilayet of Trabzon - the presence of the Greek-Orthodox, despite the demographic decrease, already within the first century after the Ottoman conquest, vividly described by Heath Lowry, had its roots in the Byzantine period. The importance of the city of Trabzon for international trade is related to several aspects. The increasing interest for the trade of Iran, the opening up of the Straits and consequently the Black Sea to international trade, the use of steamboats later on are the most important. In the 1860s, two events had an additional impact on the commerce of the region, first and foremost of Trabzon: the loss of the Caucasus to the Russians and the opening of the Suez Canal. Despite the fact that the Russians prevented the transfer of products from Persia, and this trade route declined, the commercial activity in the region still increased. The Greek-Orthodox communities had already developed considerable social and educational activity, with more well known the teachers' college (*Frontistirio*), which was established *in Trabzon in 1683*, and provided a major impetus

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1. Stephane Yerasimos, «La Communauté Grecque de Trabzon au XIX siècle», *CIEPO VII sempozyumu'ndan ayrı basım*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), pp. 241-267.

for the development of the so-called ‘Pontus Renaissance’, as Akşin Somel reiterates². At the second half of the nineteenth century, Trabzon, reinforced by migration from the interior, will profit from the developments described above and will increase in numbers. This growth will lead to the emergence of diverse groups and social strata, which, as it was the case elsewhere in port-cities, in Smyrna or Salonica, led to intra-communal conflicts in Trabzon as well. As it happened there, here too, the Church played an important role. Finally, in 1897, with the dominance of a new generation of notables, calmness will eventually prevail. Yerasimos describes them as a new bourgeois class. The most prominent representatives were the Theofylaktos and Fostiropoulos families, who dominated the banking section³, and who represented the economic elite of the Greeks of Trabzon and the Black Sea. Let me point out that this wealthy elite based its authority not on the community institutions or the state, but on its businesses. A consensus within the community will survive until 1914. In the meantime, historic changes occurred throughout the Empire.

The Revolution of the Young Turks and the representatives of the Greek-Orthodox communities

The conditions that led important personalities among the Greek Orthodox to be involved in politics at a large scale, after the constitutional revolution spearheaded by the Committee of Union and Progress, are frequently disregarded. The celebrations for the collapse of the absolutist regime were universal. Crowds flooded the streets of every city of the Empire. For months after the restoration of the constitution that the Sultan Abdülhamit himself had suspended 33 years before, workers of all sectors organized a number of strikes, which led to tension in the everyday life of the urban cen-

2. Akşin Somel, “Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Period”, in El. Özdalga (ed.), *Late Ottoman Society. The Intellectual Legacy*, London-New York (Routledge, 2005), pp. 257-276.

3. Hatzi Ioannis Fostiropoulos from Imera, a wealthy mountain town in the prosperous minning region north of Gümüşhane, settled in Trabzon in 1880. Together with his five sons, he established his bank that had also a branch in Batum.

ters. To this, one should add the tension triggered by the elections that were proclaimed everywhere in the Empire and that lasted for several weeks.

As elsewhere too, riots targeting the central administration had occurred in the Black Sea region even before 1908. Consequently, as Aykut Kansu points out, there were hopes that liberal-minded candidates would win the vote even if they did not belong to the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress). Finally, out of those who prevailed in the elections in Trabzon that ended up on November 15, none seemed to be a member of CUP. First came the müftü Mehmed Emin Efendi with 141 votes, while the first Greek-Orthodox was Matthaios Kofidis, who was fifth among a total of six deputies with 106 votes. According to the electoral law, the casting of votes took place in two rounds, in the first one electors were elected, one for every 500 inhabitants, while on the second round the electors voted for the deputies, one for every 5,000 inhabitants⁴. Apart from Kofidis, the candidates among the Greek-Orthodox included the lawyer Pouloulidis, the pharmacist Andreas Myridis whose program had been published in the most influential Greek newspaper of the time in the region the *Lighthouse of the Orient* (Φάρος της Ανατολής) of Trabzon. In Giresun, after internal strife within the community the lawyer Charalambos Eleftheriadis got the nomination. All these and many more details we draw from the only article written so far on the 1908 elections in the Black Sea, authored by Christos Andreadis. The author, in his turn, draws the info from the newspaper 'Proodos' of Istanbul⁵. What I wish to highlight is the professions of all those candidates. As it happened in practically all other urban areas of the Empire, most of the candidates among the Greek Orthodox and Armenian belonged to the newly emerged upper middle class of professionals who had managed mostly through their training and skills to claim a role in community participation and politics. They were not state sponsored, neither were they among the elite of bankers and merchants that Yerasi-

4. Hasan Kayali, "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919", *IJMES* 27:3 (1995), pp. 265-286.

5. Χρήστος Γ. Ανδρεάδης, «Οι βουλευτικές εκλογές του 1908 στην Τουρκία και ο Πόντος» (Elections of 1908 in Turkey and Pontos), *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 43 (1990-1991), pp.

mos describes as a bourgeoisie. The winner of the election for the Greek-Orthodox, however, was Kofidis and he was a different case. I will return to that.

During the elections accusations of fraud were frequent throughout the Empire. The same is true for the Black Sea. The fact that Greek-Orthodox and Armenians had previous experience of similar collective processes in their communities alarmed the CUP which made desperate efforts to mobilize both the urban and the rural Muslim population manipulating at the same time their vote. Political associations were established, in this case the Political Association of Giresun ‘Πολιτικός Σύλλογος Κερασούντας’ for instance. Naturally, the strategic goal of many among the members of the CUP was similar with that of the Christian communities, namely a majority based on ethnoreligious criteria. Indeed, the regional authorities seemed to have left room for manipulation. Thus, the results depended on several factors. The Sancak of Samsun (Canik), where the elections came to an end on 27th of November is an interesting case. While out of 370,000 who lived there, there were 90,000 Greek-Orthodox and 22,000 Armenians, according to the numbers published at Levant Herald, no Christian was elected to the Parliament⁶. Similar are the statistics presented by the Greek consul deputy of Amisos (Samsun).⁷ Let me note here that the sal-name of 1906 gives a number of approximately 50,000 Greeks and 18,000 Armenians. Still, this is a significant number.

According again to the consul deputy in Samsun, due to the frauds and the civil strife, those who were not elected were Theodoros Arzoglou in Samsun, a landowner, tobacco producer and merchant who got 51 votes, Paraskevas Kelektzoglou in Bafra with 49, Hristos Symeonidis, with no further info and finally Giorgos Papazoglous, a wealthy tobacco merchant with 46⁸. Here both the professional profile of the candidates, big merchants and landowners as well as their names which are clearly more Turkish and reminiscent of the Turkish speaking populations strike to me as important. Let us

6. Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi* (The 1908 Era), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), pp. 313-314.

7. *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 44 (1990-1991)

8. Ανδρεάδης, «Οι βουλευτικές εκλογές του 1908», p. 19.

keep the name of the first of these candidates, Theodoros Arzoglu. I will return to this as well.

The Black Sea deputies of the Parliament

Greek sources inform us that Matheos Kofidis was born in Likast of Kromni on 22 March 1855⁹. He graduated from the Teachers' College (Φροντιστήριο) of Trabzon in 1872. Then, he worked as a civil servant at the Regie of Tobacco and was elected as we saw to the Ottoman Parliament and later again for two terms (1908-1912, 1912-1914 και 1914-1918). Kofidis seems to have enjoyed the trust of the authorities. According to Ottoman registers, in 1330 (1914), being a civil servant, he was considered suitable to be appointed to the inspection commission after the suspension of the parliament together with the deputy for Izmit Ahmet Müfid Bey. This commission was in charge of all the administrative affairs until the Parliament would resume its function. After WWI was over, in November 1919, Kofidis replaced the metropolitan of Trabzon Chrysanthos in his administrative duties, while the latter was in the conference on the Pontic Question in Batum. Kofidis seems to have also become active in this respect. Eventually, in 1921, an 'independence court' sentenced Kofidis to death on the accusation of collaboration in the movement for an independent Greek Pontic state.

Kofidis, who had connections with the CUP from an earlier period, during his years in the Parliament became friend with the deputy of Smyrna Emmanouil Emmanouilidi, a lawyer, whose uncle was also a bureaucrat, Aristidis Georgantzoglou Pasha, and who became a staunch supporter of the Young Turks. In an article on Emmanouilidi, who had been involved in communal strifes in his hometown already since the early 1900s, I have claimed that this strife was the result of both social and ethnic divisions that led a part of the rising middle class for various reasons not to identify itself with Greek nationalism but rather with the Ottoman state. These people clash both with traditional elites among the Ottoman sub-

9.«Κωφίδης Ματθαίος», *Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού* (Encyclopedia of Asia Minor), *Μ. Ασία*, 2002, URL: <<http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=5027>>

jects as well as with certain groups among the new bourgeoisie, the one built outside the realm of the state, as Muge Göçek has shown, which are more Greek-state oriented. If this is true, it is easier to understand why such people gave full support to the Young Turks in the period after 1908, when the fates of the Greek-Orthodox were clearly at stake. Interestingly, Kofidis, a civil servant, someone of a similar caliber with Emmanouilidis, was the only Christian from the Black Sea to make it to the Parliament, most probably with support from bureaucracy networks as well.

After the Balkan Wars, Ottomanism became an empty word almost for everyone. All these deputies between 1914-1918 spent a lot of time in protesting in the Parliament the ethnic cleansing against Christian populations that took place in several areas.

Georgios Ioannidis¹⁰, for whom we have neither place nor date of birth, is introduced in the political landscape with his election as deputy of Trabzon in 1914. For four years, he was the second Greek-Orthodox from Trabzon. Although as all Greek deputies he also voted against Sait Halim Paşa's cabinet in 1914, he retained his position until 1918, when the last information we have about his political activity is that on the 19th October 1918 he was among those who also voted against the cabinet that was set up after the Mudros armistice. Then, we are informed by Ottoman registers that he petitioned for a permission to travel to Switzerland. In the same year, his house in Trabzon was used as a hospital for the Red Crescent. A year later, in 1335 (1919), his house in Niğde was also transformed to a school. Although the World War was over, a new had started that brought new difficulties. In 1336 (1920), a telegram was sent to the mutasarrıf of Niğde, regarding Ioannidis's complaint that soldiers had collected grapes from his vineyard there without paying. This information is valuable since it establishes that Ioannidis not only had a house, but also land property in this Cappadocian town. Therefore, even if he himself was born somewhere in Trabzon, we can safely assume that his family was from Cappadocia. The migration networks are extremely important in this respect. Figures like Emmanouilidis and Georgantzoglou and

10. «Ιωαννίδης Γεώργιος», *Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού* [Encyclopedia of Asia Minor], 2002, *Μ. Ασία* URL: <<http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=4665>>

many others who collaborated with the CUP or at least did not have a militant position against it in Smyrna had their origins in Cappadocia too. It was for me a pleasant surprise to find out that Ioannidis had also links with that area. Even more firmly related to Cappadocia is the third of our characters, the Samsun deputy Theodoros Arzoglou.

Thodorakis Arzoglu¹¹ was born in Bafra between 1858 and 1860, his parents, however, were immigrants from Enderlük (Androniki), in the kaza of Kayseri. From an article on family registers in that town, we learn that in 1834/35, 2.6% of those who migrate from Enderlük come to Bafra. At the end of this period, in 1912, the 22.4% goes to Samsun¹². The commercial route Kayseri-Merzifon-Samsun seems to be very crucial in this respect. His family was not a poor one, since they could send their son to study in Switzerland. When he returned, he was involved in the tobacco commerce and soon became one of the most important tobacco merchants in Samsun. He was also involved in the affairs of the community. In 1905, he appears as one of the members of the elders council of Amisos (Samsun). Following that, he even served as a mayor there before he was elected deputy for Samsun in 1914-18.

Arzoglu was apparently a colourful personality. There are a few registers of his name in the Ottoman archives. In a document in 1310 (1895), he is described as a Hellenic Greek (Yunan) agent (acenta). The police was after him for the arrival on a boat of illegal newspapers and inappropriate printed material. He was arrested in Istanbul and brought to Samsun. We do not know the outcome of this case but our hero did not disappear. In 1320 (1904), Arzoglu asked for a permission to open a store at the quarter of Saidbey in Samsun. Few months later, he petitioned to get the permission to build six shops. In 1323 (1907), instructions are provided to the local mutasarrıf about how the first twenty telephone apparatuses that were imported to Samsun by the member of the Local Council of Canik (Canik Idare Meclisi) Theodoraki Arzoglu efendi are going

11. «Αρζόγλου Θεοδωράκης», , *Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού* [Encyclopedia of Asia Minor], Μ. Ασία, 2002, URL: <<http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=3729>>

12. Ειρήνη Πενιέρη, «Ανδρονίκιο: ένα Καππαδοκικό χωριό κατά τον 19^ο αιώνα» [Andronikio: a Village in Cappadocia in the 19th Century], *Μνήμων* 15 (1993), p. 29.

to be used. In another document, in 1328 (1912), we are informed that he was reelected in the same council. In 1331 (1915), he petitions for the privilege (*imtiyaz*) to administer the electricity and water supply network that was going to be built in Samsun. Indeed, after a public competition, Arzoglu is granted the privilege. In 1916, an additional contract is signed for the construction of an electric tramway. Finally, in 1918, a limited liability company is taking over and gets a renewal for six months. We do not know if Arzoglu is involved in this but it is highly probable. Whatever the case, it is remarkable that all these contracts take place while he is a parliamentary deputy and while, in the meantime, the war is raging all around.

Starting from 1919, Arzoglu most probably was also involved in the Pontic movement. After things took a downturn, he was also sentenced to death in absentia but managed to escape, first to Istanbul and from there to Marseille where the only thing we know is that he got married to the daughter of a merchant from Trabzon. From there, he moved to Salonica, where he started a new career. In 1929, he was even elected with Venizelos' party in the Senate. There is no information about his death.

Concluding remarks

The three figures that played a central role in politics in the Black Sea region during this era derive from specific areas of economic activity. Two of them were involved in the commerce of tobacco, one as a bureaucrat at the Regie, the other one as a merchant. Two among them have roots in Capadocia, one in Enderlük, the other in Niğde. I have mentioned already that among the Ottoman Greeks who take sides with the Young Turks, there are many Turkish-speaking Cappadoceans. The two Greek-Orthodox deputies from Smyrna Emmanouil Emmanouilidis and Pavlos Karolidis were born in Kayseri; the second one, actually, in Enderlük. This overlapping is too extensive to be merely the result of coincidence. The reasons that led these Cappadoceans to get involved in politics in such a way is related, I have argued elsewhere, partly to their awareness of their difference vis à vis the Greek-speaking populations of the

islands and the Western coast of Anatolia. In Smyrna, they were accused of being traitors of the nation. They were journalists, lawyers. In the Black Sea region, there are also big merchants among those who stayed in the parliament until the end. Civil servants exist in both cases. As it was the case with Aristidi Paşa Georgantzoglou who was deputy governor of Sivas, here we come across Mathaio Kofidi. It would be interesting to know how the local population responds to their political choices, here as well. The newspaper “*Faros tis Anatolis*”- many of its issues for the period before 1912 have survived - might offer an insight in this respect. This will be the topic of a different paper though.

Let me finish with an older example. There had been merchants who were involved in the local politics of the Black Sea even before 1908. Georgios Konstantinidis was one of these figures. He was a merchant, ship-owner and mayor of Giresun for several decades. He was also involved in the commerce of hazelnuts which he traded in Russia, Romania, up to Marseille. He was commonly accepted both by Christians and Muslims. I came across the strange information that Abdülhamit declared him a mayor for life. It was during this period that many innovations, electricity, a sewage network as well as a safe harbor were introduced. After his death, in 1906, his compatriots built for him an impressive monument over his tomb, where the church of the Transfiguration of the Savior on the Acropolis of Giresun. Today a monument for Topal Osman Ağa stands in its place.

4.

The Greek-Orthodox communities of Pontus at the beginning of the twentieth century: A glimpse at the Greek bibliography

*Elia Kyfonidou**

[It will be] hardly surprising, if among the readers of this book there are a few who don't have a clear understanding of the meaning of the words Pontus Euxinus and Pontus, or – to be more precise – of the difference in the geographical limits each one represents. For this reason, I believe it is useful to explain here in short the content to be presented hereafter about these places.¹

This explanation is deemed necessary by Konstantinos Papamihalopoulos already in the first pages of his book *Tour in Pontus*, published in August 1903. Indeed, the work of Papamihalopoulos, addressed at the general reading public of the Greek state at the time, is one of the first attempts to outline the pontic region. Certainly, this ignorance is not associated exclusively with Pontus, but is also extended to the whole of the Asia Minor world, as the president of the Asia Minor Association 'Anatoli', Margaritis Evangelidis, points out in the prologue of the same book. To sum it up: the book was the first attempt of familiarizing the Greek public with the pontic world – in the form of a travel memoir.

In the same context, when I first started studying the Greek-Orthodox communities living in the northeastern extremities of the old Ottoman Empire, Pontus itself gave me the impression of an area, which was uncharted from a historical perspective. I gradually came to realize that this picture was not in correspondence to reality. Studies about Pontus existed and those were plentiful. The

* Ph.D.

1. Konstantinos Papamihalopoulos, *Περιήγησις εις τον Πόντο* [Tour in Pontus], (Athens: τυπ. Κράτος, 1903), p. 2.

majority of these studies, however, exhaust themselves in issues of distinctly local interest, following a course over a long historical period.² In other words, the historically extensive period under study is subject to the criterion of locality. This first category encapsulates a significant body of works, which trace the historical course of the Greek-Orthodox populations in specific cities and towns of the wider area. In the second case, the exact opposite method was followed: the need for examining a historically specialized subject, for example the administration of the Young Turks in Pontus, narrows the historical narrative within a given time framework.³ In both cases, however, these studies contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to the enrichment of the whole pontic narrative. This discrimination will remain invariably in time, defining the book production concerning the Greek-Orthodox communities of Pontus to this day. Let me clarify from the beginning that this essay does not constitute a historical study that aspires to bring to light new historical conclusions. Such an attempt would presuppose a different, more synthetic approach. It rather aims at the most collective possible recording of the literature on the Greek-Orthodox communities of Pontus. In other words, it is a historical outline, which allows us to trace the pursuits, development and overall course of the pontic research. The matter in hand proves interesting enough, if one considers that the pontic history, in many cases closely tied to major historical “traumas”, has often been the subject of hyperbole

2. The following titles can be indicatively noted: Tatiana Gritsi-Milliex, *Η Τρίπολη του Πόντου* [Tripoli of Pontus], (Athens: Κέδρος, 1976); Miltiadis Nymphopoulos, *Ιστορία της Σάντας του Πόντου* [History of Santa of Pontus], (Drama: Χρ. Τσαουσίδης, 1953); Georgios Sakkas, *Η ιστορία των Ελλήνων της Τριπόλεως του Πόντου* [History of the Greeks of Tripoli in Pontus], (Athens: 1957); Ioakeim Saltis, *Χρονικά Κοτυώρων* [Chronicles of Kotyora], (Athens: 1955); Christos Samouilidis, *Το χρονικό του Καρς* [Chronicle of Kars], (Athens: Γκοβόστης, 1987); Christos Samouilidis, «Αμισός – Σαμφούντα» [Amisos – Sampsounta], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 27 (1965), pp. 247-267; Christos Samouilidis, «Η περιφέρεια Σαμφούντας από γεωγραφική, κοινωνική και ιστορική άποψη» [The Region of Sampsounta from a Geographical, Social and Historical Perspective], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 37 (1980), pp. 32-118 et al.

3. Evripidis Georganopoulos, *Το νεοτουρκικό κίνημα και οι επιπτώσεις του στον ελληνισμό του Πόντου, 1908-1914* [The Young Turk Movement and its Consequences on the Greeks of Pontus, 1908-1914], (Thessaloniki: Κυριακίδης, 2001).

or even purposeful concealment – elements that could be traceable only through the study of its literary production.

So, the topic is the bibliography about the Greek-Orthodox populations of Pontus – and the subject in itself needs further clarification. It is not the term *bibliography* causing an apropos bewilderment. Typically, anyway, a bibliographical essay incorporates the entire book production concerning the Greek-Orthodox communities of Pontus. Yet, what causes some reasonable questions is the content of this term in relation to the examined issue. To be more specific: it is a fact that the historical course of the Pontic populations took some time to fall into the hands of the specialists – in other words, to become the subject of historical study. As a consequence, a significant volume of material written in the first decades after the “exodus” from Asia Minor, which soon passed onto printed form, were composed by the protagonists themselves.⁴ Obviously, such works are often deprived of the basic criteria of historical discipline. By extension, every attempt at reconstructing the historical conjuncture, based on these works, is an especially risky task. Therefore, by purely historiographical criteria, this would suffice for them to be excluded from any bibliographical listing. However, such works do not only bear the merit of first-hand information, constituting potentially historical evidence of the era. Some historical information would be latent altogether without their existence, which renders them an inseparable part of the bibliography on Pontus as a discernible category.

Still, the body of material remains extensive. Consequently, an

4. I will mention some indicative works: Xenofon Akoglou, *Το τάγμα εθελοντών Πόντου* [The Volunteer Battalion of Pontus], (Thessaloniki: n.p., 1956); Theofylaktos Theofylaktos, *Γύρω από την άσβεστη φλόγα* [Around the Inextinguishable Fire], (Thessaloniki: n.p., 1956); Filon Ktenidis, «Στα παρασκήνια του αγώνος για την ανεξαρτησία του Πόντου» [In the Backstage of the Struggle for the Independence of Pontus], *Ποντιακή Εστία* 5 (1975), pp. 23-25; Eleftherios Pavlidis, *Πώς και γιατί εματαιώθη η Δημοκρατία του Πόντου* [How and why the Pontus Republic was failed], (Athens: Ν. Απατσίδης, 1953); Panaretos Topalidis, *Ο Πόντος ανά τους αιώνες* [Pontus through the Ages], (Drama: 1929); *Βιογραφικά αναμνήσεις του Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών Χρυσάνθου, του από Τραπεζούντος, 1881-1949* [Biographical Memoirs of the Archbishop of Athens, Chrysanthos from Trebizond, 1881-1949] (published in Athens in 1970) et al.

additional categorization was considered as necessary. In the context of this study, the small in quantity, but nevertheless important, body of works, written by natives of the area and published in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century⁵, will not be included here, for reasons of economy. Undoubtedly, these precious works, predominantly travel memoirs or books of geographical interest, formed the first link between the reading public of the Greek state and the distant Pontus region. Even more so, their uniqueness could render them the object of a separate study, which would probably require different questions and tools. Therefore, these works, judged solely by their place of publication, have not been included in the discussion of the present study.

For the needs of this bibliographical traverse, it is natural to seek the most suitable guide. As such, the chronological recording of the relevant works was preferred. It was decided, in this case, that the chronological axis would greatly facilitate the outlining of subjects, the questions and, ultimately, the concerns that were born out of the study of the pontic issues.

First period (1922-1980)

If one wishes to give a characterization to the book production of this first period, it can be summed up in one phrase: ‘the refugees’ account’. The fact, that the works were composed – in the vast majority – from the refugees themselves, constitutes the primary link between them. This is natural; immediately after their expatriation,

5. Savvas Ioannidis, *Ιστορία και στατιστική της Τραπεζούντος και της περί ταύτην χώρας ως και τα περί της ενταύθα ελληνικής γλώσσης* [History and Statistics of Trebizond and the Surrounding Area as well as of the Local Greek Language], (Istanbul: 1870); Epameinondas Kyriakidis, *Βιογραφία των εκ Τραπεζούντος και της περί ταύτην χώρας από της αλώσεως μέχρι ημών ακμασάντων λογίων* [Biographies of Scholars from Trebizond and Adjacent Regions since the Conquest], (Athens: Λεώνης, 1897); Avraam Papadopoulos, *Στατιστική της επαρχίας Σουρμένων* [Statistics of the Sourmena District], (Athens: 1882); Pericles Triantafyllidis, *Η εν Πόντω ελληνική φυλή ή τα Ποντικά* [The Greek Race of Pontus or the Pontics], Athens 1866; Pericles Triantafyllidis, *Οι φυγάδες* [The Fugitives], (Athens: 1870) et al.

and with the collective traumas still open, the recording of what it was like ‘back there’ – the life in the Asia Minor homelands – was an exclusively refugee internal matter. This fact also defined the expanding thematic landscape: subjects such as histories of pontic towns or institutions, topics of folklore interest, as well as few, isolated attempts at reconstructing a history of Pontus seem to be dominant in this early period. In essence, anything that could preserve, even partly, the refugee memory. For indicative reasons, I will mention a few titles, which fall into the same chronological axis: Georgios Valavanis and Georgios Violakis, *Σύγχρονη ιστορία του Πόντου* [Modern History of Pontus], Athens 1926; Archbishop Panaretos Topalidis, *Ο Πόντος ανά τους αιώνες* [Pontus throughout the Ages], Drama 1926; Archbishop Chrysanthos, *Η Εκκλησία Τραπεζούντος* [The Church of Trebizond], Athens 1933; Xenofon Akoglou, *Από τη ζωή του Πόντου: Λαογραφικά Κοτυώρων* [From the life of Pontus: Folklore of Kotyora], Athens 1939; Odysseas Lampsidis, *Μελωδίαι δημοδών ασμάτων και χορών των Ελλήνων Ποντίων* [Tunes of folkore songs and dances of the Greeks of Pontus], Athens 1977. A short glimpse into the biographical details of these authors reveals exactly this: all of these writers bear the refugee identity (first or second generation), while their works constitute products of personal memoirs rather than of rigorous research. Next to these works, a few other rescuing efforts of equal importance are notable too; such as the case of the Pontian Dimitris Psathas, who, staying within his familiar literary grounds, authored the notable *Land of Pontus*, offering an extremely detailed insight into the last years of the Greek-Orthodox presence in Trebizond⁶, or the more historicized one of the pioneers of the ‘Centre for Asia Minor Studies’, Octave and Melpo Merlier, and their successors, owing to whom the memories of the Greek-Orthodox refugees from Pontus sprang into life (in the 1960s and 1970s)⁷. Evidently, the works of this early period could not reap the laurels of the his-

6. Dimitris Psathas, *Γη του Πόντου* [Land of Pontus], (Athens: Φυτράκης, 1966).

7. Centre for Asia Minor, *Ο τελευταίος ελληνισμός της Μικράς Ασίας. Κατάλογος έκθεσης του έργου του Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών (1930-1973)* [The Last Hellenism of Asia Minor. Catalogue of the Work of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (1930-1973)], (Athens: Κέντρο Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, 1974), pp. 200-54.

torical discipline. As was already mentioned, though, their value lies elsewhere: without this raw material, the historical research could not have easily proceeded. So, the first step had already been achieved: what was lost on the ground was forever rescued in the collective memory⁸. The scientific study of this body of material did not take too long to bear its fruits.

The truth is that, in the long duration, no attempt at a chronological categorization can be in accordance to reality. In any case, old and new tools, questions and problematics intersect and co-exist. The pontic bibliographical output was no exception – on a personal and on a collective level. Already in 1927, the newly-founded Committee for Pontian Studies put as the primary target of its foundation – based on its charter – ‘the gathering, study and publishing of the lingual, folk and historical material about Pontus’⁹. Just one year later, the Committee will fulfill its decisions practically, by issuing a periodical publication, under the title *Αρχεῖον Πόντου* [Archeion Pontou / Pontian Archive] (January 1929). Although this move would not bring directly the pontic issues under a wider, scientific lens, it was still indicative of the Pontian intellectuals’ intention of placing the pontic study on more solid grounds. It would take, of course, thirty more years for learned researcher Odysseas Lampsidis (1917-2006) to publish his work *Οι Έλληνες του Πόντου υπό τους Τούρκους (1461-1922). Α΄ Πολιτική Ιστορία* [The Greeks of Pontus under the Turks (1461-1922): A. Political History] (published in Athens in 1957). Although this text is no more than a short lecture, it sowed the seeds for an attempt to make a historical interpretation. Indicatively enough, the publication was supplemented with a very important historical document – the re-

8. Ioanna Petropoulou, «Η ιδεολογική πορεία της Μέλπως Μερλιέ. Το Κέντρο Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών και η συγκρότηση του Αρχείου Προφορικής Παράδοσης» [The Ideological Journey of Melpo Merlier, The Centre for Asia Minor Studies and the Compilation of the Oral History Archive], *Μαρτυρίες σε ηχητικές και κινούμενες αποτυπώσεις ως πηγή της ιστορίας*, (Athens: Κατάρτι, 1998), pp. 117-132.

9. *Καταστατικό του κοινωφελούς και μη κερδοσκοπικού σωματείου με την επωνυμία Επιτροπή Ποντιακών Μελετών* [Charter of the Public Welfare and Non-profit Association under the name of Committee for Pontian Studies], First Article, May 1927: www.epm.com.

port of Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Katheniotis, personal delegate of Eleftherios Venizelos to the pontic region (July 1920). Even more characteristically, less than half a century later, Lampsidis himself will revisit the Katheniotis report, annotating it anew, thus imprinting in this new publication the progress of the pontic research.¹⁰

Second period (1980-today)

‘The specialists’ account’: let’s consider, for a moment, the term ‘specialists’. Undoubtedly, the defining difference between the first and the second period lies exactly in the fact that the researchers, who are now studying the Greek-Orthodox communities in Pontus, belong, with few but notable exceptions, to the body of the historians. This practically means new pursuits, new methodological tools, a more effective use of archival sources and, ideally, a more sober contemplation of the facts. To this, the era itself contributed too. Fifty or more years had passed after the tragic refugee experience and the arrival of the third generation had already created the necessary distance from the events, laying the ground for more scientific approaches.

However, let’s take things from the beginning. The truth is that, during this second period, the thematic range does not change dramatically – at least regarding its basic categorization. In other words, the study and publishing of the “lingual, folk and historical material about Pontus”, in the words of the first charter of the Committee for Pontian Studies, still remains the primary target of the pontic research. A notable shift can be noticed though: the lingual and folk research seem to retreat to the background, allowing history to come into the limelight. This change is foremost recorded in the body of the periodical publication *Archeion Pontou*. Since the 1970s, articles of ‘historical interest’ take up a considerably larger space in the body of the periodical. At the same time, the discussants’ circle expands. Next to the leading names of Odysseas Lampsidis, Chris-

10. Odysseas Lampsidis, «Προσπάθειες στρατιωτικής οργάνωσης των Ελληνοποντίων (25 Απριλίου 1919 – 5 Απριλίου 1920)» [Attempts at a Military Organization from the Greeks of Pontus, 25 April 1919 – 5 April 1920], *Δωδώνη* 31 (2002).

tos Samouilidis and Christos Andreadis, a new generation makes its appearance, engaging itself solely with the pontic research. I will indicatively mention a few names: Artemis Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, Maria Vergeti, Kostas Fotiadis, Vlassis Agtzidis and their much younger, mostly pupils: Kyriakos Chatzikyriakidis and Evripidis Georganopoulos. Moreover, it would consist an overlook, if the names of Nikolaos Petsalis-Diomidis, Alexis Alexandris or Ioannis Chassiotis are not mentioned, who, while not focusing exclusively on the matters of Pontus, forwarded the relevant research considerably.¹¹

An equally progressive course can be traced within the context of these historical works. Characteristically enough, the latter three historians inaugurate this new period, by touching upon a very “sensitive” matter – that of the presence of the Greek-Orthodox populations in Pontus during those dramatic last years. Their work actually constitute the first historically documented material on this highly controversial issue. Even more characteristically, Petsalis-Diomidis and Chassiotis surpass the Greek frontiers, aiming at a wider – and much more scientific – audience. It is, in other words, a turning point: the “refugees’ account” transforms into an “account about the refugees”, with a given scientific sufficiency. In the same context, one cannot ignore the rising curve displayed in the number of archival sources annotated publications, relating to the pontic issue and its protagonists. The tireless scholar, Odysseas Lampsidis, leads the way with a series of articles¹², as well

11. Nikolaos Petsalis-Diomidis, ‘Hellenism in Southern Russia and the Ukrainian Campaign: Their Effect to Pontus Question (1919)’, *Balkan Studies* 13/2 (1972) 221-258; Alexis Alexandris, «Η ανάπτυξη του εθνικού πνεύματος των Ελλήνων του Πόντου, 1918-1922. Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική και τουρκική αντίδραση» [The Growth of Pontine Greek Nationalism, 1918-1922: Greek Foreign Policy and Turkish Reaction], *Μελετήματα γύρω από τον Βενιζέλο και την εποχή του*, (Athens: Φιλιππότσης 1980), pp. 427-74; John K. Hassiotis, ‘Shared Illusions: Greek-Armenian Co-operation in Asia Minor and the Caucasus (1917-1922)’, *Greece and Great Britain during World War I. First Symposium Organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute of Balkan Studies and King’s College*, (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1985), pp. 139-192.

12. Odysseas Lampsidis, «Τρία σημεία της «Δημοκρατίας» του Πόντου» [Three Points of the Republic of Pontus], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 40 (1985), pp. 241-248; Odysseas Lampsidis, «Δύο τραπεζουντιακά φυλλάδια κατά Χρυσάνθου, μητροπολίτη Τραπεζούντος, και της πολιτείας του (1920,1921)» [Two Leaflets from

as Christos Andreadis¹³, whereas Kostas Fotiadis comes later with his multi-volume work¹⁴. Regardless of the reasonable reservations that the latter author's views create, this work remains the most extensive published collection of archival documents on the Pontus issue. Seemingly, the circumstances were mature enough for a full-scale chronicle of the history of the pontic movement – a task which Evripidis Georganopoulos tackled adequately¹⁵. More importantly, the historical background paved the way for even more specialized treatings of the Pontic issue¹⁶.

Undoubtedly, the desperate attempts of the Greek-Orthodox populations to achieve independence still reads today as an emotionally charged narrative. Thus, the call for its historical study can be viewed as a significant indication of the progress in the field of the study of pontic matters. It is not the only one though. As a matter of fact, the surfacing of a great number of archival sources, the increase in the number of historians that deal with the subject, as well as the new methodological tools put various pontic issues

Trebizond against Chrysanthos, Archbishop of Trebizond, and his Administration (1920, 1921)] *Δωδώνη* 29 (2000); Odysseas Lampsidis, «Η πρώτη εκδήλωση (1 Οκτωβρίου 1917) για αυτονομία - ανεξαρτησία του μικρασιατικού Πόντου» [The First Manifestation (1 October 1917) for the Independence of Pontus], *Δωδώνη* 29 (2000); Odysseas Lampsidis, 'Attempts at a Military Organization of the Greek-Pontians, etc.

13. Christos Andreadis, «Ο Κωνσταντίνος Κωνσταντινίδης, ο «Εθνικός Σύνδεσμος του Πόντου» στο Παρίσι και το πρόβλημα της ανεξαρτησίας του Πόντου» [Constantinos Konstantinidis, National Delegate at Paris and the Problem of the Pontus Independence], *Νέα Εστία* (1991), pp. 394-401; Christos Andreadis, «Ιστορικό Σχεδιάσμα της δράσεως των Ελλήνων ανταρτών του Πόντου» [Historical Outline of the Pontian Guerilla Activity], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 40 (1992-1993), pp. 153-301.

14. Kostas Fotiadis, *Η γενοκτονία των Ελλήνων του Πόντου* [The Genocide of the Greeks of Pontus], 11 volumes, (Thessaloniki, 2002-2004).

15. Evripidis Georganopoulos, *Η Δημοκρατία του Πόντου: ένα ανέφικτο όνειρο ή μια ρεαλιστική επιδίωξη;* [The Republic of Pontus: an Unfeasible Dream or a Realistic Pursuit?], *Αρχαίον Πόντου*, Appendix 28, Athens 2012.

16. Eleftheria Kyfonidou, *Ποντιακό ζήτημα: Στρατηγικές επιλογές και αδιέξοδα, 1917-1922* [Pontic Question: Strategic Choices and Dead-ends, 1917-1922], Athens 2013, aims at the systematic analysis of the strategic choices created within the framework of the Pontic case and the corresponding dead-ends that these specific choices supplied during this critical five-year period.

under the scientific microscope. For example, subjects less popular during the previous, somewhat non-professional, period, such as the economic life, the education, the demographics or the frequent immigrations of the Greek-Orthodox populations, were re-examined, resulting in much safer conclusions and, ultimately, a more substantiated knowledge.¹⁷ For obvious reasons then, early works, like the book of Ioannis Papapetrou on the mines of Sim (1955)¹⁸, although worthwhile in its time, can not be weighed against later ones, such as the book of Kyriakos Chatzikyriakidis, *The El-Dorado of Anatolia: The Penetration of European Companies in the Mines of Asia Minor (1861-1923)* (published in 2008)¹⁹. In these obvious reasons,

17. Some indicative cases: Pinelopi Stathi, «Απόρρητα τουρκικά έγγραφα αναφερόμενα στη δράση του Χρύσανθου Τραπεζούντας για την ανεξαρτησία του Πόντου» [Turkish Confidential Documents concerning the Activity of Chryssanthos, Archbishop of Trebizond, in Relation to the Independence of Pontus], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 34 (1977-1978), pp. 159-175; Theof. Chatzitheodoridis, «Το σύστημα αυτοδιοίκησης στον Πόντο» [The Administrative System in Pontus], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 38 (1983), pp. 441-492, Sofronis Chatzisavvidis, *Ελληνική εκπαίδευση και πνευματική ζωή στην Τραπεζούντα του Πόντου* [Greek Education and Intellectual Life in Pontus], (Thessaloniki: Κυριακίδης, 1993); Artemis Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, *Αλληλογραφία του Υποπροξενείου Τραπεζούντας (1839-1845)* [Correspondence of the Trebizond Sub-consulate (1839-1945)], (Athens: Επιτροπή Ποντιακών Μελετών, 1995); Vlassis Agtzidis (ed.), *Οι άγνωστοι Έλληνες του Πόντου. Προσέγγιση στα σύγχρονα γεγονότα της Μαύρης Θάλασσας και του Καυκάσου* [The Unknown Greeks of Pontus: Approach to Modern Events in the Black Sea and Caucasus], Athens 1995; Vlassis Agtzidis, «Ο ελληνικός τύπος στον Εύξεινο Πόντο (19ος -20ος αιώνας)» [The Greek Press in Pontus Euxinus (19th-20th Centuries)], *Ta Istorika* 24/25 (1996), pp. 267-293; Odysseas Lampsidis, «Η οικονομική ζωή του Πόντου μετά το 1880. Κείμενα και Έλληνες φορείς» [The Economical Life in Pontus after 1880: Texts and Greek Organizations], *Xeniteas* 15 (1999); Antonios Pavlidis, «Πόντος - Κωνσταντινούπολη: Ιδεολογία των εκπαιδευτικών σχέσεων κατά το τελευταίο τέταρτο του 19ου αιώνα» [Pontus - Istanbul: Ideology of the Educational Relations during the Last Quarter of the 19th century], *Αρχαίον Πόντου* 48 (2001), pp. 376-386; Artemis Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, «Η έκθεση του Βρετανού προξένου Alfred Bilioti (1885) για την εκπαίδευση στο βιλαέτι Τραπεζούντας» [The Report of British Consul Alfred Bilioti (1885) for the Education in the Trebizond Vilayet], *Archeion Pontou* 49 (2002), pp. 45-127 et al.

18. Ioannis Papapetrou, *Το μεταλλείο Σιμ (The Mine of Sim)*, Athens 1955.

19. Kyriakos Chatzikyriakidis, *Το «Ελ Ντοράντο» της Ανατολής. Η διείσδυση των ευρωπαϊκών εταιρειών στα μεταλλεία της Μικράς Ασίας (1861-1923)*

the whole evolutionary course of the study of Pontus is embodied. This evolutionary procedure did not halt, at least regarding its qualitative dimension. With the aid of other sciences related, to a greater or lesser extent, to the historical discipline, such as anthropology or architecture, the Pontic research succeeded in elaborating not only the ethno-regional identity of the Greek-Orthodox populations²⁰, but also the particular character of both the urban and rural spaces of the Pontic region²¹. In the same evolutionary context, it managed to study certain historical periods that were overlooked until recently, such as the period of the Young Turks' administration in Pontus²². Moreover, the recent publication from the Centre for Asia Minor Studies on the 'exodus' from the inland parts of Pontus (with two more volumes for the coastal areas to be expected) accomplished the revival of the refugee voices – a material compatible with the modern quests of oral history²³. Exactly in this manner, the image of the Greek-Orthodox populations of Pontus in time has been enriched, gradually recapturing its triple dimension (time, space, people).

[The El-Dorado of Anatolia: The Penetration of European Companies in the Mines of Asia Minor (1861-1923)], (Thessaloniki: Επίκεντρο, 2008).

20. Maria Vergeti, *Από τον Πόντο στην Ελλάδα. Διαδικασίες διαμόρφωσης μιας εθνοτοπικής ταυτότητας* [From Pontus to Greece: Formation of an Ethno-regional Identity], (Thessaloniki: Κυριακίδης, 1993).

21. Pavlos Kanonidis notes about the Pontus area: "The urban centres of Pontus constitute today some of the best preserved examples of historical centres with a rich and diachronal evolution. Moreover, they have the peculiarity of presenting an impressive variety of architectural types and rhythms. This fact elevates Pontus into an actual open museum of architectural evolution, where the Greek urban centres from the mid 19th century to the first decades of the 20th century emerged. By this time a gradual transition from the popular architecture of Pontus to an evermore Europeanized architecture took place, as a result of social developments and the urbanization of everyday life in the large historical centres" in Pavlos Kanonidis, *Η αρχιτεκτονική και ο πολιτισμός του Πόντου* [The Architecture and Civilization of Pontus], Athens 2007. See also Eleni Gavra, *Αγροτικός χώρος και κατοικία στον Πόντο. Από τον 19ο ως τις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα* [Rural Space and Habitation in Pontus: From the 19th Century to the Early 20th Century], Thessaloniki 1997.

22. Evripidis Georganopoulos, *The Young Turk Movement and its Consequences*.

23. Centre for Asia Minor Studies, *Η Έξοδος. Μαρτυρίες από τον Μεσόγειο Πόντο* [Exodus: Testimonies from Inland Pontus], Paschalis Kitromilides (ed.), Athens 2013.

By closing, I wish to stress out this: the literature concerning the Greek-Orthodox populations of Pontus is, in reality, much richer. For the economy of this essay, however, this recording could not have been exhaustive. Instead, the works that have been chosen are thought to be essential parts of the evolution of the pontic studies. Even so, it is understandable that many parts of the pontic “image” continue to be missing. Some examples could be illuminating: although the area includes some very important cities – ports, that were integral parts of the commercial and transport route to the East, a single study on the area’s commercial activity is completely absent. The same applies for the Greek-Orthodox communities of the region during the crucial World War I period – a period of important political fermentation that bore the upcoming turmoil. All these are, of course, open fields – or, in other words, the gaps of an ongoing research, which is certain to give much more in the future. There lies, anyhow, the appeal of the research: the missing puzzles that every researcher longs to fill in.

